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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
A Scholar Apart 
EUGEN DÜHRING was a unique scholar in many respects. One of the most remarkable 
aspects of his academic career was how it began: an eye ailment, which would lead to 
complete blindness at the age of twenty-eight, caused him to give up a promising career in 
law in order to become an academic and a writer. Aside from his physical handicap, which 
forced him to use unconventional methods to carry out his academic duties as a blind man, 
Dühring stood apart from his contemporary academic colleagues in other respects. He 
received his ‘habilitation’ (qualification for professorship) in two different fields of study, 
philosophy and political economy (something uncommon in Germany at the time). He wrote 
essays, articles, and books at a rate unmatched by his most successful colleagues. He drew 
more students to his lectures than many of the most well-known professors of the era. He 
broke taboos of the German academia of his day by championing the rights of women to 
study and by endorsing the writings of foreign scholars such as Henry C. Carey, Thomas 
Buckle, Auguste Comte, and others (at a time where fervent German patriotism had become 
the norm). He became an outspoken critic of the conditions of the Frederick William 
University of Berlin, Prussia’s most prestigious institution for higher learning, as well as of its 
renowned professors, men such as Trendelenburg, Ranke, Helmholtz, and Wagner. Finally, 
through a scandal he did not create, he became a well-known public figure, using his fame 
thereafter to become involved in politics, finding favor among the leaders of the German 
workers movement and later in German völkisch circles.  
Dühring did not merely pursue an academic career, but rather, in the words of Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, “embarked upon an intellectual effort that resulted in the conquest of a vast 
domain extending from mathematics, mechanics and theoretical physics in general to 
ethnology, economics, and philosophy.”1 Owning different talents which rarely exist in one 
mind, he was a master of mathematics and natural science, while at the same time possessing 
an exceptional gift of language and clear and eloquent expression. Like David Hume, whom 
he greatly admired, Dühring became an authority in the areas of philosophy, political 
economy and history, going on to write important works in all three fields – something also 
without precedence in the Germany of his day. He became a best-selling academic writer in 
the 1870s, exerting influence on intellectuals from different occupations and classes 
throughout German society. His academic work received high accolades, with one of his 
1 Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 509. 
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books winning the renowned Benecke Prize of Göttingen University in 1871.2 In 1883 George 
Holmes Howison, the founder of the philosophy department at the University of California, 
Berkeley, although critical of Dühring’s philosophy, spoke of him as a man of “really great 
and thorough attainments, of positive originality, and of a certain delicacy of intellectual 
perception essential to a great thinker.”3 
From the heights of his success came a steep fall, which would leave Dühring’s reputation 
ruined and his work relegated to obscurity. His downfall was precipitated by a furious sense 
of justice and a political will to challenge authority which put him on a collision course with 
his colleagues, university officials, as well as with forces in the world at large. Being merely a 
scholar was not enough for Dühring: he felt impelled to challenge authority or to “defy the 
Gods” with the weapons of science and modern humanitarian ideals. It might be argued that 
politics overwhelmed Dühring. Controversy and animosity are, of course, nothing unusual in 
the field of academia; heated rivalries and even intense quarrels among colleagues vying for 
recognition and positions are something commonplace at all universities all over the world. 
Although increasingly disregarded by the public today, academics still frequently delve into 
party politics, taking positions on various issues such as civil rights, global warming, 
economics, etc. Dühring’s brand of politics was, we will argue, different. He was an 
intellectual in a continental tradition, and a representative of a convention that has never really 
become established in the Anglo-American world rooted primarily in empiricist and analytical 
discourse. Thoughts, ideas, and general humanitarian ethics had deeper philosophical 
underpinnings on the European continent and were given a societal value hardly imaginable in 
Great Britain or America. Following his direct precursors, the Young Hegelians, Dühring truly 
believed in the “realization of philosophy” and his ability to change society through his own 
intellectual trajectory. 4 With Promethean recalcitrance, he challenged not only the God of 
traditional religion, but also the “Gods” of the powerful status quo who, as Dühring saw it, 
forcefully shaped man in the image that they saw fit.  
The humanitarian ethos which had been represented in Germany by the intellectuals 
belonging to the school known as the Young Hegelians, a generation earlier, was in Dühring’s 
day vanishing institutionally due to the drive towards specialization and the implementation 
2 The judges of the committee for the Benecke Prize, which included the renowned physicists Alfred Weber and 
the philosopher Hermann Lotze, issued the statement that the level of Dühring’s writing was far beyond what 
would have been needed to win.  
3 George H. Howison, “Some Aspects of Recent German Philosophy,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 
(January 1883): 12. 
4 On the Young Hegelian’s liberal interpretation of Hegel see Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl 
Marx (Cambridge: University Press, 1961), 73-80. 
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of the rigid requirements and restrictions of what Adolf von Harnack labeled “Großbetrieb 
der Wissenschaft” (the big business of science). Dühring fought strongly against this trend of 
German bourgeois society, stressing the importance of the individual at a time when the 
anonymity of academic work was becoming the norm. When he began his publishing career 
in the 1860s, it was commonplace for journals not even to publish the names of the authors 
writing for them, and Dühring did anonymous work himself for Mayers Konversations Lexika 
and Brockhaus Enzyclopädie to earn a living. When an exposé that he had written for the 
Bismarck government was published without his consent - at first anonymously and then 
under the name of one of a government minister - he took legal action and won a battle in 
court. Believing in the virtue of individualism from the beginning of his career onwards, he 
went against the current of German academia and challenged the established authorities. From 
the early 1860s until his dismissal from the Berlin University in 1877 and for some time 
beyond, Dühring found strong resonance in a German public which, particularly among the 
educated middle class, was open to his interpretations of science. 
Shifting Institutional Framework 
The philosopher and anthropologist Arnold Gehlen argued that one of the salient features of 
the spirit of the Enlightenment was a polemic against institutions.5 Dühring, as a self-
proclaimed adherent to the liberal values of the French Revolution, became one of the 
strongest critics in his day of the two institutions within which he was working, namely, the 
university and the state. His autobiography My Cause, My Life, My Enemies indicates that his 
discontentment with the conditions of the university dated back to his days as a student at the 
University of Berlin in the 1850s and carried on to when he was a lecturer there in the 1860s 
and 70s. He was extremely wary of authority and in his theoretical writings in the field of 
political economy developed a concept of unjust government based on force (Gewaltstaat), 
which was to be overcome to create a “free society”.6  
While his discomfort with the university mounted, the system of education in Germany that 
Dühring criticized was undergoing fundamental institutional change. Science up to that point 
had been inextricably connected with the state, which for the most part sponsored and 
5 Cf. Arnold Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral (Frankfurt am Main/Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1969), 95. 
6 It should, however, be emphasized that Dühring was not against institutions in a fundamental sense as were - and 
are - some members of the far Left. As will be shown below, Dühring did not reject the institution of private 
property. In one of his early essays he writes: “Die Angriffe, die man gegen die Fundamentalinstitutionen des 
socialen Daseins gerichtet hat, nahmen also die verkehrteste Richtung, die nur irgend möglich war. Anstatt das 
Eigentum auf strenge natürliche Grundlagen zu stellen und auf diesen auszubauen, bekämpfte man es. Anstatt das 
Kapital zugängliche zu machen und ihm durch natürlichen Einfluss auf seine Vertheiling seine absolutistische Rolle 
unmöglich zu machen, findet man es in seinem ganzen Wesen als verderblich.“ KKB, 328.  
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monitored it; as of the mid 18th century the concept of the Staatswissenschaften, the sciences 
of the state, of which Dühring would one day be a part, became established at German 
universities. The sciences of the state are a complicated historical entity, but in the main 
entailed all knowledge and teachings that referred to the state, be this the actual conditions of 
the state itself or its goals, i.e. the teachings of what the state had to do in order to fulfill its 
specific purposes. The state was both the subject of their inquiry as well as the point of 
departure of their research and findings.7 As Dühring’s career unfolded, the state was 
beginning to be viewed within a societal context itself, rather than as the point of departure for 
research and teaching; it thus became the object of social science (Gesellschaftswissenschaft). 
The connotation of the state became more general, entailing now a multitude of associations, 
which were both rational and irrational.8 With the rise of social science, the sciences of the 
state lost influence and would ultimately become a mere part of the social science, which 
viewed them as being a component of general society, although in the strict sense, “society” 
and “state” would remain opposing entities.9 
Despite Dühring’s opposition to the institution of the university as he saw it before him, his 
education was shaped within its institutional framework. According to Lindenfeld, the 
Staatswissenschaften involved a combination of “calculating, instrumental rationality and 
non-substantive, value-orientated rationality” and had an Aristotelian flare.10 These attributes 
all left their mark on Dühring, but it may have been the cultivation of general encyclopedic 
knowledge which influenced him most. The kind of all-round knowledge and interdisciplinary 
research cultivated by the sciences of the state, which is apparent in Dühring’s work, was 
becoming outdated at the time as the trend towards specialization set in.11 In a sense, in terms 
of institutional development, history was working against both Dühring’s brand of scholarship 
and the Staatwissenschaften.12 Although not predictable at the time, it might be claimed that 
7 Rüdiger vom Bruch emphasizes the complexity of the Staatswissenschaften by saying that “a logical systematic 
classification or the changing content and not conceptually fixed ‘sciences of the state’ in Germany is next to 
impossible.”Cf. “Zur Historisierung der Staatswissenschaften: von der Kameralistik zur historischen Schule der 
Nationalökonomie,” in Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 8, ed. Fritz Kraft (Weiheim: VCH 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985),132. Cf. Walter Tauber, “Staatswissenschaft,“  in Handwörterbuch der 
Sozialwissenschaften,  vol. 9 (Stuttgart, et al, Gustav Fischer, et al, 1956), 763-770. 
8 David F. Lindenfeld, Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of the State in the 19th Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 198. 
9 Ibid., 763. 
10 Ibid., 2. Dühring’s doctoral advisor, Adolf Trendelenburg, was known as an Aristotelian for his work in the 
field of logic. Cf. Klaus Köhnke, Enstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche 
Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 39-41.   
11 Gustav Schmoller, arguably the most successful Staatswissenschaftler of his day, came under attack for his inter-
disciplinary approach. Cf. Kurt Breysig, Das neue Geschichtsbild (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1944), 70. 
12 Gerhard Lehmann saw a parallel between the trend towards limiting philosophy through epistemology and 
specialization and the efforts to strain the influence of the state through constitutionalism. Cf. Gerhard Lehmann, 
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history was also working against the historical German state, which, in its traditional form, 
was to be done away with at the end of the First World War in 1918. 
Complexities of an Intellectual Biography of Dühring 
Aside from Gerhard Albrecht’s monograph from 1927, there has been no scholarly biography 
written on Dühring and this is surely not a coincidence.13 There are certain challenges 
standing in the way of biographical historization of Dühring as a scholar. One of the 
difficulties is how to deal with the vast quantity of literature he authored, and to accommodate 
the broad scope of his scholarship. Due to his expertise in various fields of science, such as 
philosophy, political economy, history, physics, mathematics, chemistry and mechanics, it is 
hard to competently summarize and to offer critical insight into his voluminous work. When 
viewing the entirety of his collected works it is difficult to avoid the impression of an 
overwhelming chaos. It would have been more appropriate and beneficial to have several 
different scholars working simultaneously on the biography.14 Without this luxury, it has been 
important to try to concentrate on the most essential aspects of his thought and career. 
Inevitably, much has had to be left out. 15   
Another difficulty is how to address the problem of what Theodor Lessing termed “Dührings 
Haß” (Dühring’s hate). Dühring’s writings in the second half of his career have a rebarbative 
quality that is particularly offensive to the contemporary reader, often bringing forth 
disapproval and even outrage on the part of scholars today. 16 Pejorative and often effusively 
Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1943), 53. 
13 Gerhard Albrecht, Eugen Dühring, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Sozialwissenschaften (Jena: Gustav 
Fischer, 1927) - henceforth abbreviated ED. There is also the book of the Dühring follower Emil Döll which, 
although one-sidedly in favor of Dühring, contains valuable biographical information. Cf. Emil Döll, Eugen 
Dühring: etwas von dessen Character, Leistungen und reformatorischen Beruf; eine populäre Gedenkschrift aus 
eigenen Wahrnehmungen, mündlichem und brieflichem Verkehr (Leipzig: C.G. Naumann, 1893). 
14 In a review that he wrote of a biography on Alexander von Humboldt, Dühring elaborated on the difficulties of 
writing biographies; he contrasted the difference between having a biography written by one author as opposed 
to having several people work on the project. The latter option has the advantage of lessening the chance that the 
outcome will be eulogy. “Die Gelehrtenbiographie und das neue Werk über A. von Humboldt,“ Die Gegenwart 
46 (1872): 359. 
15 Any one of the many aspects touched upon in this general intellectual biography could be more deeply 
researched and elaborated upon. Dühring’s complete works consists of thirty volumes (some of which are 
updated editions of the same work) and 15,000 pages of articles from his bi-monthly journal Personalist und 
Emancipator.  
16 Wolfgang Drechsler has labeled Dühring a “medical case” and “ridiculously and insanely vile”. Drechsler, 
„Herrn Eugen Dühring’s Remotion,“ Journal of Economic Studies 29 (2002), 266. At the end of his article 
Drechsler effusively speaks of “a clearly destructive, threatening and downright evil central streak in his work 
and personality.” Ibid., 284. In her polemical summary of Dühring’s philosophy Peggy Cosmann speaks of 
Dühring’s “raping of thought” (Denkvergewaltigung) and “superficial twaddle” (seichten Gewäsche), and of his 
“vain destruction of philosophy” (eiteles Plattmachen der Philosophie). Cosmann, Physiodicee und Weltnemesis. 
Eugen Dührings physiomoralische Begründung des Moral- und Charakterantisemitismus (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
2007), 115-116. 
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polemical value judgments of Dühring seem to be the rule rather than the exception among 
scholars who have written on him in recent decades, and Dühring’s vitriolic polemics and 
hostile outbursts during the second half of his career have rendered him unattractive to serious 
scholarly research.  Without wishing to downplay Dühring’s worst remarks and most indecent 
comments, it should be seen that he was what Hans Vaihinger terms a “destructive thinker” 
with a penetratingly wounding and uncomfortable humor. He was also a Berliner, who like 
Alexander von Humboldt, had a type of “Mephistophelean spirit” unique to the capital city of 
Germany.  
The “unattractiveness” of Dühring’s later writing from our perspective today should neither 
cast doubt on the justification of the topic, nor prevent the merit of Dühring’s scholarly work 
from being recognized. We will argue that Dühring is a significant figure of 19th political 
economy and philosophy, and that his turbulent academic career, which Ernst Nolte has 
labeled “a kind of epos”, is a notable chapter in the history of German academe.17 The 
trajectory of Dühring’s thought was powerful from the 1870s until the 1890s and we find his 
name mentioned in most philosophical and political economic reference books, in numerous 
contemporary works, and his work is reviewed by the widest spectrum of thinkers. 
Particularly noticeable is Dühring’s influence on Friedrich Nietzsche, which was brought to 
light by the publication of the Nietzsche Papers in the 1880s.18 The prominent neo-Kantian 
Alois Riehl borrowed a fundamental concept of his thinking directly from Dühring; Ludwig 
Erhard’s doctoral mentor, Franz Oppenheimer, derived a core principle of his theory of 
“liberal socialism”, as he admitted, largely from Dühring.19  
Dühring and a Typology of Scholars 
A scholarly biography should aim not only at illustrating the life, career, and works of its 
subject, but also at creating general systematizations in order to facilitate scientific critique. 
One such method is the typology. Typologies, induced from recurring data that gravitates 
17 Ernst Nolte, Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus. Mit einem Nachwort: Nietzsche in der deutschen Gegenwart 
(München: Herbig, 2000), 21. 
18 Rudolf Steiner believed that Nietzsche created his concept of „eternal recurrence“ by taking Dühring’s ideas 
and intentionally contradicting them. Cf. Rudolf Steiner. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kultur- und Zeitgeschichte 
1887-1901, eds. Edwin Froböse und Werner Teichert (Dornach/Schweiz: Rudolf Steiner Verlag, 1989), 556.  
19 On Dühring’s influence on Riehl, cf. Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus, 373-376. His 
significance for Franz Oppenheimer’s though can be seen throughout the sociologist and political economist’s 
writings, which caused Albrecht to conclude that “Dühring is the father of the basic ideal of Oppenheimer’s 
system.” Albrecht, “Zur sozialen Theorie der Verteilung,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 47 
(1914): 76. Paul Mombert also speaks of  Dühring’s „deeply penetrating influence on Oppenheimer“. Cf. 
Geschichte der Nationalökonomie (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1927), 413. Oppenheimer mentions Dühring in 
connection with his concept of „liberal socialism“ see Franz Oppenheimer, Theorie der reinen und politischen 
Ökonomie (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923), XVI et seq. and 206. 
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together in certain patterns, can be an effective instrument at bringing forth solid deductive 
knowledge. Despite Dühring’s physical handicap, which lends his biography an exceptional 
status, it can be shown that his career contains elements of “ideal types” which modern 
society has brought forth in the area of academe. A basic or ideal type should reflect a natural 
classification of material that is valid despite all variation from the pure essence of the type.20   
In an extensive article he wrote on Alexander von Humboldt, Dühring reflected on the “basic 
types” (Grundtypen) of scholars.21 He refers to the typology developed and used by a Russian 
academic named Théodore Wechniakof. Wechniakof had conducted extensive research on 
scientific production and created three basic types of scholars to aid critical biographies, 
which can be usefully applied as they relate to Dühring: the mono-typical, the poly-typical 
and the philosophical. “Mono-typical scholars” are specialists concentrating primarily on one 
main aspect alone. They are a product of the division of scientific labor and serve, so to speak, 
as one cog in the wheel of science. They have a monographic character and retain an isolated 
perspective in their research and writing. By and large, their work can be termed “intensive” 
and they usually remain constant and consistent. The counterpart to the mono-typical scholar 
is the “poly-typical scholar”, who has only a small level of concentration and gravitates to 
diverse fields of intercourse. He offers little resistance to the arbitrary intellectual on goings 
and often becomes the victim of circumstance. He is receptive to many things, but is destined 
to become a slave of the many different spheres which he tries to accommodate. The third 
type is the “philosophical scholar” – not the philosophy professor - who in any given field of 
study attempts to pursue science with rational general explanations often creating a system for 
his work. He tends to be less acknowledged than the other types unless he builds an influential 
school around himself.  
20 The most prominent typology applied to German academia has been Fritz Ringer’s controversial concept of 
the German mandarin to which Dühring can hardly said to have belonged:  Cf. Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the 
German Mandarins. The German Academic Community 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1969). Dühring also considered the university professors of his day as belonging to a caste. He writes: 
“Das Zunftgerüst und seine Wirkungen können auch an den heutigen deutschen Universitäten zur Genüge in 
Augenschein genommen werden. Die ausschließende Körperschaft kopiert nach persönlichem Belieben; denn 
die Staatsgenehmigung ist fast nur formell. Ein Fachprofessor entscheidet darüber, wen er zum Kollegen haben 
will und sieht sich natürlich nach einem möglichst gefälligen und zahmen Konkurrenten oder vielmehr 
Nichtkonkurrenten um. Wo er sich nicht gerade Nullitäten besorgen kann, weil seine Fachkollegen auf anderen 
Universitäten mit ihm in vetterschaftlichem Kartell stehen und auch ihre Leute untergebracht sehen wollen, 
arrangiert man sich nach dem Prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit und teilt innerhalb der Kameraderie das Monopol nach 
jedesmaliger Konvenienz […] Der Professorenstand ist eine Art Kaste, die sich vornehmlich durch Inzucht 
fortpflanzt. Schwiegervater und Schwiegersohn sitzen innerhalb derselben Fakultät und fungieren innerhalb 
derselben Kommission als Examinatoren. In die Professuren heiratet man sich ein wie früher in die 
Handwerksgilden.“ WHB, 2nd edition, 40-42. 
21 Dühring, “Die Gelehrtenbiographie und das neue Werk über A. von Humboldt,“ 361 et seq. 
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To further our understanding of Eugen Dühring, we will apply a fourth ideal type of scholar: 
the “controversial scholar”. The German phrase “umstrittener Gelehter” brings the essence of 
this type to life: he is a scholar who is “fought around” (um-gestritten). This figure offends or 
breaches the “sensitivities” either of the scholarly community or of society. The first 
prerequisite of this type is exceptional academic performance of some sort, usually the 
publication of books, but also research results and successful lecturing hold weight. This 
scholar holds solid credentials, but has come to have views that are unpopular and seen by 
influential people or the public at large as being “dangerous”; warnings are issued about him 
and books by him should not be read and their ideas should not be discussed. Often ad 
hominem attacks are made on the author and he is judged as being “morally bad”; his books 
become ignored, his lectures often boycotted. This type has existed from the days of Socrates 
(not a scholar in the strict sense of course) up through Galileo and Bruno, on to men such as 
Nearing, Jenson, or Nolte and Finkelstein in recent decades. The controversial scholar tends 
to take on the role of a “martyr” for science, becoming the victim of the powers that he 
challenges through his intellectual discourse. 
As we progress, we will consider how Dühring relates to these ideal types of scholars and, as 
he wrote about them himself, how he viewed himself in relationship to them. As indicated 
already, there was a narrowing down or specialization of scholarly activity in the second half 
of the 19th century and as Dühring taught two different disciplines, he was somewhat of an 
anomaly, although from the perspective of the present quite modern. After over a century of 
specialization scholars are beginning to realize that, as Susan Strange puts it, “there have been 
serious losses to set against the gains from specialization”.22 
A Unity of the Contradictions 
Although a man of exceptional talent and mental ability, Dühring has been most remembered 
for his flaws. In contrast to his early writings, his later work, as we have hinted to already, is 
marred by subjective outbursts, bitter cynicism, name-calling and vitriolic insults - all of 
which are of course an anathema to serious scholarly endeavors. Despite his great erudition, 
his intelligence, his ability of linguistic expression, and his scholastic achievements, he has 
been seen - not without good reason - as a man who overestimated himself to the point of 
22 Susan Strange, Paths to International Political Economy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), ix. Strange 
describes this development with an allusion to the American West. Social science “was once a vast, wide open 
range where anyone interested in the behavior or men and women in society could roam just as freely as the deer 
and the antelope”. Like the West, which has now been enclosed, social science has “been divided into exclusive 
territories where trespassers meet with plenty of discouraging works, ominous warnings and keep-out notices.” 
                                                     
19 
 
megalomania (a trait that is hardly rare among even great philosophers by the way). It should 
be noted, however, that Dühring was never just a scholar, in some ways more than one, and in 
many ways less. Despite the great antagonism he felt towards the institutions within which he 
learned and studied, through his education, he was firmly entrenched in the classical German 
culture from which he was raised. Dühring was molded by its science, its language, its value, 
and its knowledge of history. Yet, at the same time, he was intensely modern, expressing 
himself in the self-confident, rebellious and often offensive terms that were common in the 
Western modernist trajectory.23 In his day, the far-reaching changes facing Western Society 
were just beginning to be internalized and expressed. As we will see, Dühring became 
convinced early on that the traditional forms of Western culture had become outdated in the 
new economic, social, and political conditions of the emerging fully industrialized world. He 
believed that new societal forms could be inspired through intellectual discourse whose 
effectiveness involved pessimism and aggressive attacks. He ultimately dedicated his whole 
existence to this cause.  
Nietzsche likened Dühring to a “band dog” (Kettenhund) who would bite out at anyone who 
critically approached his work and indeed there can be no doubt that at times he crossed the 
line of human decency and honorable behavior. It is unfortunate, however, that he has been 
remembered more for his flaws than for his virtues. Ortega y Gasset once claimed that 
biography involves the unity of the contradictions; this dissertation aims to view the whole 
Dühring. The vicissitudes of his career and the fact that he came to change some of his key 
theoretical positions provide a challenge for an all-encompassing portrayal of Dühring’s life. 
Whereas Albrecht and Köppe chose to portray his thought in distinctly different stages, we 
have chosen to handle his Weltanschauung, his scientific bearing, and his system of social 
economics in a largely unified fashion. 24 Our biographical depiction - divided into two main 
parts - devotes one chapter to each of the four major phases of his life and intellectual 
development: his early education, his career as an academic and scientific writer, his activity 
23 Being an academic is uncommon for a modern. The most important modernists were writers and painters.  
24 Although his thought will be portrayed comprehensively we will make reference to the different phases, which 
we see as being divided roughly into the four main periods which we have delineated for his biography. Albrecht 
defines an “early phase” of preparation and of acquiring knowledge as well as creating the first concepts of his 
own teachings, where Dühring acts as a civil reformer, followed by “a main phase” in which Dühring laid down 
the clear foundation of his own ideas in his main philosophical and social scientific work turning more to 
socialist discourse and the “ruinous phase” where Dühring’s thoughts were no longer clear and objective but 
rather marred by vitriol and unscientific polemical outbursts. Cf. ED, 12-23. Köppe’s division is closer to ours in 
that he distinguishes four phases. Cf. “Das ‘Sozialitäre System’ Eugen Dührings,”  Archiv für die Geschichte des 
Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung 4, ed. Carl Grünberg (Leipzig: C. L. Hirschfeld, 1914), 394-395. 
Friedländer, writing in 1901, distiguishes three phases. Die vier Hauptrichtungen der modernen socialen 
Bewegung. II. Teil Eugen Dührings socialitäres System und Henry Georges Neophysiocratien (Berlin: S. 
Calvary & Co., 1901), 31-32. 
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as freelance publicist, and the end of his career, as the editor of his own journal Personalist 
und Emancipator. The turning point in Dühring’s life came in 1877 with his dismissal from 
the Berlin University after fourteen years of successful teaching. This event coincided with 
Friedrich Engels’ polemical attack on Dühring’s philosophy and worldview, known as “anti-
Dühring”, originally a series of articles that began to be published in 1877. Both events were 
to seal Dühring’s fate, on the one hand, isolating him from fellow scholars, and, on the other, 
ultimately ruining his credibility in the labor movement. Although the second phase of his 
life, depicted in Part Four, amounts to a kind of denouement it is, in our opinion, unfair to 
Dühring to automatically overemphasize the inconsistency in his thinking in the later phase. 
The “more successful” phase of his life exhibits traces of the indignant pessimism that would 
later come to dominate his literary output. As we proceed it will be important to ascertain the 
degree to which his philosophy and general Weltanschauung remained consistent and dictated 
his behavior throughout his entire biography.  
While it may be argued that Dühring’s philosophy is rightly not given much credence today, 
his role as theoretician of political economy should not be underestimated. Gustav Schmoller, 
a man of great esteem and one of the most influential Staatswissenschaftler of the 19th 
century, labeled Dühring a “highly talented philosopher from the natural scientific school of 
thought” and recognized him a “significant theoretician”.25 Scholars of political economic 
history in the 20th century, such as Albrecht and Kruse, have shown that Dühring’s work in the 
field of economics deserves a place in the history of economic thought.26 Thus we have 
devoted an entire section to “Dühring’s System of Sociopolitical Economy”. Considering the 
enormous influence which Marxism had as a mass movement throughout the world in the 20th 
century, it may be surprising to many that the philosophical formulation of its tenets as an 
ideology was achieved to no small degree through its dealing with and in reaction to 
Dühring’s writings. Indeed one of the most important factors making Dühring interesting for 
the present was that, unique among German thinkers following Hegel and Marx, his approach 
to economic theory was philosophical.27 In a time of practical and theoretical disorientation in 
25 Gustav Schmoller, Zur Literturgeschichte der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften (Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 
1888), 162; Schmoller, “Ein offenes Sendeschreiben an Herrn Professor Dr. Heinrich von Treitschke über einige 
Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirtschaft. VII: Ihr Urtheil über die socialpolitischen Bewegungen und 
Erscheinungen der Gegenwart,“ Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 24 (1875):110.   
26 Kruse refers to Dühring as “one of the most significant German political economists of the 19th Century”. 
Alfred Kruse, „Eugen Dührings wissenschaftliche Isolierung,“ in Festgabe für Friedrich Bülow zum 70. 
Geburtstag, eds. Otto Stammer and Karl C. Thalheim (Berlin: Dunker und Humblot, 1960), 211. Mombert says 
that Dühring has been „underrated for so long“. Paul Mombert, Geschichte der Nationalökonomie (Jena: Gustav 
Fischer, 1927), 413. 
27 Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche. The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1964), 282. Here Löwith writes: “Except for E. Dühring, no one made any attempt to 
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the field of political economy, as we are experiencing in the present, it may prove helpful to 
look back to accomplished but largely forgotten theoreticians of the past such as Dühring. 
Through his “Philosophy of the Actual”, an idealistic, if not metaphysical, system, he 
attempted to integrate philosophy and history with exact science in order to offer a vision for 
a better society.  
The structure of our analysis is organized to place Dühring’s thought within the framework of 
his life. The treatment of his Weltanschauung and scientific bearing  (Part Two) as well as the 
depiction his system of sociopolitical economics (Part Three) have intentionally been placed 
in between the historical portrayals of the early and later stages of his career (Parts One and 
Four). This has the advantage, we hope, of highlighting the close connection between his life 
and his work. Each section of Part Two, dealing with his philosophy, political economy, and 
his perspective on history begin with an in-depth look at his paragons and the intellectual 
foundation of his thought. Part Four is divided into four chapters: Chapter Six deals with the 
preparatory work which formed the basis of his system; Chapter Seven covers the 
complicated theoretical components of his system; Chapter Eight provides an excursion into 
the social imperative or practical postulates that his system entails, seen within the framework 
of leftist utopian thought; Chapter Nine attempts to illustrate the ultimate conclusions which 
his system implies. It will also be important to offer a critical analysis of his thought, and to 
try and understand Dühring as he saw himself and in terms of what he wished to accomplish.  
provide a philosophical basis for the economic and social problem of work.”   
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IN THE BEGINNING was the French Revolution. This “glorious sunrise” forty-four years 
before Dühring’s birth would be a guiding light of his philosophical and social-political 
pursuits. “Putting man on his head”, as Hegel described it, with the will to govern and to lead 
society by the power of the human intellect would prove to be no easy balancing act. What 
exactly does the human intellect entail? Not the same thing for Hegel as it did for Dühring and 
yet both men were sure that a new eon of political freedom had begun. Hegel died of the 
bubonic plague in the Berlin in 1831, the same place where Dühring just over one year later 
would be born. The “Ideals of 1789” were about to morph and take on new meaning amid the 
changing social conditions of the incipient Industrial Revolution in Germany. The new and 
final era of humanity, which Dühring, following St. Simon and Comte, avowed, was set to be 
one of progress and science, but also one of the destruction of religion, unjust violence, and 
evil corruption. The inspirational values for which he would fight were individual freedom 
and emancipation, hence the name the journal he founded, edited and contributed to until his 
death entitled Personalist und Emancipator. 
If the human mind was in position to revolutionize society, as Dühring thought it was, its 
requisite instrument for doing so, philosophy, was in a state that hardly seemed up to the task. 
In Dühring’s formative years, philosophy was rapidly losing its status as the “mother of all 
science” amid advances in science and technology. Hegel and Goethe’s deaths in 1831 and 
1832 respectively have been seen as the end of an era symbolizing the “great crash” of 
German Idealism as well as the end of the romantic “Goethe-Zeit”.28 Philosophy did not know 
where to go, but Dühring’s compatriots did not seem to care. Germans were now in the 
process of finding their great talent as a nation in the field of natural science and were 
becoming increasingly wary of nebulous metaphysical speculation. The 
Geisteswissenschaften, or “moral sciences” as John Stewart Mill labeled them, had long been 
more advanced than natural science and up to then had led the way in all scientific discourse. 
But by the middle of the 19th century this had changed. Philosophy was rapidly losing its self-
confidence, and in the decades to come was fighting for its life against several different foes: 
28 Cf. Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophie in Deutschland 1831-1933 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 15. 
Karl Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der Revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neuzehnten Jahrhunderts 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986), 17. Arnold Gehlen dates the end of German Idealism with the deaths of 
Schelling and Schopenhauer (1854 and 1860 respectively).  Cf. “Der Idealismus und die Gegenwart,” in Arnold 
Gehlen Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2, ed. Lothar Samson (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1980), 352. Dühring 
spoke with contempt for the classical period of German philosophy, which he saw ending in the middle of the 
19th century. RMII, 1. 
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anthropology, empirical scientific psychology and materialism, as well as positivist or 
inductive logic.29  
Science to a large degree presupposes technology and after generations of slow technological 
advance German science was now beginning to bear the fruit of past labor. Justus von Liebig 
came up with a theory of organic metabolism and applied it to agriculture to create artificial 
fertilizer – an invention that was to provide one of the cornerstones of Carey and Dühring’s 
refutation of the British classical school of political economy. Swann created a new theory of 
organic development with his cell theory. Mayer, whom Dühring would fervently champion 
and go on to write two books on, discovered the law of energy equivalence. Instead of being 
led by philosophy, as it had been up to then, natural science turned towards pressing worldly 
matters and issues such as increasing wealth, alleviating economic misery, technological 
research and the needs of transport.  
At the time of Dühring’s birth in 1833, social science and political economy were also in a 
phase of transition which mirrored the deep social and economic changes, and the political 
crises of the thirty-year period between 1815 and 1848 known as the European Restoration. 
Following the Napoleonic Wars, the developing Industrial Revolution and its concomitant 
economic turbulence had proven to be a challenge for the aristocratic forces that strove to 
restore traditionalist absolutist order. The Holy Alliance attempted to maintain order in the 
countries it controlled, but political uprisings led by democratic forces occurred repeatedly. 
By 1830 well-developed theories of growth, wealth, and distribution had been established by 
the British classical school of political economy lead predominantly by David Ricardo and 
Thomas Robert Malthus. The ominous social conditions, wherever industrialization advanced, 
brought forth counter positions that disparaged the new economics of the British free traders. 
Thomas Carlyle suggested that the new science of political economy, instead of being labeled 
a “gay science”, as it had been by Emerson, should be called “the dismal science” because it 
did not consider the human factor.30  Auguste Comte was motivated by what he saw as a 
“necessary intellectual reorganization” of a society, which had been in a “great crisis” by the 
29 Köhnke, op. cit. 138. The influential Prussian politician Friedrich Stahl, a Jewish convert to Protestantism, of 
whom Dühring wrote disparagingly in his autobiography, spoke of the danger philosophy poses for religion. 
Although he did not advocate getting rid of philosophy all together, he supported banning the “rational 
pantheistic world view”. Ibid., 140-142. Vaihinger writes: „Als nach dem ‚großen Krach‘ der Hegel’schen 
Philosophie sich alles in wirrer Auflösung getrennt hatte, zerfiel die deutsche Philosophie, noch mehr als zuvor, 
in eine Menge von Schulen und Richtungen, und verlor dadurch mit Recht die Bedeutung und die Geltung, die 
ihr bis dahin zugekommen war. Hans Vaihinger, Hartmann, Dühring und Lange. Zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Philosophie im XIX. Jahrhundert (Iserlohn: Verlag von J. Baedecker, 1876), 1. 
30 Thomas Carlyle, The Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question (London: Bosworth, 1853), 9. 
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first third of the 19th century.31 Karl Marx spoke of “a crisis in political economy arriving 
once and for all” in 1830 in the afterword to the second edition of Das Kapital.32  
In a time of crisis, one urge of intellectuals is to turn to history and an historical movement in 
political economy had been crystallizing for some time. Whereas the physiocrats and the 
classical school of economics (which largely developed from it) saw the economy as a natural 
order determined by the laws of nature, the German Historical School emphasized less the 
“being” of political economy, than its “becoming”; not only nature, but also history became 
important for the science. The roots of the historical consideration of society, as opposed to 
the rational and mathematic- natural scientific thought of Descartes and Quesnsay, went back 
to Giambatista Vico (New Science, 1725), who postulated the world of history, to be 
conquered by science, alongside the world of nature. In France, Bodin, Montesquieu and 
Turgot strengthened the historical method with their emphasis on the individual and concrete 
in political, social and economic affairs.33 In Germany, as Meinecke has shown, the 
preoccupation with the past known as history had developed into a powerful movement 
through Möser, Herder, and Goethe.34 Adam Müller’s romanticism with its historical 
consciousness and emphasis on the totality of economic life provided a link to the 19th century 
and influenced Friedrich List, who saw the value of national entities for trade and industry. 
List’s ideas of “nurturing protective tariffs”, to be dealt with below, reflect the historical 
consciousness embodied in this movement and represented a theory which directly opposed 
the individualism of classical liberalism.35 
In January 1834, just one year after Dühring’s birth, the precursor of a German national 
unification, the German Customs Union (Zollverein), came into existence. Efforts towards 
creating economic centralization went hand in hand with cultural standardization, and history 
became a vehicle for unifying the country. The central intellectual figure and political pioneer 
of the union was Friedrich List, who can be considered a most important precursor of the 
German Historical School of economics. At the same time, men such as Niebuhr and Ranke 
were instituting scientific methods of historical research that emphasized the importance of 
31 Auguste Comte, Entwurf der wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, welche für eine Reorganisation der Gesellschaft 
erforderlich sind, ed. Wilhelm Ostwald (Leipzig: Unesma, 1914 [1822]), 1. 
32 Karl Marx, Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Erster Band, Buch I: Der Produktionsprozess des 
Kapitals (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1955), 13. 
33 Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Das 18. Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt (Leipzig:Teubner, 1927). 
34 Cf. Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (München: Leibnitz Verlag, 1946). 
35 On the turn to history in political economic theory cf. Alfred Kruse, Geschichte der volkswirtschaftlichen 
Theorien (Berlin: Dunker und Humblot, 1959),155-179. 
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the nation.36 The views that List developed on political economy (influenced by his stay in 
America during the late 1820s) stood in direct contrast to the classical school of economics, 
further complicating the crisis of economic thought as the time of Dühring’s birth.  
Dühring’s career thus began in a transitional period for the fields which he would specialize 
in, philosophy and political economics. He took time to gain his bearings and to carefully 
solidify his own positions before establishing his own system of thought. Once his own views 
had been established, he stood behind them, advocating his ideas with an intensity that never 
seemed to fade. A noticeable general characteristic in the development of his career stands in 
stark contrast to the usual tendencies in a person’s life, where one gets older, wiser, and 
inevitably more conservative; the basic tone of Dühring’s thought and actions intensifies and 
becomes far more radical as he gets older. In the first half of his life, he is a proponent of 
liberal emancipatory views, advocating more or less conservative social reform, based on 
current conditions. Later in the 70s, he proposes a fundamental restructuring of society and 
the creation of a “free society”. In the second half of his career, which began following his 
dismissal from the University of Berlin, his views radicalizes and he begins directing his 
efforts towards criticizing Judaism, Christianity, as well as religion in general. A spectacular 
academic career that brought Dühring wide acclaim, fame, and notoriety began under modest 
circumstances in Berlin.  
  
36 Cf, Wolfgang Hardtwig, Geschichtskultur und Wissenschaft (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1990), 43. Niebuhr, writing during the French occupation of Prussia, chose to write about the great ancient 
nation of Rome in order to strengthen his own mind and that of his listeners. G. P. Gooch, History and the 
Historians of the Nineteenth Century (London/New York/Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co.), 17 et seq. Ranke, 
who was the first historian to develop objective methods of historical research, spoke of “creative forces, moral 
energies at work” which gave history meaning. Ibid., 80. Cf. also Hardtwig, Geschichtskultur, 16.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
FAMILY BACKGROUND AND EARLY EDUCATION 
 
1. Ancestry, Childhood, and Schooling  
Dühring’s paternal ancestors originally came from the region of Thuringia. In his 
autobiography, he is knowingly or unknowingly guilty of romanticizing the origin of his 
family by claiming that his great-grandfather crossed the Baltic Sea from Sweden to 
Brandenburg, where he went on to run and own several watermills and found a large family.37 
In an article published after his father’s death, Dühring’s son Ulrich sets the record straight 
asserting that the Dühring family never crossed the Baltic Sea, but actually originated from 
the heart of Germany in Thuringia (the German name “Thüringen” bears a similarity to 
“Dühring”). Although Dühring apparently liked the idea of being the descendent of the 
Germanic tribes of the north, his ancestors lived on the continent, dwelling in Thuringia 
before settling in Bremen, which was then part of Sweden, just before the thirty years war.38   
Dühring’s great-grandfather moved to Prussia under the reign of Fredrick the Great and 
settled on an estate near Landsberg an der Warte that came to be called Dühringhof. Being of 
noble descent, the elder Dühring had the choice of entering into military or court service or 
giving up his noble title. He chose the latter and became a miller. Through his profession he 
had an affinity for architecture and mathematics, which he passed on to his children, one of 
whom was Eugen’s grandfather Johann Christian Dühring, born on 3 December 1761 in 
Uckermarkt. At the request of his father, Johann Christian gave up his study of medicine to 
learn the building trade. He married and became a castle architect in Berlin, later going on to 
be a military and architectural advisor in Marienwerder. Eugen’s father Wilhelm Ferdinand 
was born on 25 July 1789. Johann Christian served as a soldier in the Napoleonic Wars and 
died of an illness contracted while on duty in 1807. Johann Christian Dühring's premature 
death brought hardship upon his family. Eugen’s father had to give up his architectural studies 
to earn money to support his siblings. Wilhelm Dühring was a resourceful man and he used 
the talent for mathematics and draftsmanship, which he had inherited from his father, to make 
ends meet. He earned money working as a math tutor and utilizing his technical drawing 
skills. Through strenuous effort, Wilhelm was able to improve his social status to become the 
37 The main source for Dühring’s life is his autobiography Sache, Leben und Feinde. Als Hauptwerk und 
Schlüssel zu seinen sämmtlichen Schriften (My Cause, My Life, My Enemies. As Main Work and Key to his 
Complete Wrtings.) first published in 1882 (2nd ed. 1903). SLF, 1. 
38 Ulrich Dühring, „Geneologisches,“ PE 454 (July 1929): 127. 
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private secretary of influential General Field Marshal Friedrich Adolf Graf von Kalckreuth, a 
man of unconventional political views and a positive view of the French nation. Although he 
was exempt from military service being a Berliner and a Prussian civil servant, Wilhelm 
volunteered to take part in the military campaigns against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814, where 
he became stricken with severe illnesses that would follow him the rest of his life. After the 
war, he became a privy secretary at the Prussian Supreme Building Deputation, a position he 
would carry out until his early retirement when Eugen was seven years old. 
Dühring’s early childhood was heavily influenced by his father, who, following his 
retirement, was able to devote a great deal of time to the education of his son. As Eugen 
would later do with his own sons, Wilhelm set out to educate his son by himself. The most 
important lesson that he received from his father was the way in which to learn. Wilhelm, who 
liked to get out of the big city and into the fresh air of the country, attempted to convey to his 
son a sense of a healthy life and an understanding of nature. Wilhelm was an unusually free-
spirited man for his day and was skeptical of public schools and educational institutions. Like 
James Mill, the father of the English philosopher John Stewart Mill, Wilhelm Dühring 
considered the interference of schools in the early lives of children to be harmful. Dühring 
later emphasized that his father was religious and that he possessed a clear concept of God, 
which, according to Dühring, “hindered neither his intellect nor his disposition”.39 He writes 
that his father acted in the spirit of Giordano Bruno and Jean Jacques Rousseau, two men who 
would be role models for Eugen Dühring for all of his life. Although Wilhelm Dühring had 
fought against the French in the War of the Sixth Coalition, he was a great admirer of the 
values of the French Revolution, as his son would also be. Much like James Mill, Wilhelm 
Dühring was critical of the institution of the church even though he believed in God and had 
respect for the teachings of Jesus Christ. According to Eugen, his father had sympathy with 
the Jews, whom he viewed as a religiously persecuted minority. Wilhelm passed this positive 
view of Jews on to his son.40 In contrast to Nietzsche, who as a child dreamed of becoming a 
priest, Dühring seems to have had a disliking of the church from his childhood onwards. 
In his early years Dühring was educated by both of his parents. His mother, who he mentions 
only briefly in his autobiography – although she lived until 1884 – instructed him in the 
necessities of reading and writing, while his father taught him mathematics by introducing 
39 SLF, 10. 
40 Ibid., 14. 
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him to the difficult formulas of algebra, analysis, and geometry.41 According to Dühring, both 
of his parents tried to convey a feeling of righteousness and self-reliance to him. His father's 
goal was to motivate his son to learn how to study on his own. He was, however, careful to 
warn against too much studying. Dühring relates that at one point his father took away his 
books for fear that his son was reading too much. Like Schopenhauer and Lichtenberg, as well 
as many thinkers of the Enlightenment before them, Dühring would later warn of the evils of 
"too much reading". In his autobiography, Dühring proudly claims that there were no novels 
or history books in his house as a child.42 Wilhelm Dühring placed more value on essential 
demonstrative techniques of learning. He would give his son practical tasks, for example, to 
pretend he was a surveyor and needed to measure the size of certain fields. He once asked 
Eugen to measure the space of a mill which had been made inaccessible by a lake. Wilhelm 
taught his son to concentrate on non-human nature. Dühring characterizes his father's 
philosophy as being "realistic" and geared towards "truth and reality".43 
Eugen’s exceptional intelligence and particularly his gift for mathematics became noticed 
when he was just a boy.44 His father decided to send him to the Köllnische Realgymnasium, a 
municipal (not a state-run) school known for its excellent natural science program.45 One year 
later, on 8 June 1845, Wilhelm died of lung tuberculosis, leaving the family with very little 
money. With his mother not able to look after him sufficiently, Eugen received support from 
his father’s sister Charlotte Dühring, an unmarried governess who had moved from the 
country to Berlin to look after the wealthy widow of a privy councilor.46 A government 
41 Voelske rightfully draws attention to the odd fact that Dühring, as someone who particularly later in his career 
would lend so much importance to a person’s ancestry, writing in his fifties (and as his mother was still alive), 
would not even mention his maternal ancestors in his autobiography. Cf. Voelske, Die Entwicklung des 
“rassischen Antisemitismus” zum Mittelpunkt der Weltanschauung Eugen Dührings, Dissertation zur Erlangung 
der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Hansischen Universität (Hamburg: Hans Christian Druckerei 
und Verlag, 1936), 10. In an article announcing his father’s death to the Personalist und Emancipator readers, 
Ulrich Dühring relates that his father’s mother was of a weak constitution, although she had a lot of energy. He 
writes that she suffered from senility at an early age and was unable to recognize her son and grandson who 
visited her at Elisabeth hospital in Berlin where she lived for many years before dying in 1884. Ulrich Dühring, 
“Eugen Dührig gestorben,” PE 414 (November 1921): 3305. 
42 SLF, 14-15. 
43 Ibid., 17-20. This method of education, which Dühring would use with his two sons, was advocated by 
Schopenhauer, who believed that children should become acquainted with “the ways of the world without 
getting wrong ideas in their head”. Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. T. Barry Saunders (New York: A.L. 
Burt Company, n.d.), 429. 
44A mathematician from the Berlin astronomical observatory, Dr. J.W.H. Lehmann, visited him in his home 
when Dühring was twelve and spoke in different circles of the young Dühring’s exceptional knowledge of 
math. SLF., 53-54. 
45 Ibid., 20. 
46 This widow, Frau Hartmann, took an interest in Dühring at an early age. She was convinced that big things 
were to come of him and, having read in a biography of a woman who had assisted Martin Luther as a boy, 
decided to leave Dühring an inheritance in her will. Because her intent was solely to support someone who 
would achieve great things later in life, which if he had died at an early age would not have been possible, he 
could not obtain the money (2000 Thalers) until he was 30 years old, although he could receive the interest 
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custodian decided that Eugen would have to be placed in the Kornmesseschen Orphanage 
while he remained in school at Köllnische Realgymnasium.  
Three years later, while he was still a student at Köllnische School, Dühring experienced the 
1848 Revolution up close, in an experience that would affect his worldview substantially. Up 
to that point, internal German politics had hardly been a concern of his, but Eugen became 
deeply moved by the events of March 1848, taking notice of the liberal ideas of the 
revolution. One of his teachers sympathized with the revolution and turned his math lesson 
into a political discussion. According to Dühring’s autobiography, some days later an actual 
battle took place on the school premises, destroying many of the facilities including the school 
director’s apartment. 47 The young students were pleased to be granted vacation while the 
schoolhouse was repaired. The failure of the revolution seemed to have disappointed Dühring 
and brought about a disliking of the authoritarian, conservative European tradition, which he 
associated especially with England and which he would soon be confronted with at the Berlin 
University. From this time on Eugen developed an aversion to the "periwig-pated" medieval 
England and found sympathy for the liberal French.48 
After graduating from Köllnische Realgymasium, Dühring became a boarding student at 
Joachimtaler Gymnasium, one of Prussia’s best schools, located in Berlin-Mitte on the Spree 
directly across from what is today the Berlin Cathedral on the Museum Island. Life in the 
dormitory was strictly regimented and guarded. Any infraction resulted in house detention.49 
He received excellent grades, but did not like the method of learning, which he considered 
more narrow-minded than the Köllnische Realgymnasium. Looking back on his school years 
in his autobiography he was highly critical of his teachers’ methods and particularly disliked 
the religious character of the institution, especially resenting the compulsory church 
attendance.50 Although Dühring would later be an opponent of classical language teaching 
and criticized his school for its overemphasis on grammar and scholasticism, he was among 
payments on the money. Ibid., 21, 53. It is worth noting that Dühring’s career was benefited through the private 
efforts of a member of the upper-middle class. 
47 Ibid., 28. 
48 Ibid., 28-29. 
49 Ibid., 39. 
50 Ibid., 34-36. In defense of Dühring it should be said that there were others who were equally as critical of the 
state of the German high schools. Henry Adams (1838-1917) of Boston, who came to Germany to study Civil 
Law in 1858 and attended Friedrich-Wilhelm Gymnasium to learn German, called the German high school 
“something very near an indictable nuisance”. The Education of Henry Adams (New York: The Modern Library, 
1946), 79. 
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the best Latin and Greek students at his school.51 After finishing secondary school as class 
valedictorian, he began studying law at Berlin's Friedrich-Wilhelm University in 1853. 
2. University Years: Disappointment with "Pseudo-Historicism" 
In the summer semester of 1853 Dühring began studying law at the University of Berlin, 
which was only forty years old at the time. Although he would ultimately move into the fields 
of philosophy and political economy, he decided to study law. His philosophy, as we will see 
below, would exert a leaning towards legal discourse and background in law, influencing not 
only his style, but also the content of his writings. It was common for German students to 
study at different universities, enabling them to become acquainted with other towns and 
regions of the country, but due to financial considerations Dühring did not have this luxury. 
He lived with his Aunt Charlotte and was forced to remain in Berlin for the duration of his 
studies, which was not a pleasant prospect at the time.52 The university disappointed him 
considerably. Looking back on this time in his autobiography written in 1882, he emphasizes 
that the conditions in the law department were weak, and that the whole university did not live 
up to his expectations. He especially did not like the historic-philological intellectual 
atmosphere at the university, whose curriculum had become less orientated towards 
philosophy since the days of Hegel. According to Dühring, a philosophical foundation of 
science was lacking completely; the philosophical roots of law had been the very thing that he 
had hoped to find, and he became greatly disappointed that only history was being taught. 
Since the days of Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), there had been mostly historically 
and philologically-orientated teachers of law at the Berlin University. The philosophy faculty 
was also dominated in a similar way by August Boeckh (1785-1867) and later Adolf 
Trendelenburg (1802-1872), Dühring’s doctoral mentor. The historical school of law was in 
full swing and, according to Dühring, there was not a single professor who did not belong to 
this school. True Natural Law was not taken into account, and legal principles were only 
conveyed historically.53 The theological and medical faculties did not deserve mentioning, in 
his opinion. Theology was not scientific and medicine only imparted physiological 
51 SLF, 45. 
52 Ibid., 55. Henry Adams spoke very disparagingly of Berlin and believed that the entire country was ripe for 
reform. He wrote, “In 1858 Berlin was a poor, keen-witted, provincial town, simple, dirty, uncivilized, and in 
most respects disgusting. Life was primitive beyond what an American boy could have imagined. Overridden by 
military methods and bureaucratic pettiness, Prussia was only beginning to free her hands from internal bonds”. 
The Education of Henry Adams, 77. Heinrich von Treitschke also described the living conditions in Berlin at that 
time as deplorable. See “Der Sozialismus und seine Gönner,” in H. v.Treitschke, Deutsche Kämpfe 1865-1874. 
Schriften zur Tagespolitik (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1874), 547. 
53 Fifty years after his study of law, Dühring came to see the German historical school in a different light, giving 
particular credit to the Göttingen legal scholar Hugo. SR, 127-128. Dühring remained highly critical of Hegel 
and the lawyer Julius Stahl, who to his mind was not a worthy heir of Savigny. Cf. Ibid., 133-136.    
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knowledge. A philological-historical approach was omnipresent at the expense of the natural 
sciences. Dühring became increasingly alienated from the university.  
He did not see everything at the university in a negative light, however. A Swiss teacher of 
Romance languages, Friedrich Ludwig Keller vom Steinbeck (1799-1860), made a positive 
impression on him. Showing that Dühring was not opposed to emphasis on history in general, 
he praises Keller as "a true researcher of primary sources” because he “advocated the 
emancipation from text books by turning to the Latin documents in which the classical Roman 
lawyers wrote down their knowledge."54 He liked Keller’s disdain for theology and his 
critique of university philosophy and logic as well as his advocacy of mathematics. The Swiss 
professor told of his student days in Göttingen where there was a much less formal 
atmosphere – dogs were admitted, pipe smoking was allowed – and where the advanced 
students never wrote down what the professor was saying; there were first semester students 
who were required to take notes which could be copied if necessary by the other students 
later. Dühring, who had been instructed by his father to learn in a lively manner, avoiding 
books wherever possible, frowned upon the practice of mindlessly recording whatever the 
professors presented in their lectures. Aside from Keller, most of the professors, according to 
Dühring, had a stuffy, formal manner, and he found their method of lecturing appalling; they 
would simply read texts that the students would write down uncritically in their notebooks.55  
His critique of the university may seem surprising in light of the fact that the German 
university enjoyed a great reputation throughout the world in the 19th century. Approximately 
9,000 Americans came across the ocean in the 19th century to study in Germany, so many that 
Johns Hopkins University, one of America’s best colleges, became known as “Göttingen in 
Baltimore”. 56 The British writer Mathew Arnold praised German education and Mme de Staël 
quotes a French saying that “the German university begins where many nations of Europe 
finish”.57 In contrast to the Oxford scholars, who lived an isolated existence in the ivory tower 
of academe, the German professors were known for their active participation as facilitators 
between the realm of education and the state. Since the Reformation, the power of the 
professors in Germany had grown and would continue to grow until the time of the Weimar 
Republic. Unlike the oldest universities in Europe, the German universities had been endowed 
54 SLF, 58-59. 
55 Dühring was of the opinion, especially as technology advanced through the use of phonograph and telephones, 
that this form of lecturing would become outdated. He envisioned a university reform that would make such 
professors obsolete. SLF, 63. 
56 Quoted from David Phillips, “The German Universities – Citadels of Freedom or Bastions of Reaction?” 
Comparative Education 17 (Oct. 1981): 344. 
57 Ibid. 
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by the nobility, and most of them were municipal foundations. The universities were thus 
subjugated to local authority and had a territorial character. With the Reformation, sacral 
consecrations were replaced by scholarly theological training. There was strong competition 
between the different territories and princes would often forbid their subjects to study at 
foreign universities. On the other hand, foreign academics were sought for important civil 
service positions that allowed the influence of science on state and political life, as had never 
been seen in the older European universities. The princes came to rely on scholarly councils 
to administrate their land, and as the power of the councils increased, a new social group was 
created.58  
Through the generations they had gained substantial power and had attained a sort of demigod 
status in the eyes of most students. Max Müller wrote, for example: “People have no idea in 
England what kind of worship is paid by German students to their professors. To find fault 
with them or to doubt their ipse dixit (he himself said) never entered our minds. What they 
said of other classical scholars from whom they differed […] was gospel and remained 
engraved on our memory for a long time”.59 The American historian Henry Adams, who came 
to Berlin to study Civil Law in 1858, was critical of the methods of teaching at the University 
of Berlin. The scion of the famous Adams family wrote in his autobiography: “The professor 
mumbled his comments; the students made or seemed to make notes; they could have learned 
from books or discussion in a day more than they could learn from him in a month, but they 
must pay his fees, follow his course, and be his scholar if they wanted a degree. […] Neither 
the method nor the matter nor the manner could profit an American education”.60  
Dühring detested the, as he saw it, false reverence given to the professors. As mentioned, his 
father had instilled in him a strong sense of justice and he had hoped to become acquainted 
with the true spirit of the law, i.e. its moral origins; all he found was dry philology and 
historicism. He was willing to accept Roman law as a model for his studies, but in reading the 
ancient theoreticians he always tried to find traces of a general united sense of justice that 
existed above all history. In the field of legal philosophy, he saw his professors as being 
equally closed-minded and dogmatic. Aristotle and Hegel were put on a pedestal and viewed 
58 Helmut Schelsky, Einsamkeit und Freiheit. Idee und Gestalt der deutschen Universität und ihrer Reformen 
(München: Rohwohlt, 1963), 18. 
59 Quoted from Phillips, op. cit., 343-344. 
60 The Education of Henry Adams, 75-76. Nietzsche also condemned the state of learning at the German 
universities: “Everything that matters has been lost sight of by the whole of the higher educational system of 
Germany: the end quite as much as the means to that end. People forget that the education, the process of 
cultivation itself is the end – and not the empire – they forget that the educator is required – for this end- and not 
the public school teacher and university scholar”. Twighlight of the Idols (Herdfordshire: Wordsworth, 2007), 
44. 
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uncritically, according to Dühring. He came to believe that he had wasted a lot of time reading 
unnecessary material, and if he had to do it all over again, he wrote that he would have 
concentrated exclusively on Hobbes and Rousseau.61 Generally, Dühring viewed the methods 
and the content of the teaching at the university as having a thwarting effect on the students. 
He considered himself lucky that his talent for mathematics, which he had inherited from his 
ancestors, had allowed him to be protected from the distracting sophistry of the university. 
Dühring was convinced that the majority of the students were not able to see through the airs 
and graces of the professors due to the large number of people who attended their lectures.  
Dühring relates that it took him years to break the chains of the “intellectual incarceration” to 
which his university studies sentenced him. Henry Adams had seen a silver lining to the dark 
cloud of the University of Berlin in that it ultimately made its students become more 
orientated towards leisure time: “The curious and perplexing result of the total failure of 
German education was that the students’ only clear gain – his single step to a higher life – 
came from time wasted; studies neglected; vices indulged; education reversed; - it came from 
the despised beer garden and music-hall; and it was accidental, unintended, unforeseen.”62 
Never an idler in any respect, Dühring did not partake in leisure activities, but turned towards 
extracurricular studies in the area of economics, which were not offered at the university. He 
read the works of Adam Smith, which originally turned him off for lacking sufficient 
quantitative consideration, as well as for being, as he put it, somewhat blasé. He also began 
reading French socialist writers whose emphasis on justice he appreciated, but who, according 
to his autobiography, he remained intellectually detached from.63 He went on to attain a legal 
degree, completing a dissertation and habilitation (both written in Latin) by 1861. Both 
manuscripts can be found in the Dühring Papers of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer 
Kulturbesitz. The dissertation is entitled De juris quaesiti notione dissertation critica, and the 
habilitation De methodo ratio vinandi in jurisprudentia observationes quaedam. 
3. Eye Illness, Decision to Become an Academic and Scientific Writer 
The role that circumstance would play in Dühring's biography has already been mentioned. 
The precarious financial situation of his family following the death of his father was not 
without influence on his worldview, giving him a realistic sense of the dangers that could 
affect individuals and groups of people, seemingly ruining them without any fault of their 
own. The roots of his sense of social justice were to be found in his personal experience. With 
61 SLF, 68. 
62 Ibid., 80. 
63 Ibid., 71-73. 
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the concerns of his sustenance now relieved, Dühring faced what would become the greatest 
crisis of his life: an eye illness that would lead to complete blindness at the age of twenty-
eight.64 
After receiving his degree and beginning work as a lawyer, Dühring began to have serious 
problems with his eyes. The reading of files which his work required became increasingly 
difficult, and finally he decided to give up his legal career to become a scholarly writer. In his 
autobiography, he states that he did not envision an academic career, but he felt that he would 
be able to sell himself better a writer if he took a doctoral degree.65 His negative view of the 
university as an institution remained, but he believed that pursuing postdoctoral qualification 
would help him establish a reputation as a writer and give him the necessary contacts for this 
goal. Dühring proceeded to complete a doctoral thesis in the area of epistemology under Adolf 
Trendelenburg. Despite a few negative remarks from the mathematician Kummer, he 
completed his degree magna cum laude.66 Soon thereafter he became completely blind and 
began his career as a writer "without eyes and the assistance of others".67    
As dramatic a personal misfortune as his blindness was, it should be noted that he was very 
fortunate that it came at a relatively young age, where he was still able to adapt himself 
professionally and privately to his handicap. With regard to his private life, some assistance 
was soon to come, as he met Emilie Gladow, five years his junior, working as a nurse in the 
house of his Aunt Charlotte.68 The young couple lived in a small apartment on Oranienstraße 
and soon had two sons, Ulrich and Ernst, born in 1863 and 1864 respectively. Dühring 
decided that he would make the most of his blindness and turn a handicap into strength. To do 
this he would have to go his own way, as it were, and build upon the (mostly negative) 
experience from his studies and the sense of justice that he had developed since his childhood. 
As stated in his autobiography, his blindness actually increased his enthusiasm for justice, 
truth, and trying to create a new unique approach to scholarship. He believed that fate had 
instructed him to give up the advantages of academic life in his own way. He would now 
64 Although Dühring considered his blindness to be one of the more minor setbacks in his life, he complained 
that his eye doctor, the famous Prussian ophthalmologist Albrecht von Graefe, had not treated his eyes properly. 
SLF, 78-81. 
65 Ibid., 85. 
66 On Dühring’s relations to his math teachers Kummer and Weierstraß from a Marxist government perspective 
see K.-R. Biermann, Die Mathematik und ihre Dozenten an der Berliner Universität (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1973), 89-91. 
67 SLF, 92-93. 
68 Her family came from Swedish Pommerania and were the descendents of nobility. On Emilie Dühring see a 
book published to commemorate the 100th anniversary of her birth, containing a compilation of the articles 
written about her under the title “One of Us” (Eine von uns) in Personalist und Emancipator following her death. 
Zum Andenken an Frau Emilie Dühring, ed. Frau L. Michaelis (Rostock: Carl Hinstorff, 1939). 
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strive for what he had missed in his studies. Instead of dry historicism with heaps of facts and 
rhetorical language, he would approach science in a different, fresher way. He writes, "The 
sudden exceptional nature of my situation forced me to break through intellectual barriers."  
Dühring was forced to develop a way of working and researching suitable to his handicap; 
what was lost in one direction could be made up in another. He would develop a method of 
scholarship that would emancipate him from the "rotten scholarly manner" that he detested so 
much as a student. His wife and later his sons read aloud to him. Not being able to use his 
eyes, he was forced to have his works clearly organized in his head in order to dictate them to 
his wife, who wrote them down by hand. He was able to take on an optimistic outlook 
towards his handicap and seems to have developed a sense pride at being able to overcome 
the hardship he faced. Through his personal crisis, he generated a defiant spirit which gave 
birth to the cause that he sites in the title of his autobiography, a fight against injustice in 
science and society. 
4. Habilitation in Philosophy, Early Teaching and Publishing Success 
Despite being inspired by the path that he had chosen or been forced to choose, it was initially 
very difficult for Dühring to find publishers for his work. Being an unknown writer without 
connections to speak of, his articles and manuscripts were rejected one after the other. 
Notwithstanding the misgivings he had concerning university life, he decided that it would be 
in his interest to pursue a habilitation. This degree was required at the time to attain the venia 
legendi, or permission to lecture, and he hoped it would open doors for him as a writer. He 
had maintained contact with Adolf Trendelenburg, his doctoral advisor, and was soon able to 
complete a habilitation for the faculty of philosophy. In the winter semester of 1863, Dühring 
began giving private and public lectures. In 1864 he succeeded at having his first writings 
published in newspapers and journals for which he was also remunerated. In 1866, he decided 
to do another habilitation, this time in the field of political economy, an area that he been 
eyeing for potential publishing activity for a long time. Soon he was giving lectures in this 
field as well.69  
69 To specialize in philosophy and political economy was uncommon in Germany at the time. There is indication 
that Dühring did not think very highly of the philosophy reading public in Germany. The fact that John Stuart 
Mill, who he considered to be an average thinker, became so popular in his country was frustrating for Dühring. 
It is “kein Kompliment für den deutschen Markt, daß sich ein Stuart Mill auf ihm behaupten“. In „Die 
Philosophie im Jahre 1865,“ Ergänzungsblätter zu Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1866): 578. Cf. Dühring’s critique 
of Mill in favor of William Whewell, “John Stuart Mill,“Unsere Zeit 2 (1866): 919-939. 
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Dühring's lectures, whose popularity has been compared with that of Sartre and Marcuse in 
the 20th century, were known for being demonstrative and lively, and he soon gained a 
popularity which the other lecturers, many of them tenured professors, did not have.70 His free 
style of delivery contrasted with the more formal style of his colleagues, who usually read 
manuscripts or excerpts from books that they had written. His lecturers belonged to the best 
attended at the University of Berlin and he placed great value on receiving an echo from the 
young students.71 In a letter to Gersdorf from 1868, the young Friedrich Nietzsche referred to 
Dühring's "fine classes on Schopenhauer, Byron, and pessimism".72 The strong attendance of 
his lectures increased his income, because at the time students had to pay attendance fees to 
attend lectures. He could not, however, live from his university income alone and was 
fortunate to find more and more commissions as a scholarly writer. Particularly important for 
his career as a publicist was his acquaintance with the editor of the Vossische Zeitung, Ernst 
Otto Lindner (1820-1867), who accepted his first publications. Lindner had substantial 
influence on Dühring. Listening attentively to the stories of Lindner's negative encounters 
with the "university cliques", he must have felt a confirmation of his own negative experience 
at the university. Linder took a liking to Dühring, but expressed concern that the young man 
would be ruined by the atmosphere of the university.73  
Lindner was a disciple of Arthur Schopenhauer. He knew Schopenhauer personally, having 
come into contact with author of The World as Will and Representation in the 1850s. Lindner 
defended and supported Schopenhauer at a time when the philosopher had found very little 
resonance among academics in Germany. Despite all of the sympathy he had for the great 
philosopher, Lindner vehemently rejected Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, as Dühring would 
also do later. Perhaps some of the pessimistic indignation which would later characterize 
Dühring's writings can be traced to Lindner's influence on him. Lindner was actively 
interested in music and wrote articles and reviewed literature on music history, as well as 
writing a history of music himself. He was an avid supporter of the Bachgesellschaft and 
70 Cf. Stewart, Theodor Herzl, A Biography of the Father of Modern Israel (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 
& Co., 1974), 81. 
71 In his autobiography the well-known German dramatist and novelist Hermann Sudermann (1857-1928) 
reminisced on the admiration he once had for Dühring as a twenty-year old student attending his lectures. He 
writes: “Was er (Dühring) gelehrt hat war Offenbarung, was er verwarf, sank in den tiefsten Abgrund der Hölle.“ 
Sudermann, Das Bilderbuch meiner Jugend (München:Langen Müller, 1981), 229. 
72 Nietzsche to Carl von Gersdorff, 16. February 1868, in eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Nietzsche 
Briefwechsel, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Erste Abteilung, Zweiter Band (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), 
258. 
73 Cf. SLF, 101. Also Gustav Michaelis, “E.O. Lindner und sein Verhältnis zu Schopenhauer und Dühring,“ 
Sendbogen für Dühringsche Geisteshaltung und Lebensgestaltung 70, ed. Hans Reinhardt (March 1938): 7-9. 
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wrote pamphlets to propagate the music of Bach, Mozart, and Gluck much in the way that 
Dühring created propaganda for his heroes of science such as Carey, List, and Mayer.  
Once Dühring had published his first articles, more and more commissions began to come his 
way. Among the journals that he worked for were Unsere Zeit and Grenzboten, both published 
in Leipzig, and Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift from Stuttgart. He also began working for the 
Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart of Meyers Conversationslexikon, where in the 
coming years he would publish numerous book reviews and articles on philosophical and 
political economic subjects. His work there gave him the opportunity to consider a wide range 
of thought trajectories. He wrote encyclopedic entries and articles on numerous philosophical 
and economic topics, giving him a solid, all-round historical context for his own work. 
Friedrich Lange called this “Dühring’s Kostprobe”, i.e. a sampling for his own philosophy. In 
the volumes of this well-known German encyclopedia he wrote detailed excerpts on Comte, 
Schopenhauer, Humboldt, Lotze, Feuerbach, Fechner, Whewell, Marx and many others. 
Through theses writings, Dühring became well-versed in the history of philosophy and was 
provided with a solid background for his own work.74   
In his early writings, one can see that Dühring was already assuming the role of the defiant 
outsider. He largely ignored the work of German scholars, choosing instead to write about 
thinkers from abroad, most of whom were either private scholars or had in their careers come 
into conflict with universities. In 1864, Dühring had discovered the writings of Henry C. 
Carey, and he soon became a strong supporter of the writer and publisher from Philadelphia, 
who had been ignored by university scholars and was virtually unknown to the German 
public. Dühring published several articles on Carey and Friedrich List, who had lost 
recognition for his original work in the field of political economic theory. He wrote in his 
autobiography that the outsider List, who had suffered through many trials and tribulations in 
his efforts to establish a German customs union, was a role model for him. Other major 
writings dealt with Auguste Comte, Henry Thomas Buckle, and Arthur Schopenhauer. 
Dühring became taken by what he called the "modern spirit" of the 18th century, which, in his 
eyes, was the very opposite of the dry historicism prevailing in the sciences of the state. He 
began to focus on the challenge of taking the fruits of the 17th and 18th centuries and applying 
them to the newly formed material and social questions of the 19th century. 
74 This historical background has not necessarily been an advantage for posterity for, like the 19th century which 
is known for the borrowing and the compiling of various forms and styles from the past, Dühring has often been 
- unfairly in our opinion - labeled an eclectic thinker. In a book which otherwise provides insight into Dühring’s 
critique of history, Jürgen Große has renewed the eclectic label. Cf. Kritik der Geschichte (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2007), 179. 
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Much like his paragon Friedrich List, Dühring possessed an enormous capacity for work and 
produced a voluminous amount of literature. He published five books within two years in 
1865-1866: Natural Dialectic, Carey’s Revolution in the Teachings of Political Economy and 
Social Science, The Worth of Life, Capital and Labor and finally Critical Foundation of 
Political Economy. Whether Dühring's claim that the university professors were jealous of his 
intellectual productivity is valid or not cannot be determined, but this flood of publications 
was probably not beneficial for an academic career in Germany at the time, which was known 
to develop slowly over a long period. In 1866, Dühring sought a promotion to become an 
associate professorship based on his academic achievements and teaching success. His 
dissertational mentor Prof. Trendelenburg advised him to apply for the subject of political 
economy as there were currently too many philosophy professors. Dühring took this advice, 
but his application remained unanswered. In the meantime, a philosophy chair opened with 
the sudden death of a professor. He applied immediately, but Prof. Trendelenburg, despite the 
friendly advice he had given six months earlier, explained to the university officials that the 
post must be filled by a “real philosopher”, not with a “cameralist” like Dühring.75 Dühring 
had published two philosophical works the year before, Natural Dialectic and The Worth of 
Life, and had held successful lectures on philosophy, but was apparently disparaged because 
he had extended his studies to the field of political economy.76  
The faculty also hurt his pride. Without any initiative from Dühring, a petition to the minister 
of cultural affairs was issued to have Dühring granted a yearly salary to be paid for, not by the 
university, but by the ministry. He saw this offer as condescending pity and rejected it. 
Despite this disappointment, his voluminous publishing had won him a good reputation and 
his writings on political economy had begun to receive the interest of men in high places. He 
was soon to receive a commission from the Prussian government which would have serious 
consequences for his career. 
  
75 „Cameralists“ were the political economists of the Staatswissenschaften. In defense of Trendelenburg, it really 
could be argued that Dühring was heading more in the direction of political economy. At the time in 1866, 
Dühring had just published his book Critical Foundation of National Economy and, with his scholarly opposition 
to the proponents of free trade, had gained notoriety within the Bismarck government. As described in the 
General Introduction, there was a tendency towards specialization which was working against state scientists. 
Even Gustav Schmoller was disparaged (from the other side of the coin) for not being a “real economist”. Cf. 
Breysig, Das neue Geschichtsbild, 70. 
76 The veracity of this claim is challenged by Dühring’s colleague Jürgen Bona Meyer. Cf. idem, “Dühring’s 
Wirklichkeitsphilosophie,” Nord und Süd. Eine deutsche Monatsschrift 15 (1880): 43. Meyer was also of the 
opinion that Dühring underestimated the administrative functions of a tenured professor in applying for the chair, 
and that a blind man would not be able to uphold the oath to “alle Pflichten gleich den Collegen zu 
übernehmen.” Ibid., 42. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CAREER AS AN ACADEMIC AND SCIENTIFIC AUTHOR (1868-1877) 
 
1. Brush with the Prussian Ministry: The Social Exposé Scandal of 1868 
In our discussion of typologies of scholars in the General Introduction, we invoked the 
“controversial scholar”, who draws attention from the public. Dühring was soon to take on 
this role through a public scandal which he did not create himself, but which would entail 
unforeseen consequences for his career as an academic and as a writer. He had already 
become a well-known figure in university circles, as Nietzsche had indicated in1868, but he 
was about to become well known to the public at large.   
In contrast to the ruling circles of England and France, the ethos of the middle class was not 
especially pronounced in the German government. 77  Whereas in both England and France 
the bourgeoisie had staged successful revolutions in (1688 and 1789 respectively), the 
German national state of Dühring’s day was not the product of a revolution. After 1848 parts 
of the German middle class gravitated towards the protection of conservative forces; some 
allied themselves with economic liberalism, others became apolitical and turned to “culture”. 
In short, there was no unified bourgeois tradition in Germany. In line with this, Dühring’s own 
bearing towards the middle class in his country was ambivalent. He venerates the French 
Revolution and its values, but exactly how “liberty, equality, and brotherhood” were to be 
achieved remained open. Despite his enthusiasm for the rise of the bourgeoisie as a class in 
Europe since 1789, and despite his own middle-class origin, Dühring became extremely wary 
of laissez-faire economic liberalism, which was rapidly gaining a stronghold in Germany at 
the time. Put off by British “Manchesterism”, as British economic liberalism came to be 
called in Germany, he sought favor with the working class, but also maintained a rapport with 
members of the upper class, as would soon be evidenced. 
In 1865 Dühring came into contact with Lothar Bucher, one of Chancellor Bismarck's closest 
advisors and a man whose writings on Comte and Hegel Dühring had read with interest in the 
Berlin Nationalzeitung.78 Bucher had read Dühring's books and recommended him for a 
position to take over the political economic articles for a leading journal, the Preußische 
77 Hanno Kesting, Geschichtsphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg, 131. 
78 Bucher was critical of the Hegelians, calling them the “priests of the absolute”. This is mentioned by Dühring. 
Cf.  “Die Philosophie im Jahre 1865,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1866): 579. 
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Staatsanzeiger. 79 This position did not pan out, but Bucher suggested that Dühring try to 
write a “social exposé” for Chancellor Bismarck, which might help him gain a 
professorship.80 Dühring was visited in April by a high counselor from the Prussian state 
ministry, Hermann Wagener, who asked him if he would write a social exposé for the state on 
policies that could be undertaken to improve the situation of the workers, along the lines of 
those already suggested by Dühring in his writings. Wagener, the former editor of the 
conservative Kreuzzeitung, said that Chancellor Bismarck had taken an interest in Dühring’s 
Critical Foundation of Political Economy and would like a position paper on how this policy 
could be achieved. 81   
According to his autobiography, Dühring took the commission not only because he was 
honored, but also because he felt that it would be good for him to have support in the 
government for his debates with the free traders and the historical school. 82 He finished the 
writing by the middle of June 1866 and sent it to the ministry only to have it apparently lost in 
a sea of bureaucracy, or so he thought. Soon thereafter, the political goals of the ministry were 
changed when the Austro-Prussian War broke out on 14 June. The issues regarding the social 
question and the workers movement, the subject of the social exposé, seemed to have no 
longer been a priority for Bismarck, and Dühring believed that his writing had been forgotten 
completely. 
The next year Dühring was paid a visit by the economist Karl Heinrich Rodbertus, who 
informed him that he had recently read a vituperative review in the journal Vierteljahresschrift 
79 According to Hugo Ball, who quotes Mehring, Karl Marx was offered the position before Dühring but turned 
it down. Hugo Ball, Critique of the German Intelligentsia, translated by Brian L. Harris (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 256. 
80 Cf. Bucher to Dühring, 22 October 1865, Box 6, HA/SBB. In this letter Bucher wants to arrange a meeting 
between Dühring and the Prussian minister Zitelmann, presumably to discuss Dühring writing an exposé for the 
government. Bucher mentions he has just read a review Dühring’s Natural Dialectic, which he has, with some 
difficulty, also begun reading, and now, “inspired by the memory of his deceased friend Lassalle” looks forward 
to reading Dühring’s other book (presumably Capital and Labor). Dühring commented in his later years that 
Bucher, who lived as a correspondent in London after fleeing from Germany amid the 1848 revolution, let 
himself be influenced by the anti-revolutionary conservative manner of the English. PE 369 (May 1917): 2946.  
81 The Prussian government’s motive in commissioning the social exposé is not certain. As Nipperdey points out, 
Bismarck and Wagener were interested in trying to generate support among the working class for the monarchy. 
Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866, 247. One method of doing this would be to show support for labor coalitions in 
Prussia – as Dühring did in the exposé (cf. Chapter Six below), which had been banned in Prussia since 1844. 
Vollgraf points out that the Bismarck government was interested in instituting a series of measures designed to 
attain a level of domestic stability in order to prepare militarily for an inevitable conflict with Austria. One of 
Bismarck’s tactics, according to Vollgraf, was to politically engage his opponents in reform projects for the 
government in order to neutralize them; gestures had been made to Lassalle and Marx which were unsuccessful. 
Carl-Erich Vollgraf, „Ein ‚Handgemenge‘ im Vorfeld des ‚Anti-Dühring,‘“ in Kritik und Geschichte der MEGA, 
ed. Carl-Erich Vollgraf et al.(Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 1992, 109. The fact that Dühring’s exposé was later 
published by the government would seem to contradict this thesis, though. 
82 SLF, 137. 
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für Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte of an anonymously published paper, which seemed 
to bear an uncanny similarity to Dühring’s work in style and content. Indeed, without 
Dühring’s knowledge and permission, the social exposé he had been commissioned to write 
had been published anonymously under the title Exposé on the Economic Associations and 
Social Coalitions (Denkschrift über die wirtschaftlichen Assoziationen und socialen 
Coalitionen). Dühring was taken aback as the exposé had been written for Chancellor 
Bismarck alone and was not intended for publication. For him it was an egregious breach of 
the agreement made with Wagener, and he felt his honor had been insulted. Upon ordering the 
publication from a book dealer (now in its second edition), he was shocked, and further 
outraged, to read that Wagener himself was credited as author! Dühring petitioned Bismarck 
to have disciplinary action taken against Wagener and called for Wagener’s resignation as well 
as a public apology - both of which did not follow. As things would have it, Wagener himself 
felt insulted by Dühring’s harsh critique of his person and he threatened to file a lawsuit 
against Dühring. Wagener then gave a public declaration in the Vossische Zeitung, which was 
then printed by other newspapers and also found an echo in the satirical magazines. The 
Berlin Kladderadatsch in particular highlighted the incident in several polemical 
commentaries.83 The controversy did not die down as Wagener soon tried to place the blame 
for the affair on the publisher of the text in Leipzig, who in turn publicly denied any blame. 
Dühring launched a civil suit for damage incurred which was first rejected in court and then 
accepted in appeal. He declined to accept the money awarded to him in order to show the 
public that it was not a money issue but a matter of principle. Between the two court 
decisions, Dühring published a book on the incident titled The Fate of My Social Exposé for 
the Prussian State Ministry. Likewise a Contribution to the Rights of Authors and the Use of 
Justice.84  
As Vollgraf has shown, the social exposé scandal made waves among leading socialist 
intellectuals. Karl Marx was informed about the event by his friend Sigismund Borkheim, a 
revolutionary democrat, as well as by Louis Kugelmann. Karl Wilhelm Eichorff was also sent 
83 In one issue, the magazine had a caricature of two men, one of whom was standing on the cover of a book 
which read “Exposé for Wagener” and the other standing next him making threatening gestures.  Kladderdatsch. 
Humoristisch-satyrisches Wochenblatt 14 and 15(29 March 1868).    
84 Kladderdatsch magazine reacted to Dühring’s almost pedantically detailed account of the incident as follows: 
“Der Privatdozent Dr. Dühring soll als Motto zu seinem neusten Werk und zur Sicherung vor unbeugter 
Aneignung seiner Gedanken den bekannten Schulkinderspruch gewählt haben: ‘Dieses Büchlein hab ich lieb; 
Wer mir’s stiehlt, der ist ein Dieb.” (As a motto for his new book to prevent the unlawful acquisition of his 
thoughts, the university lecturer Dr. Dühring should have used the well-known schoolchild’s saying: ‘I love this 
little book. Whoever steals it from me is a thief.’) Kladderdatsch. Humoristisch-Satyrisches Wochenblatt 12 (15 
March 1868). 
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a copy of the exposé. 85 Dühring had suddenly become a well-known and likeable figure for 
socialist agitators who were looking for intellectual leadership. The confrontation between 
Dühring and Wagener would continue to surface in the press from time to time in the years 
that followed. Dühring was seen as a courageous fighter against the arbitrary measures of the 
Prussian state and its inscrupulous civil servants.86 The incident appears not to have tarnished 
Wagener’s career, although he later ran into trouble when in 1873 he was forced to resign 
from the Prussian ministry due to charges of illegal profiteering made by Eduard Lasker. 
Wagener, of whose life the poet Theodor Fontane said contained “much light and many 
shadows”, died in 1889. He is still listed today as the author of Dühring’s exposé.87    
2. Academic Accolades amid Mounting Conflict at the University 
The social exposé scandal was a harbinger of conflict yet to come with the university. The 
Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin had been established in 1809 during the occupation of 
Prussia by the French. It was unique in that it was founded specifically upon philosophical 
ideals, and it would become a model for all German universities as well as for many 
universities abroad. Under the influence of the linguistic scientist Wilhelm von Humboldt, the 
Berlin University was meant to follow a philosophical concept which advocated a 
combination of research and teaching, free science for its own sake and the development of 
character. Schelsky has emphasized that the salient point in the ideals of the university's 
founding was the concept of "seclusion and freedom" (Einsamkeit und Freiheit). The 
advocacy of seclusion for scholars and students was based on the old and often confirmed 
assumption that truth, and even more the continual search for truth, involve seclusion. As soon 
as truth is applied to practice, it inevitably becomes entwined with the interests of society that 
then serve to compromise it. The pure search for truth becomes then socially cancelled. 
Therefore, true freedom in science involves seclusion; seclusion and freedom are two sides of 
the same coin.88  
Another aspect of the ideals set forth at the founding of the university was the function of the 
free lecturer who was not paid by the university, but rather exercised his trade freely, apart 
from the influence of the state. The lecturer announced his lectures and waited to see if 
85 Cf. Vollgraf, “Ein ‚Handgemenge‘,“ 115-117. 
86 Vollgraf cites an article from the journal Die Wage, titled “Hermann Wagener. Ein Schattenbild”, where 
Wagener is unfavorably portrayed as having stolen a poor blind man’s intellectual property. Vollgraf, op. cit., 
117. 
87 For the Fontane quote, see M. Kramer, “Theodor Fontanes Erinnerungen an H.W.,” Deutsche Rundschau 192 
(July-Sept. 1922, article written 1890): 50. Wagener is still listed as the author of Dühring’s paper in the online 
encyclopedia Wikipedia’s entry on Hermann Wagener,. 
88 Schelsky, Einsamkeit und Freiheit. Idee und Gestalt der deutschen Universität und ihrer Reformen, 79 et seq. 
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students would attend. The bulk of his pay was the money which he received from the 
students who paid to attend the lectures. The credits given to the students for attending the 
lecture of the Privatdozent were the same as those for attending the tenured professors' 
lectures, but because the lecturers were not involved in the testing of students, the students 
tended to attend the lectures of the professors who would be testing them later. Generally, the 
position of Privatdozent was seen in a negative light. As Köhnke has pointed out, it was not 
easy to make a living as a non-tenured lecturer, and in Berlin it was only privately wealthy 
individuals, such as the philosophers Prantl and Bona Meyer, who were not forced to struggle 
to make ends meet.89 Dühring had to supplement his income from the university with private 
tutoring, the most lucrative of which was preparing candidates to prepare for state exams 
required to become government administrators.90  
Dühring occupied the position of lecturer with great success, however, earning a good 
reputation throughout Germany. The aggressive insulting tones, which his writing would take 
on later, and for which he would become known for, contradicted his outward appearance as a 
distinguished-looking scholar.91 He was a likeable and popular professor. Hundreds of 
students came to his lectures, which were held twice a week in the university’s largest 
auditorium. Through the public attention that the exposé scandal received, he had attained a 
degree of notoriety in the German public. Public sympathy was clearly on the side of the blind 
lecturer whose work had been taken by a Prussian high official. In the coming years, Dühring 
would gain more notoriety through further conflict he had with the administration of the 
university. Following his unsuccessful attempt to become a professor of philosophy in 1866, 
he had already begun to become more vocal in his critique of the university.92 Although he 
had upset the university establishment, his popularity among the student body increased 
enormously. His lectures were filled and he soon gained a good reputation not just in Berlin 
but throughout Germany. Dühring appealed not only to students, but also to young political 
activists. He relished being in the spotlight of the nation’s capital, when other professors were 
less enthusiastic about the politicized setting. The conservative historian Heinrich von 
Treitschke, for example, who had just moved from Heidelberg to Berlin, frowned upon the 
conditions of the University of Berlin, which, as he wrote, were influenced by the “scandal 
89 Köhnke, Die Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus, 147. 
90 Cf. SLF, 123-127. 
91 Dühring was above average height and had a lively high-pitched voice. Despite the hard knocks which life 
dealt him, his face had no deep wrinkles and was evenly proportioned; he had blue eyes and light brown hair. (cf. 
Appendices). Like his son Ulrich, he had distinguished-looking nose and a high forehead. 
92 Dühring applied for and did not get the chair for philosophy which was vacated by the Hegelian Leopold von 
Henning (1791-1866). 
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hungry press” and “screamers like Dühring”.93 It is doubtful that Treitschke ever attended a 
lecture of Dühring’s, because according to all accounts he was anything but a screamer, 
although the content of his lectures did create turbulence.94 One of the main reasons for 
Dühring's popularity among students and young intellectuals of the day was his ability to 
present complex abstract concepts in a clear, demonstrative fashion. Gustav Landauer would 
later speak of this aspect of Dühring’s thought. His work, according to Landauer, was more 
“visually perceptive” (anschaulich) and understandable than Marx’s. It seems that Dühring 
was able to use his handicap to his advantage: unable to rely on notes or written material, he 
spoke freely in his lectures, making his teaching easier to follow.95  
Not only did his style of delivery contrast with the established professors, Dühring’s lectures 
presented more than mere academic discourse; they advocated a cause backed up by the 
personal convictions of a man who did not have the security of being a civil servant with an 
insured position with the state. As will be shown in our treatment of his Weltanschauung, 
Dühring’s thought, although inherently rational, was based on forces deeper than reason; his 
lectures and his writings were conceived to incite emotion and a will to action among his 
listeners. His ideas were more than just a dry theory; they were above all a command to take 
part in the reforming of society. Not surprisingly, he was increasingly seen as a persona non 
grata by the tenured professors, and his writings were often condemned.96 Overall, despite the 
disfavor of the faculty, he was able to build on the popularity that he had gained from his 
teaching and the public sympathy he received from the Exposé scandal through successful 
book publishing. As mentioned, after he had established himself by writing for various 
journals and magazines, he was able to find publishers for his first four books (Carey’s 
Revolution of Political Economy, The Worth of Life, Natural Dialectic und Capital and 
Labor), which had been laying and waiting to be published for some time. In 1866 he 
published Critical Foundation of Political Economy which laid the basis of his own teachings. 
Up to this point, his writings had been mostly scientific in their nature and free from the 
93 Treitschke to Gustav Freitag, 19 December 1875, in Gustav Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke im 
Briefwechsel, ed. Alfred Dove (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1900), 171. 
94 The Swiss philosopher and then student in Berlin August Stadler wrote to Friedrich Albert Lange that Dühring 
seemed to him to be a gifted and unusually well-read man who holds his lectures in the tone of a conversation 
and intentionally shows the audience his partiality through bitter comments. Stadter to Lange, 19 July 1872, in 
Friedrich Albert Lange. Über Politik und Philosophie. Briefe und Leitartikel 1862-1875, ed. Georg Eckert 
(Duisburg: Walter Braun, 1968), 365.  
95 Gustav Landauer, „Referat über Eugen Dühring’s ‚Kursus der National- und Sozialoekonomie‘,“ Der Sozialist 
35 (27 August 1892). It is known that the spoken word, or rather the word in general, has an intense meaning for 
the blind; the word becomes a substitute for the sense that is lost through a redirection of energy. 
96 Wilhlem Dilthey cites Dühring’s “passion of polemic which entices immature readers, but appalls more level-
headed ones”. Dilthey, “Karl Eugen Dühring, Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie und des Sozialismus,“  
in Wilhelm Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften 17, ed. Karlfried Gründer (Leipzig: Teuber, 1974), 360-361. 
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polemical style which was to characterize his later work. With his 1867 book Carey’s 
Belittlers and the Crisis of Political Economy, Dühring gave a taste of the harsh polemics 
which he would become known for. Whereas the first book on Carey two years earlier was a 
positive portrayal of the American's teachings, this book was an open attack on Carey's 
opponents and the professors who disparaged the American scholar. Dühring was a great 
admirer of Carey's clear and popular style, and at this time his ambitions began to center not 
only around recording his own views on science and philosophy, but also on formulating them 
in a way that would find resonance in a young reading audience. He saw the publication of 
this book in defense of Carey as his having “crossed the Rubicon”.97  
Although critical of the historical school of political economy, Dühring published a series of 
histories himself, which will be dealt with in detail below. As will be shown, he saw history 
primarily as having an ancillary role to science and – at least in his day – not yet science 
itself. His histories were designed to support his own system of thought, which had taken 
form in the Critical Foundation of Political Economy. In 1869, he published his Critical 
History of Philosophy, which emphasized not only the teachings of the great philosophers, but 
also their characters and dispositions (Gesinnungen). This book represented the beginnings of 
the "personalism" which he would advocate later in his career; individualism became an 
important principle for Dühring of evaluating science. The book was heavily criticized in the 
academic world, but was a publishing success. In 1871 he published a book on the history of 
political economy and socialism titled Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism, as 
well as his economics textbook Cursus of Political Economy (Cursus der National- und 
Socialökonomie). 
In these early years, Dühring became perhaps the most prolific scholar of his generation, a 
feat made all the more impressive when one considers that he was working as a blind man. It 
was in these years that two of his most scholarly works were completed. The first was The 
Law of the Geneva Convention. History, Analysis and Experience; Critique and Suggestions 
for Continuation, written shortly after the end of the Franco-Prussian war in 1871 and Critical 
History of the General Principles of Mechanics.98 The books were written completely free 
from any of the subjective and politically motivated outburst, which would characterize all of 
his work from 1873 onwards; the former book argues for the implementation of more humane 
customs of war and gives testimony to Dühring’s study of law as well as being a strong 
97 SLF, 135. 
98 Das Recht der Genfer Convention. Geschichte, Erläuterungen und Erfahrungen; Kritik und Vorschläge zur 
Fortbildung, unpublished manuscript, in Dühring Papers, HA/SBB. 
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indication of his left-wing credentials. The work, which may have been written for a literary 
contest, was never published.  
The second book, Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics, was submitted to a 
competition of the Benecke Foundation at Göttingen University.99 Among the judges of the 
contest were the physicist Wilhelm Weber and the philosopher Hermann Lotze.100 Of the five 
anonymously submitted papers, Dühring’s work won first prize. His paper was praised in a 
public meeting of the faculty on 11 March 1872. The committee spoke of “complete and free 
command of the matter and amazing extension of exact literary knowledge”. Dühring 
succeeded in showing the “whole intellectual signature of the age”. His writing style was 
emphasized as was the book’s “warm recognition of each achievement, the explanation of the 
unsuccessful and the conservation by which the mistakes were overcome”. Dühring’s talent 
for instruction was also cited. Lotze spoke of Dühring’s manuscript in a letter that the book 
was “more fitting, more intelligent and aesthetic” than anything he had read in a long time.101 
Not to be forgotten is that up to that point Dühring was known for his work in the field of 
philosophy and political economy, and none of the judges would have expected him to be a 
candidate. He was sure that if they had known who had written it, he would not have received 
the award.102 He was awarded 500 Thalers of gold for his efforts and the official final 
judgment released on 13 March 1872 read as follows:  
The fifth work with the saying "S'il y a quelque-chose" etc. comprising 586 closely written 
folio pages required a considerable though agreeably worthwhile effort from the faculty. On 
99 The foundation sponsoring the award was created through the will of councilor C.G. Benecke, who wished to 
leave a commemoration for his brother F. E. Benecke, who had also been somewhat of a “controversial scholar” 
in his day. Professor Benecke taught philosophy at Berlin University but was dismissed in 1822 at Hegel’s 
behest for allegedly advocating materialism. He was ultimately readmitted to the university after Hegel’s death, 
but took his own life at the age of 57 in 1854. KGM,VI-VII.   
100 Wilhelm Weber (1804-1891), a physicist who invented the electromagnetic telegraph, was known for 
controversy himself, having been one of the “Göttingen Seven” professors who lost their positions at the 
university for refusing to sign an oath to the King of Hannover. Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) was a philosopher 
and physiologist who held the notion that the inorganic and organic world is determined mechanically. In a letter 
to the publisher Salomon Hirzel, Lotze issued great praise for Dühring’s writing and looked forward to finding 
out who had written the work. “Bisher war ich durch zwei Dinge verhindert; zuerst hatte ich fünf Preisschriften 
für die Facultät zu lese, worunter eine, 586 enge Folioseiten, mir viele Zeit kostete, freilich auch die Mühe 
lohnte. Es war eine Geschichte der Prinzipien der Mechanik, so vortrefflich, so klug und schön, wie ich seit 
lange kein Buch gelesen; ich bin höchst neugierig, am 2. April in feierlicher Fakultätssitzung den Verfasser 
kennen zu lernen und ich wünsch ihm, daß er mit seinem prächtigen Buche den Weg zu Ihrem Verlag finden 
möge.“ Hermann Lotze. Briefe und Dokumente. Zusammengestellt, eingelietet und kommentiert von Reinhardt 
Pester, ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth (Würzberg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003), 558. Ironically, Dühring had 
written two less than favorable reviews of Lotze’s books, one published one year before the contest. Cf.  
Dühring, “Lotze, Mikrokosmos, Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit,” Ergänzungsblätter 
zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1866): 513-516. “Lotze, Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland,” 
Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 3 (1868): 385-388. 
101 Cf. Lotze’s letter to his publisher Hierzel from 28 December 1871, in Siegmund Posner, Abriß der 
Philosophie Eugen Dührings (Breslau: H. Fleischmann, 1906), 16. 
102 SLF, 149. 
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account of its extensive index, the work excites the hope that all questions which the faculty 
recommended for treatment will indeed be given careful consideration by the author. And this 
hope is fully justified in the realization of the work. Not only are all the essential points treated 
with consummate command of the topic and an extraordinarily precise knowledge of the 
literature, but also a large number of more minor discussions – which the faculty would not 
have deemed indispensable, but welcomes nevertheless since they contribute everywhere to a 
fuller understanding – testify to the great love and care with which the author has gone about 
his task. The extraordinary material thus amassed is mastered with a competence no less 
extraordinary. The author does not separate presentation and criticism, but combines them as 
he charts the successive epochs in the history of mechanics; thanks to his fine feeling for clear 
structuring of the mass of material, the author is able to cast an instructive historical light, such 
as the faculty desired most of all, on the intellectual spirit of the age, the scientific character of 
the leading personalities, and the evolution of the various principles and theorems. 
Furthermore, none of the particular requirements set for the task has been overlooked. The 
original problems which led to the emergence of each new principle or theorem are 
reproduced with perfect clarity, and the gradual transformation to which each has been subject 
is pursued meticulously through all its intermediate stages. There is no shying away from 
points of contact between ideas of mechanics and philosophical speculation; on the contrary, 
they are discussed in separate sections, and the author's subtle philosophical instinct, which 
guides him on this terrain too, is clearly revealed in a large number of general explanatory 
remarks which are skilfully woven into the presentation of mechanical investigations at 
judicious junctures. The pleasant impression made by the whole is enhanced by a style of 
writing very simple yet rich in felicitous turns of phrase, in which accomplishments are 
warmly acknowledged, failures are explained and excused, and mistakes are graciously passed 
over. The faculty has but one reservation. The author goes into great detail when recapitulating 
earlier passages and referring to them; if one imagines the work as a series of lectures, then 
these recapitulations are a well judged method attesting an outstanding gift for teaching; were 
the text printed, they would trouble the reader less than they do in the manuscript version. It is 
worth considering nonetheless whether it may be advisable to lessen the repetitions at least in 
the second half of the manuscript where, on the one hand, the nature of the topic anyway 
necessitates the repetition of the same ideas in different forms, and on the other, the points 
which the author wishes to bring over can be regarded as having been adequately made in 
previous sections. The faculty has no other points to mention. Deeply gratified to be the 
instigator of so fine an achievement which fully meets the requirements and exceeds many 
additional expectations, the faculty has no hesitation in awarding first prize to the author.103 
103 KGM, IV-V (Translation by Giles Shephard). 
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The award increased Dühring’s prestige throughout Germany and abroad.104 Despite the often 
immature and polemical tones that his work had shown, as well as the lack of reverence that 
he had displayed towards the tenured professors of the German universities, the award and his 
other publishing successes offered him a chance of gaining a professorship. A letter from Karl 
Snell to Hermann Lotze shows that Dühring was seriously considered for a position in Jena 
which had opened up by the retirement of the philosopher Conrad Fischer in the fall of 1872. 
Snell, a professor in Jena, wrote Lotze saying that several of his colleagues had been eying 
Dühring because of his prize writing on the history of mechanics. Snell mentions that there 
were some reservations because of the disrespectful tone with which Dühring spoke of the 
greatest philosophers in his history of philosophy. He writes, however, that the sample of 
Dühring’s comments gave him the impression of “unruly creative energy combined with 
youthful cockiness”; he cannot believe that Dühring would continue this “offensive tone of 
judgment” after his successful prize writing.105 He asks Lotze to write a short comment on 
Dühring. If Lotze replied is unknown. Dühring did not get the position and Rudolf Eucken 
became Fischer’s successor. 
Despite the award given to him by the academic establishment, Dühring's critique of the 
university persisted, and even escalated in the second edition of Critical History of Political 
Economy and Socialism, which was published at the end of 1874. Here he went on the 
offensive against some of his professor colleagues at the University of Berlin, citing the 
names of the "socialists of the chair" (Kathedersozialisten), e.g. Gustav Schmoller, Adolph 
Wagner, Lujo Brentano and Adolf Held. Dühring expressed open disdain for the 
Kathedersozialists, of whom H. L. Mencken once disparagingly wrote “flirted with radicalism 
with one eye and kept the other upon his chair, his salary and his pension”.106 It did not take 
long for a reaction to follow, and soon Dühring was engaged in yet another public conflict, 
involving another “Wagner”: this time Prof. Adolph Wagner. Wagner, who was called to the 
chair of political economy instead of Dühring in 1870, polemically attacked Dühring in the 
Börsenzeitung. In his writings, Dühring had made disparaging personal remarks against 
Wagner and his father Prof. Rudolf Wagner, implying that the former had been appointed 
professor due to his father's connections. Adolf Wagner used his university lectures to issue 
104 The world renowned physicist Ernst Mach considered Dühring’s book “valuable”. Mach, Die Mechanik in 
ihrer Entwicklung. Historisch-Kritisch dargestellt (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1883), VII. Regarding his influence 
abroad, see the effusively positive treatment of Dühring’s book in a well-known British journal Westminster 
Review. “Science,” Westminster Review 43:2 (April 1873): 592-593.  
105 Karl Snell to Hermann Lotze, 18 November 1872, Briefe und Dokumente. Hermann Lotze, ed. Ernst 
Wolfgang Orth (Würzburg: Könighausen und Neumann, 2003), 576-577. 
106 Mencken, “The Dismal Science,” in Prejudices: First, Second, and Third Series (New York: The Library of 
America, 2010), 466. 
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polemics against Dühring.107 Dühring published a strong reply to Wagner on 15 
December1874, but did not mention Wagner in his lectures although students were expecting 
that he would. Wagner and the university took measures to have Dühring removed, citing his 
article from the Börsenzeitung. Dühring was notified of the case against him by Prof. Zeller 
and given 48 hours to defend himself. The public was clearly on Dühring's side as several 
magazines attacked Wagner. Due to the attention that the case had received, Wagner soon had 
to worry that there would be pressure calling for his own removal should Dühring be 
dismissed. Dühring reports that he was approached by a third party and asked if he would be 
satisfied with the arrangement of a compromise where he would receive a warning, which 
would allow him to continue teaching. Dühring agreed, but only on the condition that Wagner 
receive a warning from the faculty as well.108 The faculty agreed, but to Dühring it was clear 
that his time as a university lecturer would soon be over. He was warned against making 
polemical attacks against his professor colleagues and against the university as an institution. 
After the warning from the faculty Dühring would have five semesters left to teach before he 
would finally lose his position for good. Knowing that he was, as it were, teaching on 
borrowed time, his goal was to "dig in" and prepare for the coming battle. The problems he 
had at the university would soon be extended to a lectureship which he had taken on at 
Victoria-Lyceum, a secondary school for girls which stood at the center of the Berlin women’s 
liberation movement. 
3. Lectureship at Victoria Lyceum 
Dühring had received the commission to teach at Victoria-Lyceum from the recommendation 
of the women’s rights activist Hedwig Dohm, the wife of the satirical magazine 
Kladderadatsch editor Ernst Dohm.109 Frau Dohm belonged to a women’s movement which 
in recent years had made progress through the founding of multiple women’s associations. 
The Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein was founded in Leipzig in 1865 with the goal of 
attaining women’s right of owning property, and also of having the opportunity to be trained 
as teachers and doctors; soon thereafter, the Lette-Verein , named after Adolph Lette, the 
107 Wagner notified Dühring that he had denounced him in his lecture. Wagner to Dühring, 2 December 1874, 
Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. 
108 SLF, 161. Cf. Wagner accepted being reprimanded by the university, but was greatly disappointed that the 
measures against Dühring were not harsher. Cf. Adolf Wagner to Hermann Wagener, 29 January 1875, in Adolf 
Wagner. Briefe, Dokumente, Augenzeugenberichte 1851-1917, ed. Heinrich Rubner (Berlin: Dunker und 
Humblot, 1978), 131. Wagner was so upset by the incident that he expresses his intention to resign his position 
and leave the university (which he ultimately did not do). Cf. Wagner to Hermann Wagener, 17 March 1875, in 
ibid., 133.   
109 Cf. WBF, 65 et seq.; Jakubowski, „Eugen Dühring – Antisemit, Antifeminist und Rassist,“ 73. Reményi, “Der 
Fall Eugen Dühring und die Diskussion um das Frauenstudium,” in Geschlechtsverhältnisse in Medizin, 
Naturwissenschaft und Technik (Bassum: GNT-Verlag, 1996), 270-273.  
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president of the Centralverein, an association for the prosperity of the working class, was 
founded.  
Dohm and her daughter attended the Victoria Lyceum, an institution in close contact with the 
Lette-Verein, founded in 1868 by the Englishwoman Georgina Archer with the goal of giving 
women instruction similar to what was offered at the universities. She originally approached 
Dühring to hold tutorials in her home, hoping to supplement the instruction she was receiving 
at the Lyceum.110 Having enjoyed Dühring’s lectures, she approached Archer about having 
Dühring teach at the Lyceum, and Ms. Archer agreed.111 Beginning in 1873, Dühring gave 
lectures on subjects ranging from philosophy to the greats of modern literature. It appears that 
the lectures were a success.  
Dohm’s letters to Dühring indicate that the two of them had a cordial relationship.112 She 
showed him support and sympathy during the public controversy with Adolph Wagner, 
speaking of an “unbelievable and dishonorable persecution”. In the same letter, she passes 
along the message from her husband that an article to Dühring’s defense will appear in the 
National Zeitung.113 Some weeks later Dühring asked Dohm if she could help him by finding 
someone to write an article against the university on his behalf. She responded: “My husband 
has agreed to write the article in question from your material and will submit it to Die 
Gegenwart”. The letter indicates that the matter was apparently important enough to Dühring 
for him to arrange a visit to the Dohms’ home. 114 
The board of trustees of the school consisted of Rudolf Virchow as well as Anna Helmholtz 
(neé von Mohl), the wife of Hermann Helmholtz.115 After three years of successful teaching at 
the school, due to pressure from the board, he was dismissed in what Dühring saw as an 
indirect university measure taken against him.116 The exact reason for his dismissal is unclear. 
In a letter from 2 May 1876 Mrs. Archer wrote: 
110 Hedwig Dohm to Dühring, 14 November 1872, in the Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. 
111 Cf. Georgina Archer to Dohm, no date, in the Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. 
112 The fact that the Dohms were Jewish does not seem to have been an issue for Dühring, who, as we will see 
below, would later be known for his strong anti-Semitic views. 
113 Hedwig Dohm to Dühring, 19 January 1876, in the Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. 
114 Dohm to Dühring 11 February 1876, in the Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. Ernst Dohm’s article in support 
of Dühring was published shortly thereafter. Optimus (Dohm), “Aus der philosophischen Facultät,” Die 
Gegenwart 10 (1876): 154-155. 
115 Anna Helmholtz was the daughter of the well-known law professor Robert von Mohl. Dühring made a point 
of pointing out that the university elite intermarried among themselves, an issue which is also expounded upon 
by the Dühringian of the Weimar Republic Gustav Michaelis in his article “Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte der 
Remotion Eugen Dührings,” Propagandablätter für Dühringsche Geisteshaltung und Lebensgestaltung (Juli 
1927): 13. 
116 SLF, 166.  
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 Dear Sir 
I regretted exceedingly having been forced to be absent last Wednesday at your closing 
lecture. I had to wait for my Dr. who did not keep his time, I was thus forced to omit my usual 
duty. – Closing has always something very sad about it. More especially when it comes to a 
last close. The lyceum has enjoyed the fruit of your labors now for quite a series of years, and 
for what you have given in that time we desire to return our warm thanks. Many (…) have 
increased their store of knowledge and ideas. With kind regards I remain 
Yours truly Archer117 
Upon his dismissal, Dühring felt obliged to give a public statement as to what occurred and 
believed that using his “old means” of going to the press - a critical weapon of the 
“controversial scholar”- was also necessary to protect himself from being fired by the 
university right away.118 Soon thereafter he published his short pamphlet Women’s Path to 
Higher Vocational Training and the Means of Teaching at the Universities. As will be shown 
in detail below in the portrayal of his system, Dühring held very liberal views for his day on 
the role of women in society. Although the charge was publically denied by Helmholtz, it 
seems plausible that the discontinuation of Dühring’s contract came about due to Dühring’s 
rows at the university.119 
4. Rising Influence in the Social Democratic Movement 
As will be shown in the portrayal of his worldview below, Dühring moves from an intense 
study of Schopenhauer’s philosophy towards creating his own concept of reality (or “the 
actual”, as we will translate it) which involves ideas of socialist reform. The social exposé 
scandal of 1868 had captured the eyes of some of the most influential intellectuals of the 
Social Democratic movement, Karl Marx included. The fact that Dühring was a real opponent 
of the Prussian state spoke for Dühring in their eyes, and thus they began to give him more 
attention. Dühring’s evening lectures at the Berlin University became very popular among 
Social Democrats and socialists, as did his presentations in front of union organizations. His 
books were available in union libraries.120 Here was a young socialist thinker seemingly 
uninfluenced by the, as many saw it, flawed and conservative Hegelian philosophy, who was 
117 Georgina Archer to Dühring 2 May 1876, in Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. 
118 SLF, 2nd edition,176. 
119 Interestingly, Dühring’s successor at Victoria Lyceum, the philosopher Friedrich Paulsen, was years later also 
dismissed from the school by Ms. Archer, apparently for making a “poltically incorrect” remark critical of the 
banker Bleichröder, which may have been interpreted by a board member attending the lecture (Bleichröder’s 
sister-in-law) as being anti-Semitic. Cf. James C. Albisetti, Schooling German Girls and Women (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988) 118-119. 
120 Vollgraf, “Ein ‘Handgemenge‘,” 117. Vollgraf makes reference to the Berliner Handwerker-Verein at 
Sophienstr. 15, where Dühring also held lectures. 
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completely independent of Marx and now espousing his own concrete plans for changing 
society through science. For many young socialists, Dühring's vivid, demonstrative style of 
presenting his theories was a breath of fresh air from the abstract often clumsily expressed 
concepts of Marx.  
In the years that followed the exposé scandal, he sharpened his critique of the Prussian 
government and its ideological representatives. The unification of Germany and the Paris 
Commune seem to have caused him to all but abandon his views of the nation as being a 
viable intermediary for social development.121 His book Critical History of Political Economy 
and Socialism, published in 1870 but dated 1871, was an attack on the various “Gods” of the 
German intellectual elite. In the events that would lead to Engel’s “anti-Dühring” in 1877, 
Dühring drew first blood, so to speak, already in 1870. He maintains that if one takes away 
the plump pseudo-dialectic, the only thing left in Das Kapital is the determination of value 
through work and here, in his opinion, Marx has two different portrayals of value, one of 
which aims to be popular and is completely “illogical, clumsy and convoluted” and an 
“effrontery to the taste of a clear wording and structure”.122 Dühring also attacked Marx in 
public lectures, where he labeled Marxism a “symptom for the influence of a branch of new 
sect scholasticism”.123 At the same time Dühring began a battle on a second front against the 
leading university political economists Wilhelm Roscher and Adolf Held (in the second 
edition he widened the scope of his critique to include the Kathedersozialisten, i.e. the 
socialist of the chair).124 In a letter to Engels, Adolf Hepner writes of Dühring: “He walks to 
the beat of a different drummer, hating Marx and Roscher with the same fire, independent in 
political economy as well as in philosophy and yet so independent that you don’t know at all 
where he stands.”125 It was Dühring’s recalcitrance combined with scholarly erudition which 
seems to have attracted many prominent leaders such as Wilhelm Liebknecht, August Bebel, 
and Johann Most to Dühring.126 His theoretical concept of unjust government armed with 
121 As will be shown below, Dühring would continue to hold on to List’s “national principle”, but not only as it 
applied to whole nations in an international context, but rather as applied to small societal groups vying to better 
their positions. In the decades to come he would gravitate more towards the idea of “race” as a metaphysical 
intermediate reality between the individual and mankind. Cf. Voelske, Die Entwicklung des “rassischen 
Antisemitismus”  zum Mittelpunkt der Weltanschauung Eugen Dührings, 22. 
122 Cf. Carl-Erich Vollgraf, „Marx‘ ‚Randnoten‘ zu Dührings ‚Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie‘,“ 
MEGA, 236-237.  
123 Ibid., 237.  
124 For a comparison of Dühring and Roscher’s perspectives on history cf. Jürgen Distler, Ursprung und 
Entwicklung der deutschsprachigen Literatur zur Lehrgeschichte der Nationalökonomie. (Dissertation Johannes 
Gutenberg-Universität in Mainz: 1971), 111 et seq. 
125 Vollgraf, 239. 
126 Regarding Dühring’s influence on the workers movement see Rjazanov, D. B. „Fünfzig Jahre Anti-Dühring,“ 
Unter dem Banner des Marxismus 2 (1928): 446-487. Adamiak, Richard, „Marx, Engels, Dühring,“ Journal of 
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force (der Gewaltstaat) as a historical entity also a struck a chord with Social Democrats, who 
were worried about the worshiping of the state done by many socialists. Eduard Bernstein in 
particular was interested in Dühring’s underlining of the liberal elements in socialism (an 
aspect of Dühring’s thought which would later be developed by Franz Oppenheimer). 
Dühring’s futuristic vision of a free society, which would do away with the salary system, 
socialize all human conditions, and establish equality through economic communes captured 
the minds of many young socialists. Bernstein remembered:  
Instead of the battle cry hail Marx, hail Lassalle, another battle cry seemed to appear, namely: 
hail Dühring, hail Marx and Lassalle. My efforts were more than a little to blame for this [. . .] 
Eugen Dühring’s Cursus der Nationalökonomie und des Sozialismus appeared in late autumn 
of 1872. This greatly strengthened my interest in the blind scholar, whose book Critical 
History of Political Economy and Socialism I had already read. He was wholeheartedly 
devoted to socialism, and the pragmatic-positive form which he taught it spoke to me all the 
more, as the socialism in those days in Germany, since the days of Marx and Engels 
Communist Manifesto, had brought forth no all encompassing portrayal of the basic thoughts 
and the goals of the socialist movement; the manifesto limited itself to sweeping declarations 
which appeared to me to no longer be sufficient for the needs of the socialist movement as it 
had developed. Nearly all of the socialists who I, an enthusiast of his works, introduced to 
Dühring saw this the way that I did.127  
We see that it was the realism inherent in Dühring’s approach which found favor with 
Bernstein. It is also worth noting that this “incipient Dühringianism” germinated, like other 
radical movements of history, in prison, isolated from the on-goings of the discourse of 
everyday political activism. Both Bebel and Most, the two key figures involved in spreading 
Dühring’s ideas, read Dühring in prison. Bernstein continues: 
One of the first men I introduced to Dühring was August Bebel, imprisoned in Hubertusberg, 
whom I visited in the summer of 1873 and gave a copy of Cursus of National and Social 
Economy to. He wrote me an enthusiastic letter about the book and celebrated Dühring with an 
article titled “A New Communist” which appeared in the Leipzig Volksstaat, the central organ 
of the Social Democratic Eisenach Program. Johann Most was captivated no less by the book 
when I gave it to him and other party officials of the Eisenachs. [...] You could call it 
eclecticism all you want, I felt like the socialist movement was big enough to embrace a Marx 
and a Dühring at the same time.128  
the History of Ideas 35 (January-March,1974). Dowe, Dieter and Tenefelde, Klaus, “Zur Rezeption Eugen 
Dührings in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung in den 1870er Jahren,“ 26. 
127 Bernstein, Entwicklungsgang eines Sozialisten, 9 et seq. 
128 Ibid. See also Bernstein’s  Sozialdemokratische Lehrjahre, 52. 
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The fact that that it was assumed by many that the ideas of Dühring and Marx were 
compatible indicates how little credence was given to Marx’s theoretical deliberations in the 
first volume of Das Kapital, which had appeared in 1877, or perhaps to theory in general. 
What seemed to count most was that Dühring, a man of science “from the higher classes” 
(Bebel), was fighting for the workers. When Wilhelm Liebknecht told Bebel that about the 
incompatibility of Dühring and Marx’s method, Bebel replied, “To hell with the method if the 
cause is good”.129  
Later, Franz Mehring spoke of the “glaring emptiness” of the intellectual character of the 
socialist movement at the time.130 A socialist named D.B. Rjazanov looked back on the why 
Dühring became an attractive figure for socialist comrades: “He was a man with encyclopedic 
knowledge who was orientated towards the questions of natural science, philosophy, political 
economy as well as to socialism in an open-minded way”. For Rjazanov, Dühring’s popularity 
lay in that he gave the revolutionary youth a “worldview and a system of opinions with 
answers to damned questions”.131 A Marxist had the Communist Manifesto, but there were no 
facts here to work from; his doctrines were less understandable than Lassalle’s program for 
the workers.132 Dühring’s philosophy became popular because it was directed to concrete 
issues and gave impetus to practical action while at the same time retaining a general 
philosophy to back it up.133 
Ferdinand Lassalle was killed in a duel in 1864 and the fact that his cooperative plan failed to 
reach its goals left many looking for guidance elsewhere. Franz Mehring remarked after 
129 Quoted by Bernstein, “Entwicklungsgang,” 10. August Bebel found Dühring’s idea of nationalizing property 
especially good, but disagreed with him when it came to the question of international socialism. Dühring was of 
the opinion that the socialist movement had to be led by the country that was most advanced economically and 
socially, whereas Bebel thought that socialism could be realized by simultaneous international revolutions. Cf. 
Bebel, “Ein neuer Kommunist,“ Volksstaat 30 and 33 (12 and 20 March 1874).  
130 Mehring, „Sozialistische Chronik,“ Die Grenzboten 37/II, (1878): 31. 
131 Rjazanov, “Fünfzig Jahre Anti-Dühring,” 467. 
132 Ibid., 480. Dowe and Tenefeld also underline the impotence of Marxism in this respect: “Von besonderer 
Bedeutung ist, daß, wie auch Dühring gesehen hat, Marx and Engels nach dem Kommunistischen Manifest, das 
in den 1870er Jahren eine der wesentlichen Propagandaschriften war, keine den Erfordernissen der Zeit 
entsprechende, zusammenfassende, systematisch den Marxismus erschließende Schrift veröffentlicht hatten, die 
zur breiten Agitation hätte herangezogen werden können, zumal das Kaptial von ganz wenigen 
Sozialdemokraten gelesen, geschweige denn verstanden und rezipiert worden war.”  “Zur Rezeption Eugen 
Dührings,” op. cit., 38. 
133 Georg John, a Dühring follower writing in the 1920s, writes that he turned to Dühring after giving up on 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. He wrote: “Ich suchte mir ein anderes praktisches Feld der Betätigung. Ich ließ die 
Philosophie beiseite, um Kenntnisse in der Volkswirtschaftslehre und Sozialökonomie zu sammeln und der 
sozialen Frage näherzutreten, vor allem aber das meinem Stande am nächstliegende, das Bauerntum zu meiner 
Hauptaufgabe zu machen. In diesen Zeitpunkt meiner geistigen Entwicklung fällt nun die Kenntnisnahme 
Dühringscher Werke. Als erstes las ich den "Wert des Lebens”, sodann andere Schriften, um mich dann mir dem 
Inhalt seiner volkswirtschaftlichen Werke vertraut zu machen.“ John, “Mein Weg zu Dühring,” in 
Gemeinverständliche Einführungsschriften, eds. Emil Döll and Hans Reinhardt (Leipzig: Reisland, 1928), 3. 
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Lassalle’s death that his followers and the people who “did not understand Marx’s Kapital in 
its complicated historical dimensions” were strongly drawn to Dühring.134 Dühring’s 
relationship to Lassalle offers further insight into his popularity among socialists. As we have 
seen, Dühring had little but contempt for Marx and his theory, but he held Lassalle in higher 
esteem as a man “with sound instinct”. He credited Lassalle with creating a bridge for the 
workers to receive general suffrage, which went against the Marxist credo of economic 
determination.135  
As will be shown in detail below, Dühring’s suggestions were largely realistic and practically 
orientated. His conviction was that the way to socialism was through peaceful, lawful means, 
as opposed to class struggle, violence, and revolution as proposed by the Marxists, and this 
won him followers. The path which the revisionist movement under Bernstein would later 
take had its foundation in Dühring’s teachings.136 Paradoxically perhaps, although Dühring 
was to no small degree a realist and offered pragmatic impulse to the workers’ movement, he 
was philosophically and ideologically to the left of Marxism in that he attempted to take the 
Enlightenment’s ideals of equality and justice to their farthest and most consistent 
extremes.137 
As we conclude the portrayal of the first half of his career in 1877, shortly before his 
dismissal from the university, Dühring stood at the pinnacle of his career, having completed 
his system of social economics and having laid the foundations of his general worldview and 
ideological bearing which we will now examine. The portrayal of Dühring’s life will be 
resumed in Part Four after his Weltanschauung and system of social economics are portrayed 
and critically analyzed (Parts Two and Three).   
  
134 Franz Mehring, Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, vol. 3 (Berlin and Stuttgart: Dietz, 1924), 10. 
Even one of the leading communists, Karl Liebknecht, was of the opinion that Das Kapital was less than 
inspiring; Liebknecht said that the book was primarily useful for providing material for parliamentary speeches 
on workers’ legislation and commemorative occasions when he needed to show the level of exploitation against 
the workers and little more. In 1874, Liebknecht was convinced that Buckle and not Marx was the greatest 
creator of a new perspective on history; Marx was merely the creator of a new economic system. Rudolf Rocker, 
Johann Most. Das Leben eines Rebellen (Berlin: Fritz Kater, 1924), 52-53.     
135 KGN, 2nd. edition, 523-524. It should be noted, however, that Dühring was overall highly critical of Lassalle.  
136 This fact, as well as Dühring’s influence on Bernstein in general, is downplayed by Peter Gay in his 
biography of Bernstein. Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge to 
Marx (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1962). Friedländer speaks of an “exploitation of Dühringian thought” by 
Bernstein and the Social Democrats. Cf.  Die vier Hauptrichtungen der modernen socialen Bewegung. II. Teil 
Eugen Dührings socialitäres System und Henry Georges Neophysiocratie (Berlin: S. Calvary & Co., 1901), 20. 
137 See Chapter Nine. 
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PART TWO: 
DÜHRING’S WELTANSCHAUUNG AND SCIENTIFIC 
BEARING 
  
58 
 
THE EUROPEAN AGE of world history has been said to have “ended irrevocably in 1917 
with the almost simultaneous epochal events of the Russian Revolution and the American 
entry into the World War”. 138 Whether one subscribes to this assessment by a prominent 
historian of modern Germany or not, it is apparent that as the 20th century progressed a 
conscious break with the previous tradition of Western thought had taken place.  Philosophical 
trajectories rooted in religion and metaphysics, and in the intellectualization of factors such as 
identity, power, vigor and primal emotions, would not vanish from the stage at once, but, 
despite the continued popularity of Nietzsche’s writings, entered into a denouement in the 20th 
century as an “age of analysis” set in.139 No longer was a collective philosophical view of 
reality sought or wanted. Philosophy was beginning to become relegated to an anti-
metaphysical “logico-analytic” discipline located within the confines of an academic 
community largely preoccupied with language.140    
Despite the fact that there seems to be a clear logic in the development of modern philosophy 
in the last 100 years, an end to the European age was not something which was expected or 
even considered in Dühring’s time, although perhaps it might have been. The 19th century was 
a battlefield for competing worldviews and ideologies, whose trajectories lost strength 
through struggles against one another while vying for influence at giving life meaning and 
guidance. The immense changes brought forth by industrialization, the advances in science 
and technology, and the presence of societal conditions not yet understood called for 
philosophical underpinnings, which philosophers of various kinds tried to create. The gap 
between a modern progressive society, on the one hand, and antiquated, out of place romantic 
philosophies, on the other, was seen as a challenge to be overcome. However, among the 
chaos of interpretations there was destined to be no clear winner. This was not perceived by 
the European thinkers of the 19th century, including Dühring, who strove to influence society 
and determine where it was heading. 
138 Epstein, Klaus, “A New Study of Fascism,” 306.   
139 Arnold Gehlen was one of the thinkers who illustrated the crisis of the mind most clearly. Cf. Gehlen, 
Wirklicher und Unwirklicher Geist, 127 et seq. Henry Aiken has aptly shown that nearly everything of which 
20th century philosophy was most proud, such as its emphasis on methodology, analysis of meaning, language 
and symbol, does not really distinguish it from the centuries which preceded it. “The Fate of Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century,” The Kenyon Review 24 (Spring: 1962): 233.  
140 As White points out, 20th century philosophers “shy away from the issues of public and personal life, from the 
problems of culture and practice, as though they are no concern of philosophers”. Morton White, “The Decline 
and Fall of the Absolute,” in The Age of Analysis, ed. idem (New York: George Braziller, 1958), 17. Dühring 
willingly became a public figure to advance his cause and considered his philosophy to be inseparable from his 
life. As we will see, he advocated a “personalism” which stressed individualism and biographical factors of 
philosophy. 
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Eugen Dühring sought to create an alternative to German Idealism, which seemed to have run 
its course and could no longer hold its own in the rapidly changing industrial world. Despite 
the vituperative treatment he gives Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and later Kant as well, we will 
see that he did not abandon the tenets of Idealism completely, and in some ways can be said to 
have even solidified the movement by giving it a foundation in natural science.141 The 
positivistic and social-utilitarian quality of his thought, as well as its preoccupation with 
political economy, give Dühring’s philosophy a matter-of-factness, a prosaic quality and a 
lack of the philosophical refinement the Hegelians possessed. What is in this respect a 
weakness, particularly from the perspective of today, was then a strength, as the Zeitgeist 
called for an austere rather than aesthetic bearing towards society. However, as Otto 
Weininger once aptly pointed out, a Weltanschauung can never be a synthesis concocted by a 
diligent man at a desk in a library; it is an intuitive vision of the world, rooted in the self, 
experienced as a whole and which is clear and intelligible.142 Without the certain intellectual 
instinct and the will to make a difference in the same sense of the German idealists, the 
unparalleled bulk of scholarship, which Dühring produced as a blind man, would not have 
been possible. 
  
141 Helena Druskowitz, Eugen Dühring. Eine Studie zu seiner Würdigung (Heidelberg: George Weiß, 1889), 2. 
Although in many respects critical of Dühring, she considers him one of the first “greats of science” of his day, 
ibid. She sees his system as the first completed system “in which reality is raised to the level of all conceptions”. 
Ibid., 13. 
142 Otto Weininger, Geschlecht und Charakter. Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung (Vienna and Leipzig: 
Braumüller, 1929), 209-210. In a similar vein Sombart refers to a Weltanschuung as a ”childlike naive 
affirmation of the world, a longing and calling for happiness, pleasure and freedom exuding from the complaints 
of the existing society”. Sozialismus und soziale Bewegung (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1908), 25. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PHILOSOPHY 
1. Paragons: Comte, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach 
The basic tenor of Dühring’s philosophy is shaped by two of the most influential thinkers of 
the 19th century, who had lived in the same age, but had little to do with one another: Auguste 
Comte and Arthur Schopenhauer. Exact knowledge inspired by the Comtean method and the 
pugnacious and pessimistic individualism of Schopenhauer are the driving force behind 
Dühring’s thought. To these most influential thinkers we add Ludwig Feuerbach, whose 
materialism and critique of religion also influenced Dühring’s Weltanschauung 
substantially.143 
As Dühring began to write about Comte in the middle of the 1860s, the French thinker was 
little read in Germany and was largely looked down upon by German scholars and leftist 
intellectuals alike.144 Since his childhood days, and due to his father’s influence, Dühring had 
a liking for France and particularly the ideas of Rousseau and the values of the French 
Revolution. What attracted Dühring to Comte most, however, was the Frenchman’s new 
method of objective science, which proceeded from the basis of the material world and 
excluded metaphysics. Dühring was also convinced of the merits of Comte’s philosophy of 
history. As much as he admired Comte, Dühring also saw him as embodying a ruinous 
contemporary tendency of neglecting the human emotional disposition in favor of a purely 
scientific way of looking at things. He published four essays on Comte and devoted an entire 
chapter of his history of philosophy to him. 145   
Comte, who in his younger years had been fascinated and inspired by the American Benjamin 
Franklin, advocated a “positivistic” approach involving a strict adherence to natural science 
143 It will be shown below that Dühring was influenced by Kant, Leibnitz, and Hegel  (all thinkers whom he also 
disparage at times) but it was Comte, Schopenhauer and Feuerbach who he tried to emulate most. 
144 Cf. Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 1890-1933, 299 
et seq. Marx also thought very little of Comte holding him for a reactionary. “Comte ist den Pariser Arbeitern 
bekannt als der Prophet des Kaisertums (der persönliche Diktatur) in der Politik, der kapitalistischen Herrschaft 
in der politischen Ökonomie, der Hierarchie in allen Sphären der menschlichen Tätigkeit, sogar in der Sphäre der 
Wissenschaft, und als der Autor eines neuen Katechismus mit einem neuen Papst und neuen Keiligen an Stelle 
der alten.”  “Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich,“ in MEW 17, 335-343. 
145 “Auguste Comte’s politische Philosophie,” Grenzboten, Zeitschrift für Politik und Literatur 4 (1864): 259-
272. “Der Positivismus in der Philosophie,” Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift 3 (1865): 167 et seq.; “Auguste Comte 
und seine positive Philosophie,” Unsere Zeit. Deutsche Revue der Gegenwart 2 (1866): 444 et seq.; “Auguste 
Comte’s ‚positive‘ Philosophie,“ Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1866): 257-260; KGP, 479-
494.  
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and a rejection of all metaphysics; only observable phenomena are taken into account.146 
Dühring praises the rejection of metaphysical philosophy and, in one of his early essays on 
Comte, emphasizes that the intellect needs to raise itself to a new standpoint which ignores 
unsolvable contradictions.147 He extols the fact that mathematics and analytical mechanics are 
the basis of Comte’s knowledge. In the “objective method”, mathematics, mechanics, physics, 
chemistry and physiology are the only categories of natural knowledge. The methods of these 
disciplines are to be applied to the social world. Dühring sees the Contain principles as a 
means of ensuring that “metaphysical semblance of knowledge” and “forgery of our catalog 
of knowledge” are fought at every corner.  
Early in his career Comte had negatively characterized the human faculty of abstraction. He 
wrote: “Humans originally began with the concrete, but soon raised themselves to abstract 
ideas, and the capability for abstraction which they developed in themselves seemed so 
beautiful to them, and they bloated their self-love to the extent that they began to despise the 
material world or at least that they considered it a reality subordinate to the ideal world”.148 
Although a rationalist at heart, Dühring shares Comte’s uneasiness towards human abstraction 
and makes the opposite of it, the concrete, the clear, the matter-of-fact the basis of his 
philosophy. 
Despite the strengths of Comte’s positivism, Dühring’s position towards him is critical. He 
believes that Comte has neglected the aspect of human feeling in the matters of life. Comte 
did not understand that philosophy is not only a purely scientific matter, and that its focus is 
not only the extending of knowledge.149 Comte’s mistake is that he “leaves an area open, 
where the intellect has no field of activity”, and thus “has no adequate means of defense when 
metaphysical presumptions get involved in this particular realm of the mind”. The Frenchman 
therefore, as Dühring sees it, simply turns his back on superstition instead of fighting it 
properly.150 As the mind and reality are directly connected with one another, all of the 
elements of thinking, including one’s character and temperament, must be taken into 
consideration. The sphere of emotions cannot be fully separated from that of thought. This 
146 Both Comte and Dühring looked to America for intellectual inspiration, Dühring in Carey, Comte in Franklin. 
Pickering says that the United States was Comte’s first utopia. “It was interesting in development, science, 
industrial genius, comfort and the rational construction of government”. Mary Pickering, Auguste Comte. An 
Intellectual Biography, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 42. Comte read all of Franklin’s 
writings and admired the American as a self-made man and as someone who stressed merit instead of birth and 
had faith in improvements through perseverance and willpower. Ibid., 43. 
147 Dühring, “Auguste Comtes politische Philosophie,” 267. 
148 Comte, Ecrits de jeunesse 1816-1828, eds. Berrêdo Carneiro, Paulo E. (Paris: de Gruyter, 1970), 61. 
149 “Der Positivismus in der Philosophie,” 172. 
150 KGP, 491. 
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“dark side” of Comte’s thinking, as he calls it, which leaves out the light of intuition and 
emotive issues is not merely a personal mistake of Comte’s, but rather, a tendency that has 
grown out of history.151 Despite these reservations, he follows Comte’s general line of 
positivist thinking, believing that it provides a sound basis for modern thought: anything that 
claims validity in any form has to rely upon the intellect and science even when strong 
convictions and emotion are involved. Dühring went on to formulate the positivist motto: 
“Man deals with nothing but the ground under him, the air above him, and his own kind 
alongside him”.152       
Alongside Comte, Dühring was most influenced in his early years by the philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer. 153 Whereas Dühring values Comte for his scientific positivism, it is more the 
noble character and vital individualism which he admires most in Schopenhauer. He praises 
the clarity and order of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, as well as the philosopher’s special ability 
to find a large reading audience at a time when the sales of philosophical books were 
generally decreasing. In an era of dry, abstract scholasticism, Schopenhauer shows blunt 
honesty, refreshing vigor, and uncompromising directness – all traits which Dühring would try 
to emulate throughout his long career.154 There was an undeniable affinity between the two 
thinkers. Both men are dissatisfied with the world as they see it before them. Dühring defends 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism, which he was otherwise strongly opposed to, as being a reaction 
to the corruption of his day.155 He is also particularly impressed with Schopenhauer’s 
independence from academic philosophy and greatly appreciates his polemics against the 
university professors. Schopenhauer’s famous essay “On University Philosophy”, Dühring 
believes, is not merely an essay on higher education, but also a study with general 
philosophical significance; when it comes to his bearing towards academe, Dühring carries 
the torch for Schopenhauer, indeed so much so that he was seen as a “caricature of 
151 Gustav Theodor Fechner had labelled the phenomenon of a purely mechanically materialist world the “night 
view“ (Nachtansicht)  which he contrasted with the the “day view” (Tagesansicht). Cf. Michael Heidelberger, 
Die innere Seite der Natur. Gustav Theodor Fechers wissenschaftlich-philosophische Weltauffassung (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993), 90-93. Dühring wrote a favorable book review on Fechner: “Fechner 
Psychophysik,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 2 (1867): 78-82. 
152 CP, 7. Dühring is careful to distance himself from the religious teachings formulated by Comte at the end of 
his career. Cf. KGP, 4th edition, 517-518. 
153 In addition to his in depth portrayal of Schopenhauer in The Worth of Life and in his critical history, 
Dühring published three essays on the author of The World as Will and Representation. The three articles are 
titled: “Arthur Schopenhauer und die Bestrebungen unserer Zeit, I-IV,” Vossische Zeitung 79, 85, 90, 95 
(1865): ; “Der Pessimismus in der Dichtung und Philosophie (Schopenhauer und Byron),“ Deutsche 
Vierteljahrs-Schrift 3 (1865): 189-215; “Arthur Schopenhauers Philosophie,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis 
der Gegenwart 1 (1866):193-196; cf. Also WL, Vorrede and 94-97. 
154 Like Dühring, Nietzsche drew inspiration from Schopenhauer, publishing a book on him in 1874 titled 
Schopenhauer as Educator. 
155 “Arthur Schopenhauer und die Bestrebungen unserer Zeit,” Vossische Zeitung 79 (1865): 1-2.  
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Schopenhauer”.156 Schopenhauer, according to Dühring, displays the conditions, 
circumstances, and strivings against which every independent philosophical mind has to fight, 
and against which Dühring was destined to fight as well.157 He is molded by Schopenhauer’s 
style, his behavior, and also his approach to developing his own philosophy. He also follows 
Schopenhauer’s method of basing his own philosophy on a great precursor, whom is at first 
venerated and then subjected to fundamental critique.158 This method of critique, which draws 
strength from ideas it rejects, as Albrecht points out, is particularly relevant for Dühring’s 
work in social science: as Schopenhauer bases his entire philosophy on his critique of Kant, 
Dühring’s bases his teachings on political economy on Carey, whom he also both criticizes 
and draws inspiration from.159 Despite strongly disagreeing with his negative evaluation of 
life, Dühring sees Schopenhauer as an “epoch-making” philosopher due to the questions that 
he poses in which life is placed at the center of philosophical discussion.160 Dühring’s first 
book of philosophy, The Worth of Life, is devoted to the same questions on life which 
Schopenhauer posed and his confrontation with Schopenhauer’s philosophy was a key 
element to his publishing strategy.161 Schopenhauer succeeds, according to Dühring, at 
156 Othmar Spann, Types of Economic Theory, in Early Histories of Economic Thought 1824-1914, ed. Roger E. 
Backhouse (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 208. Schopenhauer’s influence on Dühring was 
characterized differently by contemporary philosophers. Conrad Hermann correctly saw the strong influence of 
Schopenhauer in Dühring’s Critical History of Philosophy: “Überhaupt aber glauben wir das Dühringische Buch 
am Passenden durch die Auffassung der Geschichte der Philosophie vom Standpunkt und im Sinne des 
Schopenhauerschen Pessimismus charakterisieren zu können. […] so kann doch der Dühringsche historisch 
philosophische Kritizismus wesentlich nur als ein Correlat und eine Fortsetzung der Schopenhauerschen Welt- 
und Lebensauffassung angesehen werden.” Conrad Hermann, “Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie von ihren 
Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Von Eugen Dühring,” Philosophische Monatshefte 3 (1869): 482. Hartmann, on 
the other hand, sees only Dühring’s indignant pessimism towards Hegel as being authentically Schopenhauerian: 
“Man würde kaum auf den Gedanken kommen, Dühring zur Schopenhauer’chen Schule zu rechnen, wenn er 
nicht mit dieser in der Abneigung und Missachtung gegen die übrigen nachkantischen Philosophen Deutschlands 
übereinstimmte und Schopenhauer als den einzigen wirklichen Philosophen dieses Jahrhunderts auf den Schild 
erhöbe”. Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophischen Fragen der Gegenwart (Leipzig, et al.: Wilhelm Friedrich, 
1885), 48.  
157 KGP, 447. Dühring publicly scolded a senior “living legend” of German philosophy, Hermann Lotze, for 
intentionally ignoring Schopenhauer in his History of Aesthetics in Germany. Cf. “Lotze, Geschichte der 
Aesthetik in Deutschland,“ Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 3 (1968): 387. Two years earlier he 
had also written a critical review of another book of Lotze’s. Cf. “Lotze, Mikrokosmos, Ideen zur 
Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1866): 
513-516. As was shown above, this may have had repercussions for Dühring’s career when Lotze was asked to 
write a recommendation for Dühring for a professorship in Jena. 
158 Nietzsche applies this method in an even more radical form. The critique of his paragons, e.g. Wagner, 
Dühring, Hartmann, becomes personal and insulting, almost as if his former teachers should never have been 
read (or listened to in the case of Wagner) in the first place. 
159 Albrecht, ED, 46. 
160 Dühring writes that he is a follower of Schopenhauer, “sobald es gilt, diesem Philosophen seine einzige 
Stellung nach Kant zu vindizieren, dass ich aber, was die Ansichten anbetrifft, und zumal in der Frage der 
Wertschätung des Lebens wohl von niemand diametraler als gerade von jenem pessimistischen Weisen 
abgewichen sein möchte.” Dühring, WL, VI. Albrecht points out that Dühring’s style of writing emulates 
Schopenhauer’s nearly to the point of copying some of his unusual phraseology. Albrecht, ED, 47. Friedell on 
the other hand contrasts the two, polemically disparaging Dühring’s style. Cf. Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit, 
1299.   
161 Dühring was able to strike a nerve with the German audience of the 1860s with his book, as evidenced by 
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formulating the attitude of consciousness towards life and the world in a completely new way. 
By questioning the worth of life, Schopenhauer opens new avenues of philosophical 
discourse. Despite Schopenhauer’s stature as a unique individual, Dühring sees him as an 
historical force which came about as a reaction to the moral decay of the time. Schopenhauer 
becomes, as it were, a necessary ointment for the danger that the age posed to the 
individual.162 He is also valued for his commitment to advancing knowledge: Dühring honors 
Schopenhauer’s experiential or empirical point of departure, which has its foundation in 
natural science; he compliments Schopenhauer for emphasizing that natural science is an 
essential pre-requisite of philosophy.163 Dühring’s emphasis on instinct as a source of 
cognition, as well as his attempt to use a material principle as the basis for law (justice being 
equated with revenge) is also of Schopenhauer an origin.164  
As similar as the two men were, they differed not only in terms of their temperaments, but 
also with regard to the focus of their research and study. Schopenhauer was not at all well 
versed in exact natural science, Dühring’s area of expertise, and Dühring seems to have had 
very little knowledge of biology, an area in which Schopenhauer distinguished himself. It 
should also be emphasized that Dühring is vehemently opposed to important aspects of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and remains unaffected by some of the philosopher’s most 
important results. Dühring thinks nothing of Schopenhauer’s thesis that the human intellect is 
of secondary importance compared with man’s organic nature. Schopenhauer gives a critique 
of the intellect seeing it as a fragmentary, scattered and forgetful faculty, destined to lose 
vitality as it gets older. As will be shown below, Dühring’s “Philosophy of the Actual” has an 
unerring faith in the intellect, which it views as a united entity equipped to determine man’s 
fate. Schopenhauer’s concern with subconscious factors affecting the mind draws sharp 
criticism from Dühring. His method of philosophizing from the perspective of the human 
body rather than from consciousness, which Galen sees as an “epoch making” discovery of 
Schopenhauer’s, is not even considered by Dühring, nor is Schopenhauer’s insight into 
religion, which is also valued by Galen.165 However, Dühring completely accepts 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s quote that he read Dühring’s The Worth of Life “to find out what he had on Schopenhauer 
and what he did not”. Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 8, ed. Mazzino Monintari 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 129. 
162 Dühring writes: “Das Beste an Schopenhauer hat darin bestanden, daß er die moralischen Häßlichkeiten im 
Großen und im Kleinen, im Ganzen der Gesellschaft wie in den einzelnen Repräsentanten zu treffen wußte.” 
Dühring, “Gegenwärtige Philosophie,” 345.  
163 „John Stuart Mill,“ op. cit., 921. 
164 Cf. KGV, 330. Schopenhauer saw compassion (Mitleid) as the basis of morality. Cf. The Basis of Morality 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915). 
165 Arnold Gehlen, “Die Resultate Schopenhauers,” in Gedächtnisschrift für Arthur Schopenhauer, eds. C. A. 
Emge and O. v. Schweinichen (Berlin: Verlag für Staatswissenschaften und Geschichte, 1938), 102. 
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Schopenhauer’s anti-Cartesian thesis that the body and soul cannot be separated and 
emphasizes the phenomena of consciousness, often referred to as psyche, as “an action” 
ephemeral by nature.166 Despite substantial differences between the two thinkers, Malia von 
Meysenbug is probably correct in concluding that, “Schopenhauer would have approved of 
Dühring, just as Dühring approved of Schopenhauer”.167  
The thought of Ludwig Feuerbach is also of substantial importance for Dühring’s worldview. 
Feuerbach found many followers in Germany with his critique of Christianity and went on to 
influence an entire generation of continental thinkers with the anthropological notion that the 
concept of God consists of mere projections of the human mind. The Christian principles of 
love and solidarity, he believed, are not a sign of God’s love of man, but actually stem from 
humans ourselves. Religion is deleterious as it deprives and alienates the believer from 
autonomy, virtue and community.168 Feuerbach writes, “For even love, in itself the deepest 
truest emotion, becomes merely ostensible, illusory by means of religiousness, since religious 
love gives itself to man only for God’s sake, so that it is given only in appearance to man, but 
in reality to God.”169 Dühring deals with Feuerbach’s philosophy in The Worth of Life and in 
1866 wrote a review of the philosopher’s book Gottheit, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit. He also 
portrays him positively in Critical History of Philosophy from 1869.170 
Feuerbach, Dühring writes, is a specialist for the area of religion in the field of philosophy. In 
terms of the “typology of scholars”, referenced in General Introduction, he can be considered 
166 CP, 133. Dühring does not pursue this weighty thought, which Schopenhauer elaborated on in §18 of the 
World as Will and Representation.  
167 Briefe von und an Malwida von Meysenbug, ed. Berta Schleicher (Berlin: Schuster & Loeffler, 1926), 68. 
168 Feuerbach’s influence in the English speaking world, much like Dühring’s, was minimal. His works were not 
translated into English until the 1940s and Friedrich Hayek was of the opinion that there was no need to have 
translated them at all. Cf. Hayeck, Untitled review, in Economica, New Series 8 (Nov. 1941): 460. Dühring and 
Feuerbach did not know each other personally, but we know from a letter written by Dühring to Carl Ubell, the 
editor of the Austrian Grazer Zeitung, that Feuerbach said of Dühring that he was very happy that “there exists 
someone in the north, who has portrayed me favorably in the history of philosophy.” Cf. Dühring‘s letter to Carl 
Ubell, Briefe des Philosophen und Nationalökonomen Eugen Dühring im Nachlaß Carl Ubells, Brief Nr.32. 
Later Dühring would write a review of Feuerbach’s last book which did not please the latter. Feuerbach believed 
that Dühring had portrayed him as “worn out Hegelian” and fires back in a letter to the Finnish philosopher 
Wilhelm Bolin that Dühring is an example of the “German philosophy becoming senile”. In German it reads, 
“Unmittelbar von dem erhebenden Gedanken an die Homerische Poesie führt mich ja die Fortsetzung meines 
unterbrochenen Briefes zu einem deutschen philosoph(ischen) oder jetzt nationalökonom(ischen) Dozenten und 
Schriftsteller, einem Rezensenten meiner letzten Schrift. Diese von meinem Buchhänder, nebst zwei anderen, 
mir zugeschickte Rezension ist aber nur ein neuer Beweis, daß die deutsche Philosophie von Alterschwäche 
kindisch geworden ist. Kleinliches Wortgeklaube, vermischt mit Sophismen erbärmlichster Art! Es tut mir leid, 
dieses Urteil über Herren Dühring aussprechen zu müssen, da vielleicht nur sein körperliches Unglück seine 
eines, noch dazu abgelebten Hegelianers würde Rezension zu verantworten hat.” Ludwig Feuerbach to Wilhelm 
Bolin 1 July 1867, in Ludwig Feuerbach. Gesammelte Werke, Briefwechsel V,  ed. Werner Schuffenhauer 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), 307-309.   
169 Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, 48. 
170 KGP, 497-503. Here Feuerbach is only dealt with in a part of one chapter. In the later editions he receives an 
entire chapter to himself.  
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a “mono-typical scholar”, standing in contrast to the more universally oriented Dühring.171 
Despite Feuerbach’s fixation on one main aspect of thought, Dühring values his efforts at 
helping to create clarity in the realm of religion. He also praises Feuerbach’s view of history, 
which he sees as a more natural approach, delving deeper into occurrences by looking to the 
anthropological roots of historical phenomenology. Whereas thinkers such as Strauss and 
Bauer had based their critique of Christianity on theology, Feuerbach proceeds in a more 
fruitful manner. In reference to David Stauss’ attempt to historicize Jesus Christ, Dühring 
writes: 
It is completely different when Strauss researches theology and Feuerbach religion. The 
former’s task involves scholarship in the framework of the tradition of schooled theology. The 
latter involves real philosophy, lively immersion in the essence of religion and religions and a 
conclusive exclusion of the more or less coincidental scholarly elements which religious 
teachings have accepted depending upon the needs of lower or higher culture.172 
Feuerbach defined philosophy as being exclusively physiology and anthropology. There are 
thus two objects of philosophy: nature and man. A third element such as God is to be 
categorized a mere a figment of the imagination. Theology, he professed, should be a small 
chapter of the subject of anthropology. Dühring agrees with this assessment and emphasizes 
that Feuerbach’s positive conclusions for philosophy came only after he gave up the baggage 
of the Hegelian philosophy; he is convinced that Feuerbach’s views on religion are directly 
opposed to Hegel’s and regrets that Feuerbach distanced himself from the Hegelian 
philosophy so late.173  
Feuerbach issued a harsh criticism of historicism, advocating what he saw as “critical anti-
historicism” in the writings of Kant, Fichte, Herder, Lessing, Goethe und Schiller. These men, 
as he saw it, “strictly differentiated between history and truth.”174 Similar to Dühring later on, 
Feuerbach warned in 1839 of shying away in fear from applying healthy impulse to the 
present.175 Dühring agrees with Feuerbach’s thoughts on religion and historicism, but he holds 
171 “Ludwig Feuerbach, Gottfreiheit und Unsterblichkeit,” 1. Here it reads, “Ludwig Feuerbach war innerhalb der 
Philosophie […] stets Spezialist; seine Spezialität ist von Anfang bis zu Ende dieselbe geblieben, und er hat 
gegenwärtig in der Tat die Genugtuung, das religiöse Interesse in Richtungen wachgerufen zu sehen, in denen 
sich Deutschland längst nicht mehr bewegte.”  
172 ”Ludwig Feuerbach, Gottfreiheit und Unsterblichkeit,” 2. About five years later, Nietzsche would issue 
Strauss a scathing critique in the first of his Untimely Meditations. 
173 KGP, 4th edition,467. 
174 Ludwig Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke, Vol. VII, 77, cf. also 130 et seq. 
175 Cf. Annette Wittkau, Historismus. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs und des Problems (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1994 [1st ed. 1992]), 199. Feuerbach was attacked by Hegelians such as Christlieb Julius Braniß. 
Braniß first became a Hegelian after the failed revolution of 1848 and gave lectures at Breslau University at the 
same time that Dühring’s mentor Ernst Otto Lindner was expelled from the university for having an „unchristian 
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Feuerbach’s religious views to be insufficient, arguing against his claim that the belief in the 
value of religion was exclusively rooted in ideas whose object was man. Expressing the strain 
of realism characteristic of his thought, Dühring asserts: “Religious affects are not so limited 
that they are only applied to the human or to human image. Religion is historically a universal 
affect that is only very artificially forced into the framework of the human”.176 By and large, 
however, he sees Feuerbach’s efforts as an historical step forward in the consideration of 
religion, which should be used occasionally to guide the way in discourse on religion. 
Dühring writes: 
As the natural path in the development of thought is accompanied by the progression from 
mere historical criticism of empirical facts to the inner critique of religious affects, the 
Feuerbachian religious philosophy, regardless of its correctness or incorrectness, involves 
looking beyond the level of a pure historical view in favor of a lively interest in the direct 
content of those affects.177 
Feuerbach took part with Schopenhauer and Comte in the dissolution of the traditional 
concept of God: the essence of religion is now independent of the idea of God, which 
Nietzsche alluded to with Zarathustra’s proclamation that “God is dead”. It might be said that 
Dühring values Comte, Schopenhauer, and Feuerbach, as thinkers who defied the heavens. 
2. Basic Concept of Philosophy 
Dühring defines philosophy as “the evolution of the highest form of consciousness of life and 
the world”. It is the pinnacle of freedom and rules out any authority in the strict sense of the 
word. It is not a dormant view of the world, but rather a “restless active principle of shaping 
life in general”. Philosophical consciousness is more than mere knowledge; it is “a sensation 
of instincts, in which desire finds conscious expression”. It contains basic elements common 
to all forms of knowledge and is not limited exclusively to human consciousness.178 
Originally known as the “love of knowledge”, philosophy presupposes a “highest 
knowledge”, as well as a best and most productive way of implementing this knowledge.179 
Those who possess the highest philosophical consciousness will always be a very small 
minority, but for the social reformer Dühring, the development of philosophy is not limited to 
this elite. As history progresses and science develops, the natural barriers, which had given 
access of philosophy to only a select few, are broken so that the “highest form of 
way of thinking (“eine unchristliche Gesinnung”). 
176 WL, 187. 
177 KGP, 469. 
178 CP, 2-3. 
179 WP, 1. 
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consciousness”, which is philosophy, morphs, becomes simplified and then something which 
is more than mere philosophy. Dühring sees philosophy gaining a new intellectual status in 
modernity through its ability to create new mindsets and intellectual leadership. 180   
He calls his system the “Philosophy of the Actual” (Wirklichkeitsphilsophie), which is 
fittingly – and intentionally - formulated to contrast with the speculative idealism of the 
generations preceding him.181 Rejecting every form of irrational mysticism, the Philosophy of 
the Actual’s subject is the world of senses that we have in front of us, nothing more and 
nothing less: philosophy deals with matter. Dühring’s basic point of departure is a calm and 
calculated epistemology that soon, rather surprisingly, develops into ontology and 
metaphysics (although he avoids the latter term completely). Consciousness is a concentrated 
focal point, which like all elements of the Actual is a “whole”. When thought tries to turn the 
world into an object, it reaches a level of abstraction that borders on non-thought. Starting 
with the concept of a primordial or universal being (das allgemeine Sein), the Actual is 
posited on epistemological premises which are developed in Dühring’s dissertation  De 
tempore, spatio, causaliitate atque de analyisis infinitesimales logic (On Time, Space, 
Causality and the Analysis of Infinitesimal Logic) as well as in his first book, Natural 
Dialectic. Like Martin Heidegger over half a century later, Dühring is convinced that 
metaphysics has gone awry for over two thousand years. He sets out to go back to the roots of 
philosophy in the ancient world and, as it were, pick up the problem from there. Turning to 
the early pre-Socratic thought of the Eleatics, and using modern principles of logic, he aims at 
creating a new modern form of ontology. 182   
An important aspect of philosophy for Dühring involves adopting certain mindsets that have 
existed in the past. He labels this process, somewhat clumsily, the “rational transmission of 
180 This view, implied in his earlier work, is articulated most clearly in one of his later works The Philosophy of 
the Actual (Wirklichkeitsphilosophie) published in 1895. Cf. WP, 1 et seq. Plechanov emphasizes the role 
between the personality and the masses in Dühring’s thought in 1878. The Russian wrote, “Dühring, who 
completely recognizes the influence of the personalities on the course of societal development, adds that the 
action of the personality has to have wide support in the moods of the masses.” Plechanow, “Das Gesetz der 
ökonomischen Entwicklung der Gesellschaft und die Aufgaben des Sozialismus in Rußland.“ Quoted from: 
Rjazanov, “50 Jahre Anti-Dühring,”, 466-478.   
181 We have intentionally chosen to speak of philosophy of the “Actual” instead of philosophy of “Reality”. 
Dühring himself emphasizes that in German “Wirklichkeit” and “Realität” have subtly different meanings. The 
term “Actual” appears to us more fitting as it brings the essence of what is being described “closer in”, so to 
speak; Wirklichkeit is immanent and “the Actual” conveys this well. “Reality”, on the other hand, points more to 
an abstract status or quality. When Dühring speaks of “being” there is usually a sense of nearness or something 
impending which in our opinion makes “the actual” the better choice than “reality” in our opinion. In calling 
Dühring’s system the “Philosophy of the Actual” we follow the lead of the American George Holmes Howison 
(1834-1916), the founder of the department of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley and the 
Philosophical Union, who wrote extensively on Dühring in his article “Some Aspects of Recent German 
Philosophy,” op. cit..   
182 Cf. SLF, 108-109.  
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disposition” (die rationale Mitteilung der Gesinnungen). The “disposition” of which he 
speaks is something that exists above all historical conjunctures, enabling the individual to go 
back in time and to become united with other thinkers of a kindred instinctual spirit. This 
aspect of Dühring’s concept of philosophy, to be dealt with in detail in Chapter Five below, 
suffers somewhat from a vagueness of expression, but is a key element of his understanding 
of “the Actual”.183 “Gesinnung” is not simply any attitude or inclination of thought, but rather 
a certain enlightened conviction, based on intellectual insight and rugged individualism. The 
certain disposition that he describes is embodied by the “defiant outsider”, whose existence is 
part of the phenomenology of the Actual, exerting itself throughout history. The heroic 
manner of thinking which Dühring has in mind involves thought, willpower, knowledge, and 
especially noble behavior; it is on the one hand an active impulse and on the other a passive 
reflection. The active component involves a sense of justice and a healthy dose of indignant 
pessimism; the passive consists of compliant reflection and of letting oneself become 
influenced by the great enlightened outsiders from the past.184   
A salient feature of Dühring’s thinking, which we will be referring to time and again, is what 
the Danish philosopher Harold Höffding has labeled Dühring’s inclination for emphasizing 
“fertilizing fundamental notions” (“Anfangsdenken”) of cognitive phenomena.185 In the 
Dühringian metaphysics there was never an “ancient creation of life” (eine Urzeugung des 
Lebens) from something out of nothing. There is in all development an “original type” from 
which subsequent forms of life develop; this type is a nucleus of sorts, which, in many ways, 
still prevails and is even more true to life than what follows it historically. Otherwise a 
representative of leftist-liberalism, through this idea of fundamental notions Dühring’s 
philosophy is given a noticeably conservative element in this respect. He is often more 
concerned with the fixed basic elements of social phenomena as opposed to how they are set 
in motion or progress. A system of experience, as Dühring portrays it, consists of basic 
principles of the world and of life that are the simplest prerequisites from which thinking has 
to precede. These principles are the last components on which every form of proof lies when 
making deductions. Dühring delineates the different branches of the Philosophy of the Actual 
as follows: at the top of the individual disciplines is logic and metaphysics (or, as he writes, 
183 Wilhelm Dilthey, born in the same year as Dühring and his colleague at the Berlin University,  correctly 
speaks of Dühring’s “vagueness of expression” and that facts and concepts are “not as sharply delineated as you 
would like to see them be”. “Karl Eugen Dühring, Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie und des 
Sozialismus”, in Wilhelm Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 17, ed. Karlfried Gründer (Leipzig et al.: Teubner, 
1971), 360-361.   
184 KGP, 1-3; CP, 3-4.  
185 Harold Höffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, vol. 2, 551.  
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“dialectics in general”), to which psychology also belongs. The second part consists of natural 
science and the third is the “realm of man” (morals, natural science, the philosophy of history, 
critique of religion as well as esthetics). Philosophy functions as an intermediary between the 
individual disciplines and is not only a unification of the principle content of the positive 
sciences, but also consists of all principles and has the practical calling to reform life.186 
In the foundation of these principles, Dühring rejects the traditions of metaphysical dualism in 
what amounts to a radically immanent approach. The Actual entails an interplay between the 
“persistent” and the “changing”. Both factors together make up a whole that is the vital nerve 
of the Actual. There is no dichotomy, separating a realm of human thought and sensation from 
the rest of nature.187 However, philosophy should not try to take all of the preconditions of 
knowledge under its authority, but rather should recognize its relationship to “logical truths”. 
The Actual is a totality that has a systematic outline and a logical consequence. He writes, 
“Nature and history have a constitution and development whose essence largely corresponds 
to the general logical relationships of all concepts”.188 Altogether, the field of philosophy is 
given enormous importance for the development of elevated consciousness; it is assigned the 
task of unifying thought, inspiring action, and forming life. The power of the human intellect 
can be trusted to rationally shape the world in which we live. Our thought is objective and 
real. Never just an abstraction, our thought is always a new setting of the Actual. Thought is 
reality, and, it seems, reality is thought. Dühring writes, “The nature of the world is a mind – 
this should not be forgotten – an embodied and largely at the same time right mind”.189  
3. Epistemology and Metaphysics  
Following the work of Kant and Schopenhauer, Dühring initiates his philosophy with a theory 
of knowledge which aims at keeping the intellect in check by defining the boundaries of 
186 CP, 10. Dühring later creates a pyramid of knowledge at the top of which is “knowledge in general” followed 
by “metaphysics” (Seinsschematik, d.h. Struktuierung von Sein durch universelles Denken), then “logic”, below 
that “mathematics”, then “physics and the higher natural sciences”, “natural history”, the “social world of man”, 
and finally “political economy”. SLF, 307. 
187 Ibid., 33-34. We will see below how this view with its roots in the science of the Enlightenment contrasts 
with the ideas of the representatives of German historicism. Droysen, the founder of the “Borussian school of 
history and the most significant German theoretician of history” (Hardtwig), spoke even of a “duality of human 
nature”. Cf. Historik: Vorlesung über Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte, ed. Rudolf Hübner 
(München: Oldenbourg), 9. See also Über das Studium der Geschichte, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig (München: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1990), 83-85. 
188 CP, 11. 
189 In German this reads: “Die Weltnatur ist Geist, daran halten wir fest – verkörperter und im großen und ganzen 
zugleich r e c h t e r Geist.“ Personalist und Emancipator (March 1912): 2370. He sees the Kantian tendency to 
denigrate the intellect as a favorite pastime of sophistic scholars and writes: “So wird beispielsweise die 
Kantische Manier, den Verstand von seiner Souveränität gut kritisch abdanken zu lassen, heute wirklich eine 
Nahrung für Gelehrtenblasierteheit”. LW, 501. 
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“how” we know and “what” we can know. As just indicated, his critical approach leads him to 
a higher estimation of the intellect than either of his two predecessors. The basis of his 
epistemology, as mentioned, is established in his dissertation, written under Trendelenburg 
and Kummer, entitled On Time, Space, Causality and the Analysis of Infinitesimal Logic. This 
work, written one year after Schopenhauer’s death and launching Dühring’s career in academe 
in 1861, critically examines the concept of eternity. Four years later, his ideas were presented 
in the book Natural Dialectic, which established his reputation in the broader public.190 
Dühring attempts to refute any general doubt about the objective power of the intellect while 
at the same time showing a certain skepticism towards reason and the inherent dangers of 
intellectual abstraction. Similar to Leibnitz, who believed that mathematics transcribed the 
whole of philosophy, Dühring begins his epistemology with the concept of the number, which 
he sees as having deep significance for the thought of man. Every number is independent and 
finite. There is no such thing as an infinite accumulation backwards in time; there is no such 
thing as infinite causality and there is no infinite space. Instead of accepting infinity, he 
defines what he terms the “Law of the Determinate Number”, which postulates that all 
thinkable numbers are complete and fixed.191 Only the unfinished in the collection of numbers 
can entail infinity, because only that which is not yet ended, i.e. is not yet complete, takes on 
something else. A counted infinity is therefore preposterous and the notion of an infinite 
number is a false and logically contradictory figment of the imagination. Every number that 
exists must be divisible into a finite number of parts; correspondingly, the natural world must 
be limited and must have had an absolute beginning (although as we have seen a “creation 
from nothing” is vehemently rejected). The division of matter must also have a limit. These 
notions stem from Dühring’s study of pre-Socratic philosophy and make a point held by the 
Eleatics, in which a singleness of the cosmic principle existing in or behind the change of 
things is postulated. Paramenides concluded that only one abstract unchanging Being exists. 
The method of only accepting what is fixed, and in itself united, paves the way for Dühring’s 
understanding of knowledge.   
In the Natural Dialectic Dühring concludes that Kant is incorrect in believing that our 
knowledge of the world is not objective. Cognition and objective truth are indeed possible. 
Kant, he writes, forgot to ask the question as to the nature of our basic logical insight, i.e. 
190 Höffding calls Natural Dialectic “one of the most admirable epistemological works of the last half of the 19th 
century”. A History of Modern Philosophy, op. cit., 551. Hans Vaihinger wrote, “ein höchst anregendes und 
ungemein scharfsinniges Werk, das den Ruf Dührings mit Recht begründet”. Hartmann, Dühring, und Lange, 
217.    
191 On Dühring’s concept of time see Small, “Dühring, Nietzsche and Time,” The Journal of the History of Philosophy 
28 (April: 1990): 229-250. 
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“what it is and what are its consequences”.192 A critical philosophy that denies the objectivity 
of categories is not in accord with our thought the way it really is and degrades the 
intellect.193 Space, time, and causation are objective and finite categories of the Actual. 
Human consciousness is objectivity; it is not a copy of things, as the theory of dualism would 
have it. We can presume that “being” and “thought” are homogenous and that there is a 
formal logic which has absolute significance for the Actual. In his high appraisal of the 
intellect, Dühring separates himself not only from Kant and Schopenhauer, but also from 
Comte’s positivism, which makes no claims to final and complete knowledge of how things 
are.194  
Dühring defines “natural dialectic” as a higher form of logic that has the task of keeping the 
intellect on the straight and narrow, avoiding the difficulties that confuse human thought.195 
Although the Philosophy of the Actual forbids the duality between mind and body, Dühring’s 
train of thought is dualistic as far as it, on the one hand, follows the intellect and, on the other, 
adheres to sensual perception. When in doubt, the intellect always takes precedence, serving 
as the higher tribunal that filters impure perception. When the intellect goes beyond its 
boundaries and founders, as for example in creating the concept of infinity, the “natural 
dialectic” or “logic”, as one would have it, are there to lead the way out of the difficulties. 
Even certain crutches of our thought, such as the principle of sufficient reason, should not be 
readily accepted as it can become a dogma, which can lead the intellect astray. The question 
“why” is, according to Dühring, not always applicable. 196    
For Dühring, the Actual is always a united and undividable totality and thus it is logical that 
the role of abstraction is kept to a minimum in his epistemology, if not ruled out completely. 
Dühring is wary of what is merely “man made” as separated from “nature”. With this 
inclination, he belongs to a modern trajectory going back to the 17th and 18th centuries: 
thinkers such as Malebranche and Berkeley had attempted to eliminate abstraction completely 
192 ND, 16. 
193 CP, 38. 
194 CP, 42. Dühring also rebukes Spinoza, who had great respect for the intellect’s objective value, for not 
recognizing the power of imagination in his system. Cf. Ibid. 
195 His distinction between “logic” and “dialectic” suffers from vagueness or imprecision. Logic, as a method 
providing clarity in a pure abstract isolated form, differs from dialectic, which provides clarity in the process of 
becoming. Perhaps the term “natural logic” would have been more fitting as a title than “natural dialectic”; the 
second edition, in which he opts to insert “logic” in the tile, on the other hand, might have been better with 
“dialectic” in the title as he also deals with practical processes of scientific theory, e.g. his including a critique of 
the universities and the development of the ideal type of the martyr in science, etc. 
196 ND, 14; CP, 36. Nietzsche was of the same opinion: “Man soll sich der “Ursache”, der “Wirkung” eben nur 
als reiner Begriffe bedienen, das heißt als Konventioneller Fiktionen zum Zwecke der Bezeichnung, der 
Verständigung, nicht der Erklärung”. Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 30.  
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and Schopenhauer had supported their critical perspective.197 Such pursuits tended to 
minimize Reason (Vernunft), as the faculty of abstraction, in favor to “Understanding” 
(Verstand), involving direct perception and as the measure of causality. John Locke, who had 
made the Understanding the topic of his ground-breaking work An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (II, 11,§10-11) concluded that Reason is something specific to humans, and, in 
the general activity of thinking, deserves a special place and priority.  
Dühring is extremely wary of mere abstraction, and does not believe that Reason and 
Understanding should be distinguished from one another:  
To see in Reason an ability to analyze, draw conclusions, and make final summaries of the 
elements of thought is a very idle task; for why should the one and only activity of the 
intellect, which is constantly repeated, be traced back to a qualitatively different power of 
thought? Or why should complete and conclusive insight, which runs through the chain of 
elements, be different in its creative function than one of its parts? It is harmful scholasticism 
to make differentiations that cannot be proven for the functions of the mind, nor have any 
sense for material and provably perceptible theoretical considerations.198   
The Philosophy of the Actual thus gives no special priority to the concept of Reason, i.e. the 
agent of abstraction. It conflates Reason with Understanding, in most cases choosing to use 
the term Verstand, which can be translated simply as the Intellect.199 The Intellect, according 
to Dühring, cannot be identified directly, but is rather to be ascertained by what it produces in 
the realm of science. The elaborate epistemological attempts of Kant remain for Dühring 
scholasticism as long as “the tool of the Intellect, i.e. the corresponding parts of the brain, 
cannot be judged according to their performance like other perceptive tools”.200 Schopenhauer 
had emphasized the difference between Reason, as the creator of concepts, and the 
197 Cf. Joachim Kopper, “Schopenhauer über Philosophie und Abstraction,” in Zeit der Ernte Studien zum Stand 
der Schopenhauer-Forschung. Festschrift für Arthur Hübscher zum 85. Geburtstag. Im Namen des Vorstandes 
der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft, ed. Wolfgang Schirmacher (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 
1982), 330. 
198 CP, 178. After his statement, Dühring surprisingly goes on to write that the term reason could actually be 
used. He writes: “Wohl aber können wir in den Antrieben aller Art die Wuzeln eine praktischen Verständnisses 
und Verstandesgebrauchs antreffen, dem wir mit Fug und Recht den besonderen Namen Vernunft beilegen 
mögen. Die Vernunft könnte hiernach sogar als die durch den Verstand erzeugte Einheit der Triebe und 
Leidenschaften angesehen werden, so dass sie die Einigung des mannigfalitgen Strebens zu einem nach 
bewussten Gründen bestimmten Wollen wäre”. Ibid., 178 et seq. Hans Blüher is convinced that “Reason” and 
“Understanding” are different faculties of the mind and believes that the medical findings on the phenomenon of 
agnosia have proved it. Cf. Achse der Natur. System der Philosophie als Lehre von den reinen Ereignissen der 
Natur (Hamburg-Bergedorf: Stromverlag, 1949), 358-359. 
199 Hans Driesch, a popular academic philosopher of the 1920s who follows Dühring using the term 
“Wirklichkeitsphilosophie”, also does not distinguish between Reason and Understanding. Cf. Ordnungslehre. 
Ein System des nichtmetaphysischen Teiles der Philosophien (Jena: Eugen Diederichs), 4.  
200 LW, 75. 
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Understanding, which is limited to determining causality.201 The lack of distinction between 
the two terms in Dühring’s Philosophy of the Actual is symptomatic for its skepticism towards 
abstraction, which we will be encountering throughout this paper. The concrete perceptive 
elements of the here and now are real and objective, and thus gain an importance that mere 
rational or abstract elements of thought do not have.202 The essence of the Intellect for 
Dühring consists of “recognizing of the grounds, in other words, the perception of context”.203 
This perspective, geared towards intellectual discernment of “what is” signifies, we hold, a 
reflection of his general proclivity towards realism and pragmatism.  
In Cursus of Philosophy, published a decade after the foundation of his philosophy in the mid 
1860s, Dühring broadens the scope of the Actual to include the important and, for a positivist 
unusual, factor of “Rational Imagination”.204 Although extremely skeptical of “half products” 
of isolated abstraction, as he calls them, he emphasizes Rational Imagination as a constructive 
force in the process of perception itself; it offers the realm of possibility. This “inventive 
power” cannot create from nothing, and thus remains chained to the facts of experience; yet it 
embodies human freedom at its best. It has the ability to “compose” from what is given by 
experience. Dühring is convinced that the inner workings of Rational Imagination are to a 
certain degree on par with how nature functions itself. If this were not the case, he reasons, 
then there would never be the chance of gaining ideal insight into existence. Without Rational 
Imagination, we would be forced into a slavish reproduction of facts alone.205 Thus 
abstraction does creep into the Philosophy of the Actual, not as an agent of idle analysis, but 
as an inventive tool or a catalyst. Dühring recognizes imagination’s value in art – poetry in 
particular has a role to play – but, in his opinion, its value for science has gone little noticed. 
The concrete Intellect remains fixed on an immediate or future reality and in this sense can 
perform scientific anticipation. It is a productive impulse and a key to the riddles of the 
201 On the history of the distinction between the concepts of reason and understanding, cf. Franco Volpi, 
“Vernunft/Verstand, B. VII. 19. und 20. J”, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 11 (Basel: 
Schwabe & Co., 2001), 833-838. The distinction between the two concepts is a key doctrine of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, which repeats itself in nearly all of his works. For a summary, see “Vernunft” and “Verstand” in 
Schopenhauer-Lexikon, vol. 2, ed. Julius Frauenstädt (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1871), 436-438;441-443. See 
also Volpi, “Schopenhauers Unterscheidung von Vernunft und Verstand und ihre begriffliche Relevanz,” 279-
297.  
202 It must be emphasized, however, that although the intuitive powers within the intellect take precedence over 
the abstract ones, Dühring’s emphasis on the importance of the intellect in general causes his thought to be 
predominantly rational in its nature. 
203 CP, 180. 
204 Ibid., 180-182. 
205 Ibid., 46. 
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history of science. Rational Imagination is not only a part of the Actual; it is in a sense also 
higher and superior to its other components.206 
Consciousness itself, according to Dühring, is based on something that does not exist in 
thought. That which enables us to think is what enables nature to work. While admitting that 
consciousness is fragmentary, we should not, in Dühring’s opinion, follow the example of 
Schopenhauer (later it would be Hartmann, Nietzsche, and Freud) and see the unconscious 
factors as being higher than and superior to the conscious ones. True free will is not to be 
found in irrational “mysterious freedom” (Zauberfreiheit), but rather in objective elements of 
the mind and its creations, of which consciousness is a part. Ultimate freedom involves 
“acting according to principles, and thereby letting the given essence of one’s own being 
come into play. All instinct and urges, all lower and higher interests, all passion and energy 
and finally all insights and purposes are given their due”.207 Freedom thus involves principles 
as well as behavior and is highly individual and instinctual. It is also a product of objective 
principles (institutions and facts) created by man which determine the prevailing urges and 
intellectual forces within us.208   
Dühring’s philosophy also contains metaphysical elements in the form of an “illustration of 
the world” (Weltschematik), which represents the intellect applied to the highest principles of 
the Actual. The original illustration, which is also the most elementary, is a totality. The 
Actual, as universal being, is singular and accordingly the world was something in which 
everything was once unified and unmoving. As we have mentioned, there was never an 
“ancient creation” (Urzeugung) from the non-living to the living: at some point and for some 
unknown reason, the primordial being began to develop and, according to Dühring, this 
development cannot regress. The world exists between two points and is heading to an 
unknown final conclusion.209 The Actual creates from within, without changing its totality. 
There are no recurring patterns, but rather “persistent elements”, which function amid change. 
206 Although Dühring first applies the concept of Rational Imagination in Cursus of Philosophy (1875), 
interestingly, an early article of Dühring’s from 1866 mentions the importance of imagination, citing – of all 
people – Goethe, whom he would later mock and defame, as someone who successfully applied imagination in 
the area of natural science. Cf. “William Whewell,” op. cit., 847.  
207 CNS, 67. There is an element of Schopenhauer’s understanding of freedom here, but ultimately Dühring 
defines the term in a completely different manner. Schopenhauer emphasized the scholastic phrase “operari 
sequitur esse” (doing follows being). Cf. Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will , ed. Günter Zöller (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 51. For Dühring, “collective and organized activity” plays a role in freedom 
and thus societal or manmade entities in the concept of freedom. CNS, 66. 
208 Ibid, 67. 
209 CP, 28. This is a secularized Christian perspective, which is an important element of Dühring’s understaning 
of progress. As Reinhard has shown, the ancients did not have this linear perspective of history. Wolfgang 
Reinhard, “Die lateinische Variante von Religion und ihre Bedeutung,“ Saeculum 43 (1992): 233. 
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The philosopher is challenged to view changing phenomena in its context and to dismantle the 
elements of Being into its different unchanging components. Although the Actual has many 
parts it is characterized by oneness: 
All-encompassing being is alone. With its self-efficiency it has nothing above or alongside of 
it. To affiliate a second being with it would mean to make it what it is not, namely a part or a 
component of a comprehensive whole. If we carefully consider our own mind and its unity, 
nothing that must enter into this unified mind can retain a duality for itself. Nothing can be 
stripped away, as it were, from the unity of the mind. For where should an element be placed 
which is supposed to be an object of thought in general? That which cannot be an object of 
thought would cease to belong to our conception of the Actual and the world, and thus become 
a complete nothingness to us.210 
There is constant interplay within the human mind between “being” and “thought”, between 
“permanence”, and “change”. Dühring emphasizes that consciousness is qualitatively 
different from inanimate processes due to the continuousness or interconnectedness of its 
nature; whereas in nature every real result is limited and signifies a certain definite quantity, 
thought advances uninhibited, while at the same time being the outcome of mechanical forces. 
Thus humans have, according to Dühring, a natural tendency to err. Error is, however, an 
“asset of all levels of existence” and a component of the subjective as well as the objective 
side of nature. It belongs to every epoch of history and, according to Dühring, is based on 
“antagonism”, which is a crucial element of the Actual.211 There are certain natural barriers 
that stand in the way of all movement and progress, and thus mistakes become “necessary 
disturbances” which serve to support life.   
There is, Dühring writes, a “Law of Difference”, or inherent antagonism, which brings forth 
change. The essence of all sensation consists of difference or the “antagonism of forceful 
structures of the elements and the individuals”. The permanent and the variable are concepts 
that belong together, making up two sides of the same coin of the Actual. Something that 
remains the same would result in coagulation and would mean nothing for life; a change 
without conservation is impossible.212 Becoming different does not mean completely 
210 CP, 16. 
211 “Antagonism” comes from the word antagonista or adversarius, an opponent, a counter-part. The history of 
the term shows that the ancient world did not use the word. At the end of the 18th century Kant applied the term 
to people. He spoke of man’s “unsocial sociality” and the “tendency to socialize”, as well as an “inclination to 
isolate” through which nature develops ultimately making society a “moral whole”. Dühring’s role model 
Schopenhauer described the word as “the relationship of the will and vivid knowledge to the outer world”. Cf. 
Goerdt, “Antagonismus,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 1, eds. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried 
Gründer (Basel, et al.: Schwabe, 2007), 358 et seq.  
212 Howison sees a strong correlation between Dühring’s concept of change and permanence and Hegel’s notion 
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beginning again, but rather partially continuing what was there, in that something is lost and 
something is gained. Between two different successive conditions, one of which has morphed 
and transformed, there has to be something in common, and that which they have in common 
is what perseveres and carries change. Absolute changeability is therefore an 
incomprehensible concept because becoming different would contain no antagonism from 
which it could withdraw and show its essential nature.213  
Changes in consciousness, Dühring writes, resemble a mechanical jolt. With each sensation 
there is a new static added and a higher energy is created. The feeling created accompanies 
the transition from one condition to the next. Dühring draws the conclusion that the change 
that is felt is most significant. The “difference” is the most basic law of enhancing 
consciousness of any kind. A sort of opposing tension seems to be necessary for the 
emergence of every impulse.214 Without difference, life would be hollow. Repetition of what 
has already been tried has no excitement left. Obstacles, which stand in the way of men, bring 
change into life and raise the worth of life. Thus a certain level of disturbance, he believes, is 
beneficial and necessary. Every change, every transition from one phase to the next until 
death brings forth a certain degree of pleasure. Every stimulus is based on a change in 
circumstances in the lives of individuals, as well as in those of nations. The system of the 
Actual creates positive impulse for life through obstruction and disturbance.215 The reality of 
death, from which pessimism has gained so much strength, is a reason for optimism in 
Dühring’s opinion, as death is not merely continuous destruction, but rather a self-
emancipation from existence when it has had enough.  
 
of identity and difference being “the elementary “moments” of the absolute Idea.” Cf Howison, “Some Aspects 
of Recent German Philosophy,”12. 
213 CP, 22.  
214 Ibid., 21. 
215 When reading Dühring’s chapter on death in The Worth of Life one cannot help but be reminded of 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, particularly the parting advice Zarathustra gives to the dying rope dancer of 
not worrying about going to hell, “On mine honour, my friend, there is nothing of all that whereof though 
speakest: there is no devil and no hell. Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body; fear therefore nothing 
any more!” Thus Spake Zarathustra, eds. Adrian del Caro and Robert Pippin (Cambridge, et al.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 11. Nietzsche, it should be remembered, studied Der Werth des Lebens meticulously, 
writing a 53-page summary and critique of Dühring’s book. Cf.  Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 
Vierte Abteilung. Erster Band. Nachgelassene Fragmente, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 208-261. 
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4. Estimation of Life 
The Worth of Life was written by Dühring to “fit the times if nothing else”.216 There had been 
a rising tide of pessimism in Germany following the unsuccessful 1848 revolution as people 
were becoming uncomfortable with the political conditions amid the rapidly developing 
industrial development and the concomitant changes that were affecting their country. It was 
no coincidence that Schopenhauer’s gloomy metaphysics started gaining immense popularity 
at this time.  Dühring believes that phases of history shape the mindsets and the views that 
people have and comes to the conclusion that it will never be possible to decide the issue of 
whether optimism or pessimism is more justified; any purely theoretical attempt to evaluate 
life favorably or unfavorably is destined to fail. Negative and positive perspectives on life are 
changeable and “come into play under the influence of individual fate determined by 
favorable or unfavorable times”. We do not judge life merely according to what it “is”, but 
also according to how we think it “ought to be”. The spirit of any given age will never have 
the last word. The empirical world which Dühring has before him is apparently an authority 
that he does not feel the need to accept:  
We reject the mere facts. We do not want them. We curse unfortunate circumstances and cruel 
coincidence. What does this entail? Evidently nothing less than, that we are prepared to 
condemn contemptible conjunctures of history with their arbitrary twists of fate.217  
The notions behind events, i.e. the subjective sensations of the individuals, are a phenomenon 
of the Actual just as are the real events that transpire. We, as humans, experience strong urges 
or sensations, which Schopenhauer would have labeled as belonging to “the will”, but which 
Dühring calls “Cosmic Impulse” (universaler Affekt). 218  Cosmic Impulse creates inspiring 
and sometimes depressing sensations within us. We develop an optimistic or a pessimistic 
view of things according to the manner and degree in which these sensations affects us. 
Somewhat banally, Dühring concludes that such affects are the result of many different 
factors, one of which is the circumstance under which we live.  
Although a self-professing advocate of optimism, in Dühring’s opinion, the real existence of 
evil gives justification for pessimism. Confronted with the ills of Germany under Bismarck 
216 WL, III. Oswald Spengler put The Worth of Life on his list of the “real landmarks” of the 19th century, 
describing the book as “a work which is rarely heard of, but which exercised the greatest influence upon the 
succeeding generation”. Spengler, The Decline of the West, vol. 1, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 373. Hans Vaihinger called the book “one of Dühring’s best works”. Hartmann, 
Dühring, und Lange, 151. 
217 “Wir empören uns gegen die Tatsache, wir verwünschen sie; wir fluchen der Ungunst der Umstände und dem 
grausamen Zufall. Was heißt das? Offenbar nichts anderes als wir die uns verhassten Conjunkturen dieser oder 
jener Daseinsverwicklung verurteilen”. Ibid.,VII. 
218 See CP, 174-177, 358 et seq.  
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and beyond, he comes to advocate a furious, outraged pessimism, which he later terms reagent 
pessimism (“Entrüstungspessimismus”, “Reagenzpessimismus”). This hostile and indignant 
negativity, he writes, is not to be confused with the complacent otherworldly pessimism 
(“Jenseitspessimismus”) of Schopenhauer and his school, which turned its back on the world 
and took solace in nothingness or nirvana. The pessimist, Dühring argues, knows no unified 
thought and can therefore disparage reality. He can fervently reject the fact that everyday life 
has an absolute value and loses himself in dreams where fantasies are put in the place of 
reality. Whereas the optimist takes what “ought to be” for granted, generally having a positive 
view of the status quo, the pessimist turns away from the world and acts as if there were a 
superhuman position from which to master the world. Dühring makes a careful differentiation 
between the subjective system from which a measurement of the conditions should be given 
and an objective totality from which the means to satisfy the subjective strivings can be 
taken.219  
An estimation of the worth of life, Dühring insists, comes from one’s own temperament and 
can therefore not be purely theoretical or abstract. A theoretical judgment must be based on a 
theoretical concept as well as a practical assessment of the approval of certain efforts. A 
purely theoretical value judgment cannot be based on desire. In Dühring’s opinion, a practical 
judgment can never follow the orders of theoretical concepts, which from the beginning 
intend to say how life should or should not be. Consistent with his aversion to abstraction, as 
illustrated above, he rejects every attempt to judge life from outside of life, as well as to make 
metaphysical statements about the preconditions of life. A person’s own temperament and the 
practical concerns which stem from one’s character take precedence. In an approach relevant 
for his thought on political economy, Dühring writes that strict checks need to be made as to 
whether seemingly theoretical judgments actually come about from practical occurrences.220 
Passions, which are specific, i.e. never abstract or theoretical, belong to life and should never 
be seen as detrimental (unless they are taken to extremes). Life would be barren without love 
and hate; he goes as far as to say that ascetics who condemn the pleasures of life “commit an 
intellectual crime against humanity”. If asceticism were ever to become a universal axiom, he 
believes, life would lose its joy and turn into death.221Although not of “theoretical” value, 
219 WL, 8. 
220 Ibid., 8. We will see below that Dühring, following Henry Carey, thought that the British School of 
economics was pursuing practical concerns with its theoretical postulates. 
221 Ibid., 19. Nietzsche objects vehemently to this perspective of Dühring’s, pointing out - in our opinion 
correctly -  that great thinkers need isolation and ascetism: “Er meint also in allem Ernste, daß ein Leben in der 
Einsamkeit nie ein Leben für die Menschen sein könne, und daß Abwendung vom Leben Abwendung von den 
Menschen sei. Nun ist es thatsächliche umgekehr; ich möchte wissen, welche Art von höheren Bändern überhaut 
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instinct and passion serve as instructors for humanity and should not be suppressed. We will 
see below that Dühring bases his concept of law on the instinct of revenge. 
Another reason that Dühring puts forth to justify optimism is the existence of an absolute 
inevitability of what happens in the world. This idea assumes Natural Law, which he feels 
gives the human mind a comforting repose. Just as the individual antagonism of life, i.e. the 
natural tension between need and satisfaction, is seen as the main source of energy and 
enjoyment, the subjugation to Universal Law is, according to Dühring, not something painful 
burdensome, but rather an act that carries with it a wealth of higher gratification. The 
differentiation brought about by the laws of nature adds spice to life, so to speak, and allows 
goodness to grow and higher consciousness to evolve. Contrast, he writes, is the source of 
pleasure; resistance to overcome brings happiness.  
The argument that Dühring seems to emphasize the most to justify optimism as an ethical 
principle is his belief in the future of humanity, i.e. that man will be happy in the future. This 
fact should comfort everyone as they can look beyond their own personal situation and any 
sorrows they might have and see a bright future. We all possess the essence and the logical 
system of nature within us; the inner workings of our conscious resemble how the process of 
the world is re-enacted.222 We also have congenial instincts which link us to the whole of 
humanity. We possess a “solidarity of fate” as a species and can be confident of the idea that a 
new “scientific era” of mankind has begun in which the minds of men will be elevated and the 
social conditions of human society ultimately improved. Here again, we touch on the main 
thrust of Dühring’s ethics, namely science seen as an ethical entity involving morality, justice, 
and the ideal of a noble form of humanity.  
5. Critical Summary 
Growing up in the aftermath of the collapse of classical German philosophy, Dühring offers 
an antidote to what he views as the mystical abstraction and bold speculation of the German 
university philosophy since Kant. There is no deep-seeded mystical background to the world, 
Mensch an Mensch knüpfen würde, wenn man die Arbeit der einsamen Asketen jeder Art wegnehmen wollte! 
Und nun gar geistiger Selbstmord! Man denke an Empedokles und Schopenhauer, Leopardi, die hier als 
“Verbrecher am Intellekt˝. erscheinen, an Luther und an wie viele andre. Es scheint nicht, daß gerade der “Geist” 
bei dieser Art, das Leben zu betrachten, verkümmert! ” Nietzsche Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, eds. 
Giorgi Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 215-216. 
222 Dühring calls the individual “almost a kind of monad, a completely separated whole that fosters the reason 
and measure of his fate in himself”. WL, 184. Howison sees this postulate of Dühring’s as being reminiscent of 
Leibnitz. “Some Aspects of Recent German Philosophy,” 14. Dühring thought very little of Leibnitz, believing 
that the philosopher had incompetently copied the Italian monk Giordano Bruno’s concept of the monad. KGP, 
226-227. 
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according to Dühring. Philosophy deals strictly with the Actual, i.e. the concrete, the real, or 
simply what we have before us. Dühring takes on the ambitious task of synthesizing two of 
the dominant currents of thought of his day, scientism and individualism, as represented by 
his two most important historical paragons: Comte and Schopenhauer, respectively. With a 
penchant for architectonics, he constructs a balanced philosophy that exhibits substantial 
analytical insight while utilizing his personal talents for mathematics and abstract mechanics, 
as well as his training in the field of law. Despite his philosophy’s symmetric form, having a 
balanced configuration to his thought is not an end in itself, and is to an extent even 
misleading. As Vaihinger emphasizes, Dühring is a destructive thinker. His main objectives 
are, as he states himself, on the one hand, to fight against the absence of clarity and on the 
other, to battle against injustice.223 Unlike Marxism, whose philosophical ambiguities had to 
be made more comprehensible long after Marx’s main works had been written (in Engel’s 
“Anti-Dühring”), the Philosophy of the Actual is built on epistemological foundations. His 
theory of knowledge is at once a veneration of the rational faculties of the mind and, to an 
extent, a reduction of the faculty of Reason (Vernunft) - which we understand as the ability of 
human abstraction – in favor of instinctive intuition. If we were to see a man’s philosophy as a 
kind of “unconscious biography”, as Nietzsche called it, Dühring’s strivings for concrete 
visual clarity of thought (Anschaulichkeit) might be interpreted as a compensation for his 
blindness.224 
As “concrete” as his philosophy strives to be, the power of abstract thinking and the ability to 
apply logical principles to metaphysical quandaries is one of Dühring’s greatest strengths. 
Whereas philosophical thinkers in the Anglo-American tradition have been influenced by an 
anti-metaphysical and anti-theoretical discourse, Dühring belongs to a continental European 
tradition where the primal ontological quandaries of life are approached with vigor. The will 
for clarity in the realm of the abstract can be seen in his rejection of the concept of infinity, 
which is present from the very beginning of his philosophical endeavors onwards and serves 
223 Dühring to Ernst Jünemann, 7 June 1894, Dühring Papers, Box 7, HA/SBB. Dühring writes: “Der Urtrieb in 
meinem Streben haben Sie richtig getroffen: Gerechtigkeit und Haß gegen aller Unklarheit.”  
224 Nietzsche on philosophy as unconscious biography, cf. Jenseits von Gut und Böse und andere Schriften 
(Cologne: Könemann, 1994), 13-15. Houston Stewart Chamberlain exaggerates when he writes that due his 
blindness Dühring has “gar keine Anschauung” (no visual intuitiveness).  There is, however, some validity to the 
author of the Foundations of the 19th Century’s emphasis on the abstractness of Dühring’s thought in the sense 
that Dühring is a man of mathematics and physics as opposed to biology. Chamberlain wrote: “Will er die 
grossen Namen der Wissenschaft anrufen, so nennt er Kepler, Galiei, Huygens, Lagrange – niemals Boerhaave, 
Harvey, Jussieu, Cuvier, Lyell; denn ihm gelten die beschreibenden und biologischen Wissenschaften als 
untergeordnete, und verächtlich spricht er von den ‚Niederungen, in denen das Leben wimmelt‘.“Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain and Friedrich Polske, Heinrich von Stein und seine Weltanschauung (Munich und Leipzig: 
George Müller, 1905), 24-25. 
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as a pillar of his thought. For Dühring, the Actual contains unity and has clear borders; just as 
there are only exact numbers, there is only one all-encompassing primordial Being. The 
essence of the Actual, and of Dühring’s philosophy, is revealed in the interplay between the 
fixed or permanent entities of reality as opposed to its changing elements. Dühring’s writings 
on the configuration of Being represent a noble attempt to take the human mind to its absolute 
limit by reaching out beyond what exists and what can exist to view an absolute whole. 
Another strength of his philosophy is its emphasis and understanding of forms and 
configurations, one of which is the individual itself. Dühring postulates the ideal type of the 
defiant enlightened hero who preserves freedom throughout history. The emphasis on the 
persistent elements of the Actual adds a sense of conservatism to Dühring’s thought. He is 
intensely concerned with values and entities that exist above and beyond time or the 
“historical conjunctures”, as he terms it. His philosophy, like Schopenhauer’s, is strongly anti-
Hegelian. Dühring - in our opinion correctly - sees elements of Hegelian thought as an affront 
to natural science. Whereas Hegel’s dialectic explains, interprets, and predicts historical 
movement through contrasting elements fused together to create progress (thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis), Dühring’s “Law of Difference” is orientated towards the creation of a static 
equilibrium. This gives him, in our opinion, the advantage over Hegel of having a perspective 
perhaps less exhilarating, but holding more water, so to speak, to scientifically deal with 
concrete social phenomena. Dühring’s preoccupation with the “constant” might be seen as a 
philosophical expression of the natural scientific revolution caused through the discovery of 
the law of energy equivalence.225 
Dühring’s philosophy has serious weaknesses. His ontology makes no attempt to decipher or 
interpret the ultimate complexities of the Actual itself. Dühring tells us, that “primordial 
being”, i.e. a state in which distinctions and change did not exist, began to change, thus 
beginning a causal series that exists into the present. For this most crucial of all happenings, 
he gives only vague hints as an explanation. With regard to the universal, he denounces 
metaphysics at every turn, and yet his concept of the “illustration of the world” seems nearly 
as idealistic and speculative as many of the philosophical predecessors whom he disparages. 
His idea – similar to Leibniz’s concept of the monad – that every individual possesses in his 
own thought a natural universal logic which at any given moment functions in the same or 
similar manner as the ultimate Being borders on the mystical.  
225 As is so often the case with scientific discovery, this law was discovered by Robert Mayer and Hermann 
Helmholtz independently of one another. Dühring charged Helmholtz with plagiarizing Mayer, which, as seen 
above, was one of the reasons he was dismissed from his lecturing position at the Berlin University. 
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Through its strong rational propensity Dühring’s philosophy has a tendency of being 
somewhat indeterminate at times. He sometimes vacillates between two, sometimes extremely 
different positions, ending up with a perspective that might be seen as ambiguous. We find it 
difficult, for example, to characterize his philosophy optimistic or pessimistic. He places 
himself clearly on the side of optimism and yet winds up advocating a furious form of 
pessimism as a reaction to corruption. His view of the significance of the individual is both 
relative and absolute. He rightfully criticizes the “hero worship” of the 19th century, where a 
genius operates in a kind of historical vacuum independent of circumstance (Carlyle). And yet 
he takes for granted in the realm of science “it is more about those who shape their age, than 
those who are shaped by their age.”226 Other examples will be demonstrated below when we 
analyze his social theory. There is a certain relativism to his philosophy, and one can see what 
Ludwig Marcuse meant when he spoke of the “lack of a will to a goal” in Dühring’s 
thought.227 It is perhaps this ambivalence that also led the Finnish philosopher Wilhelm Bolin 
(although otherwise full of praise for Dühring) to write that Dühring’s books leave the reader 
unsatisfied.228 Arnold Gehlen has shown, however, that the category of indeterminateness has 
in many ways been a “signature of the times” in modernity, signifying a period of transition. 
Dühring’s philosophy, which originated in a time of transition, displays such ambivalence.229  
Modern – in a negative sense – is, in our opinion, also Dühring’s aversion to abstraction as 
exemplified conceptually by his conflation of “Reason” (Vernunft) and “Understanding” 
(Verstand). This aspect of his philosophy, which signifies a weakening of the faculties of 
detachment and sober discourse, lessons his objectivity and gives his thought, as we see it, a 
tendency towards caprice and later even childishness, which has negative repercussions for 
both his thought and his biography. Due to Dühring’s enormously high estimation of the 
human mind and its trust in the rational faculties of consciousness, his philosophy takes on a 
226 KGN, 5. 
227 Marcuse, “Der Pionier Dühring,” Das Tagebuch 14 (14 January 1933): 62, 63. Among other things, Marcuse 
reproaches Dühring for giving up pure humanist goals for in-fighting (Bruderkampf) among the different races. 
Writing in 1933 on the hundredth anniversary of Dühring’s birth, Marcuse is, however, careful to distinguish 
Dühring from the “German Socialist barbarism” of his day. Although a pionier of this movement, in Marcuse’s 
opinion, Dühring held the faculty of reason too high in esteem for him to have supported national vanity and the 
myth of blood. Ibid. 
228 In a letter to Ludwig Feuerbach, he wrote pointedly (and we would say exaggeratedly) that when reading 
Dühring “one is no further at the end than one was at the beginning”. Wilhelm Bolin to Ludwig Feuerbach, 11 
July 1867, in Ludwig Feuerbach. Gesammelte Werke, Briefwechsel V , ed. Werner Schuffenhauer (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 2004), 310-313. 
229 A chapter of Gehlen’s book Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter was titled “Unbestimmtheit als Zeitsignatur”. 
Cf. Hans Freyer, Schwelle der Zeiten. Beiträge zur Soziologie der Kultur (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
1965), 224. 
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distinct directness and imponderability, which makes him vulnerable to ill thought out “clean 
sweep” solutions to societal problems in the name of the “good of the whole”.  
It should be emphasized that Dühring is not a philosopher in the strict sense of the word, nor 
does he want to be.230 Despite his praiseworthy efforts in the field of ontology, he aims less at 
intricate analytical discourse or reflection about what the phenomenology of the world entails, 
than he does at the whence and for which purpose, i.e. matters of science, practical issues of 
causality, and especially possible fields of action. His understanding of philosophy as “the 
evolution of highest consciousness of the world and life” involves the field of action in 
intellectual pursuits. Philosophy does not only involve analytical reflection on the quandaries 
of the world, but is rather, for Dühring, a force for advancing intelligence and improving the 
condition of humankind. This, we believe, can no longer be called “philosophy” in the strict 
sense, and it is perhaps for this reason that Dühring often makes use of the term 
Geistesführung, mind leadership, in connection with his own philosophy. The development of 
“the highest consciousness of world and life”, as Dühring understands philosophy to be, 
extends the boundaries of the field and ultimately raises the issue of politics and how to shape 
the individual and society.231 
  
230 Academic philosophers of his day were quick to point out that Dühring was not a true philosopher. For 
example, Adolf Lasson (1832-1917), a Hegelian philosopher who began to teach at the Berlin University just as 
Dühring was dismissed and, like Dühring, taught at Victoria Lyceum, certainly exaggerates when he writes that 
“it is hard to find a philosophical question which is handled by him (Dühring) thoroughly and independently” 
and that “no trace of the influence of this writer (Dühring) on philosophical discussions can be proven”. 
Dühring’s influence on Alois Riehl, as shown by Köhnke, proves Lasson’s statement to be false. Cf. Köhnke, op. 
cit., 373-376.    
231 Schopenhauer also defined philosophy in terms of consciousness, but rather as the “doctrine” (Lehre) of its 
contents, as opposed to its “development” (Entwicklung), as we see it with Dühring. Cf. Schopenhauer, The 
World As Will and Representation, 128. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLITCAL ECONOMY 
1. Foundations: American School, List, Carey  
In the early years of his development as a political economist, Dühring was a loyal disciple of 
two thinkers: Friedrich List and Henry C. Carey. Both men were non-academic writers who 
devoted their lives to creating an alternative to the laissez faire capitalist theories of the 
British school that succeeded Adam Smith. Their thoughts on economics are closely 
associated with what is called the “American System” of political economy. The term 
American System, coined by Henry Clay in his tariff speech of 1824, signifies an approach to 
economics that advocated mercantilist-like measures to benefit manufacturers and facilitate 
industrial growth. Although Dühring at times showed outspoken anti-American sentiment, he 
clearly had an affinity for America. The rugged individualism and independence, the disregard 
for the burden of the past, the optimistic view to the future, as well as the standardizing and 
rationalizing of the machinations of economic life are all aspects of American life that 
Dühring viewed favorably.232 In general, the American mentality of defying the nations of the 
Old World and of marching confidently into the future found favor with Dühring. The leftist 
spirit of emancipation which he would embody was, in fact, akin to the ethos of the United 
States of America, which Ernst Nolte has aptly labeled the “first leftist government”.233  
If there was a founding father of the American System, it was the first American Secretary of 
the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, one of the signers of the United States’ Declaration of 
Independence. Hamilton, who was born in the British West Indies in 1755, rejected Adam 
Smith’s maxim of laissez-faire, believing that the federal government should offer selective 
stimulation, support, and encouragement to establish American manufacturing industries. His 
three works on political economy Report on Public Debt (1790), the Report on a National 
Bank (1790) and the Report on Manufacturers (1791) had substantial influence in his day and 
232 The philosopher and political publicist Theodor Lessing, who had written a popular essay on Dühring, went 
as far as to label Dühring an “up and coming American”, writing that Dühring is to America what Schopenhauer 
is to Asia. Theodor Lessing, Europa und Asien (Leipzig: Meiner, 1930), 258. Dühring had great respect for the 
protectionist Republicans, who he labeled as “the freest and most radical party of North America”, but looked 
down with scorn upon the free-trading Southern States, which he saw as being ruled by Junkers advocating a 
system that was a variation of English laissez-faire economics. Cf. “Die Volkswirtschaftslehre im Jahre 1865,” 
Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1865): 689. Dühring, “Carey als Arbeiterökonom,” Vossische 
Zeitung 8 (1864): 1 et seq. 
233 Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der kalte Krieg (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985 [1st ed. 1974]), 47 et seq. In 
analyzing the background to the Cold War, Nolte shows that the United States government came about through 
the efforts of radicals who disregarded tradition and sought to create a “new Zion” as a haven for the suppressed. 
Men such as Thomas Paine invoked Natural Law, calling for “freedom for all men” and “emancipation from the 
interests of money”, etc. Ibid., 50.   
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beyond. Wary of the strong pressure that British merchants could exert, backed up by the 
British Navy, Hamilton advocated protection which would enable American industry to grow. 
He emphasized the preamble of the American constitution which required the government to 
“promote the general welfare of the people”, believing that congress has the power to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imports, excises, payment of debts, and provide for common defense and 
general welfare. Hamilton was convinced that a nation’s prosperity should not be measured by 
the amount of precious metals it contains, but rather by the quantity of its production (a 
thought that List would elaborate on later). The legitimate tasks of government included 
borrowing money, regulating foreign and domestic commerce, as well as establishing rules of 
bankruptcy and naturalization, coining and regulating the value of money and declaring war. 
Thus “the state of agriculture and manufacturers, the quantity and quality of its labor and 
industry must influence and determine the increase or decrease of its gold and silver” and not 
the other way around. He was in favor of creating a national bank to increase national wealth 
and support “productive powers”, and thought that protective tariffs should be implemented 
against competing industries.234  
Hamilton possessed insight as a theoretician, and seems to have been motivated by the 
political consideration of gaining support among the wealthy class for the newly founded 
republic.235 His ideals remained, however, decidedly individualistic in the sense that he 
believed a “higher individualism” could be created through a strengthening of the 
manufacturing sector. Government should promote self-improvement, self-fulfillment, and 
self-reliance. From Dühring’s perspective there are two currents of economic thought in 
America: one stemming from scholasticism, inherited from Europe, the other a natural 
(naturwüchsig) phenomenon, the result of observation and thought-orientated to the practical 
concerns of the young country. For him, Alexander Hamilton was a representative of the latter 
trajectory, exemplifying a “national type” among the different perspectives (nationale Typus 
von Anschauungen).236 Hamilton was to die early, like Ferdinand Lassalle, in a duel, but his 
ideas would live on “as an arsenal of argument and inspiration for later generations of 
Hamiltonians”.237 
234 Michael Liebig, “Friedrich List and the‘American System’ of Political Economy,” in  Friedrich List: Outlines 
of American Political Economy, ed. Michael Liebig (Wiesbaden: Böttiger, 1996), 189-191.  
235 Cf. Frank A. Fetter, “The Early History of Political Economy in the United States,” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society 87 (July 14:1943): 53. 
236 KGN, 2nd edition, 376. 
237 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (New York: Book Find Club, 1945), 11. 
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The German state scientist Georg Friedrich List, born in 1789 in Swabia, moved to America 
after being convicted of disloyalty by the government of Baden. He lived in America from 
1825 until 1832, during which time he became an American citizen before going on to work 
back in Germany as an ambassador under the presidency of Andrew Jackson. List believed 
that the best book on political economy was “the book of life”, and through his practical 
experience in the U.S. he developed notions on economics that were directly opposed to the 
British school of his day. Like Hamilton, he advocated a “national system” involving 
protective tariffs for “infant industries” which were unable to compete with more advanced 
economies. Dühring became one of the most fervent supporters of List in the 1860s at a time 
when List’s social theory was largely ignored by German liberals and the historical school.238 
He saw List, the father of the German Customs Union and pioneer of the German railway, not 
only as a practical businessman and successful agitator (as he was viewed then and still 
today), but also as a first rate economic theorist. Dühring wrote an extensive article on List 
and gave him a prominent place in his Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism.239 
As Dühring’s political economy is to a large degree shaped by Carey, his work also becomes a 
continuation and interpretation of List’s thought (albeit to a far lesser degree). The most 
important point in List’s system for Dühring was the economic principle of nationality. He 
sees List’s great achievement as “having discovered the false concept of cosmopolitanism 
with its instability and having made national points of view an issue for political economy”.240 
Like List, he believes that progress in economics is tied to the concept of the nation. He writes 
that just as the general ideas of law had been enriched by the efforts of Savigny and the 
historical school with its discovery of national structures, the general concepts of political 
economy is specialized and made valid through List’s practical applications.241 
List’s influence is apparent in Dühring’s book Critical Foundation of Political Economy (to 
be dealt with in detail below). In this book, published in 1866, he examines the development 
of political economy as it moved from placing emphasis on the individual towards giving 
more emphasis towards an economic perspective, which incorporated the strength of societal 
238 Cf. Edgar Salin, Politische Ökonomie. Geschichte der wirtschaftspolitischen Ideen von Platon bis zur 
Gegenwart (Tübingen: J.C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1967), 124. Cf. Also Friedrich Lenz, Friedrich List, die 
„Vulgärökonomie“ und Karl Marx. Nebst einer unbekannten Denkschrift Lists zur Zollreform (Jena: Gustav 
Fischer, 1930), 4. 
239 Dühring, “Die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung Friedrich Lists”, in Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift 30 (1867): 246-
284. Cf. also KGNS, 335-376. Mombert emphasizes Dühring’s role in recognizing not only List’s significance in 
practical affairs, but also the importance of his theoretical work. Geschichte der Volkswirtschaft, op. cit., 462. 
240 CA, 52. This although List was himself a cosmopolitan: his motto was “Et la patrie et l’humanité!”. 
241 Ibid. Moffat emphasizes that the concept of the nation was present in mercantilism, which had influence on 
cameralist tradition, from which List originally came. James E. Moffat, “Nationalism and Economic Theory,” 
Journal of Political Economy 34 (Aug. 1928): 423. 
                                                     
88 
 
groups as they influence the flow of business. Dühring sees a progression from Adam Smith’s 
theory where self-interest of the individual alone can lead to socially beneficial results, to 
List’s postulate that the nations have a similar role to play in creating wealth. Dühring writes, 
The individual and the world are connected by the nation […]. The fate of individual 
prosperity, when not determined by mere coincidence, is connected to the prosperity of the 
nation. Economic teachings can therefore not be a construction that does not consider the 
vicissitudes of nations. Nations must hold on to their economic integrity at least as much as 
individuals must. They are not allowed to tolerate economic slavery if they want to avoid 
slavery in every other way as well.242  
Dühring’s emphasis on the nation, which, as Voelske had shown, would later be re-directed 
towards the factor of ethnicity, shows the Philosophy of the Actual’s concern with persistent 
elements as separate, self-contained entities in history. Dühring’s penchant for individualism 
and rebellious defiance are also hinted at in his concept of the nation. He supports the 
measures that List suggests to strengthen the nation, such as protective tariffs for developing 
industry and improvements of domestic transportation and travel – without ever becoming 
what could be called a “nationalist”.243 
Dühring’s own political economy, to be dealt with in detail in Part Three below, entails an 
original interpretation of List’s theoretical concept by applying the principle of the nation to 
domestic affairs. Dühring believes that the best way to help German workers is by 
strengthening their country and, along the lines of the metaphysical postulates of his 
philosophy, he conceives the nation as a societal whole made up of clearly distinct 
components. There is a disharmony of interests between differing groups in a nation, just as 
there is also, on another level, between the different nations throughout the world. Groups 
within a nation are not merely bands of individuals, but rather represent powerful organic 
entities, termed social classes. The efforts of the different classes lead to class struggle, which, 
according to Dühring, can only be understood by those who comprehend the nature of the 
disharmony of interests; whereas List mainly concentrated on the nation as a factor of 
economic development, Dühring sees the groups within the nations as dynamos of economical 
development, so to speak. As Albrecht has shown, Dühring applies the principles of List’s 
242 KGP, 24. Dühring holds that considerations of the nation, state and race are intermediaries of the rights of 
individuals that cannot be ignored. Cf. KG, 443-444.  
243 Dühring has been falsely considered a “nationalist” or “national socialist”. He criticized Ferdinand Lassalle’s 
position as a “type of national socialism which is in the long term untenable for all socialism”. Philosophically, 
nationalism is inherently flawed for him; it is “not a modern passion and remains superficial”. GMLII, 344. 
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protective tariffs to societal groups.244 List believed that nations do not compete against each 
other per se, but rather exist at different stages of development. Advanced nations, such as 
England at the beginning of the 19th century, lean toward free trade, whereas developing 
nations or “enfant economies” need protective tariffs. Nations are to hold other nations at 
arm’s length and strengthen their own position in order to develop. Dühring interprets List by 
advocating the same position for the working class. Just as infant nations need protection to 
develop to maturity, the workers need protection against larger and more powerful groups of 
society. 
Another concept of List’s adopted by Dühring is the idea of “productive forces”, which are to 
be put in the place of what is commonly meant by “value” in the classical theory of 
economics.245 The focus of political economic considerations had been, up to that point in 
history, placed on the production of goods and not the current value of wealth. Political 
economic theories which placed value at the center of attention had taken only the last 
quantitatively discernible cause, namely the finished products, into consideration and had 
overlook the “first cause”, namely the ability to increase prosperity; thus “productive forces” 
that do not exist in the world of goods, but rather in the realm of organizational and 
developing forces, were left largely unconsidered. The emphasis on the productive forces of a 
given economy is connected with the idea of the implementation of protective tariffs needed 
to protect endangered human entities or assets of a nation. List felt that tariffs were necessary 
at an early stage in a nation’s development and could be afterwards discontinued. Dühring’s 
ideas regarding this issue were more similar to the teachings of Carey, whose political 
economy Othmar Spann has labeled “North America’s main contribution to economics.”246  
Henry Charles Carey of Philadelphia, four years List’s junior, had a similar thought trajectory 
as List’s, but his influence on Dühring was far greater. Due to the important role that Carey 
played in shaping Dühring’s views on political economy, it will be necessary to spend more 
time on him and his thoughts than on any other paragon of Dühring’s. As improbable as the 
partnership between a wealthy Philadelphia publisher turned writer and a blind Berlin lecturer 
244 Albrecht, “Die Ausgestaltung des Listischen Nationalitätprinzips durch Eugen Dühring”, Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Staatswissenschaften 83 (1927): 7-9. We will be dealing with this aspect of Dühring’s philosophy in 
detail below. Albrecht is of the opinion that Dühring surpasses List theoretically in establishing that the principle 
of nationality has absolute validity and that it is completely incompatible with a theory which rules the state out. 
245 List, Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie, Band 1., Der internationale Handel, die Handelspolitik 
und der deutsche Zollverein (Stuttgart und Tübingen: J.G. Cotta’scher Verlag, 1841), 220 et seq. Mombert 
credits Dühring with showing the theoretical value of List’s concept of “productive forces”. Geschichte der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, 463.  
246 Spann, Types of Economic Theory, 203. It remains unclear to what degree, if at all, List was influenced by 
Carey. Albrecht is of the opinion that List developed theories independent of Carey. Albrecht, ED, 85-86. 
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forty years his junior would seem, it was no mere coincidence that the two men became 
intellectual allies.247 As Dühring’s autobiography indicates, there were both practical and 
theoretical reasons for him to develop an affinity for the optimistic iconoclastic teachings of 
Carey. By the time the first volume of Carey's main work The Principles of Social Science 
(1858-1859) was translated into German in 1863, as seen in Chapter Two, Dühring had 
developed an animosity towards academia as he had come to know it in Berlin. He was 
disappointed with the education he received at the University of Berlin due to its, as he saw it, 
authoritarian over-emphasis on history and philology.248 Carey's optimistic social teachings 
were a breath of fresh air to him: here was a man who was an independent scholar across the 
ocean writing in a manner free from the restricting conventions and pressures of academia.249 
Perhaps the trauma of becoming blind had made Dühring more receptive to the optimistic 
social outlook expressed by Carey; but it was probably a sense of freedom and emancipation 
from British doctrines exuded by the American that pleased Dühring most.250 
At this juncture in German history, Dühring was not alone in longing for an optimistic 
perspective for the future. As we have seen, there had been a general malaise in Berlin 
following what Paul Ernst termed the breakdown of the classical German Idealism ("Der 
Zusammenbruch des deutschen Idealismus"). The intellectual climate in Germany was 
characterized by stagnation and a certain sense of angst prevailed. Great strides in natural 
science and technology involving new scientific methods, theories and principles had 
rendered the ideas of Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling speculative at best. New discoveries in 
physics, chemistry, biology, and geology tended to lessen the credibility of philosophy in 
general. Science was becoming more specialized and professionalized and the role of the 
academic was changing through newly-implemented structures such as the "habilitation" 
process. The ever-increasing amounts of accumulated knowledge made it difficult for the 
individual to have an overview of the different branches of science and the existence of the 
247 It is not certain when Carey and Dühring first came into contact with one another, but the Dühring Papers, of 
the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz zu Berlin, contain an extensive correspondence which begins in 
1865 and ends in 1878 one year before Carey’s death in 1879.  
248 SLF, 70. 
249 H.L. Mencken eloquently elaborated on the pressures put on university professors of political economy in 
America and questions whether these men were free. Cf. “The Dismal Science” in H. L. Mencken, Prejudices: 
First, Second, and Third Series (New York: The Library of America, 2010), 463. 
250Dühring often makes reference to the free spirit of America when referring to Carey. Despite his scientific 
realism, Dühring had a relatively strong sense of romanticism; for example, in his auto-biography he embellishes 
a story of his ancestor Dühring “crossing the Baltic Sea to Prussia from Sweden”. Cf. SLF, 1.  
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universal scholar seemed to be in danger. Carey’s ideas were attractive not least because they 
went against this pattern.251  
The American scholar also fit the mould of the “philosophical scholar” towards which 
Dühring tended to gravitate. Carey’s more general or philosophical point of departure, which 
followed in the footsteps of David Hume and Adam Smith and aimed to unite philosophy and 
economics, influenced the worldview of the ambitious blind lecturer substantially. Dühring 
writes: "One has to be a positive specialist and a universal thinker at the same time in order to 
view the laws of political economy without error”.252 Dühring was far more inclined towards 
the “philosophical scholar” or even the “poly-typical scholar” than the “mono-typical” one. 
With the drive towards specialization and practical concerns in academia, dealt with above, 
the academic with a general outlook tends to gravitate towards the type of the “controversial 
scholar” which Dühring also represented. As a private scholar with no professional 
connections to a university, Carey was immune to any such “academic controversy”, although 
most university academicians in America rejected or belittled his work; had he acted within 
the realm of academe, he would most probably have fit the mold of controversial scholar. 
Dühring’s craving for an optimistic, universal, and practical approach led him to become a 
champion of Carey. In the years that followed, he would go on to publish two books and four 
articles on Carey and his ideas.253 
In matters of social science, Carey remained an outsider and a challenger to the dominant 
British School of political economy. His father, Mathew Carey, was an Irish immigrant to 
251 There was also opposition to Carey’s ideas as shown by a review in Julius Faucher’s quarterly free trade 
journal of political economy and cultural history. Cf. “Carey’s System,” Vierteljahrschrift für Volkswirtschaft 
und Kulturgeschichte 28, ed. Julius Faucher (1867): 113-152. On Carey’s influence in Germany from a Marxist 
government point of view, cf. Ehrenfried Gallander, Die Entwicklung der Marxschen politischen Ökonomie in 
der Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie des amerikanischen Vulgärökonomen Henry Charles Carey. Der 
Philosophischen Fakultät des Wissenschaftlichen Rates der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle – Wittemberg, no 
date, 30 et seq. See also idem, “Ein Briefwechsel und seine Hintergründe – Carey and Dühring,” Arbeitsblätter 
zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 11(Halle-Wittenberg: Arbeitskreis Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 1982 -  largely a 
compilation of passages from the previous paper.  
252 Albrecht, ED, 12. 
253 Dühring wrote two books and several articles on Carey: Careys Umwälzung der Volkswirtschaftlehre und 
Sozialwissenschaft, and Die Verkleinerer Careys und die Krisis der Nationalökonomie; "Careys Bedeutung für 
die Sozialpolitik”; "Der amerikanische Sozialphilosoph Carey"; “Carey als Arbeiter-Ökonom"; "Carey und seine 
Sozialökonomie". He also wrote a series of articles in the Deutsche Industrie Zeitung. Organ der Handels- und 
Gewerbekammern zu Chemnitz et al. (henceforth DIZ) entitled “Der Amerikanische Nationalökonomen Carey 
und die Deutschen”: “I. Eine transatlantische Lehre”, 26 (30 Juni 1865): 251-252. “II. Handel und Verkehr” DIZ 
27 (7 July 1865): 261-262. “III. Der Zollverein,” 27 (14 July 1865), 271-272. “IV. Der Bodenertrag,” 30 (28 July 
1865): 291-192. “VI. Gewinnvertheiling zwischen Capital und Arbeit”, 34 (24 August 1865): 331-332. “VII: Ein 
merkwürdiger Satz  über die Bewegung der Capitalien” 35 (31 August 1865): 341-342. “VIII. Wirtschaftlicher 
Decentralisation” (7 September 1865): 36. The Dühring Papers shows that Dühring sent Carey these articles and 
that Carey approved of Dühring’s portrayal. Cf. Carey to Dühring, 29 October 1865, HA/SBB, Box 6, where it 
reads: “The Summary of my doctrines that you have given in the Zeitung is excellent. And most glad am I to see 
that they are being there popularized”.  
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America who fervently opposed British imperialism. He founded a successful publishing 
house, which his son Henry ran for most of his life before retiring to devote himself to his 
theoretical pursuits in the field of social science.254 Carey’s method signified a break with 
the classical approach to economics. Whereas the classical school had placed much 
emphasis on describing the laws of nature, Carey, a fervent American patriot, saw political 
economy as a normative science. He believed that the social scientist had the 
responsibility of improving the human condition by promoting happiness and prosperity. 
While this echoes of Jeremy Bentham's phrase of "the greatest happiness to the greatest 
number", Carey went beyond the classical utilitarian concept of individual maximization 
of consumer satisfaction. The true wealth of a nation was for him its productive forces, as 
List had put it. Carey believed that society not only needed material improvement, but 
also moral advancement. In Principles of Political Economy he wrote: "In opposition to 
those who define political economy to be the science of wealth, or of exchange we have 
defined it as that which treats of those phenomena of society which arise out of desire of 
mankind to maintain and improve their condition”.255 Material factors were crucial, but, 
according to Carey, so were man's general happiness, prosperity, and power. For him, a 
system of political economy should concentrate on moral and social growth. He believed 
in human beings’ ability to attain mastery of their environment. In contrast to the classical 
model where nature had a mastery over man, Carey professed a more optimistic position 
where man was able to shape nature to his own advantage.  
Carey is generally not mentioned in discussions of political economic theory today, but was 
highly influential in Europe in his day. He also founded a tradition in America to which 
scholars such as Robert Ellis Thompson, E. Peshine Smith, Stephen Colwell, and William 
Elder belonged.256 His system developed slowly over a period of decades and his many 
books, pamphlets, and articles had a synthetic character that let actions emerge while, at the 
same time, allowing them to be put  in what he saw as their natural progression. The method 
he applied was strongly influenced by the English statesman and philosopher Francis Bacon 
254 In a letter of Carey’s to Dühring, Carey describes his personal background: “You ask some account of myself, 
but, unfortunately, there is really nothing to say, my life except so far as I have been before the world as an 
economist, having been a very private and uneventful one. For many years I was at the head of the largest 
publishing house in the country, and when I left that pursuit I gave my time and mind to the study of the great 
science of which you are now a teacher. I have never filled any public office whatsoever, nor have I ever been a 
candidate for any public employment. You will see therefore, that there is little to be said about me whatever you 
may think proper to say about my books.” Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB.  
255 Quoted from Rodney J. Morrison, Henry C. Carey and the American Economic Development (Philadelphia: 
The American Philosophical Society, 1986), 8. 
256 Bernard, L.L., Origins of American Sociology: The Social Science Movement in the United States (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1965), 389-343. 
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and was primarily inductive, attempting to avoid apriori constructs. Yet Carey also held that 
every independent system of thought needed to be based on a principle sentence or a basic 
idea around which the entire spectrum of its ideas revolved. The two cornerstones of his 
system were a new theory of value and a reversal of Ricardo's theory of agricultural 
cultivation. Regarding the former, he distinguished “value” from “wealth”; the true wealth of 
a nation was seen in terms of its utility. Thus wealth does not come from barter, but is rather a 
symbol of man’s power over nature. Value, the other hand, is measured by nature’s power 
over man; it is the amount of effort needed to overcome the obstacles that have to be 
surpassed to obtain something required; it is thus defined as being related to the costs of 
reproduction. With regard to cultivation, Carey was of the opinion that due to the 
development of technology and more refined tools, it would become possible to cultivate 
better land that had been inaccessible in the past. Thus Malthus and Ricardo’s views on the 
diminishing returns of land, whereby the progression of cultivation moved from the best soil 
to the poorest, was incorrect. It is really the other way around, said Carey: man first cultivates 
the worst land and through technology and innovation is finally able to cultivate the best land, 
a claim which would be confirmed through technology, e.g. the advances in chemistry 
creating crop fertilizer. As Carl-Erich Vollgraf has pointed out, Carey believed that avoiding 
the depletion of land and the prevention of exploitation of natural resources should become an 
integral component of political economy: technology, he wrote, would enable land to be 
reused without creating the excessive diminishing returns which classical theory entailed.257 
Carey espoused an optimistic theory of society where man's different interests exist in 
harmony with one another. Stemming from these two pillars were other ideas such as the 
teaching of the harmony of interests, especially the harmony of distribution, as well as the 
differentiation of "trade" and "commerce" and his concept of business decentralization. 
Carey’s method exhibited a tendency towards favoring “visually perceptive” common sense 
knowledge, as opposed to abstract theoretical discourse and this fit hand in glove with 
Dühring’s philosophy, as described above. He is, we would claim, a man of the “organic will” 
of the community as opposed to “abstract will” of society, to use the terminology of 
Ferdinand Tönnies. Carey contrasts the growth patterns of "centralization" with that of 
"concentration" or the development of local centers of economic activity. Although there has 
to be a balance or harmony between the two tendencies, Carey saw the greater danger in the 
257 Carl-Erich Vollgraf, “Marx’ erstmals veröffentlichte Manuskripte zum 2. Und 3. Buch des Kapitals von 
1867/68 im MEGA-Band II/4.3 Zu neuralgischen Punkten in der Ausarbeitung des Kapitals,“ in Der Zweite 
Entwurf des „Kapitals“, eds. Wolfgang Jahn, Manfred Müller (Berlin: Teitz, 1983), 106. 
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former. Centralization tends to spread manufacturing and agriculture apart from one another; 
concentration keeps them spatially together, creating a healthy interdependence. When one 
large center gains predominance at the expense of the smaller locales, political and economic 
interdependence is lost, he espoused. The state here, according to Carey, tends to become all-
powerful and national attention is turned "outward" as it were rather than "inward". In 
concentration, on the other hand, the local unit is lent more autonomy, increasing the general 
well-being of the local inhabitants. Carey was of the opinion that local centers advantageously 
create more specialization and diversification: more interdependence is created within and 
without the local unit. Thus as an area becomes more specialized, it is in its best interest to 
associate with its neighbors. The result of this was for Carey an impetus towards economic 
development. This cooperative tendency between locales he labels "the principle of 
association", which is seen by him as one of the key factors in catalyzing business activity.258 
Carey writes, "the establishment of a local attraction tends to neutralize the attraction of the 
capitol, or great commercial city; and where such local centers exist, one will invariably find 
the greatest tendency towards the development of individuality and the combination of action 
– and the most rapid progress in knowledge, wealth and power”.259 Consumer and producer 
will come closer together creating a developed region that Carey sees as a cell-like structure 
made up of numerous self-governing localities, which, as time goes by, grow from being 
settlements to cities and, ultimately, independent nations. Once this process takes form, states 
come into being to give birth to a “federal system”. Carey writes, "As employment becomes 
more diversified in the town, it is enabled to combine its efforts with its neighbor towns, to 
effect in the transport to and from the more distant city; and as the cities grow, they in like 
manner, are enabled to unite in facilitating intercourse with nations”.260   
The opposing alternative to this is "centralization", where monopolies dominate from large 
centers. Careful to emphasize that a certain degree of centralization is advantageous and even 
necessary, Carey believes that a state with too much centralized power endangers local and 
voluntary association, putting "forced association of dependents" in its place. With arguments 
similar to those of current detractors of the European Union, he emphasizes the negative 
consequences of over-centralization. He writes, "Every neighborhood that required to have a 
road or a bridge, to establish a bank, or to obtain a redress of grievances, would be required to 
258 In professing the anthropological importance of association, Carey emphasizes the key role of language 
without which "there can be no ideas – no power of thought”. See Carey, The Unity of Law (Philadelphia: Baird, 
1873), 77. 
259 Henry C. Carey, The Principles of Social Science, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, et al., 1858), 190. 
260 Morrison, Henry C. Carey and American Economic Development , 16. Carey’s ideas on the ills of 
centralization are contradicted by Wackernagel. Cf. “Carey’s System,” op. cit., 123-124. 
                                                     
95 
 
make its application therefore at the great city, distant many hundreds of miles, and to pay 
innumerable officers before it could obtain the desired permission [...]".261 Perhaps with the 
complaints of the American Founding Fathers against Great Britain in mind, he states, "Every 
community that found itself suffering from heavy taxes or from other oppressions from which 
it desired to be relieved, would be found seeking to make itself heard, but its voice would be 
drowned by those of the men who profited by such abuses [...]". He points to the 
disadvantages of a large-scale bureaucracy where local citizens were forced to pay sums to 
intermediaries to negotiate their business on the centralized level. Beyond that, he argues that 
when too many resources and factors for production are concentrated in one place, primary 
producers get left behind. It is essential, in Carey’s opinion, that the less-developed entities of 
an economy be allowed to evolve. If this were allowed to happen, localities could develop 
their own political and economic power to balance that of the center. He writes, "The more 
perfect the power of association and the greater the notion of society, the greater must be the 
tendency towards the development of individuality, the more rapid the increase of production, 
the greater the facility of accumulations and the smaller the proportion of the products of 
labor that could be claimed in return for their use".262 For Carey the concentration of power on 
the local level not only benefits the economy, but also offers moral improvement. He writes, 
"Concentration, by means of which the consumer and producer are brought together, has the 
same effect in nations as in families; and if we desire to see improvement in moral feeling, in 
habits of kindness and in the disposition to make exertions for the common good, we shall 
find it as we look more and more inward".  
To illustrate what he saw as the benefits of "local association" and the dangers of over-
centralization, Carey turns to history. Local association had flourished as never before in the 
Grecian Islands, Laconia and Attica, Boetia and Argos, Arcadia and Elis, Megara and Corinth. 
The forces of general association brought these peoples, as well as those of Italy and Asia, 
together in the Isthmian and Neman and Olympic games; however, a "sufficient cohesive 
order" could not be established, and the different centers came into conflict with one another. 
According to Carey, the highly centralized government in Athens ultimately gained increasing 
authority, causing the Greek people to lose the power of association and ultimately their 
rights. Carey sees a similar development in Italy: in the early days, a high level of local and 
voluntary association existed in Etruria and the Campagna, Magna Graecia and the Samnite 
Hills. Over time, this disappeared as the power of Rome increased. Ultimately, local 
261 Henry C. Carey, The Unity of Law, 82. 
262 Morrison, Henry C. Carey and American Economic Development, 62. 
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autonomy began to diminish as people became more and more dependent on Rome and its 
state treasury. The long duration of the Republic and the Empire Carey attributes to lingering 
powers of self-government.263 
Writing in 1873, Carey praises Germany for being the "home of decentralization – of jealousy 
of central power – and the maintenance of local rights".264 Pointing to the commercial union 
of his day, he cites a strong "tendency towards association" among her people. Having had, up 
to that point, no main center of power, Carey believes that Germany was a victim of the 
powers surrounding it, which pitted one community against the other. In his opinion, 
Germany had exerted no tendency to threaten its neighbors; Germany's object in the Franco-
Prussian War was to establish independence. He saw parallels between the development of 
northern Germany and the United States. "Long before the recent wars the peaceful effects of 
decentralization had here fully exhibited themselves in the fact, under the lead of Prussia, 
Northern Germany had been brought under a great federal system, by help of which internal 
commerce had been placed on a footing almost precisely corresponding with that of the 
United States. The Northern States in America exemplified an unequaled balance between 
centralization and decentralization which fostered positive local action”.265 England, on the 
other hand, was an example of the negative effects of too much centralization. Although, 
according to Carey, local centers had originally played a great role in the British islands, they 
had long since diminished. He wrote: 
Edinburgh, once the metropolis of a kingdom, has become a mere provincial city; and Dublin 
once the seat of an independent Parliament, has so greatly declined that were it not for the fact 
that it is the place at which a representative of majesty holds his occasional lévees, it would be 
scarcely at all heard of. Throughout the United Kingdom there is exhibited a constantly 
growing tendency towards centralization, accompanied by diminution in the strength of local 
263 Carey, The Unity of Law, 87. 
264 Ibid., 90. This view of Carey’s was nearly the exact opposite of Thorstein Veblen’s perspective, which, 
written in another era of course, emphasized the aggressive and militaristic tendencies of German history. 
Reinforcing widespread clichés about Germany, which existed around the time of the First World War, Veblen 
effusively condemned Prussia’s “ruthless exploitation, terror, disturbances, reprisals, servitude and gradual 
habituation to settled allegiance, irresponsible personal rule, and peaceable repression”. Douglas F. Dowd, 
Thorstein Veblen (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), 91. As was the case with many issues, Dühring 
was ambiguous about Prussia; he saw Carey as being guilty of an uncritical “Tacitus- like” veneration of the 
Germans, but would presumably not have subscribed to the “bashing” of Germany undertaken by Veblen. 
265 The Unity of Law, 87. 
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attraction, increase of absentee proprietorship keeping steady pace with the growth of 
emigration from its shores.266    
He also made a connection between the tendency towards centralization and militarism, 
writing: "With every step in that direction we see a steady increase in the necessity for 
involuntary association, manifested by the growth of fleets and armies, and of the 
contributions required for their support".267 Whereas concentration promotes freedom and 
happiness, centralization of power, according to Carey, results in poverty and war.  
Dühring was convinced that Carey's theories possessed groundbreaking significance for the 
science of political economy, and that they made up the first new system of political economy 
since Adam Smith. Smith had shown that the true source of wealth was work, thereby making 
man himself the decisive source for the wealth of nations. Carey's new theory of value and his 
thesis on progression of cultivation (where generally the worst land was cultivated first) adds 
to Smith's achievements, giving his own teachings the character of a true system.268 Dühring 
sees Carey's system as a synthesis or a "rational unification", as he calls it, of mercantilism 
(based predominantly on practice) and the ideas of the physiocrats (based on theory). The 
economist from Philadelphia, in his opinion, took the first substantial step towards clearly 
defining economic freedom in terms of nations and individuals.269  
2. The Method of “Pure” and “Political” Economics 
Dühring’s first writings on Carey are largely a reproduction of the American's thoughts, 
written with the intent of exposing the German audience to the American's new ideas. With 
the Critical Foundation of Political Economy, however, Dühring sets out to modify and 
advance Carey's system, integrating it within the nascent ideas of his Philosophy of the 
Actual. 270 Whereas Capital and Labor had dealt with societal alliances, in Critical 
Foundation he attempts to view social tendencies independently as products of societal 
functions.271 The basic principles of his political economy follow those of his philosophy: 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid., 92-93. 
268 Although Dühring values Carey for his systematic approach, many intellectuals in Germany at the time were 
wary of systems in general and criticized Carey for this very aspect of his work. One reviewer of Carey wrote, 
“Es hat in Deutschland des geistigen Ringens einer ganzen Generation bedurft, um die Naturwissenschafen von 
der Herrschaft der naturphilosophischen Systemen zu erlösen und statt ihrer die sogenannte 
naturwissenschaftliche Methode als die allein berechtigte Form der Forschung zur Anerkennung zu  bringen”. 
Wilhelm Wackernagel, “Carey’s System,” 114.  
269 Cf. Dühring, “Der Amerikanische Nationalökonomen Carey und die Deutschen. VIII (Letzter Artikel) 
Wirtschaftliche Decentralisation”, Deutsche Industrie Zeitung 36 (7 September 1865): 352.   
270 According to Dühring, Carey saw the book as in some ways a sharp contradiction to his theories and spoke of 
Dühring "emancipating" himself from Carey. SLF, 111. 
271 KGN, 456. Dühring’s praise of war as an expression of economic power is very surprising, and not to be 
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theory and practice, which according to Dühring had drifted apart in recent history, are seen as 
being inevitably interwoven, and are not to be treated as completely separate areas of study as 
they had been in German scholarship at that time.272 His system, like Carey's, is therefore 
normative and stresses the importance of social justice: iron laws hindering man must be 
defied! He speaks of not “what is”, but of “what ought to be". Economic life, according to 
Dühring, is a part of the totality of man’s social existence. A theory of society has to present 
the framework within which the center of economic life can be analyzed, and should not be 
seen as a mere accessory to political economy. He retains Carey's optimistic conviction that 
man can control his own destiny: for human beings to fulfill their needs, we must be able to 
appropriate nature in a productive manner. Dühring remains as equally opposed to the theories 
of Ricardo and Malthus as was Carey and he condemns the two English theoreticians, along 
with the physiocrats, for not taking volition and politics sufficiently into consideration. 
Whereas Carey had gone to great lengths to emphasize the "unity of law", in the Critical 
Foundation Dühring places emphasis on the qualitative dissimilarities between laws in the 
different areas of the field (although not denying the existence of the general laws). According 
to Dühring, there is some concordance between the laws of the different realms, but to him 
these similarities are too general to bring forth valuable knowledge.273 He is of the opinion 
that all problems of political economy have to be examined from the double aspect of theory 
(or natural and isolated consideration) and practice (which is social and to an extent 
historical). The laws relating to production (correlating to theory) and distribution (correlating 
to politics) are portrayed separately by Dühring, but are not seen as being mutually exclusive. 
Whereas pure laws of production, which up to that time were the basis of classical economics, 
can be conceived as being isolated from arbitrariness, the question of distribution inevitably 
involves the “political” and affects production. Distribution is, for Dühring, a "disposition 
found anywhere else in his entire body of work.  Ibid., 454. Voelske asserts that this position may have been due 
to Dühring’s acquaintanceship with Lothar Bucher, an assistant of Bismarck’s, in an attempt to win favor with 
the Prussian government. Voelske, Die Entwicklung des “rassischen Antisemitismus” zum Mittelpunkt der 
Weltanschauung Eugen Dührings, 26-27.  
272 This approach of Dühring’s follows in the footsteps of List, who in the 1830s was mercilessly criticized by 
scholars of the classical as well as the historical school. Cf. Albrecht, ED, 157-158.  
273 KGP, 177. In Cursus of National and Political Economy (1873) Dühring speaks of Laws of Development 
which represent of difference in the way that necessity is conveyed. CNS, 66. We will be dealing with this in 
Chapter Seven below. In a lexical entry that he wrote for Meyer’s encyclopedia on political economic theory 
(„Volkswirtschaftlehre“), Dühring briefly makes reference to the differences between his own ideas and Carey’s. 
Somewhat vaguely, he writes that his system “weicht auch in den letzen Prinzipien von dem carey’schen System 
entschieden ab, indem sie alle Einrichtungen, Zustände, Verhältnisse und Bewegungen aus seiner 
Kräftegravitation erklärt, ohne die Idee zuzulassen, daß die Willkür des Menschen die naturgemäßen 
Verhältnisse der ganzen Völker habe verderben können." „Volkswirtschaftslehre,“  Neues Konversations-
Lexikon. Ein Wörterbuch des allgemeinen Wissens, vol. 15 (Hildburghausen: Druck und Verlag vom 
Bibliographischen Institut, 1867), 537-543. 
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above direct consumption" involving subjugation of political groupings. Although it 
influences production, he emphasizes that it is a separate realm to be handled on its own.274 
The idea that modern capitalism is socially determined becomes the cornerstone of what he at 
different times labels his "societarian" or "organic" system. In his textbooks on political 
economy (Cursus der National- und Sozialökonomie 1st ed.1873, 2nd.ed. 1876 and 3rd ed. 
1892) the distinction between the “pure” and the “political” aspect of economics is further 
substantiated and developed.275   
In emphasizing distribution and the factor of politics in the scheme of political economy, 
Dühring creates an opening for “power” or “force” as a factor of scientific investigation.276 
Political and economic facts from history can only be understood, in his opinion, by analyzing 
the way the given results are determined. This occurs through political forms of conquest and 
forced groupings. Institutions such as slavery and indentured labor, Dühring believes, are 
social-economic forms of a political nature.277 Carey had warned as well of what he called 
"forced association of dependents", created when a centralized government gained too much 
power over its citizens, but Dühring goes beyond his mentor by making this factor the 
cornerstone of his system.    
One of the most important aspects belonging to the “political” realm of economics is the role 
of government. Although Dühring originally sees a positive, albeit limited, role of the state in 
political economy, as we will seen in detail in Chapter Eight below, the challenge of 
overcoming government based on violence becomes a core concept of his vision for social 
reform. His view of government changes in time, but his basic position is that the state is 
274 Although it tended to be ignored or downplayed in the theories of classical economics, the issue of how 
wealth should be distributed was to gain importance for political economy as the 19th century progressed. 
Schübbler had addressed the problem in his writing “Der jetzige Stand der Volkswirtschaftslehre in 
Deutschland,”  Deutsche Vierteljahres Schrift 1(1843): 216-236. Schüz also emphasized the importance of 
“politics” in political economy, (politics being understood as emanating from the state). Cf. “Das politische 
Moment in der Volkswirtschaft,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaften 1 (1844). Dühring’s emphasis 
on the connection between political power and distribution may have inspired the Russian economist Tugan-
Baranowsky’s book Soziale Theorie der Verteilung (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1913). 
275 As mentioned in the General Introduction, Franz Oppenheimer took a similar position believing that all 
scientific facts and behavior could be traced to two causes: one being "purely economic" the other being of a 
"political" nature. He credits Dühring with founding “liberal socialism”. Cf. Franz Oppenheimer, Theorie der 
reinen und politischen Ökonomie (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923), XVI.  
276 In his later years, as his outlook became more individualistic, he puts this political aspect more into the 
forefront of his theory (cf. Chapter 11, Section Two below). He then changes the title of his book Capital and 
Labor to Weapons, Capital, and Labor for the book’s second edition. Here, “weapons” are meant not only 
literally, but also figuratively for undue political influence or the menacing power that centralized governments 
can exhibit. 
277 KNS, 3rd edition, 5. Albrecht was of the opinion that Dühring's specification of political or historical factors 
in his system did not connect him to the later prominent German historical school, but rather to the Austrian 
School’s emphasis on psychological facts. See Gerhard Albrecht, Eugen Dührings Wertlehre. Nebst einem 
Exkurs zur Marxschen Wertlehre  (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1914), 9. 
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always a means and never a purpose in itself.278 He explores the possibility that the state can 
be done away with for good, i.e. that it might be a “provisionary element of history”, but does 
not press the point as is done in anarchism. If the state is not necessary for man, how and why 
was it possible for it to come into existence? He concludes that in its original condition, 
society was made up of different groups that associated with one another in different ways. 
Hostility was predominant because it was in man's nature for the weak to be ruled by the 
strong. The state, therefore, owes its origin to a certain power structure, or “relationship of 
subordination” ("Gewaltverhältnis"), that had been sustained by force and political power up 
until the present.279 According to Dühring, history is shaped by one-sided use of power, which 
develops into a scheme where certain people are helplessly tied to the wills of others in some 
form or another.280 A centralized government upheld by force (Gewaltstaat) is the opposite of 
a legitimate government based on the principles of freedom and justice.281  
3. Practical Proposals 
A salient attribute of the Philosophy of the Actual is its realism and concern for suggesting 
precise measures to unseat wrongful authority existing in the present. Political economy 
becomes an important entity of his system for achieving moral purposes.282 As we will be 
dealing with Dühring’s plans for societal reform in Part Four below, it will suffice now to give 
an outline of the views contained in his system as it helps to elucidate his general world view 
and scientific bearing. Following the ideals of Rousseau, he advocates a type of social 
contract that respects the rights of the individual while preserving a balance of power between 
the individual groups of society.283 In a free society, individuals stand on an equal basis and 
there is no room for domination and subordination. Believing – as did Carey – in the 
278 See CP, 320. 
279 Binder points out that Dühring's ideas on the use of force in history were taken from St. Simon. Hanni Binder, 
Das sozialitäre System Eugen Dührings  (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1933), 72. Dühring was also influenced by the 
ideas of Proudhon, Ibid., 78, also, Frédéric Krier, Sozialismus für Kleinbürger. Pierre Joseph Proudhon – 
Wegbereiter des Dritten Reiches (Cologne, et al.: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), 355 et seq.   
280 CP, 269-270. 
281 The American Albert Jay Nock, influenced by Franz Oppenheimer, held a similar view. Cf. Albert J. Nock, 
Our Enemy the State (Tampa, Florida: Hallberg Publishing Corporation, 1996). 
282 Dühring emphasizes the importance of political economy alongside philosophy in his Weltanschauung. CP, 
533. However, with echoes of Thomas Carlyle’s barb that political economy is the “dismal science”, he places 
the discipline at the lower echelon of knowledge. SLF, 276. Here he writes: “Die höchste Stufe der 
Wissenschaftlichkeit liegt nicht in der Volkswirtschaftslehre. Auch wenn letztere vollkommen ist, stellt sie nur 
ein niederes Gebiet vor, welches weder an sich über eine Lehre von der Futterbeschaffung der Menschheit  
hinausreicht, noch etwa  je solche Verstandeskräfte in Anspruch nehmen kann, wie die höheren und edeleren 
Wissenschaften”. 
283 Although he never wrote a monographic portrayal of  Rousseau, there is hardly a thinker for whom Dühring 
had more reverence than he. In a letter to his follower Ernst Jünemann, he emphasizes that he knows Rousseau 
“better than anyone on earth” and could have written volumes on him if he had wanted to. Dühring to Jünemann, 
15 January 1895, Dühring Papers, Box 7, HA/SBB. 
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possibility of a harmony of interest, Dühring writes that the highest principle of communal 
life is the exclusion of domination and servitude.284 Government is not needed as an 
arbitrator; the parties involved can solve their differences themselves. "Natural justice" is 
served by an absolute minimum of government intervention and by letting the given powers 
in the society balance themselves.285  
Dühring designs plans for a system of independent communities in which tyrannical power is 
eliminated, which he terms “Free Society” (freie Gesellschaft). No member of these 
democratic communities is to exploit another, and governmental influence over the citizens is 
to be held to an absolute minimum. There is to be little, if any, centralization. His concept is 
strongly individualistic and rational in its nature. Dühring believes that once all coercion – be 
it human to human or group to group – is eradicated that society can be structured in a way 
that allows free economic competition to be attained in the sense that Adam Smith had 
envisioned it; competence, disposition, and energy vary among individuals and each person 
should have the ability to develop his or her talents.   
The individual human being is seen as the starting point and purpose of all societal life. For 
Dühring, the sovereign individual will is the final instance of all societal development. The 
basic form of all socialization is the association of two people through interests or through 
likeable feelings. This unification is only possible through an understanding of working 
together, i.e. through free volition. Dühring’s vision of a truly liberal society entails an 
elaborate scheme to restructure living conditions through pedagogical reform as the control of 
education of the youth was inevitably control of the future. Poetry becomes an instrument of 
education (as it was in Plato's state).286 Private property, the basic element of society, is 
respected and is not to be based on work – as in Marxism – but on the right of use in the 
positive sense and the right of exclusion of others in the negative. When an “unequal 
distribution of wealth” comes about, there are two ways of changing the disproportion: one is 
to make the right property general and the same for everyone, including those without 
property in an egalitarian sense, or secondly, one pools those lacking property together to 
strengthen their position by increasing their earnings. Dühring chooses the latter alternative. 
The ideal of property corresponds to that of freedom of trade, which allows humans to 
284 CP, 265. 
285 In the last part of the first edition to The Worth of Life Dühring claims that reactive feeling or resentment was 
the only recognizable principle of justice or injustice. Cf. WL, 219. This emotive element exists not only in 
individuals, but also in societal groups. Cf. CP, 224. Cf. the next section of this chapter. 
286 Ibid., 423. 
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compete against each other. The role of government should be held to a minimum and has the 
primarily negative function of stepping in and settling grave violations. 
As will be described in more detail below, the “Free Society” is to come into existence 
through the development of social associations or coalitions, consisting of members of 
socially underprivileged groups with the common goal of advancing their own vital interests 
in order to free themselves from the yoke of domination. Applying classical liberalism’s 
principle of individualism to group efforts (as List had done with the concept of the nation), 
Dühring believes that the power structure can be changed to favor the good of the whole. In 
this way, the ideal state of a “societarian” economy can be formed. Through groupings of 
labor (Arbeitercoalitionen), the workers have the ability to help themselves. The main task of 
the organizations is to gain higher wages for the workers; this area is where the exploitation 
can most flagrantly be observed. The coalitions embody freedom and what Dühring terms 
“equal mutuality”. As they gain power they will be able to close the gap, he believes, between 
capital and labor.287  
4. Natural Law and the “Principle of Balance” 
We have purposefully placed emphasis on Dühring’s inclination towards rationalism as well 
as his strong concern for the issue of legitimacy and final causes. The rationalistic 
perspective, which his work embodies, allies him with the tradition of Natural Law (or 
Natural Right, German Naturrecht) as it has existed in western European and American more 
than in Germany, where an historical consideration of law had precedence.288 The German 
Historical School, whose greatest representative was Savigny, saw law developing linearly 
and as always relative to a certain context in the past. In the dominant tradition of Western 
Europe and America dating back to the Stoics, on the other hand, law was seen as existing 
beyond history, as an abstract transcendental element.289 In an attempt to lend material 
justification to transcendental law, and influenced by Schopenhauer’s concept of morality as 
being based on empathy, Dühring postulates the urge of retribution (resentment and revenge) 
as the basis of the concept of law. This theory, formulated in the appendix of The Worth of Life 
287 The coalitions, which we will deal with in Chapter Eight, are a recurring theme in Dühring’s writings on 
political economy, beginning with his book Capital and Labor in 1865 and later with Critical Foundation and 
then Cursus of Political and Social Economy. 
288 Cf. Ernst Troeltsch’s essay, “The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics,” in Natural Law and 
the Theory of Society 1500-1800, ed. Otto von Gierke (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1934). 202. 
Hanni Binder emphasizes the foundation of Dühring’s Weltanschauung in Natural Law. Cf., SSED, 42-46. 
289 The first traces of Natural Law go back to ancient Rome where the Stoics rejected the positive law of the day, 
citing a higher morality. Cf. Arnold Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral. Eine pluralistische Ethik, 32. 
                                                     
103 
 
and developed in his other writings, plays an important role in his system of social economics, 
the subject of Part Three. 290  
Natural Law, Dühring writes, is a factor in history and exerts itself in economics through the 
question of distribution, which, as we have just seen, is connected with the element of politics 
and the use of force. Natural Law – not to be confused with “laws of nature” – in the field of 
political economy, for Dühring, does not involve a leveling postulate of equality, but rather is 
connected with social justice. It is a sign of his rational-historical approach, as well as his 
background as a trained lawyer, when he draws attention to its current application rather than 
simply postulating Natural Law. He credits the socialists and communists for making this an 
issue and sees their efforts in economics as analogous to those of 16th and 17th century natural 
right theoreticians in the field of law.291 However, Dühring’s understanding of Natural Law is 
not based in history per se and even less so in mere expediency. It rests on instinct and stems 
from a feeling of revenge that exerts itself when a wrong has been committed. The basis of 
right is a “reactive sensation”, or an impulse that comes into being after an injury takes place. 
Another word for this reactive sensation is “resentment”, which downplays the condition of 
mutuality and equality in its point of departure. It should be emphasized that a reaction is 
taking place and that an injury is responded to and thereby a damage balanced. When an 
originally balanced relationship is destroyed through a deed on one side, then the reactive 
sensation demands a restoration of balance. The “economics of instinct” aims at a balance. 
The principle of balance is not strictly one of power or force where the stronger party gets its 
way. According to Dühring, it is really the weaker societal elements from which the 
preservation of justice stems. He writes, “An injustice suffered is the master of law. The 
injured party is and remains the natural advocate of law”.292 When the equilibrium between 
two parties is destroyed, a natural force is set in motion through the suppressed party. This 
force does not have to be powerful enough to destroy its opponent, but serves its purpose if it 
can defend itself from being destroyed. Even in a position of subjugation, the party can find 
enough strength to prevent that an injustice does not occur. When a certain surplus of external 
290 Cf. WL, 219-234. Dühring speaks of his “natural theory of law” one year earlier in an article. Cf. “Die 
neuesten Lehren über den Arbeitslohn,” Der Arbeiterfreund. Zeitschrift des Centralvereins in Preußen für das 
Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen 2 (1864): 279. For a helpful, in-depth portrayal of Dühring’s concept of balance 
and its influence on Nietzsche, cf. Volker Gerhardt, “Das ‘Princip des Gleichgewichts‘ Zum Verhältnis von 
Recht und Macht bei Nietzsche,” Nietzsche Studien 12 (1983): 111-133. See also Edmond Laskine’s analysis of 
the development of juristic socialism, which deals with Dühring’s thoughts alongside those of August Schroder, 
and Anton Menger. “Die Entwicklung des juristischen Sozialismus,”Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus 3 
(1913): 28-39. 
291 KG, 301. 
292 KG, 327. 
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repercussions is reached, the injustice is reconciled. This, however, has nothing to do with the 
“eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” mentality of the Old Testament, which Dühring calls 
“stubborn”. He is emphatic that a type of “ideal terrorism” cannot serve as a deterrent, as is 
the case with Orthodox Judaism. Anything can be used to deter, even something that has 
nothing to do with justice at all. He believes that nature has its own deterrent, which is the 
fear of personal revenge; this institution always remains in the sphere of the conditions of 
justice.293 In his concept of law, the individualistic and intuitive vision of the world, which 
Dühring’s philosophy represents, becomes apparent. Although he appeals to sentiments, 
which are in essence a general phenomenon, he is careful to point out that it is not the instinct 
itself, but rather the “intellectual form” of revenge which is decisive for law. Thus his theory 
has its basis in the intellect of the individual, which he sees as the only point of departure and 
destination of all law. Every association is only valid in as far as the will of the individual is 
active in it. The concept remains ambiguous, however, as it amounts to what one might term a 
critical interpretation of basic instinct.294  
Dühring also makes a connection between law and economics. Speaking out against the 
hegemony of Roman law as well as mere historical consideration of jurisprudence, he speaks 
of “independent legal reason” (selbstständige Rechtsvernunft), which has “general human 
consequences, but with national specialization”.295 Law is to have a special application to 
economic conditions assuring not only the usual legal protection, but also providing a 
guarantee of economic justice. Again the principle of balance is applied when he writes in one 
of his late works that jurisprudence can work towards creating an “authentic equalization and 
harmonization”.296 The concept of justice can be applied directly to the basic ideas of 
economics, and thus Dühring advocates bringing the two separate areas together to create a 
coherent theory.297 
5. Critical Summary 
As we will be critically dealing with Dühring’s political economy in chapters 7 and 8 below, 
we will concentrate now only on general aspects of his philosophy of economics. Before 
developing his own theories, Dühring chooses role models, being first an enthusiastic 
293 CP, 227. 
294 Dühring writes that a concept of law based on instinct can lead to “wild injustice”, while at the same time 
preserving justice. He speaks of an inherent “duality” in the principle of law which exemplifies man’s proclivity 
for error, dealt with in Chapter Three above. See the explanation of his theory in his last book Social Rescue. SR, 
2nd edition, 189-191. 
295 SLF, 336. 
296 SR, 2nd edition, 143. 
297 Ibid., 210. 
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“disciple” and “seeker” before becoming the “preacher” for his own doctrines. Carey’s 
theories are most significant for him. The American’s theory of value and his optimistic 
normative approach become the pillars of Dühring’s own political economy. Dühring holds 
that protective tariffs should be implemented to bolster industry, as not only Carey but also 
Hamilton and List had advocated. Where Carey had gone to great lengths to emphasize the 
"unity of law", in The Critical Foundation of Political Economy Dühring places emphasis on 
the qualitative dissimilarities between laws in the different areas of the field (although not 
denying the existence of the general laws). According to Dühring, there was some 
concordance between the laws of the different areas, but to him they were too general to bring 
forth valuable knowledge.298 In further distinguishing himself from Carey, he incorporates 
elements of his own philosophy into the analysis of political economic phenomenology.  
For Dühring, political economy entails social justice and is ultimately connected to modern 
socialism, which he labels “societarianism”. Dühring plunges into the social issues of the day, 
believing that the evils of society can be fought by confronting them wherever they surface. 
With regard to the working classes, social science, for him, involves educating the workers 
because he is convinced that suppressed classes can expect emancipation only through their 
own initiative. Not a revolutionary like Karl Marx, he seeks reform through the idea of 
creating a balance of power among social groups. Dühring’s preoccupation with oppressive 
force as a negative factor in the history of economic development reflect the pessimistic 
attributes of the Philosophy of the Actual, which, as we have seen above, were influenced by 
Schopenhauer.  
Dühring’s theory of justice also follows Schopenhauer in that it postulates an empirical or 
observable foundation to law (through the feeling of revenge), as Schopenhauer had for 
morality (through the feeling of empathy). Dühring’s perspective is, we believe, open to 
criticism for failing to clearly define the nature of injustice. The root of justice is said to be 
found in the “reactive sensation of revenge” and, with this postulate, he believes to have given 
Natural Law a material substantiation that it has lacked historically. Justice is based on 
material force, he reasons, and its preservation depends on a balance of forces. This balance 
itself has no material reality and is only a metaphor whose true significance is in organization, 
which contains submission and domination, but which allows the subjugated part 
“independence and elasticity”. Dühring emphasizes that positive moral action is not to be 
298 As we will see in Part Three below, despite being rooted in the abstract-rational method of classical 
economics, Dühring comes to postulate Laws of Development which apply to manmade institutions, states, and 
conditions. 
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found in a position of weakness, but through a position of strength. This claim contradicts, we 
believe, the basis of his own moral postulate: the feeling of revenge stems from a position of 
weakness itself as it is a reactive impulse against a stronger, or at least in some way superior, 
force. If revenge is a positive impulse towards the overcoming of injustice then it presupposes 
weakness or vulnerability before it takes effect, and therefore cannot be a basis. Going to the 
roots of the phenomenon one could just as easily claim that weakness is the basis of morality. 
Moreover, Dühring, in our opinion, overlooks that the reactive instinct, whose most salient 
form is the feeling of revenge, is inescapably directed towards the past, i.e. some specific 
event through which the urge of revenge was triggered. An urge of retribution, which has no 
actual purpose for the future, cannot be a basis of law whose purpose should be to prevent 
injustice occurring to others. The retributive urge, which Dühring postulates, may be an 
element of the phenomenology of morality, but due to its reactive nature, in our opinion, 
cannot be seen as the last reason (letzter Grund) for the concept of law. 
Dühring’s talent for the explanation and application of abstract thought is perhaps best utilized 
in the field of political economy. In the history of political economy there are very few 
examples of prominent philosophers making substantial contributions to the field (David 
Hume being a notable exception). As Kruse has pointed out, a main reason for the fact that 
Dühring’s writings on economics remain widely unknown is to be found in his pugnacious 
personality and in the excesses of polemic which we alluded to in the General Introduction 
and will be dealing with in Part Four.299 Another factor is that the school of thought which 
influenced Dühring and whose tenets he was trying to advance, the “American School” of 
Henry C. Carey and Friedrich List, fell into ill repute during the course of the 20th century. 
  
299 Kruse, “Eugen Dühring’s wissenschaftliche Isolierung,” 210. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HISTORY 
1. Paragons: Comte and Buckle 
Friedrich Engels disparaged Dühring for being a proponent of “eternal truths” and values that 
stand above the flow of time.300 Indeed, Dühring is interested in configurations that have 
universal value, and he often shows scorn for the mere historical, or a portrayal of facts 
heaped together in an arbitrary manner. Like Jacob Burkhardt, he is vehemently opposed to 
fabulous philosophies of history (Geschichtsphilosophien) creeping into special areas of 
historiography behind the mask of positive research.301 The role of history for Dühring’s 
Weltanschauung and bearing towards science is no less important, however, for he is in many 
ways a child of an age, which, unlike today, took great pride in historical cultivation.302 
Dühring possesses the historical Bildung of his times and, despite his attacks on the 
overemphasis of history, which he believes leads to mental complacency and limits action, he 
is strongly shaped by a “historical sense”, which, as Schumpeter correctly pointed out, is a 
prerequisite for understanding the economic phenomena of any epoch including the 
present.303    
Based on the premises of the Philosophy of the Actual, Dühring develops a view of history 
that combines historical phenomena into the categories of “nature” and “freedom”. The 
former is an abstract domain, which can be isolated as a constant factor in scientific discourse; 
the latter involves human intercourse, volition, and action directed towards changing the 
present for the purpose of fulfilling some goal. While rejecting an absolute separation of 
natural and human phenomena, as we have emphasized above, he believes that there are clear 
qualitative differences between the two realms. His concept of history thus involves a natural-
scientific and an individualistic-rationalistic approach. Fixed laws determine not only the 
300 Engels, Herr Dühring’s Revolution in Science (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1934), 97-108. 
301 Dühring, “Geschichte der Civilisation,”  Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift 29, no. 3 (1866): 51. Jacob Burkhardt 
called “philosophy of history” a centauer and a contradictio in adjecto. Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, ed. 
Jacob Oeri (Berlin and Stuttgart, 1910), 2. 
302 Cf. Binder’s assessment of the role of history in Dühring’s method, Das sozialitäre System Eugen Dührings 
[henceforth abbreviated as SSED], 51-52. Before his critique of history begins, Nietzsche emphasizes how proud 
his age is of its historical consciousness Cf. Vom Nützen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, ed. Michael 
Landmann (Zürich: Diogenes, 1984), 6. The sources on non-historical and anti-historical consciousness of the 
present age are numerous. For a good (but polemical) summary of present discussions of history with regard to 
scientific theory, see Keith Windshuttle, The Killing of History. How Literary Critics and Social Theorists are 
Murdering out Past (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 1996).  
303 Quoted from David Wightman, “Why Economic History?” in Paths to International Political Economy, ed. 
Susan Strange, 23.   
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course of nature, but also human life and volition.304 The great individuals of the history of 
science are significant for Dühring, to a large degree, because they are a part of already 
existing historic tendencies. Despite the individuality and originality that these figures 
possess, their influence can never be seen as being without precedence.305 Nature can 
intervene in the affairs of man, but a reverse intervention of human will in the realm of 
objective nature is impossible. He looks down on most of the historians of his day, but there 
are two thinkers whose philosophy of history he rates highly: Auguste Comte and Henry 
Thomas Buckle. 
Dühring sees Comte as a progressive thinker who understands the universal-historical 
implications of the recently-begun scientific age. The first sentence of Dühring’s essay on 
Comte’s political philosophy is: “Widespread teachings are only a mirror of dominant 
facts”.306 He considers Comte and his philosophy of positivism to be a phenomenon brought 
forth by the age of modernity to aid in the effort discarding of errant thought that had existed 
for thousands of years. Comte, who studied at the Parisian poly-technical school, is for 
Dühring a product of the great French Revolution and a representative of new science.  
Comte taught that there are three developmental phases of humanity: the theological, the 
metaphysical, and finally the positivistic phase. The development of the phases is not unified 
and progresses differently among the different peoples of the world, which means that all 
three phases exist in the present alongside one another. The Comtean law of development, as 
the French thinker taught it, was also valid for individuals assuming that they are in 
surroundings conducive to the rise of the higher levels of intellectuality. On a societal level, 
the stages corresponded to political forms. The theological phase was the early or childhood 
epoch of humanity. In this era man explained his environment through the power of a personal 
supernatural being and is represented politically by a theological and patriarchic regime. The 
authorities in this period had a type of prescience and were put in their positions by the Gods. 
The condition of the theological phase has, according to Comte, continued to exist in 
civilization, but was ultimately replaced by the metaphysical phase, where the intellect took 
on a more critical role. In this phase the intellect went only halfway, so to speak. As 
knowledge progressed and as true science took form, the original fantastic ideas began to 
304 This thought is often emphasized. For example: “The realm of thought and sensation is therefore no less 
determined by law than that which is in the rest of nature”. CP, 33. 
305 He positions himself here in opposition to thinkers such as Thomas Carlyle, who preached the importance of 
great heroes in history, and also to Schopenhauer, for whom the genius existed in a vacuum containing a cosmos 
of his own. CP, 310-311. 
306 “Herrschende Lehren sind oft nur ein Spiegel vorherrschender Tatsachen”. Dühring, “Auguste Comtes 
politische Philosophie,” 259. 
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disappear. There was still an area of contradiction, however, between science and imagination 
in the second phase of development. Metaphysical concepts were, for Comte, intermediate 
constructions, based on transactions that are indefensible in the long term. There were 
antagonistic principles inherent in this type of thinking: the direct naïve imaginative 
perspective battled against the growing critique supported by discipline and increasing 
knowledge. The intellect, strengthened by science, disputes the traditions handed down by the 
childhood phase. The “science” that developed was, according to Comte, metaphysics. For 
Comte, the metaphysical phase corresponded to social-political constitutionalism, which he 
considered a “bastard of feudalism” and the industrial regime. The mind had to free itself 
from the contradictions and come to a new standpoint, which for him was the positivist 
philosophy. In the positive phase the theological pre-phases were recognized for what they 
were, and the attempt to resolve the contradictions was given up completely. Every 
component of human thought which developed from imaginary ideas is to be done away with 
in the final scientific phase. Positive science is to be victorious in the end. Positivism is 
relevant from now on and stands in contrast to the first two phases. Philosophy is now, Comte 
thought, the epitome of positive knowledge.307 
Dühring sees this philosophy of history as Comte’s most original achievement and adopts its 
basic premises, albeit in simplified form. 308 His praise is, however, once again ambiguous: we 
saw in Chapter Three that he is critical of Comte’s philosophy because he believes that it 
neglects to sufficiently consider the emotional side of man. This critique is also applied to 
Comte’s theory of history. Dühring, in our opinion correctly, rejects a fundamental anti-
metaphysical perspective as he believes that the fundamental impetus that led to religion was 
something unchangeable, something which would exist in the future and be of use in the 
future; this force was a human urge which should not and could not be eradicated as Comte’s 
philosophy of history sought to. Dühring writes, “That which was the raw basis of all 
intellectual and cultural development, must also play a role far into future, albeit a different 
role”.309 In another essay he writes, “The theological circle of ideas, whose imagination and 
later intellectual interweaving we justifiably attack, contains an element that exists is in all 
307 Comte’s theory of developmental phases of history was to influence Dühring’s concept of “Laws of 
Development” of political economy. Although laws of nature do exist, there are, according to Dühring (and also 
the representatives of the Historical School), laws that govern the development of humanity in certain phases 
which influence economic activity. 
308 Instead of three phases, Dühring distinguishes only between two large halves separated by the French 
Revolution. Many socialists held this view of history containing two epochs in common with Dühring. Although 
Nietzsche did not favor this interpretation himself, he attempted to interpret his book Thus Spake Zarathustra as 
the beginning of a “thousand year perspective” for humankind. Cf. Nolte, Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus 
(Frankfurt am Main/Berlin: Herbig, 2000), 67. 
309 “Der Positivismus in der Philosophie,” 179. 
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transformation; this is not touched by science”.310 It becomes apparent how focused Dühring 
is on the unchanging forces, particularly the anthropological factor of history, as opposed to 
mere facts and figures. He also disagrees with Comte that legal constitutions are transitional 
entities. According to Dühring, Comte was too caught up in the political circumstances of his 
day and too prejudiced by his negative position towards the government of the restoration and 
the July Monarchy to have a fair judgment of constitutions. Dühring is of the opinion that all 
political-social development contains to some degree transitional entities, and he is convinced 
that constitutions were a practical necessity.311       
Comte’s greatest achievement is, according to Dühring, his general philosophy of history. He 
does not agree with its exact structure, but is of the opinion that Comte is the first to 
scientifically develop the true idea that there is a correspondence between a way of thinking 
and the political events which develop. Comte, he believes, convincingly demonstrated the 
parallel between how a nation perceives things and the method according to which it is 
ruled.312 Through Comte it can be seen how public conditions and the ruling ideas of a given 
historical epoch are connected.    
The most commendable historian for Dühring is Henry Thomas Buckle, whose writings he 
sees as attempting to focus on the “true principles” of historical progress rather than princes 
and battles.313 Dühring describes Buckle as a reformer of historical science and a strong 
opponent of German pseudo-historicism. In his book History of Civilisation in Europe, 
Buckle applied natural science to history to determine the laws of cultural progress and their 
role in the development of civilization. Although he died at an early age and his work 
remained just a fragment, he achieved great popularity throughout Europe in the 19th century. 
The German translation of the two volume work by Arnold Ruge, the editor of Karl Marx’s 
“Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher”, appeared 1860/1862 and went through seven editions 
until 1901. Although Buckle is recognized as the most important historian of positivism, he 
has generally been appraised negatively. Much like Dühring, he has been accorded only 
minimal significance in the history of science, although he was one of the more well-known 
scientific writers of his day. History of Civilisation in England applies Auguste Comte’s 
310 “Auguste Comte’s politische Philosophie,” 272. 
311 He would change this position later in his life. Albrecht was of the opinion that Dühring’s disagreement with 
Comte on this issue was due to the Prussian constitutional conflict going on at the time. Cf. Albrecht, ED, 44. 
312 KGP, 488-489. 
313 Dühring wrote two essays on Buckle, “Die Geschichtsschreibung der Civilisation,” 50-79, and “Buckle. 
Geschichte der Civilisation in England”. There is one critical monography on Buckle: Eckhardt Fuchs, Henry 
Thomas Buckle, Geschichtsschreibung und Positivismus in England und Deutschland (Leipzig: Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 1994). 
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methods to history, and for Dühring, Buckle is a “shining example of the application of the 
objective method, as it was conceived by Comte, but insufficiently practiced by him”.314 He 
believes that Buckle corrected the mistakes of “pseudo-historicism”, a brand of scholarship 
which remains chained to facts and neglects the larger scales of development, particularly as 
they related to geography, natural factors, and the role of technology.  
Buckle took up the critique that John Stewart Mill had made of the historians of the day. In 
1845, Mill had charged historians with having a lack of interest for philosophical questions 
and of not understanding the role of laws of nature in the course of history. In the introduction 
to History of Civilisation in Europe, Buckle writes: 
The unfortunate peculiarity of the history of man is, that although its separate parts have been 
examined with considerable ability, hardly anyone has attempted to combine them into a 
whole, and ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other. In all the other 
great fields of inquiry, generalization is universally admitted, and noble efforts are being made 
to rise from particular facts in order to discover the laws by which those facts are governed. So 
far, however, is this from being the usual course of historians, that among them a strange idea 
prevails, that their business is merely to relate events, which they may occasionally enliven by 
such moral and political reflections as seem likely to be useful.315 
Buckle, in Dühring’s opinion, created new principles for writing history and made a break 
with traditional historical writing. Fuchs sees the controversy which Buckle’s work brought 
about foreshadowing the famous “Lamprecht-Bülow Streit” in Germany in the 1890s.316 The 
main emphasis of history should be on less noticeable factors of man’s development such as 
climate, nutrition, and soil. A historian should, according to Buckle, explain things of value, 
describe the progress of knowledge and how it was spread, and not focus on insignificant 
details or the personal anecdotes of kings and courts with endless news on what a minister 
said and another thought. He encouraged historians to begin an entirely new way of collecting 
facts. Buckle turns away from describing the policies of governments as they came about only 
due to practical concerns. History should not be a chain of facts, but rather one which is 
determined by knowledge of nature determined by law. The goal of historical writing is to 
discover the reasons of progress, which have little to do with governments. This anti-statist 
tone of his work, as Mombert shows, found favor with fiscal conservatives in Germany.317 
314 “Auguste Comte und seine positive Philosophie,” 461. It is debated as to how much influence Comte had on 
Buckle. Fuchs, Buckle, 234. 
315 Henry Thomas Buckle, History of Civilization in England (London: Watts, 1930), 1. 
316 Fuchs, op. cit., 361. 
317 Mombert, Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 361. 
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Buckle believed, as did Holbach, that man was a part of nature and that the natural barriers of 
civilization should be emphasized. Displaying a euro-centric point of view, he maintained that 
higher culture could only develop on European soil because, in the warmer zones of the earth, 
the overwhelming force of nature limited the human intellect, keeping it from carrying out 
organized action. Where nature is more powerful than man, there are relatively few chances to 
be pursued. For Buckle, higher European civilization is characterized by the development of 
the intellect, which involves maximizing human volition. In Asia and other parts of the world 
where nature is a powerful, more threatening force, people became molded by angst and fear, 
and humanity there remained in a raw condition. Thus, great achievements of the intellect 
took place to a lesser degree than in Europe.      
Like Dühring, Buckle also sought popularity. In Natural Dialectic, Dühring had spoken of 
“winning the active participation of the crowd” and of finding a broader circle of readers 
beyond academia.318  Buckle wrote: “I want my book to get among the mechanist’s institutes 
and the people, and to tell you the truth, I would rather be praised in popular and, and as you 
rightly call them, vulgar papers than in scholarly publications”.319 Buckle did not believe the 
popular publications could judge his work, “but they are admirable judges of its social 
consequences among their own class of readers. And these are they whom I am now 
beginning to touch, and whom I wish to move”. Buckle wanted to shape public opinion and 
was critical of German historians who did not attempt to do this. Dühring takes up this 
critique and applies it himself. 
In 1866, Dühring wrote an extensive review of Buckle’s works which, despite its general 
positive tone, contained critique of the English scholar. In his review we receive a glimpse at 
Dühring’s preference for the universal or “poly-typical scholar”- Buckle is too much the 
specialist. He is in agreement with Buckle’s general principles, especially his point of 
departure and main principle of investigation, which he believes shows an imminent 
philosophical perspective. Buckle’s strong point, the natural-scientific perspective, is, 
according to Dühring, also his weakness: his exceptional scientific erudition and his eye for 
natural and technological development cause him to ignore every other principle. He remains 
too fixated on one principle and neglects other areas, such as non-scientific literature. 320  
318 ND, VIII. 
319 Fuchs, Buckle, 226.  
320 Dühring, “Buckle, Geschichte der Zivilisation in England,” 272 et seq. 
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Another aspect in Buckle’s work which Dühring applauds is his opposition to the church of 
his day. Buckle saw religion as a general condition and maintains that its significance for the 
general development of culture as minimal. Buckle was of the opinion that morality has 
meaning only for the individual and has no influence on the shaping of progress in society; he 
went along with the English natural scientists who believed that the main task of the state is 
maintaining security for the individual and for property. Many of Buckle’s historical 
observations were aimed at supporting the non-intervention of governments in the matters of 
society. For him, governments should do no more than keep the peace and be a sort of health 
police. Anything else that a government gets involved in has damaging effects on the 
development of civilization’s progress. The best legislation is that which repeals all laws. 
Buckle views the history of states in modernity in an attempt to prove that governments work 
against progress. 
Although Buckle did not even complete the introduction to his work, Dühring sees a clear 
plan. The main moments of the English and French revolutions are portrayed, and the 
instructions on writing history and the principles of civilization given in the introductory 
examination provide enough material to give a general sketch of what would have been to 
come. The main principle is the expansion of reliable knowledge, which is the only guarantee 
of progress. Dühring writes: “The strength of Buckle’s portrayal lies in the enthusiastic 
devotion to an authentically modern perspective”. He praises Buckle for making natural-
scientific insight and the technical progress, the pride of the 19th century, his basic point of 
departure. He prophesizes that Buckle’s style of history will ultimately prevail over the 
traditional forms of historical science, while at the same time emphasizing that his principle of 
ever-increasing knowledge will, in the long run, be replaced once a mechanical and naturally-
based historical perspective becomes prevalent. 321 Buckle’s main achievement is having 
shown the expansion of knowledge to be the catalyst of progress.   
In summarizing, it can be said that Comte and Buckle’s influence on Dühring’s understanding 
of history pertains to the rational side of his worldview; their approach to history represents 
knowledge and strict natural science. Dühring uses them as role models for his view of history 
because they attempted to show how laws of nature determined historical events. They also 
321 Ibid., 274. Buckle’s brand of natural history has found favor with popular writers on history such as Alfred 
W. Crosby and Jared Diamond . Cf. Crosby, Germs, Seeds, and Animals: Studies in Ecological History 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. , 1994) and Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 
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fought to liberate history from the control of the vested interests of government historians, 
whose authority Dühring sought to discredit. 
2. History as the Progressive Work of Nature 
Dühring’s own view of history involves an application of his philosophy’s postulate of the 
constant interplay between permanence and change to history. Amidst all change in the world, 
there is, he believes, a general law through which all human history is determined. Laws 
create change, which is the impetus of history. Nature brings forth differences and 
transformations from which new forms originate. Difference “satisfies progressive being, be it 
man or an intellectually advanced being from another planet, through new experiments and 
enrichments of its nature”.322 History does not, however, repeat itself as Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche believed, but rather proceeds linearly. Reality represents a whole and history is also 
single, but it is characterized by a series of “points of now” which progress, but remain 
connected. The possibilities of transformation and development increase from phase to phase, 
and the periods of time in which creative change is visible get shorter and shorter. Man has an 
intellectual ability to create, which changes his fate faster than his own nature. Dühring 
writes, “The education of man with regard to nature and to himself, along with the 
corresponding development of technical power, determines the level of cultural progress”.323 
He compares the transformation of history with movement according to the laws of 
mechanics. An example of a purely mechanical way of looking at history is the observance 
that the discovery of the bayonet through the French minister of war Vauban triggered the 
populist movement, which ultimately led to the French Revolution; this invention enabled the 
preponderance of the infantry over the knights to be completed, and in so doing put the main 
focus of power with the parts of the army which were recruited from the lower classes.324 
Within all of the diversity and variations of historical transformation there are also stable, 
unchanging components which are independent of events and happenings. These entities do 
not have their validity through adjustments to the historical conditions, but rather determine 
history themselves. These fixed elements are the objective measures of judging history. He 
writes, “The basic scaffolding of human conditions is put up predominantly the same 
everywhere and the curriculum of humanity shows a unified type in all of its phases and 
322 CP, 299. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Dühring, “Lecky, Geschichte der Aufklärung in Europa II,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 3 
(1868): 654. 
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transformations”.325 They do not need to be checked or analyzed by each new generation, as 
they are valid for every generation.326 Thus there is a “fund of knowledge” for all of the 
foreseeable future.327 In his autobiography, he writes, “Even when something completely new 
gains validity, like the Copernican system, for example, the substantial basics, such as the 
facts of measuring movements, remain”.328 
His view of history thus has anthropological dimensions. According to Dühring, the divisions 
of history that had thus far been determined by professional historians are either insufficient 
or second-rate divisions.329 If we could look back further into history on a scale of tens of 
thousands of years instead of just thousands, he believes, we would see how young our 
institutions are. The medieval relics would be cast aside and modernity would take on the role 
of basic opposition to traditional structures of authority, setting the more noble mindsets free. 
The historical laws of transformation mould states, societies, and peoples. All political 
constructions are finite and are replaced by others. Under favorable conditions, material is 
conserved; in unfavorable, it is destroyed. Material for Dühring includes individual human 
beings who are shaped by nature and culture. The individual nations and races are affected by 
dissolving forces as are institutions. In Dühring’s opinion, the deeper foundations of society 
are not influenced as much as people think. Perhaps wanting to contradict the pessimistic 
Count Arthur Gobineau, for whom miscegenation was the cause of the decline and fall of 
culture, Dühring emphasizes that the racial mixing of the different peoples is not responsible 
for the fall of nations and states.330 There are deeper forces, based on laws of nature, at work 
here. A conquering power may change the physiognomy of a nation, but Dühring believes that 
the latent characteristics of the nation remain; basic components “are pushed from the stage, 
but do not disappear from existence”.331  
His concepts of “antagonism of forces” and the Law of Difference, dealt with above, assume 
that fixed structures of history are always endangered. Death always belongs to life, just as 
destruction belongs to creation. Dühring believes it is a fact that the nations of history are 
mortal, and governments even more so. With regard to the rise and fall of entities in history, 
325 CP, 298. 
326 This thought is used by Dühring in his political economic teachings. In his Critical Foundation of National 
Economy he writes, “Ein wahrhaftes Prinzip greift über alle Geschichte über und erhält sich in derselben, wenn 
auch in verschiedenen Metamophosen”. KGV, 41.  
327 KGP, 470. 
328 SLF,  2nd edition, 311. 
329 CP, 301 et seq.. A short summary of the problem of the division of history is given by Dühring in his article 
“Eine Culturgeschichte des neuzehneten Jahrhunderts,” 122 et seq. 
330 CP, 304. 
331 Ibid. 
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he makes reference to the Greeks’ attempt to show natural laws of development and 
circulation. He also analyses Machiavelli’s idea of an organic circulation of history.332 
Machiavelli developed what he called a “law of constitutional metamorphosis”, which in 
some ways anteceded the later theories of cultural morphology put forth by Oswald Spengler 
and Arnold Toynbee. The Italian political philosopher tried to show how the ruling 
components of a political body influence the forms of government; he saw political pessimism 
as a basic scheme of social development. Once a government changes its form, in 
Machiavelli’s opinion, the process is irreversible. The creative principles that call various 
historical forms to life are called up to initiate regeneration, but ultimately become so weak 
that there is little effectiveness. Thus decline and fall are inevitable. Dühring does not believe 
that the recognition of this fact, illustrated by Machiavelli, can change the course of history: 
Every aristocracy carries with it corruption and then becomes concentrated into the most 
shameless oligarchy, whose naked exploitation reverts to centralized actions of violence and a 
with a dictator who flirts with the masses. With this last Caesar like centralization the fate of 
the empire is fulfilled in the general decay of the ruling elements and classes. Greece went 
down Alexandrian style, and Rome Caesarian style.333  
He is of the opinion that his contemporaries could take little comfort from history with regard 
to the centralizing tendencies in Imperial Germany. Any type of historicism that believes that 
lessons can be learned from the past will be proven insufficient. Thus he is convinced that no 
advantageous set of morals for society can be derived from history. This non-historical 
perspective is made relative when he claims that there is no reason to be discouraged by fact 
that history cannot show man the way. The obstacles that impede progress must be removed.  
One such obstacle is the phenomenon of “pseudo-historicism”, which looks to historical facts 
for explanation of, and guidance for, the present. As we have mentioned, Dühring was 
opposed to an overemphasis of history in the form of a mere presentation of facts. He would 
definitely have agreed with Henry Adams’ well-known statement, “Nothing in education is so 
astonishing as the amount of ignorance it accumulates in the form of inert facts”. True 
historicism should concentrate on the forces behind the facts and has no room for 
romanticism. He fights against what he sees as the attempt to retain the remote past and 
denounces what he calls “Medieval brand of historical romanticism”, which came into being 
332 Dühring, “Machiavelli und der politische Pessimismus,” in Sendbogen für Dühringsche Geisteshaltung und 
Lebensgestaltung 1, ed. Hans Reinhardt (January 1933[1867]): 16. 
333 CP, 306. 
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after the French Revolution and put its stamp on the 19th century. With Heinrich von Sybel 
and the Prussian historiography in mind, he writes: 
This historical romanticism expanded in the decade 1865-1875, taking a new turn directed 
towards the German Middle Ages. They (historians) mixed the consequences of the present 
reality with an excessively decorative romanticism by believing the traditions of the medieval 
German Empire, which were not only torn down but extinct, could be brought back to life and 
a new empire installed in an old style. Really they only succeeded in making the government a 
copy of new Caesarism, in some of its features along the lines of the French example.334 
Dühring’s contempt for the national culture of the German Empire becomes apparent; this 
perspective clearly separates him from conservative thinkers of the age, whom he has been 
listed alongside of in discussions of the nationalism and anti-Semitism of the day.335  
3. History as Isolated Individual Striving 
Dühring is of the opinion that the aspect of the individual should not be eliminated from 
science and history. In contrast to many representatives of pure science, who downplayed role 
the role of the individual, he believes that along with objective knowledge, human willpower 
must be taken into consideration. As written in My Cause, My Life, My Enemies, he was 
always interested in the great figures of science, especially the outsiders. “Such enthusiasm 
grew and became energetic when the achievements and merits had to be brought to light, or to 
even be protected from diminishment, suffocation, plagiarism or similar thievery, be it 
directly in the present or in the distant past”.336 The tenable role of personality in history lies 
for Dühring somewhere between Buckle’s perspective, which strongly downplayed the 
individual, and Thomas Carlyle’s, who saw the “hero” as the mover and shaker of history. 
Dühring sees the individual actors of history as being only the tip of the iceberg of history. 
Although admitting that in his day the individualistic or heroic view of history was still 
present and influential, he labels it a “childish national point of view” and advocates a 
separation of biography and history.337 He rejects what he called Carlyle’s “cult of the hero”, 
seeing the Scottish thinker as a type of romanticist, who, despite his passion and liveliness, 
334 CP, 313. 
335 Cf. Karl Schwedhelm, Propheten des Nationalismus (Munich: List, 1969). As we have already mentioned, 
Dühring was opposed to nationalism, seeing it as a form of “egotism” and superficial phenomenon, which was 
not a true modern movement. GMLII, 344. He is highly critical of Imperial Germany and his attitude towards the 
German nation, like Nietzsche’s, was negative. (In the 1860s Dühring had a different view towards German 
culture, however. He spoke proudly of the German philosophical tradition and even called Goethe, whom he 
would later mock, as “our great thinker”. Cf. “William Whewell,“ op. cit., 848.)  
336 SLF, 106-107. 
337 “Die Geschichtsschreibung der Civilisation,” Deutsche Vierteljahres-Schrift (1866): 52. 
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was primarily devoted to elements of the past which could never be brought back to life.338 
Beyond this, the heroic version that considers only the political pinnacle of life corresponds to 
the kind of “philosophical catastrophism, which sees the peak of life as a raw collision of 
abnormally elevated forces, and perhaps even professes that tragedy is the pinnacle of the 
experience of life”.339 In Dühring’s opinion, the great figures of history are not to be 
celebrated, or even deified for the good of themselves, but rather should be seen as tendencies 
of their time. 
The history of knowledge, like the history of philosophy, has the task of discovering the 
greatest heroic dispositions of enlightened thinkers of the past (cf. Chapter Three).340 The 
enlightened disposition appears as an isolated, unchanging factor, as it were, in the ether, 
allowing a person to strengthen his own worldview by connecting it to the past; in Dühring’s 
case, his doctrine of emancipation is connected with other philosophical outsiders such as 
Socrates, Roger Bacon, Giordano Bruno, Rousseau, Robert Mayer, List, and Carey. He 
describes this disposition or particular way of looking at things as “the most quintessential 
expression of action and thinking, desiring, and knowing”. The enlightened outsider is located 
above the various conjectures of time, being exemplified by great thinkers throughout the 
course of history, and thus can be seen as non-historical. It is an active impulse and, at the 
same time, a passive reflection. The active element is characterized by a strong sense of 
justice and a Promethean will to challenge authority; it contains elements of indignation and 
pessimism. The passive side involves the acceptance of knowledge; one lets himself be 
shaped by a greater authority and take on his insight. The disposition of the heroic outsider 
(Gesinnung) concerns the “collective enlightenment and direction of the human will”.341 In a 
lecture from 1871 he says, “Philosophy is the science of disposition. It does not come down to 
338 Cf. CP, 310 et seq. He writes: “In die romantisch reactionäre Gesamthaltung mischt er Berufungen auf eine 
unbestimmte Zukunft, die für den Unerfahrenen den Schein moderner Elemente annehmen können. In Wahrheit 
ist diese verschwommene Prophetie nicht als der Ausdruck der eigenen Unklarheit und des Wunsches, die 
Musterbilder des Ruckläufigen auch in der Zukunft mitspielend zu wollen”. Ibid., 311. 
339 “Die Geschichtsschreibung der Civilisation,” 52-53. The idea of “catastrophism”, as opposed to 
“uniformatarianism”, was introduced into the natural sciences by William Whewell in his 1837 book History of 
the Inductive Sciences. 
340 The term “Gesinnung” has a generally negative connotation in common German usage, particularly as 
relating to scientific discourse or law. The word had already become suspicious at the beginning of the 20th 
century. In his essay on Dühring from 1906, Pflaum writes: “Die Gesinnung als Voraussetzung der Denkarbeit 
ist heute schon genügend anrüchig, als dass ich nötig hätte, auf das Bedenkliche an der Neuerung Dühring 
ausführlich einzugehen”. Christoph David Pflaum, “Eugen Dühring,” in Moderner Essays zur Kunst, Literatur, 
Wissenschaft, ed. Hans Landsberg (Berlin: Pan Verlag, 1906), 7. For a critique of the term as it was used by 
Dühring cf. Meinong, “Zur Charakeristik der ‘Gesinnungsphilosophie’ der Gegenwart,” Philosophische 
Monatshefte 11 (1875):452-463. One anonymous British reviewer of KGP, who translates “Gesinnung” with 
“disposition” writes that the term “refers rather to a moral than an intellectual quality”. The Saturday Review 
(October 12: 1872). 
341 CP, 4. 
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theoretical truth as much as tradition and the propagation of it. The instinct of passion has to 
move man to reach the high goal of human instruction in philosophy. Without this ethos there 
are philosophizers, but no philosophers”.342  
Phrases like “communication of the enlightened spirit”, “power of the mindset”, and 
“propagation of knowledge and will” are used to explain how conviction and “heroic desire” 
can be brought to life from the past. This intuitive way of looking at the world is for Dühring 
a universal desire immanent in history, which must be discovered by the historian. He writes, 
“There is a propagation of knowledge […] There is, however, also a propagation of desire, or 
in other words, a historical communication of disposition and this is what has played an 
underestimated role in philosophical tradition and in the context of world-historical action of 
philosophy, which is the main task of authentic historical writing”.343   
For Dühring, the enlightened individual is not solely interested in building a better humanity. 
Knowledge without a subject cannot be true knowledge at all because it is not capable of 
raising the content of life; it is incomplete or inconsistent when the impetus from within is not 
considered. In one of his most subtle and poignant thoughts, he describes the human ability to 
think as a sort of asylum, i.e. a place of protection from outward influence. The capability of 
thought, as is the case with the other urges, has not been given to man by nature to fulfill outer 
purposes in a Darwinian sense; there is a certain “pleasure” in knowledge in and of itself; this 
sort of enjoyment sets cognition in motion. The Gesinnung is a pleasurable instinct which is 
fixated on overcoming barriers. The weakness of knowledge is that, as soon as it is acquired 
by the individual, it is cast aside; the recreation of such “disregarded knowledge”, he writes, 
involves a strong impulse in the brain that is necessary to overcome the disturbance of lost 
knowledge. A “communication of disposition” is a recreation of lost conditions of the mind, 
and ultimately involves an act introspection from which conclusions are drawn about history. 
Being a true historian requires “a spirit which is worthy of the most significant action”. There 
is a bridge which connects the past to the present which does not exist for those lacking the 
heroic Gesinnung themselves. 344   
Schopenhauer believed that the history of philosophy was of little use as it fails to transmit 
true ideas. Dühring was of the opinion that a true history of philosophy was extremely rare 
342 “Geschichte der Philosophie,” Lecture notes, in UB/HUB (cf. Appendices I below).  
343 KGP, 3. 
344 Ibid. The polemics and outbursts which characterized the later phase of his career apparently bore a 
resemblance to Rousseau’s behavior. Cf. Egon Friedell, Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit. Die Krisis der 
Europäischen Seele von der schwarzen Pest bis zum ersten Weltkrieg (München: C.H. Beck, 1927), 727-730. 
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because “only a higher developed human can perceive the gap between a higher need and the 
nature of the conditions at the time”.345 A historian who wishes to make the motives and 
attitudes of the past come to life, according to Dühring, has to be an expert of the area which 
he is writing about. Only so is it possible to reach the true spirit of his subject.346 Critical 
history involves the transmission of perception, feeling, and drive, and thus the historian 
needs empathy and also expertise of the area he is researching. Dühring assumes that the 
historian of science must act just as boldly as the pioneering scientists themselves once acted. 
For the pessimistic realist Dühring, it is self-evident that the most important thinkers of 
scientific history had to fight to bring about scientific progress, battling paralyzing 
superstition as well as against the corrupt forces of their times which mercilessly pressed 
home their own selfish interests. Thus a form of hostile pessimism plays a key role in 
“propagating past dispositions”. Just as he sees himself as having to fight against the 
established scholar guild of his day, Dühring envisions the great men of intellectual history 
having to suffer the same fate from the intellectual powers that be. He writes in his 
autobiography that his enemies are the enemies of humanity; and also the heroes of the past 
and the future were, and will be, pugnacious individuals who deploy themselves or are 
deployed for making a better mankind.347  
The view of history cultivated by Dühring is modern and, in a sense, post-modern. As 
Geldsetzer has said, the figure of the fighting outsider gives Dühring’s history an existential 
touch.348 Dühring admires men who put justice above their own interests, and it seems at 
times that he intentionally turns history on its head as it were degrading or taking pleasure at 
belittling recognized greats in the history of philosophy. Men such as Leibnitz, Hegel, Kant, 
and Helmholtz are attacked; lesser-known or overlooked figures such as Giordano Bruno, 
Roger Bacon, and Robert Mayer are venerated. In a similar vein, Dühring sees error as a 
virtue, an unusual statement for an idealist. Schopenhauer, for example, wrote, “All error has 
poison at its heart”; Weininger similarly writes, “All error is felt as a form of guilt. This 
results in that humans don’t need to err”.349 Dühring, on the contrary, believes a scientific 
result of philosophy that is discovered to be erroneous can open the way for progress. 
345 CP, 300. 
346 Cf. “William Whewell,” op. cit., 844. 
347 Cf. Chapter 11 of SLF entitled “Actions and Achievements,” 261 et seq. Also Heinrich von Stein’s review of 
Dühring’s autobiography: “Eugen Dühring und sein neustes Buch: Sache, Leben und Feinde,” Schmeizer’s 
Internationale Monatsschrift 1 (1882): 262-267. 
348 Cf. Lutz Geldsetzer, Die Philosophie der Geschichtsschreibung im 19. Jahrhundert (Meisenheim am 
Glan:Anton Hain), 161. 
349 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea (London: Kegen Paul, Trench, Turner, no date), 46. Otto 
Weininger, Geschlecht und Charakter (Wien und Leipzig: Braumüller, 1920 [1903]), 198. 
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Geldsetzer sees Dühring’s views on this as a new formulation of Ovid’s classic phrase: “Ut 
desint vires, tamen est laudanda voluntas”.350 Dühring writes in his philosophical main work 
on error: 
Man is not the only thing that errs; he is merely one who errs with clear consciousness and 
with this consciousness at a higher level and in a special way. If our instinct tends to go astray 
in a stronger and more artificial way than is the case in the tendencies of unconscious nature, 
we have to see this quality as a special endowment of our perfectibility and not as a hated 
privilege.351  
The individual is thus fallible, but fallibility should apparently be seen as an essential virtue. 
Error and truth, success and failure are apparently different sides of the same coin. They find 
expression through the deeds of the individuals who catalyze history. The individual does not, 
however, make history himself, as Carlyle preached, but he is, according to Dühring, always a 
reflection of his times. Dühring’s approach to history is a balancing act between the role of the 
Zeitgeist and the given actualities and structures, on the one hand, and the force of the 
individual on the other. There is always a balanced interplay between the two, and the former, 
according to Dühring, usually has the upper hand over the latter. This, however, makes the 
individual no less important. A given dispositional stance, directed at the present and 
corresponding to a higher need, may find support and be recognized – or it may not. 
Exceptional men are often not recognized by their times and sometimes even persecuted. New 
ages bring forth new perspectives and historical figures of the past are judged again. Dühring 
writes, “The intellectual hero carries out (…) his deeds as history permits; he waits until the 
times offer him a stage of appropriate dimensions. Then he arrives with his old power in a 
new role and even the audience in the cheap seats notices them”.352  
The famous Italian political thinker Machiavelli - in some respects similar to Nietzsche in 
advocating a ruthless morality of political power and expediency - interests Dühring as an 
historical tendency. He sees Machiavelli’s hostile pessimism as a symptom of the times in 
which the Italian political philosopher lived. Both the natural and the individual 
considerations of Dühring’s approach are applied in this case. The former involves a historical 
tendency, and the latter, the willpower and emotional impetus of an individual. The 
350 “Although the power lacking, the will commendable.” Geldsetzer, Die Philosophie der Geschichtsschreibung, 
161. 
351 CP, 161-162. The issue of error as an important element of scientific theory was made prominent in the 20th 
century in the theory of falsification of Karl Popper. Like Popper, who was strongly influenced by the writings 
of William Whewell, Dühring advocates the inductive method in the science of history. In one of his best essays, 
written upon Whewell’s death in 1866, Dühring gives an in-depth portrayal of the English scientist’s career, 
ideas and influence in the magazine Unsere Zeit. “WilliamWhewell,” op. cit. 
352 “Machiavelli und der politische Pessimismus,” op. cit., 3. 
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Machiavellian philosophy, Dühring believes, is not of universal significance, but rather an 
indication of the corrupt times within which the Florentine thinker lived. He places special 
emphasis on the Italian thinker’s pugnacious disposition, which serves a practical function of 
fighting what is bad within an historical context. His advocacy of ruthlessness and immoral 
actions to attain wanted ends has often caused his character to be questioned. Dühring is of 
the opinion that in the course of the 19th century, with its tendency towards national 
unification, that Machiavelli must be reconsidered. Leopold von Ranke is correct, according 
to Dühring, in his thesis that Machiavelli was so distressed by the political conditions of Italy 
that he decided to prescribe it the “poison it needed”, but incorrect in failing to recognize that 
it was not merely a rational decision of Machiavelli’s, but rather the Italian’s disposition 
which caused him to act; Ranke, in Dühring’s opinion, does not search deep enough to find 
Machiavelli’s true motives. Thomas Babington Macaulay’s interpretation, in which 
Machiavelli is condemned by portraying him as a child of his corrupt times, is seen as one 
sided and questionable. Dühring writes: 
Great individuals exemplify something of the soil from which they grow. They show a tinge of 
their times and its circumstances. However, what should never and ever be forgotten by 
historians is that they are only a small part an explainable product of their time. Far more, they 
carry the source of their idiosyncrasies in their own individual nature and the productivity of a 
genius begins beyond the point where it stops to be a product of his time.353 
Machiavelli did not only see his nation in decline, he also observed the moral decay of the 
private citizens. He was a man who read a lot about the ancient world and possessed high 
ideals for how citizens should behave. Dühring sees him as an object of study helpful to 
understand the principles of corruption and the mechanics of moral affects and motives. His 
work was not scientific, but we can observe “the logic of badness in its deepest chasms” from 
this “great and cold artist of categorizing political motivation”.354  
Another example of Dühring’s concept of history as “isolated individual striving” can be seen 
in his treatment of Friedrich List. As we have seen in the last chapter, Dühring was one of the 
first intellectuals in Germany to recognize List’s achievements, and it was his efforts which 
paved the way for a general recognition of List’s work.355 The intellectual founder of the 
German Customs Union was an outsider, who, like Dühring, had to deal with professional 
353 Ibid., 6. 
354 Ibid., 14. Dühring goes on to note that Machiavelli’s work was not scientific as he did not know how to apply 
laws that make up thought and passion. LW, 336. 
355 Albrecht, ED, 80. Also Albrecht, “Die Ausgestaltung des listischen Nationalitätsprinzip durch Eugen 
Dühring,” 1-32. 
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setbacks in his career. Dühring describes List as a man who could have achieved much more 
in his life had the circumstances been different; he may have become another Colbert if he 
had not been the victim of corrupt forces. List is also praised by Dühring for being an 
opponent of “Pseudo-historicism”. In his 1867 book Carey’s Belittlers, he commends List’s 
sense of history as “historicity in grand style which also led to judgments and brought fruit for 
the present; it political and stately in an imminent sense”. As we have seen in the last chapter, 
Dühring sees one of List’s greatest achievements being in the recognition of the nation as an 
element in history.356 List saw the nation as a basic component of history without which the 
single individuals would have no potency. Dühring makes a comparison between List’s 
emphasis on the nation and the efforts of the historical school of law, which, according to 
Dühring, corrected some of the cosmopolitan one-sidedness and general human rights of the 
18th century.357  
Christ’s words, “A prophet is not without honor, but in his own country…” was true for List, 
whose honor in his own land was only to be found in the future. Dühring is disappointed by 
this and sees it as an ironic fact that List, who seemed to have discovered the importance of 
the nation, would be rejected by his own nation. The role of the creative intellectual innovator 
is an essential part of any nation; especially in the branches of science in which performance 
and effectiveness are related to the people and the state, like political economy. Individual 
scientists are benefited or hurt by their connection to their country. Dühring writes, “You can 
justifiably say that a significant achievement can reach neither its fame nor its full calling in a 
small circle and that it has to have influenced its fatherland and the world before it can have 
canonical influence”.358 Without practical influence, a country will never have theoretical 
influence. As the strong nation is a prerequisite for finding an echo in science, Dühring 
believes that Germany has not been able to institute its “voice of theory” amid the great 
powers and has remained in the role of the pupil. List came too early: On the one hand, his 
system was directed to a people who had not yet learned to think nationally and politically; on 
the other, he could find no resonance abroad as the English, who reigned supreme in the 
theory of political economy, ignored List completely. Dühring shows that the French were the 
first to recognize List; the Americans followed suit but were only interested in List because of 
356 The significance of the nation was overlooked by nearly all of the great intellectuals of the 19th century. Cf. 
Isaiah Berlin, “Nationalism – Past Neglect and Present Power”, in Against the Current, ed. Henry Hardy 
(London: Clarendon Press, 1991), 40 et seq. 
357 This school saw the law in the context of its German heritage. Law was seen, on the one hand, as being a 
natural product of the past, like language, on the other hand as a specific creation of positive national spirit. 
Dühring, the effusive proponent of 18th century thought, apparently did not see the Historical School as being 
opposed to the Enlightenment.  
358 “Die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung Friedrich Lists,” 247. 
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their antipathy towards England. As the French and the Americans supported List, there was 
no chance that he would find any support in England. Dühring entertains hopes that a revision 
of political economic theory will take place as the power structure of world economics began 
to favor Germany and America more. 
He was of the opinion that List’s achievements would be saved from being forgotten and 
wrote optimistically: “In truth nothing is really missed or misguided, but rather found at the 
right time and the necessary detachment reached through which the true dimensions of an 
earlier phenomenon and its proportions become assessable to those close at hand”. Dühring 
played a key role as an historian in preserving the legacy of List.359 
Alexander von Humboldt did not need to have Dühring or anyone else save his name for 
posterity. He was famous in his day and has remained so to the present. His great journeys and 
scientific discoveries, as well as his involvement in the popularization of natural science, have 
won him fame throughout the world. Dühring admires the fellow Berliner von Humboldt and 
writes in depth about him, although he was far from being one of his great heroes. Humboldt 
generally had a good reputation, but he was not always viewed favorably; biographers 
reproached him for not developing intellectually as far as he could have. It has also been 
reported that he mocked his colleagues behind their backs. Dühring clarifies this with a 
sentence that may perhaps also explain Dühring’s often unpleasant demeanor: “This was in 
his nature. He was, after all, a Berliner”.360 As a Berliner himself, Dühring writes, “Humboldt 
always remained a Berliner to a certain extent. He had the style and humor that you find here, 
influenced by the French, and yet always retaining that tendency which is an outcome of a 
natural born sense for which there is no mask”.361     
Dühring believes that it was a legitimate goal, if not a duty, of scholars to capture and 
invigorate an audience. He was, however, skeptical of “mass success” in academic literature: 
all too many professors, in his opinion, try to bolster their otherwise weak reputations by 
publishing books in order to gain cheap success. Although popular scientific writing had 
become commonplace in Dühring’s day, in the 1840, when Humboldt was writing, it was 
359 This has been generally recognized by historians of political economy. Cf. Friedrich Lenz, Friedrich List, die 
“Vulgärökonomie” und Karl Marx. Nebst einer unbekannten Denkschrift Lists zur Zollreform (Jena: Gustav 
Fischer, 1930), 4; Edgar Salin, Politische Ökonomie, 124. 
360 Dühring wrote an essay on Humboldt titled “Die Gelehrtenbiographie und das neue Werk über Alexander von 
Humboldt”. Hans Reinhardt compiled another essay from notes of Dühring’s from a lecture in 1873. Cf. 
“Alexander von Humboldt,” Sendbogen 14, 15 (October, December 1922).   
361 “Die Gelehrten Biographie und das neue Werk über Alexander von Humboldt,” op. cit. 
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much more difficult. Humboldt was willing to “dare to be popular” and thus paved the way 
for a generation of writers after him. 
There were two extremely different opinions on Humboldt. One said he did not achieve that 
much and was mainly a collector. The other described him as a colossal figure of natural 
science and that his book Kosmos was the beginning of the “Humboldt era”. Ambivalent as he 
often was, Dühring sees the truth as being somewhere in between: the exaggerated criticism 
as being beneficial, as it helps to curb the effusive praise. Dühring also finds an element of the 
“enlightened outsider” in Humboldt: he interprets Humboldt’s natural scientific perspective as 
being opposed to the two leading philosophers of the day, Hegel and Schelling. Upon 
returning from one of his long journeys, Humboldt took notice of Schelling’s work and sent 
the philosopher a complimentary letter, but this was, according to Dühring, merely a matter of 
politeness, as Humboldt did not want to create any more jealousy than he already had through 
his lectures on the cosmos. Dühring emphasizes that Humboldt’s correspondence indicates a 
disliking of both Schelling and Hegel, and he quotes a letter to Varnhagen from April 1841 
which was published after Humboldt’s death. There Humboldt writes of the idiocy of the two 
famous philosophers, “gay saturnals, a masked ball of the most demented natural 
philosophies”. Humboldt then proceeds to quote Schelling: “A diamond is a pebble which has 
gained consciousness; granite is ether; east is oxygen, west is hydrogen; it rains when the east 
clouds and west clouds mix”. Humboldt finally concludes that the German philosophy of his 
day, “was a miserable era in which Germany sank far below England and France”.362 
4. “Critical History”: Concept and Works 
Dühring called his historical works, of which three were written (in philosophy, political 
economy, and mechanics) “critical histories”. These books form a concept which is based on 
his understanding of society as we have seen it above. The pessimistic emphasis on the role of 
unjust power, evident in his Weltanschauung and general scientific bearing, provides the tenor 
for his own historical writings. “Critical history”, as Dühring defines it, is strongly led by 
what he sees as the unique current concerns of modernity; the past is not highlighted for the 
past’s sake, but rather for the specific purpose of shedding light on the present.363 The term 
critical history has not been particularly well defined, but its usage goes back as far as the 
362 “Alexander von Humboldt,”  2 et seq. 
363 This view is also held by Ernst Troeltsch in his famous lecture “The Significance of Protestantism for the 
Genesis of the Modern World”. He correctly emphasizes that history is always connected to “a thinking mind” 
and is directed towards current experience. He writes, “So ist das Verständnis der Gegenwart immer das letzte 
Hauptziel aller Historie.” Troeltsch, „Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen 
Welt,” Historische Zeitschrift 97 (1906): 2.  
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middle of the 18th century.364 In the middle of the 19th century it surfaces especially in natural 
scientific works.365 Dühring’s critical history has a negative view of the historical in that it is 
not interested in the past for the past’s sake: past occurrences are seen as a prologue to the 
present. In his Critical History of Philosophy, he writes:  
The past is what first completely unlocks the understanding of the present. The other way 
around, and far more so, the present is a key to the past and this is a truth which should be 
forgotten least of all in critical historical writing. Only that which we experience directly in 
our closest environment gives us points of reference and comparison for far away things we 
wish to grasp.366   
Dühring affirms Schopenhauer’s statement that “history was of little use as it cannot acquaint 
people with the true spirit of the ideas of philosophy”. Why does history not allow the 
discovery of the “true spirit”? He cites two forms of false historicism that he believes stand in 
the way of communicating real ideas: the first example is a fact positivism, which involves 
uncritical “accepting and outwardly directed behavior”; this perspective is especially 
dangerous as it has no concept of the reality (Dasein) of history, and the gap that it allows is 
not even noticed, and therefore much is reported which is not understood. The reader, who 
falsely assumes that the historian knows what he is writing about, is inevitably lead astray.367 
The second false form of historical thinking, Dühring believes, goes too far in the other 
direction. Certain historians proceed from an arbitrary perspective, namely their own 
subjective system. They try to apply their own limited system of knowledge to the history 
they are writing, and they place their own ideas into history (Hegel is meant here). Dühring is 
of the opinion that this perspective reigned supreme until the 1850s, and no purely objective 
portrayal could limit its power.368 Dühring’s criticism of writing history from the perspective 
of a system seems not to be consistent, as he advocates the idea that the history of philosophy 
should be in a sense philosophy itself. He says in his lecture on the history of philosophy: “An 
objective portrayal is necessary and needed, but it is not possible without a system”.369 
Dühring tries to justify the self-contradictory stance through the assertion that modern natural 
364 The earliest example which I have been able to find is Adam Wilhelm Franzen’s Eine critische Geschichte 
der Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit (Lübeck: J. Schmidt, 1747).  
365 The most well-known attempt to define critical history came from Nietzsche in the second of his untimely 
meditations, published in 1874: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life. As the title of the book indicates, 
Nietzsche sought to analyze the practical ramifications of history for how people live. He developed a typology 
of different perspectives of the past: active striving (monumental), preserving and honoring (antiquarian) and 
guiding and emancipating (critical). Cf. Nietzsche, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben (Zürich: 
Diogenes Verlag, 1984), 19 et seq. 
366 KGP, 4th edition, 7. 
367 Ibid., 4. 
368 Ibid., 5. 
369 “Geschichte der Philosophie,” Lecture Notes, UA/HUB (cf. Appendices I).  
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science enables a system to be purified.370 The goal of Dühring’s critical history is not only to 
bring systematic philosophizing into historical writing, but also to be practically effective. 
History has relevance for the present and future. Dühring’s goal is to “make history” through 
history. Historical narrative is seen as a two way street, so to speak. “The present must be 
understood from the past and the past from the present”.371 
The first of Dühring’s historical works to be written was Critical History of Philosophy from 
its Beginnings to the Present published in 1869. This book, which is also the core of his 
concept of critical history, was one of the most popular histories of philosophy in its day and 
retained substantial success on the book market for some time to come.372 The theme of 
conflict and antagonism, recurrent in Dühring’s work, plays an important role in this history. 
The book gives importance to failed attempts to solve problems. Dühring values the inductive 
method of gaining knowledge, which proceeds from specific facts to make general 
conclusions: in contrast to deductions which advance from the safe haven of already-
established premises, inductions are open to mistake. As mentioned, like William Whewell, 
Dühring sees the inductive method as the main instrument of natural science and philosophy. 
In proceeding inductively, mistakes are likely to happen and Dühring, in his historical account 
of philosophy, sees this positively. There is a kind of pragmatism in error out of which 
something unintended but positive develops. As an example of the virtue of failed attempts he 
points to the Eleatics’ conception of the subjectivity of space, which he rejects as erroneous 
idealism, only to praise it a few lines later as having paved the way for Kant’s correct idea.373 
Another example is Thales’ idea that water is the most basic element of nature: despite the 
falseness of the idea, it was a notion that was “for the state of knowledge of nature at the time 
a relatively successful idea”. Schopenhauer’s pessimism, which, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three, he considers to be wrong, he writes, benefited philosophy by posing a new question. 
Dühring reproaches Wilhelm Whewell, a thinker that he otherwise greatly admires, for not 
giving credit to the Ionian thinkers Thales, Anaxamander, and Anaximenes credit they 
370 KGP, 4th edition, 6 et seq. 
371 “Geschichte der Philosophie,” op. cit. 
372 The academic reviews of the book, aside from Alois Riehl’s praise, were largely negative. Jürgen Bona 
Meyer regretted the book’s popularity, referring to it as “poison in the hands of students”.  Idem, “Zur 
Philosophie der Gegenwart,” 46. The twenty-two year old Austrian philosopher and psychologist Alexius 
Meinong criticized the book for its bringing an “ethical moment” into the history of science and philosophy, 
which “leads to distorted views”. Idem, “Zur Charakteristik der ‘Gesinnungsphilosoph’,” op. cit., 454. Conrad 
Hermann in my opinion is more objective than Meinong, and correctly disparages Dühring’s disregard for 
history, which “turns history upside down” by generally “making the marginal and insignificant into the most 
important and primary”.  Hermann, “Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis zur 
Gegenwart. Von Dr. Eugen Dühring,“ 483-484. See also Riehl’s positive review of Critical History of 
Philosophy: „Zur Geschichte der Philosophie,“ Philosophische Monatshefte 11 (1875): 165-179. 
373 KGP, 4th edition, 38. 
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deserve; Whewell overlooked, in Dühring’s opinion, the important connection between these 
thinkers as precursors of the successful work of Laplace. According to Dühring, if the great 
modern mathematician Laplace had been alive at that time, he would have thought just like 
those Ionic thinkers.374 With his great penchant for “fundamental notions” Dühring hold that 
even erroneous views are often important preliminary steps or building blocks for scientific 
progress.  
Another apparent paradox, which Dühring’s critical history of philosophy highlights, is how 
corrupt societal circumstances can bring forth positive actions. Decaying societal conditions 
create antagonism from which forms of morality can develop. He says: “There is a process of 
decay everywhere; where it is predominant, the old must perish and new come into being and 
the other way around”.375 The classical Greek philosophy is for Dühring an example of such 
decay; Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle cannot be separated from the degenerated conditions.376 
There are for Dühring a certain number of basic viewpoints that need to be focused upon to 
avoid arbitrariness in the portrayal of history. Everything that comes later stems from the 
original basic forms which existed at the beginning of philosophy. Like Plato, he believes in 
basic types which exist throughout time. The types which Dühring postulates are not, 
however, “outside of time”, but somewhat similar to Max Weber’s conception of “ideal types” 
rather “in the order of events”.  
Where the human mind moves towards universal thought and directs its exertion towards 
bringing forth a world-encompassing philosophical form of consciousness, it cannot avoid the 
first basic forms of direct perception, and must fall prey to them with each such highly intense 
attempt. Philosophizing without them would mean as much as preparing the collective 
representations and yet trying to do without the basic pattern and form.377  
Dühring makes a comparison between Hegel and Heraclitus, both of whom search for “reality 
in change”, and Herbart and the Eleatics who create a “fixed immovable being”.378 History – 
or rather, forces in history – are the precondition for future philosophizing. Geldsetzer sees 
this as an attempt by Dühring to reduce history to certain forms of behavior, and again we see 
374 “Wilhelm Whewell,” op. cit., 849. 
375 “Geschichte der Philosophie,” Lecture Notes, UB/HUB (cf. Appendices I). 
376 Conrad correctly emphasizes Schopenhauer’s influence on Dühring, seeing a strong negativity and 
pessimism. Idem, “Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie vo ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Von Dr. Eugen 
Dühring,“ 483 and 485.  
377 KGP, 4th edition, 17. 
378 KGP, 36. (This comparison was removed from the later editions of the book.) 
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Dühring’s affinity for original “fundamental fertilizing notions” and Dühring’s non-historical 
perspective.379  
The book’s reference to general scientific developments, especially in mathematics and 
mechanics, shows the influence of Buckle. Philosophy is not seen as unified or as something 
complete, but in connection with other cultural factors. Geographic and time divisions are 
taken into consideration, as is the distinction of different schools and sects. These fixed 
components are, however, only a background for the creative individuals which act relatively 
independent of the circumstances. For Dühring, the history of philosophy consists of a few 
centuries of Greek life and a few centuries of the new scientific culture. The first era began, 
like the religious cosmogony, with the question of the origin of the world. Whereas the myths 
created analogies to human activity, fantasizing using the conscious faculties of the mind, 
philosophy proceeded through the observation of the process of nature pointing to an 
aggregate condition. This method is valid to a degree, according to Dühring, and not as far 
away from a modern standpoint as one would think. He places special emphasis on the pre-
Socratic thinkers in the first era of philosophy. The highest level of theoretical originality is to 
be found within the circle of these philosophers. Following them, the only new direction 
opened was to be seen in Socrates’ moral thinking, which, through its teachings and good 
example, bestowed honor on philosophy, strongly contrasting to the corruption of the sophists. 
Socrates’ inspiration was followed by an era of universalism represented by Plato and 
Aristotle, as well as the “character-building philosophy” of the Epicurians and the Stoics. 
Dühring’s disliking of religion colors his view of the Middle Ages, which he sees as a desert 
and a gap in the history of philosophy. He writes, “The Middle Ages lived in a real darkness 
of the intellect”.380 Philosophy came back to life through positive speculation on nature. For 
Dühring, the only true philosopher of the Middle Ages is Roger Bacon, again an outsider who 
developed independent notions on science. 
In the modern epoch, Dühring concentrates on the thinkers who he sees as embodying heroic 
individualism. Perhaps his favorite among them is the Italian friar Giordano Bruno, who 
broke with the church as he saw that church teachings did not go along with the new results of 
science. Dühring gives special recognition to the Germans for having shaped modern 
philosophy and particularly recognizes Immanuel Kant, who he sees as having revived the 
theoretical impetus of the Eleatics. In his lecture he teaches: “The Germans do not have the 
379 Geldsetzer, Die Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung im 19. Jahrhundert,161. Jürgen Große, 
Kritik der Geschichte. Probleme und Formen seit 1900, 155 and 173-174. 
380 “Geschichte der Philosophie,” op. cit.. 
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aesthetic talent of the Greeks; their talent is more awkward, but actually becomes more subtle. 
The mythic Kant is not the fine harmonic type. He is behind the Greeks in this respect, but he 
is more keen and deeper”.381  
Although praising German philosophy, Dühring places more weight on the collective 
European development, not respecting the traditional divisions placed by most historians of 
modern philosophy.382 In a sense, he creates a revisionist history that would be carried on by 
some philosophers after him. The method of epistemology normally seen to have begun with 
Kant, according to Dühring, goes back to the empiricism of John Locke and David Hume.383 
Locke was the first person to seriously contemplate the origin of metaphysical concepts. 
There was, according to Dühring, a turn to the inner self initiated by Locke and Hume’s 
critique of the intellect.384 Locke analyzed concepts as they were and not how they came 
about. In that he presupposed nothing (i.e. postulates the intellect as a tabula rasa), Locke 
intended to reach the pure content of concepts, and thus attacked the metaphysical and moral 
principles of earlier, predominantly continental philosophy. According to Dühring, Locke 
wished to find the inner individual history of the conceptual world. He aimed to check the 
validity of opinions, views and ideas; in a word, to practice critical philosophy. Locke’s 
reflections on the concept of substance were for Dühring a clear example of his original 
critique of concepts. Before Locke, philosophers had seen “substance” as being a non-
specifically defined conveyor of certain phenomena. The term was, as they conceived it, “a 
means of information and a refuge of ignorance”. In truth, they recognized, according to 
Locke, only an inclusive concept of facts or characteristics that appear coherent. After Locke, 
the concept of substance could not be used as a “way out” anymore. Dühring emphasizes that 
Locke’s critique signifies a differentiation of the psychologically necessary and proven 
content of an idea from its historical admixture. Locke’s virtuosity lies in the self-inspection 
of the individual concepts. The main characteristic, which this form of criticism holds to, is 
proving that perception is a necessary starting point of philosophical cognition. For Dühring, 
the limits of Locke’s method lie in this criteria as its success apparently depends on from 
whom and in which time is was handled. 
381 Ibid. Later Dühring would criticize and polemicize against Kant harshly, writing a series of articles in his 
magazine Personalist und Emancipator titled “Kant’s Cant”. 
382 Dühring criticizes Hermann Lotze, one of the judges who gave him first prize in the essay contest on the 
history of mechanics, for not emphasizing the European prerequisites in the development of aesthetics in 
Germany. Dühring, “Lotze, Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der 
Gegenwart 3 (1868): 386. 
383 This view, which Schopenhauer had also expressed, had already been articulated in one of his early 
publications. Cf. “Der Positivismus in der Philosophie,” Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift 28 (1865): 181. 
384 KGP, 313. 
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After Locke, David Hume is the second most significant figure in the founding of criticism. 
He is especially praised for his honorable character. Dühring sees Hume being labeled as a 
“skeptic” as merely coincidental side note. The purpose of his philosophizing was to free the 
intellect, which for Dühring is really the opposite of true skepticism. Critical history is not 
interested in skepticism, but rather in the critique of the intellect. The inquiry of and 
inspection of the common concept of causality is, according to Dühring, what is original and 
characteristic in the metaphysics of the Scottish thinker. After Locke, there was no way back 
to inborn ideas. Hume was convinced that all knowledge had to be obtained sensually. The 
scrutiny of the ideas of causality is essential for the foundation of criticism. Hume postulates 
that all of our specific judgments of the causal connection of natural processes are based on 
experience. The concept of causality is acquired empirically and not inborn in our intellect. 
Hume took another critical step forward by claiming that experience as such contains nothing 
which includes the normal concept of causality. No one knows what the causal band in the 
mechanical communication of movement means in and of itself. Dühring claims: “Even today 
the accountability on those basic principles of proof, by which knowledge attained through 
experience supports strictly derived thought, are missing”.385 David Hume is, according to 
Dühring, the greatest representative of criticism in the history of philosophy. 
The book Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics offers further insight into 
the concept of history in Dühring’s Weltanschauung. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the work 
was not written for the larger public, as his others were, but rather for the committee of 
academics in a prestigious book contest on the history of mechanics sponsored by the 
Benecke Foundation of the University of Göttingen in 1869. Although conceived and carried 
out in a more sober academic style than his other books, the signature of the Dühring world 
view can be observed, and Dühring himself saw the book as representing an “inner necessity” 
of his system.386  
The book was an important part of his general scientific concept. Here again we are 
confronted with the spirit of the 18th century, this time its emphasis of mathematics and the 
law of motion. From the beginning of his studies onwards, Dühring had been convinced “that 
a major part of the schematic questions regarding Weltanschauung had to be transferred away 
from the nebulous area of uncertain wavering and affectedly confused metaphysics to the 
solid ground of pure mechanics and rational mechanics”.387 He wanted to portray mechanics 
385 KGP, 314. 
386 CP, 528. 
387 CP, 528. 
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as being entirely rational; through his depiction of the history of mechanical truths, he sought 
to build a bridge between pure logic and mathematics on the one hand, and the “whole reality 
of empirical laws”, on the other. His intention was to place stress on strict science in order to 
show the invalidity of groundless ideology.388 
The concept of Gesinnung and heroic struggle play only a minor role in this work, but he 
places particular weight on Robert Mayer’s discovery of the law of energy equivalence, which 
he sees as the stimulus towards a new critical orientation of past traditions.389 The book 
follows the lines of Dühring’s concept of critical history in general, but it is in a sense unique. 
A critical history of mechanics, in his opinion, has a special place in the theory of science and 
is an unavoidable pre-condition for the advancement of knowledge. It also combines with the 
principles of pure mathematics in dealing with an object whose examination leaves a purely 
psychological area, based on direct perception, as it were, putting its foot in the area of 
material reality for the first time.390 The history of mechanics is seen as a “material pedestal” 
for higher efforts and is a basic component of scientific history in general. It should attain a 
consciousness of all basic insight into mechanics and the methods of its application as well as 
concentrate on the solution of specific problems of natural mechanics. Following Dühring’s 
general concept, the history of mechanics can and should only be written by a specialist in the 
area, and should involve participation in furthering the development of the subject. The aspect 
of a system from which the history emerges is also given significance. He writes: “The system 
is an inner necessity through which the course of the development of science will always have 
to return, even if the facility and impulse are lost for some epoch”.391 In Dühring’s general 
Weltanschauung, “system” signifies “knowledge” as opposed to the “desire” of the 
coincidentally-occurring individual fates, and the skills of an individual man. There is also an 
emphasis on pragmatism in the book: he emphasizes that his own aims are in line with those 
of Galileo, who, through his own history, wanted to offer a helpful introduction for future 
scientists free from the classic portrayal of dogmatic material. Dühring writes: “Only such a 
history whose conception goes to the roots of the matter can hope not only to contribute 
something to increasing knowledge of what has been, but also to provide impetus, orientation 
and guidance for future productive activity”.392  
388 SLF, 340. 
389 For more on this cf. his article on Mayer from the Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart, “J.R. 
Mayer, Die Mechanik der Wärme,” 321. 
390 KGM, x. 
391 Ibid., xi. 
392 Ibid., xvii. 
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Dühring’s third critical history, Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism, will be 
addressed in our analysis of Dühring’s system of social economics in Part Three, so our 
description of the book here will have to remain brief. When the book was published in 1871, 
and for some time thereafter, it was one of the more commercially successful portrayals of the 
history of political economy.393 At the time it was the only comprehensive portrayal of the 
history of political economy to include theories of the latest currents of the socialist 
movement, and for this reason alone was praised for its originality, even by opponents of 
socialism.394 The connection between political economy and socialism fits into the symmetric 
structure of Dühring’s philosophy: political economy represents objective isolated 
“knowledge”, and socialism represents the impulsive instinctual factor of “desire”.395 Dühring 
again underlines, “The creative driving forces can only be found when one goes to the roots of 
very enlightened thought”.396 The structure of his system with its twofold point of attack of 
“knowledge” alongside “desire” is applied to political economic history. Material conditions 
are considered along with “the motive of shaping material forces in society”. The material 
supply is a relatively independent realm of investigation: “The idea that the treatment of this 
area can be ennobled through purely ideal or aesthetic efforts is indefensible. The material 
economy is the precondition for all intellectual considerations and not the other way around. It 
would be disastrous if a social theory tried to steer the material basis. The common roots of 
political economy are only in the sphere of material interests. The crisis of life and the critique 
of thought both make sure at the same time that both forces for better or for worse meet each 
other”.397 Political economy in general corresponds with the power of knowledge, while the 
critique of thought applies to socialism. He insists that the two powers are related and 
complement each other. The social and political combinations, politics in a general sense, 
were the cause and not the effect of economic appropriation – not the economic conditions 
themselves. 
The goal of a history of political economy is to view successful and unsuccessful attempts by 
modern man to find laws in the material interests of society through the means of science. 
This began, according to Dühring, less than a century earlier and, in the book’s introduction, 
he states that his own scholarship as an historian is meant to embody the “liberal impulse of 
393 Cf. Alfred Kruse, “Eugen Dühring’s wissenschaftliche Isolierung,” 210.  
394 See the review by Friedrich von Baerenbach, “Die Sozialwissenschaften in der Gegenwart,” Unsere Zeit 15 
(1879): 52-57. Baerenbach speaks on p. 53 of the book‘s success due to “the originality of the topic” and the 
“originality of the whole endeavor”. Although critical of Dühring, Gustav Schmoller praises the book as well. 
Cf. Schmoller, Zur Literaturgeschichte der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften, 162. 
395 KGN, 3rd edition, 5. 
396 Ibid., 3. 
397 KGN, 3rd edition, 8. 
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the 18th century” against the “backwards state and societal views of the restoration”.398 The 
knowledge of the field must be considered along with the great scientific personalities who 
brought this knowledge. Regarding the latter, he adds that “it is less about the people who are 
brought forth by the epoch than those who made the epoch”.399 Behind every theory is a 
creative personality. There are two different areas of investigation, that of nature and that of 
man. Science is united, but this differentiation is needed to provide clarity and to hold back 
one-sided positions. 
As in the Critical History of Philosophy, the conventional portrayal of the development of 
political economy is disregarded. Those who speak of a progression from mercantilism to 
physiocracy and finally to the industrial system are, in Dühring’s opinion, misguided. Only 
the last phase, which he believes was begun by Hume and Smith, deserves the name of 
science. He takes the time to follow the development of the, from his perspective, unscientific 
thought on economics dating back to the ancients. True to his fondness for historical 
precursors and the “Anfangsdenken”, the first section of the book, dealing with these pre-
scientific attempts, is one of the longest of the book! The first glimmer of a consciousness of 
economics begins with the Greeks which the Romans merely copied. As in philosophy, he 
sees the Middle Ages as a “desert” where thinking was dominated by religious superstition. 
Not surprisingly, considering his own attraction to the thought of Carey and List, he views 
mercantilism positively. The physiocrats and their postulates of a natural development based 
on agriculture signified a “breaking away from the state” and the first steps from practice to 
theory, but their efforts were deluded and marred by fantastic ideas.400 He pays homage to 
Quensay, Turgot, and the astute innovation of Hume and Smith. The third section of the book, 
titled “The Theoretical Industrial System”, which was labeled by von Baerenbach as the 
“masterly achievement” (Glanzleistung) of the book, is an account of the theoretical 
achievements of Adam Smith, as well as the legacy he created.401 Less objective and written 
with the intent of justifying his own systematic pursuits is the section on the political 
economy of Malthus and Ricardo (section four). Dühring does not always refrain from ad 
hominem attacks: for example, calling Malthus’ character into question by claiming that the 
clergyman married for money; Malthusianism is viewed as a tool of the British upper middle 
class to keep the working class in check. Ricardo does not fare better, although according to 
Dühring, he cannot be denied a certain virtuosity. 
398 Ibid., 2. 
399 Ibid., 3. 
400 Ibid., 26. 
401 Von Baerenbach, “Die Sozialwissenschaften in der Gegenwart,” 55.  
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The most original aspect of the book is perhaps Dühring’s treatment of the history of 
socialism. Dühring is clearly on the side of socialism (despite his claim of complete 
impartiality to the contrary), and yet issues a scathing critique of the early socialist thinkers, 
who in his opinion are largely not of sound mind. The genealogy of socialism is characterized 
by a far greater “perversities” (Verkehrtheit) than that of political economy. Socialism is, 
according to Dühring, even younger than political economy, and did not begin until the 
French Revolution. Babeuf and Saint-Simon are dealt with as important pre-cursors of 
socialism who went beyond the mere utopian ideas of their predecessors; Babeuf is a “man of 
action”, and Saint-Simon a “man of theory”. Much attention and analysis is given to Thünen 
and List as representatives of German political economy, as well as to Henry C. Carey, who, 
as we have seen, is Dühring’s intellectual mentor. As we will show in detail below, the 
Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism delivers in-depth analysis and critique of 
the socialist views of Marx and Lassalle. Fittingly, the book closes with a plea for supporting 
individuality as the way of fostering social justice and of improving the collective fate of 
man.402 
5. Critical Summary  
Nietzsche emphasized that history was one of the most cherished possessions of the 19th 
century and perhaps nowhere is the Promethean character of Dühring’s intellectual efforts 
more apparent than in his philosophy of history, which boldly and defiantly attempts to alter 
the bourgeois historical consciousness of his day.403 As was the case with his philosophical 
and political economic thought, Dühring follows historical paragons in his approach to 
history. He emulates Buckle at attempting to apply the deductive methods of natural science 
to history, thereby filtering out arbitrary, “mere-human” occurrences. Comte’s postulate of the 
existence of a new scientific age ushered in by the French Revolution serves as a pillar for 
Dühring’s fight for political and social reform.  
Dühring’s own philosophy of history is preoccupied with the political agenda of the 
Enlightenment and its idea of emancipation. His view of history becomes non-historical in 
that he sees the past as a “series of points of now”, the most important of which is the here-
and-now. The subjective view of the past, which Dühring’s thought represents, has its roots in 
the epistemological considerations of his general philosophy. The downplaying of Reason and 
402 KGN, 3rd edition, 594-595. 
403 Hermann saw in Dühring’s book “the attempt to destroy the history of philosophy as a unity and as on 
ordered whole”. Conrad Hermann, “Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis zur 
Gegenwart. Von Dr. E. Dühring, ”Philosophische Monatshefte 3 (1869): 488.  
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contemplative abstraction in favor of the concrete Understanding in Dühring’s philosophy, as 
described in Chapter Three, has its corollary in his view of the past: history is disparaged for 
its concern with superfluous abstraction in the form of disjointed facts and collected 
information without attention being given to the forces behind what has created the events.404 
The inherent tendency of his Weltanschauung to favor visual perception and concrete 
causation cause Dühring to depreciate history. He conducts himself thoroughly negatively to 
the established, traditional historical narrative of his day in a way that was certainly shocking 
for some of his more conservative contemporaries.  
His view of intellectual history represents a form of “revisionism” in that it involves a 
substantial reinterpretation of major events of the generally accepted narrative.405 He 
reinterprets historical data from a practical and subjective perspective suited to his worldview, 
and thereby molds the past to give his own cause legitimacy. In the history of philosophy, he 
boldly places the pre-Socratic philosophy of the Eleatics above Plato; he takes away Kant’s 
credit for creating critical philosophy and gives this honor to John Locke. In the field of 
political economy, it is no different: the powerful British school is stripped of its stature and 
the American Henry C. Carey is made the true heir to Adam Smith. In the area of mechanics 
he reduces the legendary physicist Hermann Helmholtz to being the plagiarist of Robert 
Mayer. In literature, Goethe is placed behind the today little-known Bürger. Dühring’s 
revisionist schemes presuppose an established narrative, embedded in the intellectual 
consciousness of his day, which it aims to replace. The great task of changing or unseating the 
traditional perspective, which he sets for himself, calls for a certain destructiveness, which 
gives his historical writing its strongly pessimistic tenor. 
And yet Dühring’s philosophy of history was not without original elements. He advocates 
applying strict natural scientific methods by using the method of induction, anticipating what 
would later become the Lamprecht Streit, while at the same time going to great lengths to 
theorize on the role of the individual in history, coming up with an original concept of the 
transmission of enlightened mindsets.406 With regard to the latter, he creates a form of 
404 Dühring never bothered to consider history from an epistemological point of view, but perhaps one could say 
that his critique of the accepted historical narrative lies in its emphasis of “efficient causes” as opposed to “final 
causes”. Dühring wishes to emphasize the factors from which history is made (final causes) rather than by which 
history comes about (efficient causes). Cf. Schopenhauer’s clear elaboration on the distinction between causa 
finalis and causa effciens. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World As Will and Representation, vol. 2, trans. E.F. J. 
Payne (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.), 331. 
405 The term “revisionism” was made popular by Eduard Bernstein, who, as we have seen, was influenced by 
Dühring’s practical ad hoc suggestions for improving the situation of the workers. 
406During the course of the 19th century, introspection or self-analysis became an ever-stronger approach to 
solving problems in philosophy. One example of this can be observed in Schopenhauer’s essay “On Genius”. As 
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hermeneutics which involves personal introspection and the identifying of oneself with certain 
figures of the past – an idea that would capture the interest of other scholars as well.407 His 
critical histories are able to incorporate this method into their narrative, making them not only 
easy to read, but insightful with regards to the three disciplines they handled. 
Finally, the basic structure of history that Dühring adopts from St. Simon and Comte gives 
insight into the core of his thought, which can be seen as inherently pessimistic with only an 
optimistic gloss. Whereas the Marxist vision of history, with its doctrine of the inevitable 
revolution of the proletariat, was directed towards the future, from Dühring’s perspective, the 
great turn of history has already occurred through the French Revolution. (We see here again 
the lack of a “will to a goal” in his thought.) Marx’s science explains the inner workings of an 
inevitable revolution towards which society is gravitating; Dühring’s science, on the other 
hand, turns to activism in the present in accordance with an event that has already occurred. 
Marx’s view of history provides a certain consolation with the hope of revolution, as a turning 
point still to come; Dühring’s is destructive, as it is inherently frustrated with the present, 
because it has yet to complete a revolution that has already happened.408 Thus one senses a 
certain discomfort in Dühring’s dealings with the past as the historical phenomena is viewed 
in relation to the ideals of justice set by the French Revolution.  
  
Egon Friedell points out, everything that Schopenhauer said about the genius was a description of Schopenhauer 
himself. Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit, 1228. 
407 This is a thought that would later be scientifically developed by Dühring’s colleague at the Berlin University, 
Wilhelm Dilthey. In 1896 Dilthey wrote: “Wir können zunächst das Verstehen eines fremden Zustandes als 
einen Analogieschluss auffassen, der von einem äußeren physischen Vorgang vermittels seiner Ähnlichkeit mit 
solchen Vorgängen, die wir mit bestimmten inneren Zustand verbunden finden, auf einen diesen ähnlichen 
inneren Zustand hingeht […] Die Glieder des Nachbildungsvorganges sind gar nicht bloß durch logische 
Operationen, etwa durch einen Anologieschluss, miteinander verbunden. Nachbilden ist Nacherleben”. Beiträge 
zum Studium der Individualität, 309 et seq. Another later representative of this direction was Otto Weininger 
who wrote: „Um einen Menschen zu erkennen oder darzustellen, muß man ihn verstehen. Um einen Menschen 
zu verstehen muß man mit ihm Ähnlichkeiten haben, man muß so sein wie er”. Geschlecht und Charakter, 129. 
408 It might be claimed that the Marxian view of history therefore resembles Judaism and its inherent hope for the 
future Messiah, whereas Dühring’s perspective is more akin to Christianity in that the great event, the coming of 
the Christ, has already occurred. 
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PART THREE:  
DÜHRING’S SYSTEM OF SOCIOPOLITICAL 
ECONOMICS 
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOLAR feels compelled to systematize his work to give it 
clarity, cohesion, and staying power. For Kant, a system was not a static dogmatic doctrine, 
but rather a “tendency of the intellect to architectonically create and unify diverse findings 
under an idea”.409 This “tendency of the intellect” became apparent in the second half of the 
18th century as political economy began to take form as a science. Adam Smith came up with 
the ground breaking idea that wealth is based on work and is supported by the division on 
labor, making the teachings on value, prices and money interconnected. Although he did not 
make an effort to systematize his thought precisely, the Scottish thinker’s idea laid the 
foundation for the systems which were to follow. Smith died in 1790 and the harmonic unity 
of his teachings was disrupted through critique which would split political economy into the 
bourgeois and socialist economic teachings.  
Amid the disunity of political economic theory existing in his day, Eugen Dühring sets the 
lofty goal of creating a system of social economics, based on the theories of Carey and List, 
which represent a third way between the dominant opposing schools stemming from Smith’s 
system.410 Dühring’s system of sociopolitical economics, as we have chosen to name it, 
follows the same general principles as his Philosophy of the Actual in aiming to find a balance 
between the needs of the individual and the good of the whole. As stated in his Critical 
Foundation of Political Economy from 1866, he does not believe that there needs to be a 
theoretical choice between an individualistic approach to economics as opposed to one based 
on government organization. The true evolution of political economy is organic. When the 
individuals are truly independent, they tend to bind together, according to Dühring. He writes, 
“The interests of the whole and the groupings which create order will come into existence to a 
large extent as soon as the sphere of individual freedom is extended”.411 As we saw in Chapter 
Four, Dühring is particularly critical of the two dominant schools of his day, the free traders 
and the socialists. David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, and John Stewart Mill, the main 
representatives of the “new British” school, Dühring believes, have falsified Adam Smith’s 
original teachings. Socialism, he holds, has remained bogged down by nebulous utopianism 
(particularly Robert Owen and Fourier), and  has been unrealistic and impotent in its 
409 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Nach der ersten und zweiten Ausgabe, ed. Raymund Caspar 
(Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1944), 748. Nietzsche was wary of the mind’s tendency towards systematization: “I 
distrust all systemetizers. The will to a system shows a lack of honesty.” Twilight of the Idols, Aphorism 26, 8. 
410 Dühring’s 1867 lexical entry on political economy (Volkswirtschaftslehre) for Meyer’s encyclopedia gives an 
overview of his general perspective of the field. He contrasts the method of Adam Smith, which postulates 
general laws which are of permanent validity with the “eclecticism” of the historical perspective predominant in 
German “university economics”. Dühring speaks of “Germans-American achievements” (deutsch-amerikanische 
Errungenschaften) brought about through the ground breaking views of Carey and List, which he himself is a 
part of. Dühring, “Volkswirtschaftslehre,” 542. 
411 KGV, IX. 
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philanthropic efforts (Proudhon and Louis Blanc). He views St. Simon in a more positive light 
and takes on key ideas from the one-time mentor of Auguste Comte, namely the division of 
political economy’s development from a harmonic to a critical phase, and also the idea of the 
significance of force in societal life.412 As we have seen above, Dühring believes Henry C. 
Carey was able to overcome the pessimistic critical period in the development of political 
economy and, along with Friedrich List, create the basis for a renewed harmonic unity of the 
world economy. Dühring’s political economy is in many ways an extension of Carey’s system. 
Whereas the practically minded American had given the impetus for the replacement of the 
radically individualistic teachings, Dühring sought to supplement Carey’s work by giving it 
philosophical underpinnings and systematization. Like his philosophy, his system of 
sociopolitical economics proceeds from the basis of matter (Dühring speaks of a “pedestal” of 
materialism) and presupposes discernible regularities of nature and society; it defies any type 
of “iron laws”, such as those assumed by Malthus and Ricardo, that would limit man’s 
freedom in a strict sense. His system seeks to combine theory and practice into a powerful 
force that can influence society.413 
Despite its recognition of the value of the individual and the emphasis it places on the 
principle of self-reliance, Dühring’s system is primarily concerned with the good of the 
whole. Even though he advocates laws of nature and shows reverence for the achievements of 
Hume and Smith, as Binder writes, Dühring proceeds “methodically on the grounds of 
socialism”.414 This approach is consistent with his philosophy, which has the highest ethical 
postulate, as we have seen above, of acting in consideration of life as a totality. What does this 
entail for economic theory? Dühring believes that the classical school of economics, which 
originated with Hume and Smith, had interpreted the economy from the isolated aspect of 
production without sufficiently considering the entire economic process. The new highest 
principle which his system offers, as we touched on in Chapter Four, is the view that not the 
“pure laws” of production, but the “political laws” of distribution, based on man made 
decisions, should be the basic point of departure for the science of political economy.415 The 
cornerstone of his philosophy of economics is that capitalism is socially determined. Society 
is characterized by conditions of mutual dependence between individuals; through the factor 
of force, and the threat thereof, parts of society have become subjugated or suppressed. The 
412 Alfred Kruse, “Eugen Dühring’s wissenschaftliche Isolierung,” 213. 
413 Dühring talks about the essence of his system in his autobiography. Cf., SLF, 296 et seq. 
414 Binder, SSED, 52. 
415 Dühring writes, “Die Naturgesetze der Politik und des Rechts oder Unrechts müssen heute den Ausgangpunkt 
für die tiefere wurzelnde Wirtschaftslehre bilden. Sie allein ergeben eine Einsicht, welche derjenigen aller 
früheren Wirthschaftstheorie überlegen ist.” CNS, 3rd edition, 508. 
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concept of the good of the whole, however, dictates that the different interests will be 
balanced. In order to preserve the balance of the whole of society, laws of nature come into 
play, allowing distribution to determine the level of production. 
In our analysis of his system of sociopolitical economics, it will be necessary to view 
Dühring’s early writings from 1865, which issue a critique of “capital” as a concept of 
political economy.416 We will also draw upon some of his early short essays, the majority of 
which were published in the supplemental volumes to Meyer’s encyclopedia, 
Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart. Following this, we will portray and analyze 
his system from the perspective of theory (Chapter Seven) and then practice (Chapter Eight) 
before attempting, perhaps most importantly, to consider the political and ethical 
consequences of his system within the context of the historical development of the European 
Left (Chapter Nine). It will be important to draw comparisons between his thoughts on 
economics and the principles of Dühring’s Philosophy of the Actual to ascertain the degree of 
consistency in his ideas. In so doing, our goal is to understand Dühring’s system not only in 
its historical context, but also in terms of how he perceived it himself and in terms of what he 
was attempting to accomplish.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
416 “Kritik des Kapitalbegriffs und seiner Rolle in der Volkswirtschaftslehre,” in Jahrbücher für 
Nationalökonomie und Statistik, ed. Bruno Hildebrandt (Jena: Friedrich Mauke, 1865), 316-343 [henceforth 
KKB]. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
EARLY GROUNDWORK 
1. The Social Question 
The social problems facing Germany in the incipient Industrial Revolution is the point of 
departure of Dühring’s system.  He assumes that science and philosophy can be used to 
successfully solve the enormous dilemmas and predicaments facing man in the 19th century, 
and aims in particular to alleviate the troubles of the working class. Seen philosophically, 
despite all of the present adversity and sorrow, the world, according to Dühring, is evolving 
towards a higher good and the higher good of humankind can only be attained through the 
confrontation with societal evils. Humans are a part of a great general totality, but also part of 
a lesser totality, which is society. The Social Question must be dealt with rationally and in a 
way that improves the whole of society. 
But just what was the Social Question of the 19th century, and how was it dealt with? Jürgen 
Backhaus has shown that the German expression “Soziale Frage” is only roughly translatable 
as the “Social Question”, as the English term was hardly used in political economic discourse 
of the Anglo-Saxon speaking world.417 Despite the difficulties in defining the term precisely, 
there are many factors which can be listed seen as common denominators.  The 19th century 
saw the impact of new sources of energy put to use through the steam engine and gas motors; 
machines began to replace manufacturing based on manual labor; immense social tension 
came about from increased production due to the progress of technology and the organization 
of labor. From a demographic perspective, large families became replaced by small urban 
family units. Conflict arose between workers and employers and the work place came to be 
loathed; societal groupings became organized to protect their own interests and class conflict 
intensified. In short, industrial society had created circumstances and problems never seen 
before in the course of history and there was demand to find rational solutions to the problems 
which had come into being. 418 
Already a catchphrase since the first half of the 19th century, the Soziale Frage found a place 
in scientific discussions of economics during the early phase of Dühring’s career as he was 
laying the groundwork for his system. There was no consensus on just what the question 
417 Cf. Peter R. Senn, “Economists and the Social Question: a study of the periodical literature in English”, in 
The Social Question, Part II, ed. Jürgen Backhaus, Journal of Economic Studies 33 (2006): 245.  
418 Cf. Carl Stegemann “Soziale Frage” in Staatslexikon: Recht, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft in 5. Bänden, 1233. 
Also Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866, 241-243. 
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demanded of economists: some said it was the problem of highly uneven distribution of 
goods, where a privileged few were getting richer while the masses of the proletariat were 
becoming poorer and poorer; others saw it as the fight between capital and labor, i.e. between 
employers and employees; others said it is not a social question, but rather many social 
questions; some even said it was a figment of the imagination, and there was no problem at 
all.419 Socialists and the “socialists of the chair” (Kathedersozialisten) alike were in 
agreement that the social question is one of a struggle of the man without capital against the 
man with capital. Socialists who called for more drastic measures claimed that the worker is 
destined to lose; the “socialists of the chair” said he can win with necessary help from the 
government.420 The German economist Karl Rodbertus, an acquaintance of Dühring’s, dealt 
with the question as a threefold issue involving 1) the order of society 2) the reason for its 
disruption and 3) the means of its restoration.421 In his essay “The Demands of the Working 
Class”, he asks the questions: “What do the working classes want? Will the other classes be 
able to withhold this from them? Will the demands of the workers be the grave of modern 
culture?”422 As Günther Rudolf writes, Rodbertus wanted to find the scientific and practical 
consequences to fight both “terrible captives”: “pauperism”, or the impoverishment of large 
segments of the population, and the “economic crisis” brought about by the under 
consumption of the poor classes. Rodbertus saw the core of the problem as being the uneven 
balance of power between work and property.423 
Dühring seeks answers to the questions asked by Rodbertus. The key to restoring a healthy 
social order is, in his opinion, to strengthen the weaker groups in such a way as to create a 
balance of forces (a view he sees connected with the process of Natural Law, as described in 
Chapter Four). Despite there being some similarity between his views and those of the 
socialists and Kathedersozialisten, Dühring’s perspective contrasts with the most well known 
authorities speaking out on the Soziale Frage. Too much of a realist to follow the utopian 
visions of the socialists, Dühring believes in the imperative of human will to determine the 
course of events. Whereas Marx assumes a non-political development of modern society 
dictated by purely economic forces and other representatives of social political economy 
advocate a patriarchic role of the state to ameliorate antagonism between workers and their 
419 Cf. Heinrich von Schiel, Die Theorie der sozialen Frage (Jena: Friedrich Mauke, 1871), 1 et seq. 
420 Cf. Julius Wolf, Der Kathedersozialismus und die soziale Frage (Berlin: George Reimer, 1899), 3 et seq.   
421 Cf. Günther Rudolf, „Karl Rodbertus und die soziale Frage,“ Speech given at the Rodbertus Conference on 
6.12.1995 in Greifswald, Berlin, 4. 
422 Johann Karl Rodbertus, Die Forderungn der arbeitenden Klassen (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1946), 9. 
423 Ibid., 5. On Rodbertus’ significance for the theories of socialism see an older article by the American 
professor at Brown University, E.B. Andrews, “Rodbertus’s Socialism, ” The Journal of Political Economy 
1(December:1892): 50-67.  
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employers, Dühring’s goal is to enable the workers to strengthen their position on their own to 
gain economic strength. 424    
He sees the Soziale Frage as an issue of the Germans, who have inherited the leading role in 
the socialist movement from the French. But Germany’s efforts are still dependent on what 
the French have accomplished: “The nations that first take on a matter always influence those 
which have not yet tried”.425 There are also points in common for all nations, and creating an 
effective socialist movement will entail “all ideas and efforts, which look past the usual 
hands-off approach to interaction and which have their eye on some kind of organic 
construction” of society. Cooperatives are for Dühring such a socialist phenomenon, as they 
go against the principle of laissez faire by emphasizing partnership and curbing the will of the 
individual workers. Socialism involves the effort to create social associations which would 
not otherwise come into being without the special initiative of societal groups and within 
“hands off” interaction of the normal progression of things.426 The movement is to proceed 
from its own organized strength in order to attain economic independence. From the 
perspective of Dühring’s early work, the Soziale Frage is to be answered through organized 
political impetus as well as the understanding of complex economic concepts.  
2. The Concept of Capital 
In his early essay Critique of the Concept of Capital and its Role in Political Economy, 
Dühring meticulously attempts to come to an understanding of exactly what “capital” entails 
from a natural and juridical perspective.427 His discourse on the nature of capital supports the 
views of Carey and List which were opposed to the British school of economics. The most 
basic element of an economy is a human workforce, on the one hand, and nature, on the other. 
Labor, which is a product of the social world, does not represent an asset which comes into 
being out of nothing. It has preconditions involving two main factors: 1) “basic existence” 
(bloßes Dasein), the basic material needed to work, i.e. nourishment and 2) “access to nature” 
or an object through which work is carried out.428 Every workforce has to secure a part of 
nature which has been brought under the legal control of someone in order to operate. Capital, 
424 See Chapter Eight below. Joseph A. Schumpeter defends Marx on this point emphatically stating that Marx’s 
theory “has room for all kinds of motives”. History of Economic Analysis, 440. 
425 “Der amerikanische Socialismus,” 113. 
426 Ibid., 114. 
427 Albrecht points out that this writing is heavily under the influence of Dühring’s legal studies. ED, 97. We 
have also drawn attention to the general influence of his study of law for his general Weltanschauung. Dühring 
was proud of his legal background and reproached Karl Marx, writing he “admittedly neglected his legal 
studies”. KGN, 2nd edition, 503. 
428 KKB, 319-320. 
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Dühring holds, is a concept that has a societal correlation and must be considered from two 
points of view: the natural-technological and the legal. On the one hand, nature and the tools 
applied to it are given factors for carrying out work; here the actual ownership or demarcation 
of control is a non-issue, as only the “purpose” of the given work is what counts. On the other 
hand, the legal right over an object, the second main pre-condition, has two separate factors. 
One is positive, namely, the ability to control or to be able to use an object as one wills; the 
other is negative, being the right of exclusion.429 According to Dühring, exclusion does not 
have to contain the character of ill intent, and yet it is the matrix of all social injustice. The 
exclusion of others from the control of an object, i.e. property, is a sign of respect for an 
individual and a person’s work. In contrast to Marxism, he sees ownership as a necessary 
demarcation of people’s fields of activity, any violation against which deserves reprisal.430 
In the history of civilized society, from which the concept of capital has developed, any “work 
on nature” intrinsically involves the fact that there has already been a certain one-sided 
exclusion of the control of nature. The owner is seen at first as an intermediary who, due to 
his control of the access to nature, stands between the individual worker and nature, to which 
their work is directed. This intermediary will only give up the claims he has, which stem from 
nature, when others are obliged to relinquish a portion of their work to him. Only with this act 
of transfer given as a fee for providing the legal right of usage of nature (and, if necessary, the 
work already put into it) is the creation of what is called “capital” in economics allowed.431 
Being conscious of the fact that human relations in history have been based on power or force, 
Dühring emphasizes that society has always consisted of “structures of order” which are 
historically inherited. Human interaction is based on legal rights which are a representation of 
power and always involve exclusivity. With power playing a decisive role in shaping 
economic conditions, Dühring believes that modern capitalism has not provided equal 
opportunity in its historical development: social conditions of economic intercourse take place 
in such a manner that some individuals have a greater opportunity to pursue their interests 
than others do. Thus economic exchange does not take place with even pre-conditions; due to 
existing historically inherited rights, title holders are granted unjust superiority over those 
who must relinquish all or parts of their rights to him. This is the phenomena of economic life 
and, according to Dühring, it is not beneficial to complain about this status as these conditions 
429 KKB, 321. 
430 As we will see below, Dühring veers away from this opinion with his design of “economic communes”, 
which he later drops in the 1890s when he returns to a fervent individualism with a strong emphasis on private 
property.  
431 KKB, 321. 
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are based in the given social order, as it corresponds to human nature. Avoiding a one-sidedly 
accusing tone of many socialists, he recognizes the natural necessity of these conditions and 
writes that it can be seen that every order of law is bound to contain elements of injustice, 
namely the exploitation of superiority connected to law. He writes: “The misuse of power is 
not to be separated from its use”.432 Power itself is not the problem. Outward measures to 
alleviate injustices are generally not effective and can only be applied to the most flagrant 
misuses of power; the only limits here are moral ones. 
Capital for Dühring is primarily a legal power over nature, but at the same time represents a 
collection of work, which can be considered a piece of nature. Nature itself, however, is not to 
be understood as capital. It is only through private property ownership, according to Dühring, 
that capital is created. Only when nature becomes property, entailing that it is only accessible 
to those who control it through legal contract, is it to be considered a component of capital. 
Even raw nature, which has not been subject to human labor, but is claimed by exclusive law, 
is to be considered capital. The “initial production”, which Dühring defines as the result of 
direct interaction between nature and human labor, knows only capital in the form of raw 
ground (roher Boden), provided that it has become property. In time, real value is created as 
nature becomes shaped, as it were, by labor to become tool for production. Such capital can 
then be seen as the precondition of production, which can be an object of exclusive power and 
thus exclusive law.433   
The concept of capital becomes more complicated when the various social factors that involve 
politics and power are taken into consideration. From a purely “natural” point of view, i.e. of 
pure production, capital is merely a tool. If production could be isolated completely from all 
other aspects of the economic process, this definition would be sufficient to characterize 
capital. (The problem of capital interest would be gone, as the “tool of production” would 
only be measured by the natural obstacles of procurement.) However, this definition does not 
correspond to reality. In modern capitalism, capital is also used as credit, i.e. as loan capital. 
The transfer from one hand to another for the purpose of being used by third parties, so 
prevalent in our society today, is for Dühring a decisive aspect of the concept of capital, 
which he incorporates in his theory of distribution to be dealt with below.434 In contrast to 
Adam Smith, who taught that the basis of goods – and hence the trading thereof – was work, 
432 Ibid., 323. 
433 Ibid., 330. 
434 Unlike many anarchist thinkers with whom he has much in common, Dühring never abandons the concept of 
credit.   
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Dühring sees the grounds of goods and bartering as the transfer of “defined control” 
(abgegrenzte Herrschaft). He writes, “Pure nature stops where the social world begins, i.e. 
where man delineates his control over nature”.435 Capital becomes a precondition of 
production as far as it can be the object of excluding power and therefore also excluding right. 
Only in as far as there is a line of demarcation distinguishing ownership is there an issue of 
capital interest.  
Seen politically and practically, Dühring’s theoretical considerations on capital are directed at 
finding a just economic solution for the German workers. He has respect, however, for the 
principle of individualism and does not follow socialists who want to do away with private 
property altogether. Capital is not to be seen negatively and is not something to complain 
about. He writes, “The kingdom of human sovereignty can only be erected on the ground of 
individuality. It would be going against gravity to want to avoid exclusion”.436 Private 
property is, in his opinion, a necessary attribute of the human personality. The original 
principle that created property must be called upon in its purest form; this entails making sure 
that the exclusivity that lies in private property is kept in a tolerable balance. He concludes, 
“The issue is not a general fight against property, but rather keeping property on a strictly 
natural basis. The insanity of doing away with exclusivity inherent in the concept of capital 
has to be given up from the very beginning as an absurdity”.437 Society has to be fair to the 
“natural” meaning of private property, which, Dühring writes, lies in demarcating fields of 
activity, and allowing for individual development. Capital only appears to be the cause of 
unjust exclusivity when legal institutions and conditions are not an expression of a natural 
balance of societal motives.438  
Capital interest, which is concomitant with private property, is explained through Dühring’s 
views on distribution or exchange: it is a tribute for the owner of the capital who gives up his 
rights of exclusion; it is a fee for allowing the use of natural objects, which are his private 
property, to a third party. Interest is thus characterized by Dühring as property income. 
Sounding much like Carey, he writes: “The rate of interest is a measure of exertion that work 
has to overcome in its efforts to satisfy its needs. If this exertion is little in relationship to the 
fullness of the products, i.e. if the capital requirements of production are relatively non-
435 KKB, 326. 
436 KKB, 327. 
437 Ibid., 328. 
438 As will be shown below, Dühring assumes the existence of social laws (sociale Gesetze), which are to be 
distinguished from laws of nature. The former can create conditions which, although occurring in regular 
patterns, must be subjected to critique and reform.  
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substantial barriers of free development of human force, then these conditions would have to 
be expressed in the lowering of interest”.439  
Although, as we will see, this position would be altered later, he sees the legal system and the 
government as having substantial significance for the development of interest, which serves to 
create a balance of societal interests. The more that legal measures work to give labor back its 
natural freedom (thus working against the natural gravitation of raw and unjust forces), the 
more the workers will benefit. The direction in which legal measures should be taken is 
towards combining weak business elements into larger units with the ability to become more 
self-reliant politically. Here Dühring is thinking of small businesses that wind up hurting their 
situation by competing against each other for access to capital. He advocates instead the 
formation of organizations consisting of small businesses that are to be recognized by the 
government. 
At about the same time as William Stanley Jevons, Dühring turns his attention to what had 
been the “step child of political economy”, the theory of consumption.440 Along the lines not 
only of List and Carey, but also of Ferdinand Lassalle, Dühring rejects the explanation of 
capital through savings. Individual savings only hold a moderate significance for the 
economy.441 Reminiscent of his views on Natural Law and his ideas of the value of instinct in 
human affairs (cf. Chapter Four above), the main thrust of an economic system lies, according 
to Dühring, in the desire of the consumers, i.e. in the satisfaction of consumer needs. Thus the 
need of consumption remains mechanically balanced with the need of production. All 
economic progress begins here. Every need that comes along is impetus for production, be it a 
result of cultural progress that creates more needs for the individual or a rise of population 
that creates more needs of consumers. Production is determined by the development of 
demand, and not the other way around as Malthus’ teachings implied by saying the given 
capability of production determines the demand. Dühring writes, “The production of a nation 
is admittedly limited by the amount of capital it has at the moment. The size of capital 
determines how far work can be extended at a given moment and how profitable it can be.”  
However, he continues, the relationship between capital and work is mutual and with regard 
to the variations which come about one could just as easily claim “that production is a 
439 Ibid., 338. Albrecht points out that this position would later be changed by Dühring. Cf. ED, 103.  
440 Friedrich Bülow, Volkswirtschaftslehre. Eine Einführung in das wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche 
Denken (Berlin and Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1957), 464. 
441 Dühring, “Nationalökonomie im Jahre 1866,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 2 (1867): 504. 
Here it reads, “Die Nationalökonmische Anschauung Lists und Carey’s vereinigt sich mit der sozialen Agitation 
Lassalle’s zum Absturz jener Lehre von der Erheblichkeit eines durch Sparen gebildeten Lohnfonds”. 
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limitation of creating capital” as the other way around. 442  Production, he reasons, increases 
under the pressure or traction of consumption, i.e. the consumption required or the demand 
according to the means of needs. The origin of capital and its accumulation, he believes, lie in 
production, which will adjust to consumer needs and advance the tools production repeatedly 
to ease the processing before the manufacturing of goods begin. Dühring thus concludes that 
the correlation between consumption and production is more decisive than the amount of 
capital per se. He deduces that the need to raise wages is the most powerful motive to increase 
demand, and with it production.443 This call for higher wages becomes a cornerstone of his 
social political efforts, allying him with the trend, later established in America theoretically by 
Francis Amasa Walker, and practically in the 20th century by Henry Ford, which rebelled 
against the fixed idea of “static” or “natural” wages.444  
3. Capital and Labor 
Dühring’s articles in Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart indicate that he was up 
to date on the current discussion on political economy and the incipient socialist movement in 
the second half of the 1860s. He points out that the socialists had gained substantial impetus 
from the cotton crisis of 1861-1865, brought on by the America Civil War.445 As a socialist 
movement began to germinate in Germany, more attention was cast towards political 
economy, with particular focus being given to the catchwords “capital” and “labor”. Socialism 
is, in Dühring’s opinion, an undeniable fact of his day; as he puts it, a “force of nature” that 
must be reckoned with. Many intellectuals at the time were of the opinion that the socialist 
movement could be fought and neutralized by proving that it was unscientifically utopian, 
unrealistic, and against human nature. In a missive with strong populist undertones, Dühring 
strongly disagrees:  
You are wrong if you assume that there is a single other alternative. You do not recognize the 
instincts of socialism if you believe its power can be refuted through honest logic by pointing 
out it its delusions and phantasms. You rightfully reproach it for not recognizing the 
442 KKB, 341. 
443 Ibid., 342.  
444 In a chapter of his book on capitalism entitled “Prometheus Unbound – or the Enterpriser’s Function 
Explained”, John Chamberlain shows how American political economy, starting with Henry Carey and leading 
to Henry Ford, rebelled against the idea of “iron laws”. Cf. The Roots of Capitalism, revised edition (D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc.: Princeton, New Jersey, et al., 1965),109-129. This American “Promethean” approach 
to economic matters, of which Chamberlain speaks, was embraced and advanced by Dühring. 
445 Dühring, “Kapital und Arbeit,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1866): 304. As we have 
mentioned above, Dühring was vehemently opposed to the Confederate States of America, which he disliked for 
its free trade ideology as well as for its, as he saw it, enshrinement of “oligarchy”. He takes the liberal - and we 
believe false - view that the American Civil War was an ethical conflict for which the South was justly punished: 
“Es war nichts als ein Akt der socialen Gerechtigkeit, durch welchen der Süden der Vereinigten Staaten 
niedergetreten wurde”. KGV, 327.  
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acquisitive impulse of man, one of the main points of human nature, but is there only the 
choice between ignoring the individual roots of human labor, on the one hand, and the 
recognition of a restricted principle, on the other? […] I for my part would rather dream with 
the socialists, than join a selfish cult of ‘common sense’.446  
He was convinced that the parties of the day were incapable of finding adequate solutions, 
and he chose to be independent of party politics, not because he was a philosopher dealing 
with the abstract realm of ideas – Dühring took pride at suggesting direct practical measures – 
but rather because, pessimistically, he saw parties as being led by corrupt forces pursuing 
selfish and shortsighted policies. His hopes for transforming society lay with the masses, who 
he counted on influencing through his brand of realistic socialism. How the masses should 
exert their power remains unclear. In the early phase of his career, Dühring was of the opinion 
that the will of the individual must be “brought in balance” with the general interests.447 Once 
a strong enough consciousness of the plight of the workers is developed, he reasoned, they 
will form a unit with the ability to help themselves. 
The cornerstone of Dühring’s plans for reform, as we just saw, became the initiative to raise 
wages in order to stimulate consumption. The “iron laws” of classical political economy 
postulated that this could not be done.448 Most theoreticians of the day assumed that the only 
way of increasing employment for workers in light of the limited capital at hand was by 
keeping wages low in order to assure that there would be sufficient means of capital 
accumulation left. If wages are raised, according to this line of thinking, the extra expenditure 
would be consumed from the capital and would not be available to update the equipment of 
production. In reality, as Dühring sees it, the procurement of assets and tools, i.e. real capital, 
is not a consequence of “abstention from pleasure”, but rather the result of work which is 
directed towards creating objects that make direct consumption easier. Important is having a 
large enough proportion of the labor force working towards modernization and the increasing 
of production equipment; if there is a proper division of the labor force within the production 
process, then there is no reason to keep wages low. The only real limit on the expansion of an 
enterprise is demand.449 Dühring labels an alleged limit on capital as being a disturbance of 
446 CA, 17.  
447 Ibid., 18. Dühring thought that the classical school of economics, which he negatively termed “party school”, 
made the grave error of only seeing “a heap of individuals” instead of realizing that groups were organic units of 
a structured whole. Cf. Ibid., 52. 
448 Chamberlain, op. cit., Chapter 5 “Gloomy Men and Iron Laws – or Capitalism in a Cage”. 
449 “Kapital und Arbeit,” 307. Henry Ford would prove in the 20th century that if wages are increased, so will 
demand and increased demand serves as a trigger for more production. Cf. Chamberlain, 111.  
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“circulation of political economic activity”.450 Wages can only be taken from a surplus of 
business, i.e. from the result of production. It is, however, in this surplus that Dühring sees the 
“true right of labor”, which means “a claim to such influence of the absolute economic 
domination where purposeful political economic activity is a harmonic result”.451 He aims to 
vent the powerful energy inherent in the labor force towards maximizing productivity. Free 
competition alone is not enough to facilitate an equal balance of supply and demand; this 
dogma of the classical school of political economy, according to Dühring, must be corrected 
by, as it were, bridling the “productive societal forces” through the creation of associations of 
workers and entrepreneurs which serve at once to represent the masses as well as to monitor 
collective production. There is an inherent disharmony between workers and entrepreneurs, as 
they represent conflicting interests, but by strengthening the position of the workers (through 
their own initiative), the merchant class and industrialists will realize it needs to accept the 
interest of labor, and a harmony between the two groups can be attained. 
In the preliminary work towards creating his system, the organic whole of the economic 
process in which an equilibrium between capital and labor is attained moves into the 
foreground. The components of an economy should not be observed as isolated entities, but as 
parts of the collective economy working together in the circulation of business. As we saw in 
the last section, production, distribution, and consumption are interconnected. Especially 
distribution prepares the way for production and is determined by the nature of specific social 
pressures; it represents a sphere of processes that expand into the foundations of production. 
As Albrecht puts it, “social realities intrude into production, complementing other factors that 
have nothing to do with society; whereas the other way around, the naked results of 
production can never dominate the proportions of distribution”.452 Production is also 
determined by demand, which represents a sum of unlimited needs and available means of 
purchasing. Although needs are capable of changing, at any given moment, Dühring reasons, 
they always remain a specific size. The specific need can always be considered a power of 
consumption (presupposing that a buying power is available) able to influence production. 
However, the higher productive forces are restricted due to the necessity of prior 
consumption. Only where the forces of consumption directly determine the measure of 
productive functions can we, according to Dühring, speak of a “natural correspondence”. An 
450 Ibid., 89. Although not mentioned here by Dühring, Albrecht believes that the idea for increasing wages 
needs to be complemented by Carey’s concept of economic decentralization, where the suppliers and consumers 
are physically located closer together. Albrecht, ED, 106. 
451 “Kapital und Arbeit,“ 306-307. 
452 Cf. Albrecht, ED, 107-108. 
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abstract need serving to bridge consumption and production “in and of itself” is not 
consumptive power; it is only the potential to create equivalents for products to be consumed. 
The power of consumption normally represents the ability to develop a certain productive 
activity. Dühring surmises that the consumption of the working class determines the nature of 
production, and thus the working wage is the regulator of production through its influence on 
consumption and its cooperation in the production process. By raising wages, he believes that 
a balance between consumption and production can be created. Thus the working class, in his 
opinion, possesses great power, not in a potential to seize the means of production (as 
Marxism advocated), but rather in the sense of being able to organize themselves and 
strengthen their position such that they are able to play a decisive role in production.453 
Analogous to the teachings of Carey on the progression of the cultivation of soil (from worse 
to better, due to technological advance), Dühring advances the opinion that the barriers of 
nature will in time be more easily overcome, and thus an increase in production is to be 
expected. The energy set free through this development will allow the goal of achieving 
solidarity among the workers to be realized. The salient point of his book Capital and Labor 
is that the predicament of the workers was not merely financial, but rather involved the issue 
of dealing with the essence of the capitalist class and its organizations; the improvement of 
the conditions of the workers is a collective process which will be aided by technological 
advance. In Dühring’s opinion, to see the exploitation of the workers as stemming from 
“capital” is a grossly insufficient explanation.454   
4. Group Interests and Economic Power 
From these elementary theoretical excursions on the concepts of capital and labor, Dühring 
moves into the realm of action and creating a program of social reform. While theory is 
crucially important, in his opinion, it remains incomplete without the necessary corollary of 
action and a plan for improving social conditions. Theory, in his opinion, as we touched on 
above, tends to develop out of practice; it then establishes itself and refines its tenets before 
moving forward to create reform. Already in the early stages leading up to his system, the 
individual who is seen as the “sovereign bearer of all sociality and its political forms” is a 
453 Dühring, “Die neusten Lehren über den Arbeitslohn,” Der Arbeiterfreund. Zeitschrift des Centralvereins im 
Preußen für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen 2 (1864): 281 et seq. 
454 SLF, 2nd edition, 407. Here he writes, “Schon 1866 habe ich in meiner Schrift ‚Capital und Arbeit‘ geltend 
gemacht, dass die persönlich organisierte Geschäftsverbindungen weit mehr zu bedeuten haben, als die 
sachlichen Beträge an Capital. Es ist daher eine der gröbsten und unzureichendsten Erklärungen, in den nackten 
Capitalbeträgen die Ursache der Ausbeutung, d.h. der ungerecht ausnützenden Bewirtschaftung der schwachen 
Elemente zu sehen”. 
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critical theoretical entity.455 Individualism, as Dühring understands it in this case, is a 
principle which applies not only to the “specific” person, but also to social groupings within a 
society, the strongest of which is the nation itself. Analogous to the teachings of List, Dühring 
sees an inner connection between nations and economic development. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, List proposed an involvement of government in the development of the nation through 
protective tariffs, which enable a young nation to grow. Dühring advocates what could be 
termed “neo-mercantilist” policies which involve applying protective tariffs both for specific 
economic situations, as well as to provide fundamental developmental aid for the nation: 
tariffs enable the nation to stand as an individual entity among other international individual 
entities.456 Albrecht correctly emphasizes Dühring’s debt to List, who overcame the view that 
the world economy consists of a collection of individual relationships or of a huge “pile of 
individual characters”. List conceived a structured whole whose members are the nations.457 It 
is not the individuals dealing with one another per se who give impulse to the world economy, 
but rather nations or national economies which meet in latent or active competition. 
Dühring’s neo-mercantilism goes beyond List in establishing that the principle of protection 
has absolute validity. Protective tariffs are not only to be implemented for a specific time but 
also as a means of government in general.458 Just as nations represent united entities that exist 
side by side in a more or less antagonistic relationship, analogous groups within the nation 
itself represent organic societal units at odds with one another. Dühring applies List’s 
principle of protective tariffs, which were conceived for the preservation of developing 
nations, to concrete societal groupings to foster their development and freedom from 
coercion. As Albrecht has shown, Adam Smith’s political economy did not consider the dark 
side of human nature. Not only do nations face off antagonistically, groups are also 
antagonistic towards one another.459 Thus the German working class, in Dühring’s opinion, 
must form a line of defense against the capitalists to gain the strength it needs to pursue its 
interest. Through independence, which the working class will gain, a balance of interests can 
be created to form a unity and thereby strengthen the nation.  
Dühring does not, however, contradict Adam Smith’s axiom that it is the self-interest or 
acquisitive impulse of individual men that provides the impetus for economic life. The 
455 CNS, 2nd edition, 4. 
456 Historically conscious, Dühring pays tribute to France’s foreign minister Colbert in an extensive study from 
1864: “Colbert’s Handelspolitik in ihren Beziehungen zur Gegenwart,” Grenzboten 4 (1864): 404-418. 
457 Albrecht, ED, 111. 
458 Albrecht, “Die Ausgestaltung des listischen Nationalitätsprinzip durch Eugen Dühring,“ 8-9. As will be 
shown below, he would change this view in the final phase of his career. 
459 Ibid., 6-7. 
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principle of free and unlimited competition is the best form for any economy. The reality of 
how society is structured does not, however, allow individual force to be effective by itself. If 
people were to act only according to their own interests, there would only be, as Dühring 
terms it, “a pile of individuals” with no organic connection to one another; the result of which 
would be economically unjust and “the discrimination of one person by the other”. Believing 
that the “acquisitive impulse” of the individual can quickly become destructive selfishness of 
a single individual, Dühring advocates placing “organic bonds” in place of Smith’s individual. 
He sees moving beyond the private interests of acquisition to the interests of groups as part of 
a process of disciplining primal will; private interest must be brought in line with collective 
interest. He writes, “History, which itself works in the spirit of submission, discipline, and the 
force of nature inherent in the phenomenon of the social world will make sure that private will 
is purposely limited by the public will to be then combined in to a higher type of freedom”.460  
Intervention by the government in the affairs of private citizens, however, cannot create this 
higher organic unity. Analogous to List’s teachings on the cooperation of nations, Dühring 
suggests, as we have seen above, the idea of creating social coalitions among workers, which 
represent a form of societal alliance as opposed to an agreement through or with the 
government. Self-reliance is the most basic form in which law is applied; the system 
guaranteeing legal rights is based on self-help.461 He sees the coalitions as a purely political 
measure: “The coalitions are not economic, but rather a pure means of power. They belong 
therefore to a class of help that can be called political in a general sense. They are the only 
institution which owes its existence and effectiveness to the needs, the instincts, and the 
common sense of the masses”.462  The formation of these groups, which are to include high 
and low wageworkers, is based on his belief that a unification of the economically weak and 
underprivileged workers will facilitate a slow but sure freedom from economic suppression. 
He is convinced that the power of personal groups can influence production, but must fight 
strong resistance. Effusively, he writes: 
The focal point has to be with the production organizations. But where is there any trace of 
political action there? We are still only consuming our wages the best we can, namely, through 
the consumer organizations, and the only progress that begins to touch production are the 
unfortunately still relatively backwards raw material and warehouse organizations- otherwise 
only the establishment of institutions such as the people’s credit deserves recognition. But 
460 CA, 17. He also emphasizes that true self-interest does not involve “making profit”; sometimes it is better to 
do without in order to strengthen the productive forces of society. Cf. CU, 54. 
461 Cf. WL, 78. 
462 “Kapital und Arbeit,” 307. 
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have these types of credit unions become institutions for the common worker? The later is 
encouraged to become a capitalist in order to be able to be coerced. To date, only the small 
independent craftsman, and not the mere wage worker, is on his way to becoming successfully 
emancipated.463 
His demands for the involvement of labor in production seem to go against his later, clearly-
defined demarcation of this area as “pure economy”. The main point is, however, that workers 
should be motivated to take matters into their own hands and not be forced to seek help from 
the others. Receiving welfare contradicts the self-reliance of an individual as well as of a 
group. Dühring advocates the formation of independent groupings of producers who are in the 
position to make decisions independently from capitalist owners.  
The coalitions are not merely economic institutions, as had been suggested in the form of 
cooperatives by Schulze-Delitzsch and by others in the form of unions, but rather loose, 
temporary organizations based on the principles of justice and freedom, which should 
advocate the interests of labor and build a sound social economy. Private property ownership 
and capital holdings are to be respected and, in contrast to “dreamy socialism”, the 
“fundamental powers are to remain”.464 Dühring’s proposals are close to those of Ferdinand 
Lassalle, who suggested reforming the economy not by increasing wages but by creating 
“productive associations”. Whereas Lassalle wound up drifting towards the support of large-
scale unions, as Kruse writes, Dühring’s proposals are in a sense more progressive for the 
time: social coalitions are favored to create an economic balance of what had been up to that 
point unequal parties of the working market; each individual group is to remain independent, 
thus more effectively protecting individual rights. 465 With his advocacy of coalitions, Dühring 
accepts the status of having the capitalist owners on the one hand and the wage workers on the 
other; “specification” is essential and unavoidable, as is the differentiation of wages according 
to one’s ability and level of education. Through all societal differences, in the early 
groundwork to his system, Dühring foresees the creation of a just balance and the harmony of 
interests as had been foreseen by Carey.466 
5. The Prussian Social Exposé 
The social exposé Dühring had written as a commission for the Prussian ministry (see Chapter 
Two) presents the practical measures for helping the working class, which he develops in his 
463 CU, 90. 
464 CU, 133. 
465 Alfred Kruse, “Eugen Dührings wissenschaftliche Isolierung,” 217. 
466 Cf. CU, 96. 
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other writings. As mentioned above, Dühring’s expertise was sought in this matter due to the 
positive recognition given to his early theoretical writings.467 The essay’s point of departure, 
once again, involves his understanding of science as it relates to the good of the whole of 
society: ad hoc measures are to be taken to facilitate fields of action for social improvement. 
Social science should help the workforce through education, which will allow workers to help 
themselves without having to gain favors from the other classes. Contrary to Marx and 
Engels, Dühring’s suggestions are practical and not revolutionary. Carl-Erich Vollgraf has 
illustrated how the wage issue fund becomes a key position in his concept for reform.468 
Dühring demands that the struggle for higher wages is the duty of the collective working 
force. He again expresses his critique of David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus, the 
“neo-British direction” of bourgeois economics, reproaching them for considering the 
capitalist means of production given by nature as being unchangeable, and thus legitimizing 
the plight of the proletariat.469   
In the first part of his paper, Dühring analyses the question of the effectiveness of the 
economic organizations of the workers, as they had been designed by Hermann Schulze-
Delitzsch. He concludes that their success had been minimal, and he rejects “consumer 
organizations” as being an effort directed only towards helping workers use their wages, but 
not towards actually raising wages; from a profit point of view, consumer organizations 
benefited the interests of the employers more than the workers.470 From his perspective, they 
are not a factor in the relationship between “capital” and “labor” because they offer little more 
than benefits for the individual when purchasing something. They take the side of the 
industrialists and if they were able to be put in place, they would support the development of 
the modern industry, but would also keep the money value of labor down. He sees the idea of 
“productive associations” as admitting that the concentration of production is objectively 
necessary and that the future ruling forms of industry should be on a large business scale, 
carried out through collective means. Being orientated towards small business and small 
amounts of capital, they mistakenly look for a way out of the precarious situation of the 
467 Cf. Lothar Bucher to Dühring, 22 October 1865, in Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. Vollgraf points out that 
Bismarck’s motives in commissioning Dühring may have been an attempt to neutralize a political enemy by 
drawing him in closer to the state. “Ein ‘Handgemenge’ im Vorfeld des ‘Anti-Dühring’,” 110. 
468 The Scottish economist John Ramsay MacCulloch (1789-1864) had advocated maintaining economic 
harmony through the legalization of union activity to attain higher wages; this was seen as a necessary step 
towards closing the gap between “market prices” of work and fair working wages. Ibid., 111. 
469 Ibid. The first edition of the writing, which appeared anonymously, was reviewed in a long article appearing 
in Julius Faucher’s pro-free trade journal Vierteljahrschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte 28 (Berlin, 
1867): 203-227.   
470 Hermann Wagener (i.e. Dühring), Denkschrift über die wirtschaftlichen Associationen und socialen 
Coalitionen, 2nd edition (Leipzig: Th.Thust jun., 1868), 6 et seq. 
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economic conditions in a direction which contradicts the living conditions of modern industry. 
As mentioned above, he does not believe that productive associations will be able to compete 
with the entrepreneurs. 
In the second half of the paper, he suggests creating unbridled support for workers coalitions, 
which had been banned in Prussia since 1845.471 These organizations have the collective 
interests of the class as their point of departure in the fight for higher wages. Up to now, he 
reasons, they have been utilized in strikes. The future goal of the coalitions should be to curb 
the arbitrary action of the capitalists and to allow a “natural formation of labor law”.472 
Dühring foresees a role for the government here as dealing with the Soziale Frage. The 
government should not limit itself to the legalization of unions and strikes, as the capitalists 
have a greater advantage through limiting production or moving it abroad or through the 
hiring of low wageworkers, etc. It should furthermore be considered that a battle between 
workers and owners cannot be a part of a normal sustained condition. The government should 
take a role in the collective relations between the wage worker and the enterprise and attempt 
to curb unreasonable demands from each side in order to facilitate the development of the 
national economy and economic stability. The government needs partners from both fractions 
with whom it can negotiate. On the part of the worker this needs to be “organized 
cooperatives” (Genossenschaften) whose main task would be the representation of a type of 
labor law. Fixed working hours and wages, the control of factory procedures and existing 
health insurance, unemployment insurance and retirement insurance belong to this realm. In 
general, Dühring suggests that the state should only intervene as an arbitrator in the 
negotiations between capital and work when no agreement can be reached.473  
 
6. Critical Summary  
The seminal political economic thought just covered took form in the second half of the 1860s 
before Dühring had finished conceptualizing his Philosophy of the Actual. His early works 
were preceded by his study of law, which influenced his thought on economics considerably. 
His point of departure is the “Social Question” facing Europe in the age of industrialization. 
471 Michael Kittner, Arbeitskampf: Geschichte, Recht, Gegenwart (München: Beck, 2005), 155-156. 
472 Ibid., 35. 
473 Twenty-five years after the social exposé’s first publication, the writing came under critical scrutiny again. 
Cf. Johannes Berg, “Die Parteien im Deutschen Reichstage,” Unsere Zeit 1 (1882): 853-865. Berg sees 
Dühring’s ideas in the exposé as representing an authoritarian and conservative state socialism. In a footnote 
(p.859) he draws a comparison between Dühring’s exposé and Prince Clemens Wenzel von Metternich’s exposé 
“Über die staatliche Organisation des deutschen Buchhandels” from 1820, which he claims may have been 
written for Metternich by the romantic social philosopher Adam Müller (1779-1829). See also Kittner, op. cit. 
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Lacking revolutionary undertones as well as the furious indignation which would later 
accompany his theories, his thought remains focused on the theoretical and practical factual 
concerns of political economy.  He is interested in the historical contexts of economic activity, 
and, although he speaks positively of “socialism”, is clearly committed to the established 
social order. Dühring looks down upon the hyper-rational and unproductive utopian socialism 
of the generation preceding him, while at the same time having great faith in the instinct of 
the working class. Believing that the alternatives of free trade, on the one hand, and state 
control, on the other, are inherently flawed, he begins his analysis to find an approach which 
can help the workers to help themselves. 
Dühring’s early understanding of the concept of capital already involves the - for his 
philosophy characteristic - fundamental separation of nature and freedom. Nature and the 
technology needed to work, on the one hand, are contrasted with the social world of legal 
power and control, on the other. In the early groundwork to his system, the social or legal 
aspect is not critically scrutinized as it would be later, but a clear demarcation is made. He 
points out that modern capitalism is socially determined and has developed without providing 
equal opportunity for the poorer elements of society. The social injustice of the 19th century is 
based, in his opinion, largely on conditions which are necessary. Power itself – at this stage - 
is not the issue for Dühring because it can be used either positively or negatively. Likewise, 
capital should not be seen one-sidedly in terms of exploitation and exclusion. In the 
groundwork to his system social justice is recognized as a moral issue, but the ethical 
elements involved in social theory are not yet elaborated on precisely. Certain elements which 
would become core concepts of his theory of sociopolitical economics can already be seen, 
however. He places emphasis, for example, on the general benefits of raising wages. 
Following the optimistic ideas of Carey, Dühring states that technology will lessen the 
barriers of nature and allow production to be increased to meet the needs of an expanding 
society. Analogous to List’s ideas of the importance of the nation, he highlights the benefits of 
forming societal groupings to improve their position in society – a position which he 
admirably defends in his social exposé for the Prussian government. In favoring List’s method 
to the more atomistic or individualistic approach of Adam Smith, Dühring points to the 
potential of selfishness and egotistical behavior of individual characters; it might be critically 
pointed out, however, that the potential for immoral or unlawful behavior also exists with 
groups, sometimes even more so (the organized mafia for example).   
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Despite the largely sober tone of his early writings, Dühring does exhibit some of the defiance 
towards vested authority which would characterize his career on the whole. As an evangelist 
for the ideas of Henry C. Carey, he pits himself directly against not only the powerful forces 
of “Manchester liberalism”, which were growing stronger in German society, but also against 
the German historical school of economics, which had shown an increasing presence at the 
universities since the 1850s. Although his social exposé was commissioned by the 
conservative Prussian government, the writing’s attack on the ideas of social reform put forth 
by Schulze-Delitzsch exhibits a certain rebelliousness, as it challenges beliefs that were 
gaining popularity at the time. With his support of the workers coalitions, as opposed to the 
economic cooperatives, he comes close to allying himself with the conservative forces of the 
Prussian upper class. He gives the government substantial power for regulating society, a 
position which he would abandon on a theoretical level in the years to come, as he developed 
his concept against centralized government based on violence (Gewaltstaat). At this stage, 
Dühring shows himself to be open to socialism, and he distinguishes himself for being the 
only academician to review Karl Marx’s Das Kapital.474 Finally, in critically summarizing the 
early groundwork to his system of social economics, a tribute should be given to his prolific 
publishing in the early years, which can be seen in the Hildburghausen Ergänzungsblätter zu 
Kenntnis der Gegenwart. Particularly notable are also two essays written on John Stuart Mill 
and William Whewell in the magazine Unser Zeit, which exemplify Dühring’s talent as an 
independent-minded critic, as well as his instinct for identifying topical theoretical issues.  
  
474 Dühring, „Marx, Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie,“ op. cit. Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der 
Gegenwart 3(1868): 182 et seq. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES 
1. The Essence of Political Economy   
Dühring sees political economy as a science which did not exist before the 18th century.475 
The young discipline, he writes, has made substantial progress and is moving from its 
originally political and practical point of departure towards becoming a theory of the material 
interests of nations and societal groups in the 19th century. A scientific political economy calls 
for a critical theory “of the material existence of nations and individuals in collective and 
economic life”.476 Despite the strong idealistic elements inherent in his philosophy, Dühring’s 
basic understanding of economics is realistic and functional. The object of the discipline is a 
societal budget, which includes anything requiring the expenditure of material means and 
spending. The preconditions of material existence are a particularly important object of the 
science. Economic management, i.e. the household expenditure needed to overcome obstacles 
and barriers to satisfy needs, is seen as an anthropological necessity, without which progress 
would be impossible. Anything incurring material costs employed to realize these needs is 
within the realm of the field; this includes not only strictly material needs such as groceries, 
housing, clothes, etc., but also necessary needs of thought, such as the services of teachers, 
doctors, lawyers, etc. The material conditions of existence make up a category and a domain 
in and of itself, which, for Dühring, is a relatively complete entity, not to be confused by 
abstraction and imagination. The “specific nature of the service, which gets created, is 
insignificant” as the only issue is the actual expenditure of material economic service, even 
when created by non-material performance. Economic management is a broad concept, 
entailing the collective public and private finances of a nation, but is an important foundation 
for the other societal functions which it serves.477  
Political economy is also a discipline which cannot ignore sociopolitical contexts and must 
present a framework within which factors of “power” are incorporated alongside “natural” 
ones. It is tied in with collective societal existence, thus representing a whole, which should 
not be seen as existing separately or alongside of real economic life. “Economic freedom”, 
however, takes precedence over “political freedom” because the former is a precondition of 
475 KG, 1. KGN, 2nd edition, 15-17. This opinion is also held by Salin, who, however, does give importance to 
the science’s pre-history. Cf. Politische Ökonomie. Mombert agrees, citing the origins of political economy in 
the 18th century. Geschichte der Nationalökonomie, 1. 
476 CNS, 2. In the second and following editions, he defines it as “the science of the material existence of 
individuals, groups and nations”. CNS, 2nd edition, 3. 
477 Cf. Ibid., 6-9. 
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the latter.478 Dühring takes issue with any theory that does not consider the factors that are 
decisive preconditions for the established order, and, as in his philosophical and historical 
works, fundamental causes or “Anfangsdenken” play an essential role. He writes: “The 
preconditions of material existence, as far as they are dependent on effective collective causes 
and not to be attributed exclusively to the specific good or bad behavior of individual private 
economics, are the object of national and social economy”.479  
Accepting a premise which contradicted the teaching of the laissez faire economics at the 
time, he insists that individual action taken by men in business is never to be completely 
separated from societal surroundings and is determined by general economic and societal 
conditions. For this reason Dühring implies that “national economy” (Nationalökonomie), the 
German term for the discipline, which had come into existence at the beginning of the 19th 
century, is more accurate than the more popular term “political economy” (politische 
Ökonomie) used by Marx and others. (It might be asked, however, why the term “political” 
should not be appropriate for national issues.) The real structure of a society is given a 
scientific status by Dühring, which, along the lines created by List, correlates to the certain 
societal stage of development.480 Just as there is differentiation in the phases of societal 
growth, there are also important differences to consider within the structure of society at any 
given time. He also recognizes inherent dissimilarities in the abilities of individuals, and 
accepts the status of subordination and superiority in working conditions; egalitarianism, in 
his eyes, amounts to an absurdity in economic science, as “people do not require equality, but 
rather proportionality”.481  He correctly asserts that the wrongness of egalitarianism is not that 
“certain aspects of subordination are removed, but rather that people believe that any political 
or social organism can exist without structure […]”. Thus a war against differences in society 
makes sense only when the existing inequality is replaced by another. The economy of a 
society can only be viewed scientifically when its given structure and its complex ranking 
order, are taken into consideration.482    
478 CSN, 3. Dühring is, however, ambivalent on this point, as on p.10 he writes that it would be “completely 
ignoring the basic point of departure for collective political economy” to ignore the forces of politically 
organized volition. This, as we will see below, is a point of contention he has with Marxism. 
479 CNS, 2. 
480 Albrecht, ED, 134. Cf. also Albrecht, “Die Ausgestaltung des listischen Nationalitätprinzips durch Eugen 
Dühring”, 8-9. Dühring’s reservations towards the abstract method of classical liberalism are brought in 
connection with List’s principle of the nation.  
481 KG, 309.  
482 Ibid., 310. This is one key point that separates Dühring from extreme political leftists, with whom he 
otherwise has much in common. 
                                                     
162 
 
Although every society represents an entity that is in a process of development, the material 
existence of any phase of development is the only basis for scientific analysis. For the phase 
being analyzed, trade is of less importance to Dühring than is production. Commerce is only 
one aspect within the larger framework of the supplying of materials. Price theories are also 
of a secondary nature, when they are not directly related to the political aspect of distribution. 
Production is, in his system, the cornerstone of political economy. His concern for the social 
conditions of production cause him, like Carey, to give substantial weight to technical 
advance, which he believes facilitates economic activity.  
The task of political economy ultimately involves attempting to explain the causes of 
economic phenomena, which can be perceived according to “laws”. The role of laws in the 
economic process continues to be a point of controversy in methodological discussions. As we 
define them, laws are not to be thought of in terms of manmade legislation, e.g. civil law or 
common law, based on human will, but rather as metaphors applied to the unchanging 
movement or regularities of nature. Laws amount to causal formulas that apply the principle 
of sufficient reason to societal phenomena.483 According to Dühring, the laws of economics 
differ from those of nature, but “to claim that there are no laws in political economy, or as one 
says, no laws of nature, means nothing less than to virtually negate the possibility of a 
scientific penetration of the material”.484 As in his critique of historicism, analyzed in Chapter 
Five, Dühring emphasizes that a science which merely depicts the given actualities, while 
having elementary value, remains incomplete: “A living science does not merely group facts 
of the present and past, but also penetrates into the causal context determined by law, such 
that it may ascertain something of the necessity of the future and be able to judge possibilities 
of interest”.485 This understanding of “laws” is the basis of the methodology of Dühring’s 
system to which we will now elaborate on. 
2. Methodological and Conceptual Clarification 
Dühring’s approach to economics can be seen as an attempt to synthesize the methods of 
classical economic theory and that of the Historical School. The physiocrats and Adam Smith 
worked largely with visions of society that neglected political aberrations. They tended to see 
economic activity as an idea and believed that it was determined by laws of nature. Dühring 
483 For Dühring, man is a part of nature. Whereas Schopenhauer carefully separated the intellect from nature 
Dühring sees the intellect as a part of nature, although the laws which govern it are different than those applying 
to “pure nature”. (Schopenhauer wrote, “Generally, nature signifies that which operates, urges, and creates 
without the intervention of the intellect”. The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, 269.) 
484 KG, 171.   
485 CNS, 3rd edition, 6. 
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accepts laws of nature as existing in society, but qualifies their abstract methodological value 
by also considering the factor of “human intervention” in economic development. Analogous 
to his philosophy of history, he sees the economy not only as the “progressive work of 
nature”, but also in terms of “human striving” which can be moral and heroic, but, more often 
than not, egotistical and oppressive. His belief that “man is a product of history” and that “the 
present must be understood from the past, and the other way around” allies him not only with 
German historical school, but with Marxist socialism as well.486  
From a theoretical perspective, political economy, like science in general, is concerned with 
the application of the principle of sufficient reason towards the phenomena of economic 
activity which it attempted to examine and explain.487 Its two main approaches for 
determining causality are the “abstract-isolation method”, whereby a phenomenon is freed 
from any given byproducts which might influence it (applied by the physiocrats and Adam 
Smith), and the “concrete-historical method”, which proceeds by examining the past and 
gathering necessary facts, figures, and details to explain economic development in its relevant 
context (applied by the German Historical School).488 Both methods disclose causality, but 
whereas the abstract-isolating approach – assuming it adheres to their general pre-conditions – 
has absolute validity, i.e. what is deduced from it stands as true, the concrete-historic 
approach has inductive value and is thus subject to error, or is only applicable for a certain 
phase of economic life.  
Dühring’s system of sociopolitical economy applies both of these general approaches. His 
allegiance to the scientific thought of the 17th and 18th centuries, as well as his fondness for 
fundamental causes leads him to give special preponderance to the abstract-isolating method, 
i.e. economics in its pure form; like the classical School, Dühring, for example, presupposes 
486 Cf. Dühring, “Geschichte der Philosophie,” Vorlesungsmitschrift 1870 (cf. Appendices I). Hanni Binder 
emphasizes Dühring’s kinship with the German historical school and with Marxism. SSED, 52-53. On Dühring’s 
understanding of laws of nature in political economy see also Albrecht, ED, 138-141. 
487 This epistemological point of departure was expressed most lucidly, from a purely philosophical perspective, 
by Arthur Schopenhauer in his doctoral dissertation from 1813, Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom 
zureichenden Grunde – Eine philosophische Abhandlung, 5th edition (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1891). This short 
monograph aims to provide procedural instructions on the principle which is the basis for all science.   
488 Cf. Binder, SSED, 16. The “battle of methods” (Methodenstreit), which broke out between Gustav Schmoller 
and Carl Menger in 1883 roughly followed the lines of these two different methods, although, as Schumpeter 
pointed out, there were great misunderstandings between the two parties. Schmoller is generally portrayed as the 
leader of a “young historical school” and Menger of the “school of marginal utility”. Hansen and Backhaus have 
argued that the conflict had many aspects that have often been overlooked, and that particularly Schmoller’s 
methodological position, which was anchored in empiricism, has been misunderstood. Cf. Jürgen Backhaus and 
Reginald Hansen, “Methodenstreit in der Nationalökonomie,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 
(2000): 307-336. Also Reginald Hansen, “Der Methodenstreit in den Sozialwissenschaften zwischen Gustav 
Schmoller und Karl Menger. Seine wissenschaftshistorische und wissenschaftstheoretische Bedeutung,“ in 
Beiträge zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie im 19. Jahrhundert 1, ed. A. Diemer (Meisenheim am Glan: 
Verlag Anton Hain, 1968), 137-173. 
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economic self-interest and competition. Abstract or pure factors can be determined by 
concentrating on the original context of economic development, free of any non-economical 
facts. The application of abstract-isolating laws to current social and political conditions is, 
according to Dühring, a special task of political economy and signifies the emancipation of 
free thought concerning the past and present.489 At the same time, the conditions as they 
actually exist must also be taken into consideration. Because of the fact that the main goal of 
a general theory of economics is the examination of “the given facts and the conditions 
directed to the foreseeable future”, one has to consider political or social laws which, in 
contrast to the pure laws of nature, are a result of human volition and desire. Laws which 
relate to human interaction involve free will, whose regularities, Dühring believes, can also be 
traced. Free will is not only the rational or conscious decisions a person makes, but also 
“instinct and impulse, lower and higher interests, passion and energy”; it is the “capability to 
act according to principles and thus to let the given elements of one’s own essence become 
factors to be implemented”.490 Nature and free will are both realms of the Actual and entail a 
degree of necessity; the difference between the two spheres is in the way that the “prevailing 
necessity is conveyed”.491 Conscious action and collective organized activities are the result 
of instinct and the powers of understanding within us.  Humans create a world of institutions 
and facts towards which we are not obligated in the same way as we are towards those parts 
of nature “whose manner of action cannot be changed through our influence”.492 To view 
arbitrary and often harmful human action as taking place according to laws of nature would be 
to give up the moral responsibility we have as human beings and to put the blame on nature 
for behavior which is, in reality, our own doing. This abstraction would “make rigidity a 
principle” and would involve a “completely false position towards science and (would) hinder 
knowledge of how history advances according to law”.493 Thus the way that economics are 
perceived is to a certain degree determined by Laws of Development 
489 CNS, 3rd edition, 7.  
490 CSN, 67.  
491 Concerning the world of human action, he writes, “allein die Vermittlungsart der in der Menschwelt 
herrschenden Notwendigkeit ist eine völlig andere”. CNS, 66. This distinction of Dühring’s anticipates the 
terminology of Tönnies, who distinguished between the “arbitrary” and “organic” will (Kürwillen and 
Wesenswillen). Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972). 
Dühring speaks of “arbitrary freedom” (Willkürfreiheit) as opposed to a more essential will rooted deeply in the 
subject’s intellect and character. 
492 Ibid. The work of Arnold Gehlen is of great significance with regard to institutions. See Der Mensch. Seine 
Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, as well as Urmensch und Spätkultur, op. cit. Dühring’s largely negative 
bearing towards institutions has more in common with the views of Theodor W. Adorno (The Authoritarian 
Personality) than the more ascetic ideas of Gehlen. Gehlen and Adorno debated publically on the significance of 
institutions in West Germany in the 1960s.   
493 Ibid. In the section below on the consequences of his system, it will be shown how this outlook of Dühring’s 
lends itself towards the critique and even eradication of institutions and other entities of society. 
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(Entwicklungsgesetze).494 These laws refer to “conscious organization and the effects of 
economic and social understanding”. They are changeable and capable of development as 
history progresses.495 Laws of Development are important, he believes, as they secure that 
certain societal entities are not seen as having an unchangeable status, as is often the case.496 
In light of the two different types of “laws” affecting the phenomena of economics, Dühring 
finds it necessary to create a division of labor, so to speak, for perceiving economic 
phenomena. The two main categories of his system become “production”, which follows laws 
of nature in the strict sense, and “distribution”, which corresponds to the factor of the political 
laws. These two categories are, in his opinion, the basis of all economic management and all 
economic phenomena should be considered in relationship to them. Production and 
distribution are the outermost measures of division for the portrayal of economic processes 
and phenomena. Dühring writes: 
The production of the means of existence through work applied to nature is apparently the first 
and simplest thought, best exemplified by a single imaginary person isolated in nature from 
his own kind, and by a great collective subject, called a nation, as long as the latter is not 
concerned with classes, groups and individuals. On the other hand, if you ask about quantities 
in which the means of existence are available to the different elements of society, there you 
have the practical and theoretical problem of distribution.497   
Whereas before his time different means of income such as salary, interest, rents were 
traditionally considered by political economy to involve laws of production, Dühring 
categorizes them under the concept of distribution, thus seeing them as involving political-
social conditions. The strictly individual consideration, be it one isolated person (like 
Robinson Crusoe on an island) or a single nation seen as a united whole, can be considered in 
a vacuum, but in the actual development of history other individuals and other nations come 
into play, influencing the course of the economic development. In theory, trade between 
different parties can take place on even terms; in reality, power and politics come into play. 
Ultimately, according to Dühring, the factor of coercion and repression are decisive.498 
494 Cf. Binder, SSED, 52-53 and also Albrecht, ED, 138-139. 
495 CNS, 66. Binder emphasizes that by conceiving Laws of Development, Dühring distances himself from the 
classical school of economics and, despite the recognition he gives to laissez faire principles, is “basically on 
socialist grounds”. SSED, 52.    
496 Preiser suggests that they would be better termed “main features of development” or at least “historical laws”. 
Cf. Erich Preiser, National-Ökonomie Heute. Eine Einführung in die Volkswirtschaftslehre (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
1963), 31-32. 
497 CNS, 14-16. 
498 As shown in our portrayal of his philosophy above, Dühring has strong preponderance for pessimism, which 
is clearly seen in this pillar of his economic theory. Although he recognizes the need for hierarchy and 
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Aside from recognizing political factors that influence the economy, Dühring places heavy 
emphasis on factual data and quantitative considerations. Regarding the former, the German 
historical school of political economy – and German historicism in general – made great 
strides in the 19th century. Despite his attacks on what he terms “pseudo- historicism”, he is 
quick to recognize the significance of the historical in political economy. He admits that the 
historical school filled in a gap by collecting important facts from the past, not only in 
political economy, but especially in the field of law. Facts are, however, not to be accepted 
passively, but should be viewed critically and utilized for gaining insight into regularities in 
the economic process; factual data should not remain isolated, but rather should be applied 
with specific, unified aspects in mind. Like Carey, he holds that quantitative considerations of 
the facts are of the utmost importance. He considers the size ratios of economic life to be the 
main critical principle of his economic teachings and, in this respect, Albrecht sees Dühring as 
a “precursor of the 20th century’s development towards quantitative analysis”.499 The 
quantitative method is especially important when trying to verify causal connections in the 
facts of economic life. Without a concise estimate of the size it is next to impossible for 
research to command the overflow of data. Dühring therefore gives importance to statistical 
figures, which are to be complemented by intellectual insight. Albrecht cites Dühring’s 
critique of Ricardo’s ground rent theory as an application of the quantitative method.500  
As mentioned, for Dühring, the goal of all economic management is the fulfillment of 
material human needs. Regardless of whether economic activity is considered from the 
perspective of production or distribution, political economy must deal with the concepts of 
prosperity and wealth. “Prosperity” is a general term defined as a level to which needs are 
naturally formed and can be purposefully satisfied without overburdening the workforce; as a 
general societal phenomenon it applies to the needs of owners as it does to those of workers. 
“Wealth”, on the other hand, is a term used for the purpose of political economy, and entails 
not only the technical power over nature, but also a social and political power of “people over 
people”; it can be measured on the basis of individual examples, in the same economic 
differentiation in society, he, in our opinion, mistakenly assumes that the differences in the past were due to 
unjust force. 
499 Albrecht, ED, 137. Auguste Comte was of the opinion that political economy, as a social science, should be 
approached with the inductive method and mathematics should be applied to the field. 
500 Ibid., 137-138. Although Dühring is a follower of Carey’s teaching on the progression of the cultivation of 
land from worse to the better soil, he admits that for Ricardo’s teachings and the principle of differentiation, it is 
not the order of the ground cultivation which is the decisive factor, but rather the circumstance of the revenue. 
Carey apparently overlooked this. If one checks the actual value of the real revenues, instead of being satisfied 
with establishing the fact that there is a difference in revenue, it becomes apparent that the differences are so 
insignificant that it is impossible to make this the cornerstone of a theory of distribution. 
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society, at the same time. Dühring holds that prosperity corresponds to production and wealth 
to distribution.501  
Another basic term of political economy – to be dealt with in detail below – is the concept of 
“value”. Like the Austrian theory of subjective or marginal utility, which was conceived 
around the same time, Dühring attempts to find a sound explanation for the causes of real 
value estimation. Seen basically, the concept of value involves finding a measure for mutual 
performances and services in economic intercourse. Dühring is particularly conscious of the 
difference between “price” and “value”, and is of the opinion that, in the explanation of 
economic phenomena, only the price is relevant. The term “value”, however, is an essential 
component of “price”, and one of its preconditions. Value is the more general concept of the 
two; price, which is the expression of value in money, is a social phenomenon determined by 
the principle of competition and the law of supply and demand. It is explained by the basic 
relationship between bartered goods or services and is only an aid towards calculating value. 
“Value”, on the other hand, is completely independent of barter and serves as an explanation 
for the basic relationship of traded goods or services.502 
For Dühring, the concept of “value” is to be seen in context with the phenomena of basic 
human needs. It has its place as a practical element of everyday life, but must also be 
considered from a purely scientific point of view. Both types of valuation, the practical and 
the theoretical, involve the same principles of estimation and, according to Dühring, a single 
measure of value. He defines value as “an estimation of a certain standing that objects and 
services have in societal intercourse”.503 Value should be considered the result of an 
estimation of human need, on the one hand, and hindrance to production, on the other. 
Following Carey, he postulates value as involving efforts exerted to obtain something, and 
that anything which one has free access to, such as the sunlight or the air, has no value. 
Dühring writes: “The large or small obstacles which the different natural conditions present 
for the efforts to produce something – and through which large or small expenditure of 
economic force is needed – determines the large or small estimation of results won., i.e., in 
other words, the high or low value”.504 It is not what something performs, but rather what we 
must perform in order to reach it that decides the existence and size of the value; for him, 
501 CNS, 23. 
502 Binder, SSED, 24. See also Albrecht, Eugen Dührings Wertlehre. Nebst einem Exkurs zur Marxschen 
Wertlehre (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1914), 43. 
503 “Der Wert ist die einem Schätzungsergebnis entsprechende Geltung, welche die wirtschaftlichen Dinge und 
Leistungen im Verkehr haben”. CNS, 21. 
504 CNS, 26. Dühring also emphasizes the importance of rarity for value. If something is rare, then the hindrance 
to obtaining it is also greater. Ibid., 28. 
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effort is the basis of what the cost entails.505 Dühring divides the hindrances into the pure 
“natural production value”, on the one hand, and social “political production value”, on the 
other.  Regarding the latter, Dühring brings subjective elements into play, which are 
irreconcilable with Carey’s teachings. Value does not only concern barriers to production, but 
also the second factor of distribution plays a decisive role. He argues that the costs applied to 
each individual good, as well as the costs of reproduction, are the result of a balance of costs 
according to the influence of the different elements existing at a given at the time. One 
element is the obstacle of nature; the other is obstacle of man.506 One man prevents another 
from access to the resource of nature through his position and demands a tribute so that the 
others are forced to use more individual strength than they would if they were facing the free 
nature directly. The factor of “position value” favoring one man over another, Dühring 
believes, creates a different concept of value than if only the “production value” were 
considered. The payment of the tribute which a person makes due to the position value lessens 
the value of the counter service. The actual price received for the given effort is less than it 
would have been if it were performed directly. Position value thus determines the basic 
relationship between goods and services themselves.507 In the final question of the concrete 
measurement of value, Dühring comes to the conclusion that precious metals in the form of 
metal money should be used.   
The scale of a society’s wealth depends on how productive a given economy is. Dühring 
views the concept “productivity”, to be dealt with in detail in the next section, in terms of the 
actual creation of something (production, pure economy) versus its profitability (distribution, 
political economy). Productivity signifies “the yield of the means of existence”, and 
production is anything that facilitates the creation of food, clothes, housing and similar 
conditions needed for living.508 Following Carey, who was the first political economist to 
carefully differentiate between intellectual work and physical work in his theory, Dühring 
cites services, such as teaching, engineering, law, medicine, etc., which support expenditure 
and future production, as a part of production. Whereas productivity concerns output, 
profitability for Dühring is a measure of how much the individual gains from the company 
(analogous to wealth as opposed to prosperity). He draws conclusions for his system: the 
productivity of an economy is measured as being dependent on whether the production is 
505 This seems to us to be a profound assessment. Value does not exist in a vacuum, but is inseparable from 
human behavior, i.e. human labor.  
506 CNS, 29. Also WCA, 116-117; and Lamberz, Carey und Dühring. Ein Vergleich ihrer nationalökonomischen 
Lehren, 63-64. 
507 CNS, 31-32. 
508 Ibid., 34-35. 
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determined by the needs of a small group through a large mass of others’ labor, or through the 
balanced need of the population at large. How productivity is controlled, according to the 
different types of consumption, takes precedence over the issue of the proportions of 
productivity between the main economic branches. The aspects of the most optimal means of 
production power, with regard to the collective economy, recede behind the general issue of 
the “direction of the society” and the leadership of the productivity under the existing 
conditions.509 “Profitability” must include “productivity” (just as “wealth” includes 
“prosperity”) because the goals of profit involve a certain level of productivity. 510 
3. Production and Distribution 
Although he is carefully to demarcate the boundaries between the two areas and makes them 
separate pillars in the architectonics of his system, Dühring emphasizes that production and 
distribution are causally connected in such a way that each process is a precondition of the 
other. Whereas Carey saw production as a condition of nature, Dühring holds that it is 
substantially influenced by distribution, writing “it would be an unscientific endeavor to 
assume laws of production and laws of distribution in the sense that the conditions influencing 
the one do not play a role in the other”.511 We will first analyze the role of production in his 
system, which tends to represent a stabile isolated factor in the economic process, before 
dealing with the phenomenon of distribution, which involves social factors stemming from 
political power. As in his approach to political economy in general, Dühring attempts to have 
a united perspective in dealing with these two core concepts in the processes of capitalism. 
Production for Dühring includes all activities that are necessary to prepare goods and services 
for consumption.512 It has an inherent technical priority because, seen anthropologically, 
humans are forced to behave in an indirect manner. Rather than fulfilling our needs instantly 
or directly, we are forced to apply abstract Reason and utilize different entities to obtain 
desired results. Man creates tools which are necessary to bridge the gap between thought and 
the fulfillment of particular needs.513 Dühring uses the example of Robinson Crusoe stranded 
on an island with an axe at his disposal, who is at an immense advantage over a man who has 
509 Ibid., 35. 
510 Dühring is particularly proud of the distinction he makes between the two terms and draws attention to this 
aspect of his theory in a chapter on his life achievements in his autobiography. SLF, 281. 
511 CNS, 69. 
512 KNS,18. He divides his analysis into three “general laws” which apply to the process: 1) equipping the 
workforce and division of labor 2) distance and transport 3) population and the depletion of natural resources. 
See the section “Allgemeinste Gesetze – Erste Gruppe. Bedingungen der Produktivitätssteigerung“ divided into 
three chapters: „1. Ausstattung der Menschkräfte und Arbeitstheilung. 2. Entfernung und Transport. 3. 
Bevölkerung und Erschöpfung der Hülfsquellen“, in CNS, 65-102. Cf. the analysis of Albrecht, ED, 174-188. 
513 Cf. Arnold Gehlen, Urmensch und Spätkultur. Philosophische Ergebnisse und Aussagen, 11-12. 
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only his hands. In industrial society, technological machinery evolves through the 
development of collective societal needs; technology relieves pressure and enables society to 
overcome the resistance of nature in order for our needs to be met. Machinery is created to 
surmount this resistance by expanding the means of human activity; thus technology becomes 
economic in its origin and goal. Dühring sees it as a mark of all economic progress: 
If one wishes to have an elementary formula for the law of machinery or armament, it could be 
formulated as follows: the productivity of economic means, natural resources, and manpower 
is increased by inventions and discoveries, and this occurs, namely, completely independent of 
distribution, which may experience or make decisive changes, but which does not determine 
the character of the main result.514  
But exactly how and why does technical progress come about? Dühring’s perspective has an 
affinity with the views later held by the French Nobel Prize winner Alexis Carrel (1873-
1944), whose book Man, the Unknown contained the thesis that humans reach their highest 
potential through antagonism.515 Dühring is of the opinion that industrial technology 
developed in Europe as opposed to Asia and tropical countries due to the more meager 
conditions of nature, which forced man from being a “suckling of nature” towards learning to 
control it and channel its energy. He writes: 
Man, instead of remaining a passive being at the mercy of nature, became an active, self-
reliant power which no longer looked at nature with servile reverence. He came to know his 
external environment as a mere tool and put the study of the laws of nature in place of hope 
and fear. He replaced the art of magic, the incantation of the cult with the great art of 
technology, of active intervention and of culture.516   
Economic progress is, according to Dühring, not dependent on capital, but rather on the 
abilities and the will of citizens to make the creation of capital technically possible. Like the 
Stoics and Cicero, Dühring speaks of man’s “second nature”; for him, this involves everything 
which man creates to free himself from the chains of nature and to achieve progress. Thus the 
advance of technology, in and of itself, i.e. in its pure isolated form, is seen in a positive light, 
although in Dühring’s opinion its advantages have not been shared with the lower classes. The 
fact that technology has even hurt the workers by taking jobs away from them is not, he 
believes, a factor of production itself, but rather a problem of distribution.517 
514 CNS, 71. Dühring reproaches Adam Smith for not taking technology into consideration. Ibid.,70.      
515 Carrel, Man, the Unknown (West Drayton, Mittelsex: Penguin Books, 1948). Also Gehlen, Der Mensch, 429-
431. 
516 CNS, 74-75. 
517 CNS, 78. 
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The next precondition of a sound economy is the institution of the division of labor, which 
Dühring understands to be the specialization of different professions. There are two different 
divisions of labor; one is the strict sense of dividing certain procedures in as many small parts 
as possible to improve efficiency (as emphasized by Adam Smith). The other is in the broad 
sense of dividing economic functions into different professions whose main branches are 
agriculture, industry and trade.518 Division of labor is a normal and indeed unavoidable 
prerequisite of economic development. Specialization in general is a necessary factor of all 
economic activity, and where a person chooses a profession, it should be according to his or 
her aptitude – a statement which stands in direct contrast to the perspective of Marxism, 
which condemned the division of labor as evil on the ground that it deprived freedom.519 
The concept of the division of labor, Dühring writes, should be carefully distinguished from 
the Law of Division of Labor. The latter dictates that the separation of professions and the 
dissection of the different professional activities increase the productivity of labor, and that 
the productiveness of human efforts advances according to the level of specialization. 
Whereas the concept of division of labor dates back thousands of years, the Law of Division 
of Labor is, in Dühring’s opinion, an exclusively modern phenomenon because it is dependent 
on a certain level of technological advancement.520 He is opposed to divisions of function, 
which are based on political factors involving coercion in one form or another, although 
admitting that such societal conditions have their place in organizing a pure division of 
labor.521 Coercion can also face an entire nation: the benefits of an international division of 
labor, advocated by the free trading school, are therefore downplayed in favor of 
interprovincial divisions (in agricultural and industrial provinces), which he sees as being 
more important. He writes that “the one-sided theory of an international division of labor, in 
which the all round training of intra-national abilities are ignored and are partially suppressed 
is far more a dogma of the monopoly of industry and trade of individual countries than a 
plausible principle based on pure science”.522 
The negative side-effects of the division of labor highlighted by Marxists and other socialists 
who see the worker becoming a slave of the machine through specialized work are, according 
518 Ibid. 
519 Cf. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 188. Tucker writes that Marx never abandoned the idea that 
occupational specialization was a form of slavery. Engels wrote in “Anti-Dühring”: “In the division of labour, 
man is also divided. All other physical and mental faculties are sacrificed to the development of one single 
activity. This stunting of man’s faculties grows in the same measure as the division of labour, which attains its 
highest development in manufacture”.  Quoted from ibid., 189. 
520 CNS, 80. 
521 Ibid., 81 and also 273-274. 
522 Ibid., 83. 
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to Dühring, in reality a result of societal coercion and not the division of labor itself. When 
suppression is removed from society, the institution of the division of labor is a natural 
institution which does not infringe on human dignity.523 
The second chapter of Dühring’s treatment of production involves distances and transport. 
Transportation is far more than a mere aid to trade: it is a producing power of decisive 
significance. Lack of sufficient transportation is a barrier to cooperation.524 The creation and 
improvement of means of transportation are positive factors for increasing economic activity. 
Dühring writes, “Space and transport are two of the main causes through which the 
cooperation of productive forces are either thwarted or supported”.525 Natural barriers to 
transportation can only be overcome through the power of production, created through the 
increase in the density of the population. This new force has its limits when the work and 
money involved in the transport outweigh the given capacity of consumption. Expressing his 
philosophy’s affinity for the finite, Dühring envisions a “closing phase” of economic 
development. This applies for each product as it does for productive development. Division of 
labor and the development of transportation are more favorable towards increasing production 
within smaller areas than within larger ones. He writes that there is “no substantial production 
without sufficient means of transporting masses of material to other locations, and no 
development to the highest level without the eradication of great distances between the main 
branches of supply and demand!”526 The original groupings of economic activity are based on 
the natural barriers to transportation, such as mountain ranges, great bodies of water, etc., 
which make themselves felt even in the later stages of economic development. Although the 
overcoming of barriers to transportation enables a further division of labor between 
previously isolated economic areas, Dühring emphasizes that its most productive application 
is within local boundaries. He writes:  
It would be a mistake to believe that the progress of culture will enable long-distance transport 
to be improved to the degree that a maximum productiveness can be achieved through the 
interaction of productive forces between remote points. On the contrary, this maximum 
productivity is to be found in the opposite direction. The greatest results are achieved not by 
523 Ibid., 88.  
524 Albrecht emphasizes that the logistical factor of the division of labor had been overlooked until the days of 
Dühring’s role model, Friedrich List, who saw the expansion of economic activity as a positive phenomenon for 
economic growth. ED, 179. 
525 CNS, 97. 
526 CNS, 3rd edition, 94. Dühring touches here on the theory of industrial location (industrielle Standortslehre), 
which had been developed by Thünen and was later expanded upon by Roscher and Alfred Weber. The latter, 
similar to Dühring, concentrated on creating cost advantages for businesses. Cf. Weber, Über den Standort der 
Industrien, Teil I., Reine Theorie des Standorts (Tübingen: Mohr, 1922). 
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overcoming great distances, but rather by localizing the division of labor itself, in other words, 
by forming a closer framework for the most diverse organization possible.527  
The nature of transport and its costs, according to Dühring, dictate that the highest 
productivity comes from localization, for which local traffic is the most economic. 
The natural art, on which the organization of political economy is based, finds its ultimate 
purpose not only through world trade, which is a one-sided expression of its power, but rather 
through local development of internally organized economic groups in which the circulation of 
transportation becomes more and more self-sufficient and offers its own richly shaped life.528    
Already in the mid 1870s, Dühring exhibits skepticism towards globalization in terms of the 
possibility of united cooperation among nations. In his opinion, an economy can be stimulated 
by expanding world trade to remote corners of the globe, but domestic factors will determine 
how productive it can be. Its output may become more diverse, but an international division of 
labor is never an end in itself to reach the highest productivity of a world economy.529 The 
opposition between the agrarian and commercial sectors remains, according to Dühring, a 
challenge for the organization of economic commerce. The best option for commercial gain is 
to be joined to the source of agriculture and raw materials (e.g. coal and ore). Although 
primary production, i.e. the direct transmission of raw materials into use for industry, is an 
asset for a country, Dühring emphasizes that a one-sided development of the primary sector 
can become a disadvantage when the commercial sector remains underdeveloped. If this is the 
case, then large amounts of raw materials will have to be transported to faraway places at 
relatively low prices. Economies based around primary production must therefore gravitate 
naturally towards creating their own industries with a division of labor in order to have a 
market within the proximity of the production. 
From this perspective, Dühring uses the terms “extension” and “intensity” of political 
economy according to whether the division of labor is scattered or not connected with one 
another or whether it is united and brought into cooperation as directly as possible. Extension 
involves the scattering of people and their production over wide, sparsely populated areas; 
communities remain small, isolated, and there is little chance of mutual economic stimulation 
taking place. Intensity entails a concentration of the population and strong differentiation of 
production, as well as technical and societal meshing of different forces. 
527 CNS, 92. 
528 CNS, 92-93. 
529 Albrecht, ED, 181. 
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The two types of economies exhibit extremely different types of developmental features. In 
the extensively developed economy, the trade of the different scattered elements is “sucked 
in” to a single centralized point. The centers are dominated by unproductive trade, whose 
existence is based on absorbing and suppressing opposing isolated circles. Dühring warns of 
an unhealthy economic centralization which, much like political centralization, thwarts 
dynamic forces of local autonomy. An intensive political economy, on the other hand, allows 
for a localization of power through which a concentration of all available and still to be 
created means of production can be connected; it allows for the creation of a decentralized 
nucleus and healthy commerce, which creates more productive power.530 
The idea of economic self-reliance, as we have seen, is a cornerstone of Dühring’s theoretical 
considerations of economic activity. A collective economy leads to its highest levels of 
production when the smaller economic entities converge, allowing themselves to become 
independent before connecting with other entities. The individual entities should diversify and 
develop a division of labor which will allow them to become independent. Points of 
production and markets have to be as close as possible to one another before the division of 
labor can increase productivity over wider areas. As essential as transport and minimizing 
distances travelled are for localizing and centralizing economic life, Dühring emphasizes that 
“pure politics” are an even more decisive factor. You will never be able to sustain political 
freedom in the long term, he holds, if economic independence is not the basis of the economy. 
By the same token, you will never be able to achieve economic localization if you cannot 
create the possibility for small circles to have an active interest in determining their own 
fate.531 The ideas of political freedom and economic freedom therefore belong together, as do 
the concepts of centralization and decentralization. “Concentration” and “localization” go 
hand in hand and represent healthy organization. Intensive division of labor, he believes, 
should be the goal of all political economy.532 
The third group of economic laws of production involves the strengthening of productive 
forces through population increase. Here, Dühring’s ideas are based on the work of Carey and 
List that were directed towards contradicting the thesis of Malthus that the population tends to 
increase faster than the means of production; for List and Carey, production is determined by 
530 CNS, 100. 
531 CNS, 101. 
532 “Unter Voraussetzung eines solchen Sprachgebrauchs würden Concentration und Localisation im Politischen 
wie im Wirtschaftlichen mit einander vereinbar und eigentlich nichts weiter als seine, doppelt verzweigte 
Thätigkeit sein, die aller natürlichen und gesunden Organisation zu Grunde liegt. In diesem Sinne würde die 
intensive, nicht die extensive Arbeitstheilung das letzte Ziel der Volkswirtschaft bleiben”. Ibid., 102.   
                                                     
175 
 
the needs of the population and a larger population expands the means of production. This 
position had previously been held by J. H. G. von Justi (1741-1791), who wrote, “As a 
country can never have enough inhabitants, it is above all imperative to support increasing the 
population wherever possible”.533  Dühring sees increasing the population as a chance to 
maximize organizing power and to unite people to take common action and strengthen 
society.534 The increase of man power, which applies strengthened effort to the forces of 
nature in order to manage the work, will result in the growth in production yield as relates to 
the expansion of the needs created by the increase in population. If the natural aids of 
production are depleted, then this principle may not hold.  
There are, however, certain factors which limit the growth of a population. If population 
growth is at all feasible depends on advances in the possibilities of application of technical 
means, which are largely determined by the extent of the commercial development of a 
country. Moreover, connecting the means of organized power with high-tech installation can 
only be effective if the process is able to outperform the traditionally changed economic 
structure. Every condition of the collective economic structure possesses a maximal capacity 
for the population. An extension of the capacity of the population is not possible without the 
economic structure being changed into a new form which has new possibilities for the 
exploitation of organized power being created by the population increase and high-tech 
installation.  
List and Carey had drawn attention to the fact that each type of economic framework, e.g. 
agrarian, industrial, etc., has a certain population capacity; Marx had also emphasized the 
limits of population growth.535 Dühring gives List credit for having given great consideration 
to the growth of agricultural and industrial societies, and for having determined that, even 
under the same sources of natural resources, an industrial state has a substantially higher 
capacity of population expansion.536 The direct resources available are not as important as the 
way that labor is organized, i.e. how man’s existence is secured through the administration of 
productive forces. Dühring was sure that man is more dependent on himself than he is on 
nature, and calls again for self-reliance in matters of economics. Complementing List, he 
writes that an economic area which is diverse and well-rounded has a higher capacity than one 
533 Quoted from Mombert, Geschichte der Nationalökonomie , 188. This is also in line with the traditional 
cameralist position, as for example advocated by Theodore Ludwig Lau (1670-1740), that populousness breeds 
prosperity. Cf. Entwurff einer wohl-eingerichteten Policey (Frankfurt am Main: F. Förster, 1717). 
534 CNS, 102. Broczyner calls this “the core of Dühring’s positive concept”. Die sozialistischen Systeme von 
Hertzka und Oppenheimer in ihrer Abhängigkeit von Eugen Dühring, 36. 
535 Marx, Das Kapital, 675 et seq. 
536 CSN, 108. 
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which has a relatively one-sided commercial character; an industrial state which exports its 
own or foreign agricultural products in processed form is better off than one which only 
covers its own needs. An economy based on agriculture has a relatively limited possibility to 
expand; virgin soil is cultivated very slowly. The expansion of the population is extremely 
limited, even when its natural resources are not used up. As mentioned on several occasions, 
Dühring believes that the Malthusian thesis that the population increases faster than the food 
supply has been refuted; the threat of a rapid expansion of the population has been 
overestimated. The only means for this occurring is where factory-produced goods can be 
exchanged with a more developed economy; this would, however, be a very costly 
procedure.537 An increase in population should come naturally through the creation of a 
domestic industry. The industry becomes beneficial for agriculture and allows natural 
resources to be utilized more productively than before. The agricultural sector can also trade 
its products for more useful industrial products as the great distance that had to be overcome 
is minimized and less of the profit has to be paid towards transportation. Additionally, the 
business that was given to a foreign economy is now kept in the domestic market. Dühring 
sees this as a natural development which progresses in a path of least resistance.538  
The social structure of an economy is also decisive for the size of the population. An economy 
with a system of wage earning, for example, is more productive than a system of slavery or 
indentured service; a larger country in which there is a balance in earnings between the 
propertied and working classes is more productive than one which has an uneven distribution 
of wealth. Dühring writes, “Higher wages place the focus of industry increasingly on its own 
market, which is formed through the broad sections of the population”.539 He foresees a future 
in which the capacity of the population is increased and in which the difference between 
capital and labor is minimized, while the highest level of production and consumption is 
attained under the leadership of an industry continuously balanced between producers.540 He 
does not, however, believe that the population can be increased forever; as in his philosophy, 
where every number is exact and finite and conforms to the “law of the determinate number”, 
the population also has its limit. This limit is, however, not connected to the conditions of 
production as it was for Malthus, but rather a question of space on the planet. The size of the 
population is not to be determined through mathematical equations.541 He is confident that 
537 Ibid., 111-112. 
538 Ibid., 112. 
539 Ibid., 116. 
540 Ibid., 117. Also see Albrecht, ED, 187. 
541 CNS, 199-120. 
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man will not be at the whim of nature, but rather can rationally manage the size of the 
population. With regard to the depletion of agricultural resources, which played a key role in 
Malthus’ teachings, Dühring, like List and Carey, is sure that technology will step in to create 
better farming land.542 
Jean Paul, the German romantic poet, once remarked that “only through man does man enter 
into the light of day” (Wunderbare Gesellschaft in der Neujahrsnacht). An economy can only 
begin to develop through human interaction. Whereas the Laws of Production deal with man’s 
relationship to nature, in Dühring’s system, the Laws of Distribution have a political character 
and concern the relationship of man to man and human groups in competition with each other. 
Capitalist theorists have generally tended to downplay distribution, but Dühring, like the 
Russian economist Michael Tugan-Baranowsky (1865-1919), gives the process a prominent 
place in the collective theory of political economy.543 Distribution has always been a major 
issue for socialists, building for them a point of departure from which a more just society can 
be pursued.544 In terms of the Philosophy of the Actual, as we have mentioned, production 
relates to nature and knowledge, distribution to freedom and desire. Pure laws of nature relate 
to production, and the political laws of human history apply to distribution. 545  
Dühring is in agreement with Adam Smith and the classical school of political economy that 
nothing occurs in economics without material interests.546 Interests involve the fulfillment of 
needs as well as the will to increase economic power. The pursuit of one’s interest results in 
another key factor of economic activity: competition. Competition is defined as the “basic 
condition of the simultaneous perception of the same interests by different individuals, who, 
independently from one another, pursue the same purpose”.547 It keeps individuals in check as 
men are forced to give up or redefine their financial ambitions, if they are to sustain 
sustenance at all. The competition for supplies or markets involves a type of struggle through 
which every consumer looks for his own advantage at the cost of the other consumers.  
542 To List and Carey’s credit, this did happen with the advent of fertilizer, which was developed through the 
chemical discoveries of Justus von Liebig (1803-1873). 
543 Cf. Michael Tugan-Baranokowski, Soziale Theorie der Verteilung (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1913). 
544 Pointed out by Ludwig von Mises in Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis.Translated by J. 
Kahane (Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009), 154 et seq.  
545 As with those of production, Dühring handles the laws of distribution into three chapters: 1) the principle of 
interest and law of supply and demand. 2) Ground rents, capital profit and working wages. 3) Mutual conditions 
of income. See section three of Cursus of National and Social Economy, “Allgemeine Gesetze. – Zweite Gruppe. 
Interesse, Concurrenz und Verteilung” divided into three chapters: 1. “Interessenprinzip und Gesetz von Angebot 
und Nachfrage” 2. “Bodenrente, Capitalgewinn und Arbeitslohn” 3. “Gegenseitige Verhältnisse der 
Einkünftsearten”. See also Albrecht, ED, 188-200. 
546 CSN, 124. 
547 Ibid., 137. 
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The principle of competition brings forth a Law of Supply and Demand. Demand is 
something different than a mere need; only needs which are accompanied by buying power 
and a will to buy something are of interest in political economy. Demand is increased in 
correlation to the level of a price; the relationship between a service and return service is 
altered by a change in size of supply and demand’s relationship.548 The theory of value 
explains the relationship between service and return service; the Law of Supply and Demand, 
for Dühring, compares a “past” and a “present”. His approach here can be labeled historical: 
he rejects the idea of an equilibrium, which Carey had postulated, in favor of simple 
observation of past successive conditions. The size of the service and return is fully dependent 
on the size of the relationship of supply and demand, a fact which can be derived empirically. 
Dühring speaks of “inner causes” which apparently stem from individual motivation and are 
connected with the factor of competition.549   
If there were only two competitors, representing two main interests, squaring off against each 
other, there would be an evenly proportional exchange in service. In reality, numerous buyers 
and sellers compete with one another.550 If the need for a product is lessened substantially, it 
is in the interest of the entrepreneur to speed up his production to outdo the others in order for 
more pressure to be put on the size of the service or counter service as it would have been 
without a competitor.551 Thus the consideration of changes in the relationship from supply and 
demand, as well as that of the individual competition among suppliers and consumers, is 
necessary for knowledge of shaping prices.552  
With regard to competition between suppliers and consumers, the urgency of demand and the 
offer, as well as the balance of economic power, needs to be considered.553 A shortage of 
stocks of important goods creates economic power for the supplier, a shortage of demand 
economic power for the consumer. The power on both sides of the equation is a precondition 
of any form of acquisition, of economic taxation, or of exploitation, which is, according to 
Dühring, to a certain degree natural and not the result of societal malformations. Individual 
competition works in the same direction, due to the existing conditions of ownership. The 
wealthier elements of society hold on to their control of supply in light of a shortage of stocks, 
thereby retaining their consumption of the most sought-after articles under the most miserable 
548 Ibid., 139. 
549 Ibid., 142. 
550 This is a core concept of Carey’s teachings, which Dühring draws attention to in one of his early publications 
in the Vossische Zeitung. “Carey als Arbeiterökonom,” 2-4. 
551 Ibid., 142. 
552 Albrecht, ED, 190. 
553 CNS, 143. 
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conditions. This increases the power of the seller to demand high prices that are out of 
proportion.554 
Although Dühring is otherwise disinclined to sanction the authority of government, when it 
comes to the most urgent needs of the public, he believes an “organizing power” is needed – a 
position which reveals his inherent rationalism, we will add. Competition, he emphasizes, 
does not operate under the same conditions, but rather according to the existing economic 
balance of power. Nature itself creates a limit for the possibility of free competition. He cites 
England’s position as an island as unfair conditions for competition and the reason for its 
long-standing monopoly of world trade. With individuals and societal groupings it is no 
different; fair competition remains the exception. According to Dühring, political economy 
has either neglected the unequal conditions of trading completely or refused to see the causal 
connections of economic, social, and political differences with regard to available 
opportunity.555  
Generally, the existence of free competition, or even the perception of free competition, works 
against every type of monopoly positioning. As a realist, Dühring sees, however, that there is 
a tendency towards monopolies, which are created by nature; all competition proceeds on 
regulated courses, and contains substantial inequality to some degree. Monopolies, artificially 
created by men, take form when competition is cornered in a centralized fashion and few 
enterprises control the market.556 As there are monopolies, or near monopolies, in almost all 
types and levels of economic commerce, competition is far from free and therefore the 
chances of harmonically balancing it and making it truly free are, at best, limited. 
He criticizes the idea that the relationship between supply and demand is intrinsically 
connected, as had been postulated by the classical school of economics. In reality, he holds, 
there are two different directions, one of progress and expansion, the other of regression and 
of limitation. Expansive movement is when there is more competition in production than there 
is among consumers; the other way around, when the demand outweighs production, 
554 Following the lead of Dühring and Oppenheimer, the question of power in economics was taken by the 
Japanese economist Yasuma Takata (1883-1971). Takata, a controversial scholar in his own right, was a 
pronounced anti-Marxist and lost his position at Kyoto University in 1946. Cf. Power Theory of Economics, 
trans. Douglas W. Anthony (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).  
555 CNS, 160. 
556 CNS, 162. Jane Robinson argued that ultimate free trade and monopolies were not alternatives, but rather 
extremes which hardly exist in reality. Towards the end of her life she became critical of classical economics, 
without referring to the early critique of the British school by Carey, List, and Dühring. Cf. Robinson, The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition (London: Macmillan, 1969). 
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competition is ruinous in every respect.557 A progressive condition of political economy is 
therefore one where, under the prevailing economic order, the demand for workers is ahead of 
the supply; supply ahead of the working force characterizes an economic regression. The 
existing balance between those seeking work and those looking for work does not need to be 
significantly disrupted, “but it is necessary that in the moving adjustment of this balance the 
increase is on the demand for labor”. The other way around is, for Dühring, a sign of 
“depletion and corruption”.558 The changes which come about according to the direction of 
the development for the level of wages are, according to Dühring, determined not by 
competition, but by the collective conditions of the economy, and secondarily through 
individual competition, which in a regressive economy influences the offer of labor more that 
the demand of it. To ignore the factor of production and place sole emphasis on the interplay 
of economic agents, as the theory of free competition presupposes, without considering the 
framework conditions is, in Dühring’s opinion, meager.  
Competition, in Dühring’s opinion, does not cause consumption to be adjusted to production. 
In reality, the limits applying to production and consumption are to be found in the general 
basic laws of increasing productivity as well as in social subordination. He writes: 
Competition cannot encourage production where the latter is forced to stop due to a lack of 
technological power or other preconditions. The factor of motivation first becomes possible 
the other way around in that expanding the dimensions of production is decisive. A demand 
for goods, which begins to surpass the supply, up to now, is the only condition in which one 
can continue to imagine a power of competition which would enhance production. However, 
this demand for the necessities of life and the corresponding power of competition cannot exist 
if those who come to the market as consumers cannot come up with the money. Where is the 
ability for extended purchasing, the ability to pay higher prices - the effective, i.e. solvent 
demand, as Adam Smith called it – supposed to come from if not from an extension of the 
usage of manpower?559     
Thus production determines competition, and not the other way around. It is not “free 
competition”, according to Dühring, which creates a harmonic balance of interests, but rather 
production which decides the possibility of such a balance according to its own laws. The law 
of competition is restricted to the explanation of the level of prices, and certain less important 
changes and vicissitudes.  
557 CNS, 146.  
558 Ibid., 147. 
559 CNS, 148. 
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A second group of distribution laws concerns the three main forms of earnings: ground rent, 
capital profit, and working wages. Dühring divides these earnings according to their social-
economic nature into rents and capital interest on one side, and wages on the other. The 
former are tributes given to the owner of land for the use of his property and his role as 
“master” over a certain amount of workers dependent on him. Wages, on the other hand, are 
the payment for the workers support. Rents and wages are inherently connected to the given 
social order of history up to the present. Dühring writes, “Rent of possession and payment of 
wages belong together. The one belongs to the other, and both progress alongside one another 
throughout history without ever equalization or convergence being possible”.560 Wages are 
not an appropriate retribution for a service rendered in the production process, but rather are a 
payment through which the support and continuation of work is secured.561 Dühring insists 
that the support and production costs change by necessity according to the different amounts, 
the time and place, and the type of service.562 He rejects Ricardo’s loan equalization to the 
level of the sustenance, reasoning that the time difference between a pay raise or cut and the 
increase or decrease in the birthrate make it too inexact for it to have scientific validity. 
Dühring defines labor, as it relates to wages, as any activity towards overcoming economic 
obstacles, from the lowest to the highest variety, in as far as they can be conceived differently 
from the functions of ground and capital ownership; this includes the activities of a manual 
laborer as well as those of the industrial civil servant. The differentiation in the payment for 
different activities, rejected by many socialist doctrines, results from the given costs though 
which higher qualification is originally created. Dühring tries to explain the general increase 
of the actual level of wages throughout history: with the progression of the economy, different 
qualifications of work develop, and thus the cost of training increases. In a progressing 
economy, the demand for labor increases at the same time so that, in the interplay between 
supply and demand, the balance tips towards the price of labor. The progression of an 
economy following its laws of production, as Dühring sees it, is the primary reason for the 
increase of wages; the law of competition is not a factor. The decisive point is that work only 
receives a payment for its dependence on property, while property claims the service surplus 
for itself. This is similar to the Marxist concept of surplus value.563           
560 CNS, 201. Dühring’s use of the term “rent of possession” (Besitzrente) is criticized by Engels, who believes 
that it is the equivalent of what Marx calls “surplus value” and Rodbertus simply calls “rent”. Engels, Herr 
Dühring’s Revolution in Science, 244.  
561 CNS, 191. 
562 As Albrecht points out, this definition is reminiscent of Ricardo. ED, 195. 
563 This is pointed out by Albrecht. Ibid., 196. Engels is of the same opinion. Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution  
in Science, 244. 
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“Ground rent” is the income that an owner receives for his property. Dühring views the 
category differently than the theoreticians of the classical school in that for him ground rent 
comes into existence historically through the use of force. According to Ricardo, rent was to 
be calculated corresponding to the differences in fertility of the different lands, i.e. the 
differing amounts that the land could yield; any costs incurred for the improvement of the 
land by the owner were to be added on to the rent. Ricardo wrote:  
If of two adjoining farms of the same extent and of the same natural fertility one had all the 
conveniences of farming buildings, were, besides, properly drained and manured, and 
advantageously divided by hedges, fences, and walls, while the other had none of these 
advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the use of one than for the use of 
the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would be called rent.564  
Thus there is one portion of rent paid for the use of land, i.e. “the original power of the land”, 
and another paid for the use of capital. Dühring gives a completely different explanation. 
Recreating an original state where the first men conquered other men and subjugated them 
under their control, he postulates that only a one-sided usage of force can create rent. He 
writes, “The subjugation of the workforce is in this sense also a reason for rent when there is 
no mention of a sale of products and the earnings delivers products and not money”. 565 What 
is for Ricardo a tribute for a level of expenditure and investment given is for Dühring power 
based on subjugation. The subjugation of labor for him is the origin of rent, even when there 
is no sale brought forth from the land. Ground rent is to be found “where farming takes place 
through some form of subjugation of work. The political and social character of the original 
formation of rent is hereby illustrated”.566 
Capital gain is the net income of an enterprise in which a certain amount of means of 
production exist.567 It is a company’s net income, minus the running costs of the means of 
production working in the company. Its main character is the acquisition of the revenue of a 
workforce and can be considered another form of property income. Dühring rejects any theory 
of production in which the capital gain is seen as a payment for the technical machinery of 
work: the fact that pure work becomes more productive, being boosted by technical 
machinery, in his opinion, does not give the “dead machines” a claim to absorb more than 
564 Quoted from Edwin Cannan, A History of the Theories of Production and Distribution in English Political 
Economy from 1776 to 1848 (London: Percival and Co., 1893), 194-195. 
565 CNS, 170. 
566 Ibid. 
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what is necessary for their reproduction.568 Natural capital, in the sense of technology and 
tools applied to enhance production is needed in every form of economics, but the concern for 
its reproduction and proliferation should not be confused with the creation of capital gain, 
which to Dühring is an inherently different process.569 Dühring is vehement that capital profit 
also not be considered a compensation for the dangers involved in the application of capital. If 
capital profit were to be seen as remuneration for risk taken, it would have to be considered 
primarily the result of the acquisition of a part of the work in the enterprise, i.e. a result of the 
dependency of labor on the owner of the means of production. It is in reality, he concludes, 
not a part of the scheme of pure production, but rather a matter of distribution, resulting from 
social conditions and the power structure of society.    
From the matrix of economic power which capital represents, there is a second form to be reckoned 
with: loan capital. Loan capital, in Dühring’s opinion, is based on the extension of the possibility to 
institute ground rent and capital gain, which, he believes, is a result of historical development and 
should be viewed as such; the main issue in this “system of income” is the factor of interest.570 As 
Binder points out Dühring has a narrower view of interest than most economists: it is seen merely as a 
return service for the lending of capital.571 Dühring rejects the ideas that interest is a reward for 
“wavering one’s right of usage” or for the “difference in value from current and future services”. It is 
also not “transferring one’s own power” to another individual. The real reason for borrowing rates 
ultimately stems from one-sided collection of wealth based on the right of property.572 This was made 
possible through an unjust acquisition of the labor of others (fremde Arbeitskraft), i.e. through political 
subjugation. All explanations and justifications of interest through production are, in his opinion, 
indefensible and invalid. Just as the control of land is only possible through the ruling of people, 
capital ownership has no other practical significance than the indirect violence (Gewalt) over 
people.573 Although he was to qualify this position in the third and fourth version of Cursus by 
holding that there was “just” and an “unjust” interest, the fight against interest – seen as unjust 
authority - is a step towards emancipation. 
4. Valuation and Money 
Dühring’s basic concept of value has been briefly dealt with above. Value, which always has 
to be distinguished from price, is an estimation which must take two factors into 
consideration: firstly, the ability to fulfill a certain need and secondly, the amount of 
568 Ibid. 183 Also Albrecht, ED, 198. 
569 CNS, 183. 
570 Ibid., 184. 
571 Binder, SSED, 28. 
572 Albrecht, ED, 199. 
573 CNS, 189.  
                                                     
184 
 
resistance one needs to overcome in order to produce something. The former is what Dühring 
terms a subjective estimation and is individual from case to case; the latter pertains to 
objective or material elements and can be divided into the two areas of natural resistance 
(production value) and human resistance (position value). The term value, he believes, should 
be used extremely carefully in political economy, as there are great misconceptions of what it 
exactly entails. The problem is that the word is inherently connected with a purpose, and 
nearly inevitably contains wishful thinking. He prefers the word “Geltung” which translated 
into English involves “validity” as well as a certain “application”; as Albrecht points out, it 
emphasizes the difficulty of acquiring the object obtained.574 There are two possibilities of 
measuring profit: either it is seen as stemming from power and the ability to acquire (position 
value), or it is the equivalent of a service (production value). Both factors involve resistance, 
but with the former the resistance is nature, and with the latter it is man and social power. In 
Dühring’s opinion, only in the sense of the service to produce does a measurement of value 
take place. However, political economy, according to Dühring, involves both explanations. To 
mix the two principles would be to mix up the movement of the compass with the compass 
itself.575 He sees an important role for exact valuation in science: “As the penetration into the 
causes of actual processes is the main consideration of all science, the theory of value deals 
with the causes of practical estimations of value, which means it deals with the principles of 
estimating actual current economic activity”.576 
In dealing with the issue of value, he writes, the factor of “price” has to be considered. Prices 
are a reflection of social conditions and, as with value in general, they are to be seen from two 
sides: as exchange equivalents for services rendered (and hence a reflection of the factor of 
production), and also as social ties. Seen strictly objectively, the price is “the money 
equivalent of a good or service”. Prices are a natural and necessary element of any economic 
society that has application wherever costs of production emerge. The costs of production 
represent the “resistance to production”, which apply in the same fashion for the production 
value. The price is therefore the money equivalent of the production value.577 Generally 
formulated, the value is the logical basis for the formation of prices, and no more. The basic 
“need” (Bedürfnis) and the “resistance to production” (Beschaffungswiderstand) are the 
measure of value. The resistance involved corresponds to labor, but to measure something by 
the amount of work involved would be foolish because it would be reducing the highly 
574 Albrecht, Eugen Dührings Wertlehre. Nebst einem Exkurs zur Marxschen Wertlehre, 5. 
575 KGV, 212. 
576 Ibid., 100. 
577 Binder, SSED, 24. 
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complex and diverse factors of human needs to one element. The forms of labor are so 
inherently different, Dühring writes, that to put them all under one umbrella is counter 
constructive. The value of labor must correspond to the specific branch of the work involved 
and time itself cannot be the measure because it “is something vague because its content is 
what is important”.578 
Dühring sees a way out of the quandary in the concept of money.579 Money in the form of 
precious metal can be a measure of labor for the simple reason that, according to Dühring, it is 
a good like any other and has its value in the force that is needed to obtain it, i.e. the work 
involved in acquiring the metal which is fixed and unified; the price that it takes on the market 
correspondingly becomes the measuring stick. The value of a good is determined by a 
comparison with the value of the metal.580 
Money’s general function is to serve as a final means of balancing service and return service 
and to provide legal repayment of debt in general.581 It has its origins in commerce and, 
depending on whether its scope is large or small, a world currency must take the form of 
metal money, or national coins, or finally paper money of a national or local scale. Money 
serves as a “directive” from person to person; it conveys the mechanism of service and return 
service moving freely in any direction. For Dühring, the universality of metal money makes it 
the most suitable to be used in society. He also places weight on the finality of paying service 
through money so that no other operation of consummation exists in the process of commerce, 
as, for example, the payment of notes. 
Unlike Ricardo, as well as his predecessors and immediate successors, who gave neither 
“money” nor “credit” a level importance in influencing production and distribution, Dühring 
concerns himself with the two concepts as entities that affect the economy. Regarding the 
practical possibility of using notes of central national institutes as money, he distinguishes 
between real money and credit money. The application of money in commerce is based very 
generally on the “expectation” that is connected with its realization; thus it is accepted and is 
seen as the best means of return service. With metal money, the collateral is given by nature 
and cannot be traced back to any “arbitrary stipulation” (willkürliche Übereinkunft).582 Credit 
578 CNS, 3rd edition, 30. As mentioned above, Dühring originally took the time of labor into consideration. 
579 Binder draws attention to the factor of money as a solution to the conflict between value and labor. SSED, 26. 
As she points out, in the first two editions of Cursus of National and Social Economy (1873, 1876), working 
time is a valid measure of labor. In the third edition from 1894, this position is changed. 
580 Ibid. CNS, 3rd edition, 264. 
581 CNS, 41. 
582 Ibid., 43. 
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money, which had been an important entity of economic development since the early phases 
of capitalism, is completely different, in Dühring’s opinion. Its general recognition does not 
stem from nature, but rather has its origins in the mutual good will of men to fulfill their 
obligations. It has the advantage over money that it is not dependent on legal conditions, as it 
has no liability. He does not, however, believe that a credit system is possible without a real 
money system. He writes, “Not even the concepts and provisions of credit figures can be 
thought of without referring to a valuable and needed good”.583 The development which led to 
the usage of metal as money is far from arbitrary and can be explained naturally through the 
constitution of precious metals. A complete dethroning of metal, even as a document for paper 
money, would be an arbitrary deviation from a solid and naturally founded development. He 
writes: 
The specific value inherent in money is a mediator of estimation and measurement which is 
not only of real, but also scientific necessity[…] one reaches a usable general value estimation 
only through the role of money and namely pre-monetary money, thus by historical necessity 
ultimately only through precious metals which assert themselves permanently as money 
material.584  
The concept of money thus comes to play a decisive role in his system of sociopolitical 
economics, and represents the ethos of his Weltanschauung and general bearing towards 
science more than perhaps any of its other theoretical elements. Dühring proceeds from the 
assumption that metal money can be used completely freely. To hinder someone from owning, 
buying, or trading any given object – and quantities of precious metal in particular – aside 
from any particular reason that can be legally justified – is, for him, a crime. Basic freedom is 
a status which precedes any other activity. The unlimited usage of money is more than an 
idealistic expression of the principles of his philosophy; for Dühring, it offers insight into the 
true contexts of economic activity. Dühring sees “fiat currencies” conjured into existence by 
the state as being a sign of coercion as for him money can never be an agreement or 
arrangement between different parties. Real money is an “institution of nature”.585 The 
advance of civilization would never have been possible without precious metals; men did not 
choose metals as an option to use for their own purposes, but rather, nature made this path 
necessary for man to follow. Austrian jurist and bank director Hermann Schwarzwald spoke 
of the “anti-conventionalism of Dühring’s theory of money”, which scorns the arbitrariness of 
the government’s policy of printing money and creating debt that goes against a practical, 
583 Ibid., 44.  
584 CNS, 3rd edition, 30. 
585 CNS, 45. 
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natural foundation of money.586 Dühring believes it is necessary to apply the abstract isolating 
method to understand money and to create a monetary theory free from not only the acts 
government but also from the whims of society in order to reach the “necessity of nature”.587  
5. Critical Summary 
The theoretical principles of Dühring’s system of sociopolitical economics do not only aim at 
applying scientific method to economic phenomena, they also involve the ethos of social 
reform. Unlike many socialist radicals, Dühring remains aware that it is not enough to come 
up with a philosophy or theory to change society. Without the necessary corollary of 
pragmatic action, pure theory will change nothing. It is for this reason that he looks towards 
the field of political economy as a means of improving society. His system contains the same 
structural balance between practice and theory which we have referred to above. It 
ambitiously aims at having a unified method for assessing economic phenomena. Political 
economy is defined realistically as the “material existence of individuals, groups, and nations 
in collective economic life”; he stresses the issue of “food security which comes through 
individual cooperation”.588  Along with this realistic basic premise, he integrates idealistic 
sociopolitical contexts into his system, believing that political economy must present a 
“system of reference” (Bezugssystem) in which decisions of power are integrated alongside 
natural ones. A system that does not consider the preconditions, or fundamental causes, of 
economic activity is deficient, in his opinion. He aims to distinguish the factor of the “natural” 
as opposed to the “manmade”, i.e. the “pure” phenomena of nature as opposed to “social” 
conditions created by man. Production is seen as a pure element of the economic process, 
reflecting man’s relationship to nature; distribution, on the other hand, involves man’s 
affiliation with his fellow man. Dühring treats both elements of economic activity separately, 
but finally joins them together placing special accentuation on the politically determined 
process of distribution. The exact assessment of both factors is applied by Dühring in nearly 
every theoretical element of political economy he examines. Whether he is distinguishing 
between “wealth” and “value”, or between “money” and “price”, or contrasting “production” 
versus “position value”, there is a constant interplay between the factor of the “natural” versus 
586 Hermann Schwarzwald, “Das Silber und das Dühringsche Gewichtsgeld,” Sendbogen für Dühringsche 
Geisteshaltung und Lebensgestaltung 66 (July 1937): 5. See also idem, Geld für Deutschland und Österreich. 
Denkschrift für die Staatsmänner Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns anläßlich des Krieges 1914 (Vienna, 
1914), 25. 
587 WCA, 160. 
588 Cf. CNS, 3rd edition, 3. Franz Oppenheimer criticizes Dühring’s emphasis on “material things”, which he 
believed hindered him from finding the mechanism of property based on force, which in Oppenheimer’s opinion 
was the monopoly. Oppenheimer, Theorie der reinen und politischen Ökonomie (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923), 
205-206. 
                                                     
188 
 
the “man-made”. This method is not only fruitful in his application of particular concepts, but 
it also causes him to give more attention to the important factor of tools, machinery, and 
technology in general – a “manmade” entity largely ignored by classical economics. Dühring, 
like Marx and other socialist theorists, also applies the abstract or deductive approach to 
economics. His system, in our opinion, rises above Marxism methodologically in that it not 
only addresses the issue of natural vs. manmade happenings, but also integrates the two 
factors into the structure of his discourse. The edifice of the system is based on a the balanced 
pillars of theory and practice, of nature as opposed to politics, or, as he often chooses to 
express it, of “knowledge” and “desire” (Wissen und Wollen).  If the 19th century was an age 
of “measurement and exactness” (Adolf Max Vogt), then the architectonics of Dühring’s 
system are certainly an expression of the epoch.589 
Despite Dühring’s attempt at a coherent approach, his method, in our opinion, cannot be 
considered unified in the strict sense of the term. In order to include both the political and the 
natural, he abandons, we believe, a truly unified natural scientific method by viewing the laws 
that apply to human action and the “manmade world” as being different from those applying 
to nature. In Cursus of National and Social Economy (1873), he speaks of a “difference in the 
way that necessity is conveyed” between laws of nature and laws effecting the realm of 
man.590 Where Dühring otherwise strives for clarity and exactness in thinking, he, in our 
opinion, abandons a truly critical perspective in that he neglects, or even ignores, the basic 
premise of the concept of “law”, which involves the Intellect’s application of the principle of 
sufficient reason as an instrument of measuring causality, to the phenomena of economic 
activity. Human action differs from purely natural occurrences in that it is based on 
motivation in its different forms, but the human mind’s means of determining causality, the 
principle of sufficient reason, as Kant and especially Schopenhauer have demonstrated, 
remains the same regardless of what its object is. From Dühring’s uncritical perspective, logic 
is not a tool of Reason; it is a universal phenomenon of the Actual itself. As Reason is not 
fixed as a faculty of the mind, it has, according to Dühring, a dynamic of its own, which 
allows for “different levels of necessity”. The term “necessary” always implies a result 
entailing a sufficient cause. The manner in which the necessity of the human world can be 
589 This clear structural division between the theoretical and the historical separates Dühring not only from 
Marxism, but also from the historical school. During the famous Methodenstreit (Battle of the Methods) of 
political economy of the 1880s, one of the main charges brought forth by Carl Menger against the historical 
school was that it did not differentiate clearly between historical and theoretical science. Annette, Wittkau, 
Historismus, 74.  
590 CNS, 66. Here it reads, “die Vermittlungsart der in der Menschenwelt herrschenden Notwendigkeit ist eine 
völlig andere”. 
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conveyed differently, we do not see. When Dühring postulates Laws of Development, 
involving necessary actions which create future events, he has, in our opinion, left the realm 
of pure science to presuppose certain alleged imperatives, which are vague. In so doing he is 
in good company, however. The German historical school also postulated the necessity of 
seeing all economic phenomena in a given social context and, if we go back further, 
Dühring’s understanding of Laws of Development, as they apply to man’s institutions, states, 
conditions, and history in the broadest sense, bears some resemblance to Hegel’s concept of 
Objective Spirit, which Gehlen likened with his concept of institutions.591 Despite the fact that 
Dühring’s method is not clear in this case, we agree with Albrecht, who gives Dühring credit 
for not only having seen the significance of changeability in the social and the economic, as 
well as in all phenomena conditioned by man, as opposed to the immutability of nature, but 
also at least trying to evaluate it epistemologically.592  
In his emphasis of the individual or historical, Dühring, like his mentor Carey, whose 
approach to economics John Chamberlain once associated with the “Promethean spirit”, 
creates theoretical postulates which attest to the self-reliance of man.593 The economy is seen 
in terms of “human striving”: man is not held down by the “iron laws” that the pessimistic 
economists of his day professed. Man is able to determine his own fate. Value is not 
something predetermined, but is seen rather as a challenge, i.e. in terms of resistance to be 
overcome; it is the equivalent to what a person must do to obtain something. A certain 
antagonism in human matters is, for Dühring, positive and necessary. Through careful 
planning and effective division of labor, not only wealth but also prosperity in general can be 
advanced. Through organization, an economy can develop intensively to support the 
localization of production, which will save time and money, and will facilitate positive human 
association. Contradicting the pessimistic population laws postulated by Malthus, he believes 
that the population will increase prosperity and not hinder it. Half of a century before Henry 
Ford, Dühring also advocates higher wages for employees, which he believes will help 
production rather than thwarting it. He tries to prove that some of the fundamental tenets of 
capitalism, such as the doctrine of free competition, are fatally flawed. And perhaps nowhere 
is the Promethean character of his thought more apparent than in his concept of money: 
money is a human institution which is based in nature and owes its existence to no higher 
authority. The Philosophy of the Actual’s materialist point of departure, and especially its 
591 Gehlen, Urmensch und Spätkultur, 8. 
592 Albrecht, „Dührings Stellung in der Dogmengeschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre,“ 756. 
593 Cf. Chamberlain, The Roots of Capitalism, 110-111. 
                                                     
190 
 
inherent discomfort with abstraction, come to the forefront in his monetary theory; money can 
never be created at the whim of the powerful. The theoretical principles of Dühring’s system 
of sociopolitical economics, which have served to break the shackles of authority, pave the 
way for the concrete reform of society. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
SOCIAL IMPERATIVE 
1. Towards a Post-Utopian Socialism 
Political economy, in Dühring’s opinion, must move forward from the realm of abstract theory 
into that of concrete action. If capitalism is a socially determined phenomenon, as his theory 
assumes, then it can be reformed and molded. The task of science is not only to determine the 
laws of economics and social life in order that the occurrences of the past and present can be 
causally explained, Dühring requires that science also be able to draw conclusions for what 
will happen in the impending future.594 For the Philosophy of the Actual, we remember, 
science does not only involve “what is”, but also “what ought to be”. This imperative does not 
apply to the abstract isolated laws of nature which have universal validity, but only to social 
or cultural laws. For the laws that apply to man, Dühring even suggests a new nomenclature: 
instead of the term “sci-ence” (Wissenschaft), rooted in knowledge, Dühring suggests “vol-
ence” (Wollenschaft), rooted in volition.595 Utopian visions are to be replaced by authentic 
modern socialism, which, as Sombart pointed out, from its inception following the French 
Revolution to the present consisted of two main groups: the reformatory and the 
revolutionary.596 Dühring’s system clearly belongs to the former direction, whose efforts were 
directed towards civic activism and the advocacy of practical suggestions to better society. In 
“reformatory socialism”, with few exceptions, it was usually practical measures which 
provided impetus for fundamental theoretical policy; one thinks of the ethical perspectives of 
Sismondi or Carlyle. Binder is of the opinion that, with Dühring, the opposite is the case: 
practical initiative is a corollary to his theoretical system, but not its originator.597 The 
Philosophy of the Actual is, however, inherently orientated to the practical insofar as it is 
vehemently opposed to any ideas of an incognizable background of the world that misdirects 
men’s actions. The very basis of Dühring’s philosophy could therefore be seen as practical, in 
the negative sense, in that it warns against irrational thought and behavior not in line with 
things how things really are. If this inherently practical principle of the Actual can be 
accepted as theory, then it is correct that “practical suggestions serve to advance a united 
594 CNS, third edition, 6-7. 
595 As Lamberz points out, Dühring discusses here the controversial issue of value judgments in science. Cf. 
Dühring und Carey. Ein Vergleich ihrer nationalökonomischen Lehren, 37. It seems to us that with these clearly 
articulated views on using science to steer social behavior that Dühring would have to be seen as a forerunner of 
what Karl Popper would later term “piecemeal social engineering”. Cf., The Open Society and its Enemies, op. 
cit..  
596 Werner Sombart, Sozialismus und Soziale Bewegung, op. cit. 22. 
597 Hanni Binder, SSBB, 102. Unlike Ricardo and other theoreticians, Dühring had, of course, little actual 
practice in business. 
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theoretical system”.598 Dühring is, however, not a pure theoretician; practice and theory 
belong to higher unity. 
Carey had expressed the opinion that the restricting oppressive forces of society would 
inevitably be eliminated through the development of the economy. Of this Dühring was not so 
sure; it would certainly not happen without conscious political initiative. Carey’s perspective, 
he believed, was correct in its pure, isolated form, but it lacked exact scientific foundation, as 
it did not sufficiently consider sociopolitical disturbances and offered no practical plan to 
alleviate them. The harmonic balance of the economy is not a norm which comes into effect 
automatically. If the wages of the workers increase naturally with increasing profit of the 
general economy (as Carey postulated), workers will ultimately want a portion of the 
ownership rather than being “rented” by the owners. This fact, according to Dühring, will lead 
to strong resistance from owners, as they follow their interests. To improve an economy, 
sociopolitical disturbances must be dealt with first. The science of political economy must 
therefore be accompanied by social reform. 
Despite his lineage from the Left and his affinity to the “Young Hegelians” in particular, 
Dühring does not expect a reshaping of society to take place through the real socialism of his 
day, which he sees as still not having overcome the utopian elements of the older socialism.599 
He is of the opinion that for such a movement to implement change, it must concentrate on 
current social and economic conditions and not be distracted by abstract religious or 
historical-philosophical beliefs. Socialism represents for him a theory and a brand of politics 
which will eventually be united with the teachings of political economy. Theory is destined to 
become united with practice. The result will be a synthesis in which the older political 
economic teachings are replaced by new social theory from which socioeconomic views and 
postulates will be able to be abstracted. 
Dühring believes his system offers a practical imperative to create a more progressive version 
of socialism and uses the term “utopian Socialism” polemically – as had Marx and Engels – to 
find fault with the ideas of early French socialists such as St. Simon, Fourier, and Blanc.600 
Without wanting to lose the main practical thrust of socialism, which he defines as “a 
movement to catalyze intellectual and political emancipation of society through a reshaping of 
material interests”, the practical element of Dühring’s system seeks to reform its tenets by 
598 Ibid. 
599 In his very first writings in the 1860s, Dühring expressed confidence in socialism, but as time passed he 
became increasingly more critical of the movement. 
600 Ibid., 273. 
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replacing older doctrine with a more scientific model, as he sees it, free from fantastic 
suggestion. Whereas Marx and Engels had attempted to do much the same, Dühring’s work 
represents a more thorough philosophical approach which, as we have seen in Chapter Three, 
gives greater value to the individual and focuses on metaphysical, ontological and 
epistemological concerns.601  His skepticism towards abstraction and his epistemological 
emphasis on concrete perception puts him at odds with previous socialist visions. 
Utopia was an important product of the historical development of the modern world. It came 
into existence at a time when European men and women were severing their ties with their 
homelands and beginning to journey in great numbers to settle in the new world. During the 
early modern period, as Europeans were branching out into all corners of the globe, the 
concept of a far off place, an attainable social paradise, somewhere in the distant future had 
great appeal.602 The term utopia, which was invented by Thomas More, became historically 
relevant in the 17th and 18th centuries, whose science and worldview formed the basis of 
Dühring’s thought. It is probably not coincidental that the “physical abstraction” of the 
European emigrants, who separated themselves from their homelands to live in other 
countries and other regions of the globe, was accompanied by the “intellectual abstraction” of 
utopia. A better future for society was thought up and pursued. The new imagined ideas were 
soon followed by concrete actions to improve society and to create a just society. The French 
Revolution, which Dühring saw as the turning point of human history, achieved the unseating 
of the monarchy and the feudal order, but the abstract power of utopia did not lose strength. 
The visions sought by the revolutionaries were not fulfilled immediately and the forces of 
abstraction and utopianism now adjusted themselves to the impending industrial revolution. 
Rather than simply “thinking away” the unpleasant present social conditions with abstract 
plans and visions, utopian thought changed into a more realistic theory of progress with an 
emphasis on creating “productivity” through work. Saint-Simon, who was perhaps the most 
important ideologue in this new vision, proclaimed that all men will be able to work in “the 
industrial workshop of the future”.603 
601 August Bebel spoke of Dühring as “a new type of communist”. Cf. Bebel, “Ein neuer Kommunist”. Harold 
Höffding labels Dühring’s philosophy one of the “most interesting speculative attempts of our day”, and 
emphasizes the “close connection between the thought and the personality of the thinker,” in Dühring’s work. A 
History of Modern Philosophy II, trans. B.E. Meyer (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 561. 
602 Cf. Reinhart Kosellek, Critique and Crisis. Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 5-12.  
603 Cf. Hanno Kesting, Geschichtsphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 
1959), 41. 
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As the 19th century progressed, much of the once seemingly endless space in the world had 
been filled and social visionaries changed their way of looking into the future. Technology 
progressed rapidly, and it became harder to envision just what the future would hold; one 
could say that, in a sense, utopians became more myopic, as they no longer looked into the 
distant future, but now turned to positive science to show that paradise was just around the 
corner, if only certain obstacles were eradicated. What had once been a pure abstraction, now 
took on a more concrete form as the Social Question was discovered, as we have illustrated in 
Chapter Six above.604 Soon science and philosophy were used to show how the best society 
could be achieved. The idea of servitude and domination (and a socialist opposition to the 
existence of such a relationship) became a dynamic force shaping society. The goal of 
“overcoming suppression” became a mighty instrument for the mobilization of the masses to 
change human conditions. Specific “obstacles standing in the way of a better society” were 
shown to be unjustifiably hindering moral progress. In the 19th century such “hindrances to a 
better humanity” had many different names: the state, the bourgeoisie, capitalists, freemasons, 
Jesuits, Jews.  
The socialist movement, which clearly involved bourgeois utopianism, had many different 
focal points. “Labor” was a common denominator, but also the idea of “taking away” or 
confiscation to better society became influential. Pierre Joseph Proudhon proclaimed 
“property is theft” and dispossession became a common cry among radicals.605 Saint-Simon's 
emphasis was not on “taking away”, but rather on creating productivity. Half a century later, 
in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels introduced the term “utopian socialism”, 
which for them was advocated by unrealistic thinkers who simply conceived the best possible 
world, but were unable to do what was necessary to have it happen. The Marxist alternative 
became known as “scientific socialism”. The newly-founded emphasis on work and 
production, which had begun long before Marx and Engels, and the development of a 
scientific political economy curbed the utopian fantasies of the 18th century, but did not end 
them. The utopias of More and Harrington were discounted, but others, based more on an 
appreciation of the reality of work as a social factor, came into being, e.g. Fichte's Utopian 
book The Closed Commercial State ( Der geschlossene Handelsstaat), which bears a strong 
resemblance to Saint-Simon's ideas. Owen and Fourier also aimed for a scientific application 
604 Cf. The Social Question, ed. Jürgen Backhaus, Journal of Economic 33 (2006). 
605 Nolte points out that it is often overlooked that for Proudhon the term “property” only applied to the kind of 
estates which could force citizens to pay tolls. Ernst Nolte, Marxismus und Industrielle Revolution, 278. See also 
Edmond Laskine, “Die Entwicklung des juristischen Sozialismus,” Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus 3 
(1913): 27-28. 
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of socialism, and – in contrast to Marx and Engels – tested it by attempting to form socialist 
communities. 
Among the socialists of the day, Dühring’s favorite is perhaps Louis Blanc, whose book 
Organisation du Travail influenced him substantially. Blanc’s idea that free trade and 
unbridled competition end up creating a suppression of the weak receives his approval 
(although Dühring would change his position on competition), as do his practical suggestions 
for a purposeful organization of labor. Regarding the latter, he criticizes Blanc for putting too 
much emphasis on the idea of noblesse oblige as a factor to help the workers and not 
considering their own power to improve their situation through self-initiative. He also 
supports Blanc’s idea of having a conscious organization of labor, instead of leaving the 
situation up to the interplay of forces in society. This is a realistic goal if the natural factors in 
societal intercourse are taken into consideration. Government funding is admissible, but the 
state should otherwise be prohibited from organizing, or even owning, social workshops. As 
we have seen, he supports the strengthening of production through the initiative of the 
workers and the creation of a larger united organization to control production.606  
Although Marx and Engels had aimed to rise above the ideas put forth by Blanc, Fourier, and 
others, and believed to have overcome utopia through scientific method, as Muravachik points 
out, they ultimately postulated theories which could be neither proven nor disproven.607 
Particularly with their views of a classless society, the Marxists remained captured in an 
unrealistic utopianism, the roots of which were in the Hegelian dialectic. The Hegelian 
philosophy, which highlighted the Social Question emphasizing the dynamics of domination 
and servitude, had given legitimacy to the dissolution of the old feudal and half-feudal 
society.608 Marx was only one member (by no means the most prominent) of the Young or 
Left Hegelians, who utilized the master's methods, but rejected his more traditionalist ideas, 
particularly his view on Christianity and religion, which the “Right Hegelians” still held in 
high esteem. Marx sought to legitimize Hegel's theories by making them more concrete and 
integrating them into scientific political economy. The dialectic was to be complemented by 
economic realism and only then could society be revolutionized.  
606 As will be shown below, in the final phase of his career, Dühring comes to advocate extremely individualist 
positions; at this stage, he ceases to advocate any positive intervention from the government. In the first and 
second edition to his Critical History of Political Economy, he expresses agreement with Blanc’s support of state 
measures, writing, for example, “The realization or proper guarantee of social rights is usually unthinkable 
without the creation of regulating central organs.” KGN. 2nd edition, 471. This sentence is omitted in the third 
edition from 1900. 
607 Muravachik, “The Rise and Fall of Socialism,” Bradley Lecture Series (February: 1999). 
608 Cf. Kesting, Herrschaft und Knechtschaft, 8. 
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As mentioned above, Dühring was the first scholar to review the first volume of Das Kapital 
when it appeared in 1867.609 His review was factual and neutral, but made reference to Marx’s 
“application of Hegelian speculation and dialectic towards the teachings of political 
economy”, which, when one knows Dühring, was a clear reproach.610 With the publication of 
Critical History of National and Political Economy, Dühring intensified his critique of Marx’s 
teachings, and the 1875 second edition of the book left no room for doubt that he was an all-
out opponent of Marxism.611 His critique of the most prominent socialist thinker of all time is 
excessively polemical, but also exhibits fundamental philosophical differences between the 
two men. Dühring first examines the issue of “method” before moving on to the concept of 
“value” and then, to “general philosophy” – Engels would imitate the same pattern in his 
“anti-Dühring” book.612 He goes on the offensive against Marx not only for ignoring the 
factor of politics in the field of economics, but also for abusing healthy logic, for playing a 
“metamorphosis game” with concepts and history, and for “siring a bastard of historical and 
logical imagination”.613 He finds that Marx offers no realistic vision for the future and 
remains caught in an unproductive “logic of sorrow” (Elendslogik), which prevents true 
socialism from advancing. Due to its misunderstanding of the eminent political nature of 
modern society, according to Dühring, Marxism represents a non-philosophical perspective. 
He believes that a more individualistic, and yet scientifically minded philosophy which 
utilizes the methods of positivism can advance the socialist cause beyond the utopian 
historical constructions of the dialectical method. He rejects Marx’s concept of the process of 
capitalistic economic development with the argument that the formula ‘value-money-value’ is 
nothing less than a confusing necessity and a degeneration of the idea of acquisition that 
dominates modern capitalism. Marx’s theory of value, constructed through a coarse 
semblance of dialectic, is none other than the same theory of Ricardo.614 He questions Marx’s 
teachings on surplus value, comparing it unfavorably with his own theory of wages. Marxism, 
according to Dühring, remains fixated on the weakness of the workers and not their own 
609 “Marx, Das Kapital,” op. cit. 
610 Ibid., 182. In the epilogue to the second volume of Capital, Marx mentions Dühring’s review and defends 
himself against the charge of using uncritical Hegelianism. “In einer Recension des ersten Bandes dieses Werks 
bemerkt Dr. Dühring, daß meine treue Anhänglichkeit an das Skelett der hegelischen Logik soweit geht, daß ich 
sogar in den Cirkulationsformen Hegelischer Schlußfiguren entdecke. Mein Verhältnis zu Hegel’s Dialektik ist 
sehr einfach. Hegel ist mein Lehrer und das klugthuende Epigonen-Geschwätz, das diesen eminenten Denker 
beseitigt zu haben meint, ist mir einfach lächerlich. Ich habe mir die Freiheit genommen, mich zu meinem 
Lehrer kritisch zu verhalten, seine Dialektik ihres Mysticismus zu entkleiden u. sie dadurch wesentlich zu 
verändern.” Das Kapital Ökonomisches Manuskript 1868-1870, Zweites Buch: Das Zirkulationsprozeß des 
Kapitals (Manuskript II), in Mega/II/11/6, 32. 
611 Vollgraf, “Ein ‚Handgemenge‘ im Vorfeld des ‚Anti-Dühring’,” 243. 
612 Ibid., 244. 
613 Cf. KGN, 3rd edition, 480. 
614 Ibid., 499. 
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strength or ability to improve their position themselves. He refuses to believe that there is a 
law of history which will save the workers from capitalistic exploitation.615 A postulate of 
extreme tension where opposites face off in battle, as the dialectic calls for, is a sign of 
powerlessness and a lack of mental discipline. The transferring of the means of production to 
societal property, a core concept of Marxism, is rejected as a nebulous mystification, lacking 
any tangible content whatsoever. From a philosophical perspective, Marx’s brand of 
socialism, in his opinion, lacks a clear program and ultimately leads to a quietism, in which 
self-reliance is handed over to a “dialectical reflection of concepts”.616 Dühring’s system of 
social economics aims at going beyond pure utopian socialism by creating a vision of the 
future based on the development of the given modern capitalist system, rather than the 
construction of a rational “natural order”. Whereas Marx and Engels advocated revolution as 
an answer to the social question, Dühring denounces deus ex machine solutions that will 
change society suddenly.  
2. Advancement of Labor through “Conscious Strength”  
Despite his philosophy’s adherence to the scientific method of positivism and its postulate of 
materialism as the basis for all intellectual discourse, as we have seen above, Dühring 
emphasizes the factor of human volition in the course of history. History is not merely a 
product of nature, but consists of patterns and trends brought forth rationally by humans. The 
conscious use of force by certain societal groupings is seen as the origin of an unjust 
distribution of wealth in society. Although his basic historical outlook on the development of 
society is pessimistic, his perspective is not fatalistic, as he is unwilling to accept the bad, and 
becomes an ardent fighter against it. Just as political factors shaped the development of 
capitalism to the unfair disadvantage of the working class, just retribution for the working 
class, he believes, can be attained through conscious self-initiative.  
Dühring has a positive assessment of industrialization. He sees the general historical 
development of the distribution between property, rent and wages as showing that the 
615 This Marxian idea of history heading to a certain goal was the main object of Karl Popper’s critique of 
Marxism. 
616 As we saw, Marx defended himself against Dühring’s charges in the epilogue of the second edition of Das 
Kapital by writing that he rejects Hegel’s philosophy as well as the ideal side of his philosophy; he argues that 
he is not being led by ideas, but rather by material phenomenon. In the third edition to Critical History of 
Political Economy and Socialism (1879), Dühring answers Marx by pointing out that Marx really represents 
radicalism in the form of the Hegelian dialectic and that the use of this method, which is an affront to clear 
thinking, leads to confusing word games with an arbitrary movement of facts. Vollgraf, “Marx’ ‘Randnoten’ zu 
Dühring’s ‘Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie,” 240. Marx’s rejection of the Hegelian philosophy 
contrasted with Engel’s defense of Hegel in his “Anti-Dühring”, which, as Vollgraf’s excellent article portrays in 
detail, Marx helped Engels to prepare.  
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emergence of industry and the gravitation of the workforce to the cities has improved the 
conditions of labor, not only in the city, but also in the agrarian sector. The new fast-moving 
period of economic development, dominated by the machinery of the factories, is initially 
unfavorable for the workers from an economic perspective. Technical power, he argues, came 
into the possession of the owners and then made a portion of the work redundant so that 
competition among the workers increased and wages dropped. In the further progression of 
the development of industry, Dühring holds, this process was reversed: despite the pressure 
which the machine puts the worker under, the demand for work increases, which creates the 
possibility of a gradual improvement of wages. As we saw in the last section, the increase in 
population will create an increase in demand in the future, which will ultimately raise wages. 
The increase in the demand for work signifies, an increase in the intensity of farming and 
ultimately an intensification of the entire economy. He argues that the workers’ perception of 
their deficiencies and the good which can be achieved along with what he calls their 
“accompanying strength” will help to alleviate the unfavorable situation. He writes:  
The ability to attain a certain objective can only be found in connection with a certain 
consciousness of one’s own strength. If a social reorganization is ever to come, it will not only 
be the abuse, but also the results of positive support which play a role.617  
Even the darkest cloud of suppression has a silver lining: the positive side of indentured labor 
was, for example, that it was a transitional phenomenon. It could not have the staying power 
that slavery once had as it put the worker in a precarious and contradictory position. The 
slave’s basic material needs were taken care of and were not a topic of discussion. In the wage 
labor system, the situation is just the opposite: workers needs are not taken care of, i.e. they 
are dealt with according to the workers’ own initiative, but they have a voice to issue 
complaints. Uncertainty of existence and economic pressure, Dühring argues, is the first 
impetus towards a united effort to achieve better wages. Through this train of thought, he 
comes to a modification of Carey’s principle of harmonic distribution, which, as we have 
seen, was based on what the Americans termed the “unity of law”. Dühring utilizes the factor 
of history, or the Laws of Development, as they had been labeled by the German historical 
school. In place of illusory harmony, Dühring stresses “real forms of life” which may be 
unflattering, but which help “the world of work to attain consciousness and strength”.618 Here 
we observe his departure from the perspective of rational Natural Law in favor of an 
617 CNS, 202. 
618 Ibid., 211. 
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adherence towards a form of historical realism directed by Laws of Development, a position 
he shares not only with the Kathedersozialisten, but also the Marxists.619 
“Real forms for life”, according to Dühring, involve injustice and exploitation, as well as 
positive political action aimed at eradicating the conditions of subordination and domination. 
Through his negative experience in connection with his social exposé written for the Prussian 
government, Dühring lost faith that measures could be taken from above, i.e. by the 
government, to benefit the workers. A just social balance of forces in society will never be 
attained through the initiative of its economically stronger elements, which are, he believes, 
ruthless by nature. He explicitly speaks out against a system of profit sharing and equity 
participation for workers through the help of penny stocks, and expects little aid from 
associations and cooperatives. Productive cooperatives can be of help for the socially 
suppressed lower classes, but not in the form of state issued credit. Cooperatives, in his 
opinion, lack the financial strength necessary for success. To find a solution, Dühring invokes 
his own unusual understanding of Natural Law, which we dealt with above: the only true 
protection against the arbitrary measures taken by “superior classes” of any given society is 
the fear of exploitation which arises instinctually to defend them for survival. Giving 
application to his theory of “reactive sensation” established in The Worth of Life (Cf. Chapter 
Four), he writes that the preservation of justice depends on a balance of forces in society; 
justice is preserved by the weaker elements of society, who automatically take the brunt of 
social injustice and feel a resentment, which motivates them to take action. The instincts 
which are brought forth when injustice occurs belong to the “economics of man” and have 
influence the development of society.620 It is up to the workers themselves to improve their 
situation and to correct any injustice inflicted upon them; self-initiative is the first and most 
important means of attaining social justice.  
The remedy for improving the situation, as we have seen above, is the formation of labor 
coalitions to fight for higher wages. 621 Dühring believes higher wages will increase 
619 Despite the theoretical similarities he shared with the Kathedersozialisten, he became one of their biggest 
critics, even favoring the Marxists before them. Although Dühring, as we will see below, was excluded from 
academic discussion on a university level after his dismissal from the university in 1877, there were other 
scholars at the university who fought the socialist of the chair. One example was the conservative Jewish 
German scholar Prof. Dr. Julius Wolf, who gave a presentation on the socialism of the chair and the Soziale 
Frage to the Social Scientific Students Association of Berlin. Cf. Wolff, Der Kathedersozialismus und die 
soziale Frage (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1899). 
620 KGV, 433-434. Dühring’s idea of an equilibrium of instinct influenced Nietzsche, who believed that the 
struggle for existence ended in a community whose standpoint was balance.  Cf. Gerhardt, “Das ‘Princip des 
Gleichgewichts’,”124-125. 
621 In Germany, coalitions were banned after Napoleon’s victory in the area occupied by France. In 1845, Prussia 
made coalition efforts illegal. It was not until 1872 that the ban was lifted in the German empire. Michael 
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production and change the ruling and the serving class’s patterns of consumption; higher 
wages will shape the circulation of production and consumption in a more natural way, 
causing production to be geared more towards the needs of the working class and away from 
the luxury consumption articles of the rich. The amount taken away from the rent of the 
business and put in the hands of the workers through higher wages leads to an increase in 
demand on the market; this positively effects production, and steers it away from more useless 
specialization and towards fulfilling the needs of the workers.622  
Dühring’s plan to improve the conditions of the workers through coalitions once again 
highlights substantial differences to the ideas of Marx. Marx sees improvement for the 
workers coming dialectically from the increasingly precarious situation they face, caused by 
oppression and exploitation through capital. Dühring condemns the idea that improvement 
can stem from weakness; change can only come through strength, self-initiative, and self-
reliance. By coming together in coalitions, the workers will have the power to improve their 
lot. Political organization and planning can further the interests of the workers movement, but 
without this “material force”, which is the coalitions, nothing substantial can be 
accomplished. Dühring believes that “every law which has no power available to protect it is 
a vain phrase”.623 Be that as it may, the concept of the coalitions, which is directed primarily 
against the capitalists, will need – at least to some degree – sanctioning by the government.624 
What is the role of the government exactly in these pursuits? Dühring sees two options: using 
present laws to have government try to create equality or trying to organize resistance to stand 
against the legal order. The former position, which Dühring labels “purely vegetative”, is 
advocated by the free traders and signifies degradation and dissolution. In getting rid of all 
chains, the weaker will be even more at the mercy of the stronger. The latter position, though 
Kittner, Arbeitskampf. Geschichte-Recht-Gegenwart, 155. 
622 Tugan-Baranowsky, who also argues for higher wages, points out, however, that the increase in wages tends 
to lower the birth rate, as the worker making more money becomes culturally more sophisticated; with the added 
means at his disposal, he chooses to have a smaller family. Soziale Theorie der Verteilung, 32. Heinrich von 
Treitschke argued in his famous critique of social democracy titled “Socialism and its Patrons” (1874) that the 
working class had the highest wages in German history, but that the workers usually wasted the extra money 
they had. Cf. “Der Sozialismus und seine Gönner,” op. cit., 507. In his extensive refutation of Treitschke, Gustav 
Schmoller showed that this claim was exaggerated. Cf. Schmoller, “Offenes Sendeschreiben an Herrn Professor 
Dr. Heinrich von Treitschke über einige Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirtschaft. VII: Ihr Urtheil über 
die socialpolitischen Bewegungen und Erscheinungen der Gegenwart,“ in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und 
Statistik 24 (Jena: Friedrich Mauke,1875), 93-94. 
623 KGV, 329.  
624 The state is to allow the coalitions. This is pointed out by Johannes Berg, a free-trader, who claims that 
Dühring wanted to conspire with the state to suppress the middle class. Cf. “Die Parteien im Deutschen 
Reichstage,” op. cit., 857. In his social exposé, written for the Prussian government, Dühring appeals to the state 
to grant “coalition freedom” (Coalitions-Freiheit). Cf. Hermann Wagener (vere Dühring), Denkschrift über die 
sozialen Coalitionen, 36 et seq.   
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the organization of coalitions, is one of strength, and will be vehemently opposed by the 
powerful free-trade party. The free traders therefore preach the freedom of the individual; no 
groupings, they would argue, should be formed which can suppress the individual. The 
individual and his or her preference should be the last instance in order to prevent the 
formation of restrictive social mechanisms. This is, in reality, a method of dividing and 
conquering, which results with the will of the strong being introduced. These forces will do 
anything to prevent powerful political organization, such as workers coalitions, from forming. 
One method which he believes can be used is to support unification. At first, all associations 
are “steered in a direction of the greatest natural resistance” so that the real interests will seem 
innocent; then the opinion is spread that the tasks of such associations are not of a social 
political nature, but rather a purely economic nature. They preach the theoretical weakness of 
the force which they fear the most: strikes are looked down upon as being unconstructive. The 
intention remains to prevent the formation of societal groupings whose task it is to guarantee 
social justice and to check individual acts of injustice.625 Dühring envisions limited 
government intervention as an instrument to allow the coalitions to come into existence. The 
free trade of his day, he believes, increases the freedom of the socially powerful, furthering 
their policies of oppression; the owners of businesses come together to make rules that 
strengthen their position, and their domination over workers will increase as the laissez-faire 
policies are extended. Increased centralization will make the local struggles of the workers 
even harder. Thus it is necessary for a third party to intervene to provide a balance of power to 
guarantee social justice. Government is an over-reaching, comprehensive power that, through 
act of legal administration and legislation, can intervene to prevent general societal interests 
from being damaged by the necessary battle of self-initiative. More like Carey than List, 
Dühring sees a permanent application of government measures to preserve the “independent 
economy and the natural solidarity of producers and consumers”.626 He is, nevertheless, under 
no illusions that a centralized government made up of forces which primarily support the 
owning class will help the workers. Thus government, as a third “balancing” force, is, in 
Dühring’s opinion, not a viable force in the initial phase of the labor movement. Labor 
coalitions are the first and most important step towards bringing justice for the workers. Once 
625 KGV, 331.  
626 Ibid., 333. Albrecht mistakenly says that Dühring’s views on protective tariffs are the same as List’s. Dühring 
clearly states that this principle of state intervention is “not historical”, i.e. not to be implemented temporarily at 
different phases, but is a permanent measure. Cf. Albrecht, ED, 222. Just as Dühring is philosophically wary of 
abstraction, he is also uncomfortable with government intervention. In the last phase of his career he comes to 
scorn the idea of tariffs in general. Cf. “Zöllner Aechtung,” PE 287 (October 1911). 
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a certain level of power is reached, his system calls for a grander possibility to improve 
society. 
3. Liberation from Criminal Government     
Due to the strong political imperative which his system entails Dühring cannot be considered 
a pure theoretician. The strict positivist method, which he originally advocates, although 
never abandoned completely, becomes altered when he emphasizes Laws of Development, 
which diverge from the flow of nature, giving leeway for man to determine his fate. As we 
saw in Chapter Three, he also introduces the concept of “rational imagination” into his 
philosophy, which enhances the role of the individual and makes room for creative 
intervention in the course of human development. These positions are connected with 
Dühring’s healthy belief in a principle of self-reliance, which applies to individuals, as it does 
to groups, as well as nations. His inclination towards the type of the philosophical scholar 
leads him away from purely scientific pursuits towards general speculation about society and 
how the principle of human freedom can find its highest expression. This involves, for 
Dühring, the eradication of all forms of coercion, the strongest of which, from an historical 
perspective, is the force of centralized government based on pure power (Gewaltstaat).  
Dühring was trained as a scientist of the state, who, as we have seen, came to advocate the 
mercantilist-like theories of Carey and List which give substantial importance to the role of 
the state in economic activity. As we have seen above, he does not reject government 
intervention fundamentally, but rather proceeds historically to consider the exact role it has 
played in human affairs. As Carey had done before him, Dühring points to forms of 
suppression in the central government of ancient Rome. The Roman state, whose power was 
based on conquest and force, is a classic historical example of the ills of government based on 
force. The application of the Roman policies to the medieval conditions led to the 
centralization of the modern period. In Dühring’s opinion, the centralized governments of his 
time represented the extended power of the dynasties that had paved their way through 
conquest and inheritance of power. It represents an entity of power consisting, on the one 
hand, of a group of people, among whom is a sovereign figure; below this person are other 
people who function as the machinery of the government. There are also the masses, who 
show little initiative; their passive existence consists of paying taxes, military duty and 
carrying out work for the higher classes.627 Criminal government is, Dühring believes, a 
historically inherited entity that would inevitably be overcome. The state of the present, he is 
627 Ibid., 320. 
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sure, is a provisional arrangement and any judgments on the principle of government in 
general should not be derived from its present context. He concludes that even the worst 
government is better than the chaos that would appear by having no government at all. The 
government, or some regulation of the human community, is a necessity, but it should always 
be a "means", serving the individual citizens. Government should serve practical purposes, 
and Dühring warned against a “romantization of the state”, where it is seen as a higher deity. 
Maintaining Carey's optimism in man's ability to shape society in a fair manner, he creates a 
concept of government that he believes can affirm the principle of "ruling from above", while 
at the same time upholding the values of freedom and justice.   
Dühring’s answer to the “oppressive criminal state” is his concept of Free Society (freie 
Gesellschaft). He envisions a community based on the principle of "voluntary association", 
much as Carey had used the term. The suggestions for labor coalitions, described in the last 
section, are now seen as a provisory application without a final or principal forgoing of 
further measures.628  Inspired by one of his great intellectual heroes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
Dühring advocates a type of social contract that respects the rights of the individual while 
preserving a balance of power between the individual groups of society. In the “Free Society”, 
individuals stand on an equal basis and there is no room for domination and subordination. 
Believing, like Carey, in the possibility of a harmony of interest, Dühring writes that highest 
principle of communal life is the exclusion of domination and servitude. In a society based on 
justice, there is no third force to arbitrate between two conflicting parties; the parties 
themselves would work out their differences together. Government is there only to preserve 
the "natural justice", which involves balancing the given powers in the society.629 For 
Dühring, true power only exists on the ground of individuality, and social improvement has to 
be found on this basis.630  
The Free Society, which was first introduced in Cursus of Philosophy in 1875, is 
complemented one year later in the second edition to his Cursus of National and Social 
Economy by a design for a system of “economic communes”, the culmination of Dühring’s 
vision of liberal socialism.631 Touched on briefly in Chapter Four, the economic communes 
628 CNS, 2nd edition, 334-336. 
629 As dealt with above, in the last part of the first edition to his book The Worth of Life, Dühring claimed that 
reactive feeling or resentment was the only recognizable principle of justice or injustice. This emotive element 
existed, according to Dühring, not only in individuals, but also in societal groups. See CP, 224. 
630 With his particular emphasis on “individual freedom”, Dühring tends to gravitate more towards the principles 
of the enlightenment held by British thinkers, whose views exhibited a certain contrast with the ideals of the 
French enlightenment. 
631 The design for the economic communes shows that Ludwig Marcuse’s criticism of Dühring for “lacking a 
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are a scheme to grant complete local autonomy in a society which is completely free from 
political and social compulsion. Despite the fact that they were only broadly conceived (in no 
more than eleven pages), and were ultimately abandoned in the third edition of the book, they 
are a pronounced expression of Dühring’s ethos of societal reform.632 He envisions the 
creation of social units in which every member of the community will have a say; property 
based on force (Gewalteigentum) will be removed completely, and the goal of the 
communities is the self-management of work and the economic sovereignty of politically and 
socially free people. Although the term commune, particularly in its more recent connotation 
since the 1960s, brings to mind a group living closely together in heightened sensitivity and 
receptivity, Dühring’s vision is decisively individualistic and does not resemble communist 
ideals in the traditional understanding of the concept: he aims to create what would be the 
logical conclusion of the free-trade capitalism. He writes, “All of the 18th century’s authentic 
ideas of freedom and progress are given their due. The step is taken to make the economic 
personality truly free and independent, and to completely do away with oppressive institutions 
through which work is put under the control of ownership by means of social and political 
pressure.” Economically, this means “cooperation towards production with equal rights, i.e. 
with principally the same working liabilities and the same claims of enjoyment”.633 
To design this economic system which rules out injustice and allows for local autonomy, 
Dühring uses the abstract and isolating method to envision society in its pure and genuine 
form, free from arbitrary development.634 The basic form of all socialization is the unification 
of two people through interest or mutual sympathy. This bond, like all further socialization, 
amounts to an agreement of collaboration among free individuals, who are not under any form 
of social or political coercion. The economic communes are to take the place of government 
and are to create equality between the different societal forces, ruling out the suppression of 
one person through another. Government will be kept to an absolute minimum, intervening 
only when “natural justice” needs to be protected. The “emancipated society” is borderless 
will to a goal” (cf. Chapter Three, Critical Summary) is exaggerated. His voluminous writings show the will and 
the ability to carry out goals. However, the retraction of the scheme for the economic communes does show 
Dühring was haunted by ambiguity.  
632 On Dühring’s system of economic communes see Alberto Chilosi, “Dühring’s “societarian” model of 
economic communes and its influence on the development of socialist thought and practice,” in Eugen Dühring 
and the freedom of teaching and research, ed. Jürgen Backhaus, Journal of Economic Studies 29 (2002): 293-
305. 
633 CNS, 2nd edition, 514. 
634 As we have pointed out above, this is the method of classical economics. Methodologically the ideal type 
Dühring constructs bears similarity to Thünen’s The Isolated State (Oxford, et al.: Pergamon Press, 1966). 
Dühring praises Thünen’s originality, but believes he lacked a universal perspective and was too focused on 
mathematics. KGN, 2nd edition, 314-315. 
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and is to ultimately encompass the entire world. Its construction is based on the connection of 
individuals and its dimensions fit the historical state areas of Europe. The communes make up 
an ancestral and linguistic community upon whose leadership the society is based.635 They 
function under the basic principle that labor, and not property ownership, should be the basis 
of earnings.636 Earnings are distributed according to performance and workers are to be given 
the political right to have a position in the economic management of the commune. Thus the 
organized forced management, which Marxist socialism advocated (and was later historically 
realized), is replaced by cooperative leadership which respects the rights of the individual. 
Property is not to be abolished, but rather belongs to each individual community. Dühring 
hopes to balance the exclusive character of property by allowing free entry into the given 
communes. Free trade is to exist between the communes on the basis of the gold standard so 
that free association and competition between them can develop. Interest will be used by the 
communes to maintain and improve the means of production, thus giving the value added 
surplus to the community, but not to individuals. Individuals will be able to collect wealth, not 
in the form of capital, but rather in consumptive goods. A “societarian free association of 
movement” (socialitäre Freizügigkeiten) will allow individuals to pursue activities that 
correspond to their given talents. As soon as a community has a particularly high profit where 
its members attain a higher income than the average earnings of the individuals of the other 
communes, the working force of this economically more advanced community is to be 
increased until a balance with the other communes is attained. In doing this, Dühring hopes to 
have the entire system benefit from the success of a particular industrial branch. An absolute 
equality of earnings is never to be reached, but this corresponds to economic justice, as some 
performances are harder, less pleasant or more dangerous than others. The workers entering 
and leaving the communities will allow the supply of the communes to adapt to demand. If 
the demand for a product is higher than the supply, the prices will rise and thus the income of 
the members of the commune will increase; this will set off a migration of workers, which 
will enable an increase in production until a balance of earnings is created. With a balance of 
earnings as goal and not the increase of profit and rents, the emphasis of the economic 
commune plan is to increase the quality of life of the workers and create a harmonic 
society.637 
635 One sees how an emphasis on concepts of “race”, which is associated with intolerance and elitism today, can 
entail a liberal egalitarian ethos. 
636 CNS, 2nd edition, 322. 
637 In the third edition of Cursus of National and Political Economy, Dühring gives up the scheme of economic 
communes after he had altered his theory of value. As we saw above, he comes to believe that time of work is an 
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According to the principles of the Philosophy of the Actual, Dühring cannot leave the design 
for the Free Society in a vacuum; it must be given realistic application. The development 
towards a truly liberated society will not to appear out of thin air. Neither through revolution 
of the proletariat, along the lines of Marxism, nor through a natural principle of balance, as 
Carey envisioned, will this take place. Dühring’s plan for reform will come into being through 
the mechanisms of the criminal state itself. When government becomes increasingly 
centralized, it inevitably extends itself to a point where it is doomed. Dühring gives historical 
examples of how centralization and loss of local autonomy maimed various states. The 
Greeks fell prey to Macedonianism under Alexander and eventually lost the Mediterranean to 
the Romans. The Romans consolidated the domains of their empire under one ruler and 
ultimately fell to the Teutons. Dühring speculated that these patterns of centralization and 
decay could continue until "the source of transformation" was gone, i.e. until there were no 
more enemies from abroad. Then it would be the "powers from within" which would topple 
the state based on violence.638 Such centralization, "based on force and conquest", ultimately 
means the "death of a state" (Staatentod). He gives two reasons for why such a oppressive 
centralized government is not capable of enduring: 1) the core from which it proceeds 
becomes spoiled due to unavoidable corruption, partially stemming from apathy and lethargy, 
partially stemming from arrogance and luxury. 2) The ability of the central group to rule 
becomes increasingly weakened due to the ever increasing extension of the government’s rule. 
In time, the local centers gain their own material advantages and soon begin to take on their 
own identity and political consciousness. This is, however, neither a natural nor an inevitable 
event as it had seemed for Carey. Ambiguous again, after emphasizing the dangers of 
centralization he maintains that not all local autonomy is positive. Dühring warns against a 
type of reactionary "romantic decentralization" which is a decentralizing force put into action 
by the centralized power itself. Particularly with English history in mind, Dühring cites how 
feudal elements within society could experiment with the local bourgeoisie in an effort to 
create a sense of "self-government" while really attaining a continuation of the old 
centralization.639       
insufficient means of measurement of the value of work, as the kind of work which is done within the given time 
is more important. Work performance is just as diverse as needs, and the one cannot be measured by the other. 
Related services must be measured in relation to each other, thus creating higher and lower groups of work. The 
characterization of the economic communes must be given up, not because its principle of justice was wrong, but 
rather because its postulate that work without ownership (besitzlose Arbeit) amounts to exploitation is false. 
Dühring emphasizes that initiative for social change must be connected with forms existing in the present, thus 
placing the concept for economic communes far into the future.  CNS, 3rd edition, 316-323. 
638 CP, 322. 
639 Ibid. 
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The “criminal state”, he emphasizes, has an uncanny ability to maintain control.  Writing in 
1875, Dühring paints the picture of a police state that functions much as the government 
depicted by George Orwell in his book 1984, and as was later realized, in the Marxist Leninist 
states of the 20th century and beyond. He points not only to the power of a government 
through its military, judiciary and police control, but equally important is the "police in the 
broader sense", a type of thought control which was implemented through the monopoly of 
schooling and the centralization of education. According to Dühring, oppressive government 
uses schools, from the lowest levels to the most scholarly universities, to sustain its political 
and ideological dogmas. He singles out the teaching of history as a particularly effective 
instrument of the criminal state: “The official government view of history as well as well as 
the corresponding views or even falsifications […] are a means used by the police for the 
repression of thought”. Without thought control, Dühring writes, oppressive government 
cannot exist for long. 640 
The strict intellectual control that the government enforces does not, according to Dühring, 
mean that the government will protect its citizens from crime. Quite the contrary, in a 
centralized state, robbery and murder as well as other crimes flourish; the streets of the big 
cities are unsafe. Whenever a citizen or group of citizens tries to flee from these conditions to 
set up their own lives independently, there is no means for effective judiciary. This opens the 
door for the oppressive government to make accusations that can be neither affirmed nor 
disproved. The only security against false accusations by the state can be local courts, but, 
according to Dühring, the Gewaltstaat would be defeating itself if it were to let a localization 
of such decisions take place. 
The centralized state ultimately becomes self-contradictory and falls prey to its own logic. Its 
ethos involves providing security, peace, and happiness, but this it is no longer able to do. 
Before the step towards the Free Society can take place, the reigns of the governments armed 
with force need to be taken. He writes, "Before one reaches the final emancipated society with 
all of its small political entities united under large organizations, one has to assume the 
inheritance of the centralized state, and use its already existing power as the basis for the 
restructuring of society”.641 To get rid of the oppressive force of the oppressive government, 
Dühring believes that its centralized functions have to be absorbed, and then its force or 
violence discarded. The false centralization which thrives on force, mind control, and 
640 Ibid., 327. 
641 Ibid., 325-326. 
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suppression will be replaced by a just centralization based on the rights of the individuals. In 
this way, a bridge can be built from the government based on violence to the society based on 
freedom and natural local autonomy.  
The Free Society – which is not proposed as a final solution to societal problems - will thus be 
instituted within the framework of government centralization. Once power is attained and the 
centralized mechanisms overcome, the development of the individual goes hand in hand with 
an elevation of the intellectual and moral level of the masses. 
 
4. “Universal Socialization” of Living Conditions 
The emancipation of society from the powerful centralized governments of history, as 
Dühring understands it, involves an elevation of the capacity of the individual through what 
he terms “universal socialization”.642 Once domination is eradicated and the “historical 
inhibiting means” (historische Sperrmittel) are removed, free association among men can set 
in, and people will accept that they live together with others who share the same fate as they 
do. They will subsequently learn to not only fight against injustice, but also to support each 
other.643 Unlike many leftist visions which are largely egalitarian and ignore the inherent 
distinctions between humans, Dühring’s system emphasizes racial and ethnic peculiarities 
which make up a challenge for the process of socialization. The further development of 
society cannot remain indifferent to the “specialization of physical constitution and the 
manner of thinking and feeling belonging it”, as he puts it.644 A multiracial or multicultural 
society, as it would be termed today, is looked down upon by Dühring not because he is 
opposed to it on the grounds of personal preference, but rather because he believes that within 
it intimate association between different ethnic groups is often forcefully coerced. Traditional 
society is, in his opinion, to blame for this. The historically inherited oppressive society 
(Gewaltgesellschaft), which is to be replaced by the Free Society, has created conditions in 
which material factors are decisive for the carnal behavior of its citizens. Viewing the 
developments in the rapidly growing metropolis of Berlin, he speaks of a “realm of coercion” 
which determines the sexual conditions of a society characterized by “marital, non-marital 
642 Ibid., 387. 
643 On the concept of “socialization” see Wilhelm Röpke’s entry “Sozialisierung” in Handwörterbuch der 
Staatswissenschaften, eds. Ludwig Elster, et al. (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1926), 567-578 (Dühring mentioned on 
page 567). 
644 CP, 388. Although his focus on the factor of race begins in the 1880s after being fired from his university 
position and becoming estranged from Social Democracy,  his system, as conceived in the 70s, already posits 
that ethnic factors are often more decisive for the makeup of a society than the ideas on which it is based. 
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and actual prostitution”.645 The bondage of the existing Gewaltgesellschaft is a consequence 
of the traditional social constitution and its oppressive nature. While rejecting a Darwinian 
theory of evolution to explain human races, Dühring draws attention to certain factors that 
contribute to ethnic groupings. The blood differences between different races, tribes, 
groupings, etc., he writes, play a role in procreation, not in a Darwinian sense, but rather due 
to mechanisms of inner and climatic pre-conditions and cosmic forces, which determine the 
carnal groupings. Ethnic considerations should, he believes, form a basis of the marriages of 
the future.646 He vehemently rejects the implementation of any kind of marriage laws by the 
state to improve social conditions,  however, as, in his opinion, the freedom of custom is the 
only force that can perform this task.647 He sees occasional racial mixing between strongly 
different ethnical entities as having exhibited beneficial effects, as different physiological 
qualities complement each other. He writes, “One can be certain that where personal 
inclination decides, the complete freedom of the combinations will do the least damage”.648 
The greatest damage to the physiological composition of any society, he believes, comes from 
the compulsion to marry, which, in his opinion, has been commonplace in the institution of 
marriage traditionally, particularly among Jews. Nature can be trusted to prevent 
“disharmonic ethnic mixing” ahead of time. It is only through false societal motivation that 
nature goes astray, in his opinion. If the “false coercion which double crosses nature” is 
removed then “individual freedom can be left on its own in good faith safely”.649 He thus 
advocates “the old truth that freedom is self-evident and substantial, and any limitations on it 
are secondary and in need of justification”. 650 Racial problems are to be solved on their own 
through natural social conditions, not through forced institutional measures.651   
Of great importance to the physiological composition of society is the role that women are to 
play. Dühring believes that, of all societal victims, women have suffered the most due to from 
oppression.  He envisions an emancipated role for them to play in the Free Society. In his 
645 Ibid., 389. 
646 He writes: “Die so zu sagen im Blut liegenden Unterschiede der Racen und Stämme hängen auf das Engste 
mit der Fortpflanzung zusammen. Lassen sie sich auch nicht vollständig und ausschließlich auf eine 
Abstammungstheorie Darwinischer Art zurückführen, so haben sie doch, nachdem sie einem durch die 
Zusammengehörigkeit innerer Schematismen und äußerer klimatischer oder sonst kosmischer Vorbedingungen 
entstanden waren, ihre Verbreitung durch die Beherrschung durch die geschlechtlichen Gruppierungen gefunden. 
Man wird also die Racengegensätze und Stammessonderungen vor allen Dingen zum Ausgangspunkt der 
Grundsätze über die Geschlechtsverbindungen machen müssen.” Ibid.  
647 His postulate clearly puts him at odds with the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 in National Socialist Germany. 
648 CP, 389. 
649 Ibid., 390. 
650 Ibid. 
651 As much as Dühring disliked the American South and had not approved of its society based on slavery, it can 
be assumed that he would have condemned the measures of the Kennedy and Johnson governments of the 1960s 
to forcefully integrate public schools in the South.  
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writing “Women’s Way to Higher Education”, he shows strong support for the women’s 
liberation movement in the 1870s, calling for the political and social equality of women by 
means of extending the educational and career spectrum of women. The women’s question 
was for him an important part of the Social Question.652 The universal socialization of society 
involves women being admitted to higher teaching positions as well as to the study of 
medicine.653 Whereas the conservative tenured professors, civil servants, and other academic 
groups often made reference to women’s physical and mental limitations, citing their 
tenderness, pregnancy, and menstruation as well a purported deficiencies in the area of logic 
and abstract thinking, Dühring considers them to be fully capable, both mentally and 
physically, of carrying out scientific careers.654 The career woman embodies, for him, the 
positive virtues of the middle class: a strong work ethic and devotion to duty. He envisions the 
creation of schooling and educational institutions for women. Women should be made more 
economically independent in their marriages by being given access to professional training; 
family duties are reconcilable with a professional career, but he still gives the main 
responsibility for the household and raising children to the woman. Throughout the course of 
history, marriage has, in his opinion, been an oppressive institution through which “women 
have been made the property of men”.655 Dühring sees the family as originally having being a 
political entity and the head of the family as, up to then, having had the characteristics of a 
head of state.656 When the “despot of a family” had the right to decide on the life and death of 
its members, it was a small version of a government based on violence. In the course of 
history, private violence in the family, he holds, has become more and more limited and the 
political role of the family has eventually been handed over to the state. The right of 
disciplining one’s family can no longer be seen as legal right, as it has only a pedagogical 
purpose. The remaining rights of fathers are only a small artifact of what their authority as 
head of a family once amounted to. Despite the shrinkage of the coercive elements in the 
family, the fact remains, according to Dühring, that “oppressive government, society 
dominated by property based on force and compulsory marriage” belong together as a 
sociological phenomenon.657 As in the case with the German working class, Dühring believes 
652 WBF, 2.  
653 Ibid., 10-11. 
654 Cf. Reményi, “Der Fall Eugen Dühring und die Diskussion um das Frauenstudium in Berlin,” in 
Geschlechterverhältnisse in Medizin, Naturwissenschaft und Technik, eds. M. Renneberg, and C. Meinel 
(Bassum, et al.: Verlag für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft und Technik, 1996), 271-272. 
655 CNS, 2nd edition, 321. 
656 CP, 289. Here, we believe, Dühring makes the classic mistake of many liberals of creating what Gehlen called 
a “moralischen Eintopf” (a moral stew) in where different institutions, with dissimilar moral ethoi, are combined 
without distinction. Cf. Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral, op. cit. 
657 Ibid. 
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that self-reliance is the key to emancipation, the basis of which needs to be economic 
independence.658  
Although he is a strong proponent of women’s education, Dühring is careful to point out that, 
due to the present deficiencies of the German university system, it should not be desired for 
women to attain equality with men on this level. If the situation is intolerable for men at 
present, then, in his opinion, it does not make sense for women to strive for what is 
insufficient to begin with! He writes that women have the claim to something better than just 
being accepted to the university, which only makes sense if it facilitates access to new 
vocational branches.659 Differing from other leftist thinkers in favor of women’s rights, 
Dühring, not without good reason, is careful to emphasize that the issue of freedom and 
justice should not involve blurring the natural boundaries between men and women, but 
rather, on the contrary, should serve to see that diversity develops. “Thus it is not the principle 
of women’s liberation to make the essential feminine characteristics masculine, or making the 
customs of the sexes the same or converge”.660 He believes that nature should take its course, 
and, as the artificial coercion created by society is removed, the natural differences between 
the sexes will become more pronounced in a healthy way. Once women’s education has 
sufficiently advanced, they will be able to attain an intellectual maturity which will express 
their unique character.661 
Whereas a new emancipated role of women is welcomed as a positive step towards 
overcoming the traditional society, the emancipation of the Jews is not. Dühring views the 
Jews as an element of the traditional oppressive society which needs to be overcome.662 His 
658 Cf. “Natürliche und künstliche Emancipation, I.,” Unterhaltungen am häuslichen Herd 4 (1864): 798. 
659 WBF, 2nd edition, 38.  
660 WL, 7th edition, 352-353. This opinion is mirrored by Nietzsche. Nolte, Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus,  
202. 
661 As a political advocate of the working class, Dühring is particularly outraged by the excessive physical labor 
which women are subjected to, and which, in his opinion, destroys femininity. Cf. “Natürliche und künstliche 
Emancipation, II.,” op. cit. 818. 
662 Dühring’s book on the Jews, Die Judenfrage als Racen- Sitten- und Culturfrage (Karlsruhe, Leipzig: Reuter, 
1881), went through seven editions. There is an English translation of the second edition with an introductory 
essay written by the Indian scholar Alexander Jacob. Eugen Dühring on the Jews (Brighton: 1984 Press, 1997). 
For a better understanding of the nature of Dühring’s anti-Semitism see the previously unpublished manuscript 
from the Dühring Papers of the Staatsbibliothek, printed in the Appendices below. The text was written two 
years before his book on the Jews was published. There have been numerous articles and two books devoted 
exclusively to the topic of Dühring’s anti-Semitism: Briggitte Mogge, Die Rhetorik des Hasses. Eugen Dühring 
und die Genese seines antisemitischen Wortschatzes (Neuss: Gesellschaft für Buchdruckerein AG, 1977) and 
Peggy Cossmann Physiodicee und Weltnemesis. Eugen Dührings physiomoralische Begründung des Moral- und 
Charakterantisemitismus (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2007). The anti-Semitism of the German empire came 
from different ideological currents: two enemies of Dühring’s, Heinrich von Treitschke and Adolf Wagner, were 
both known for their anti-Jewish sentiments. Treitschke contribution to the “Antisemitismusstreit” is well 
documented, and Adolf Wagner was a prominent member of Adolf Stoecker’s Christian Social Party and spoke 
out against the Jews. Cf. Evalyn A. Clark, “Adolf Wagner: From National Economist to National Socialist,” in 
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system’s tendency towards radicalism in the name of emancipation becomes particularly 
apparent here. Charles Fourier had previously attacked the Jews from a socialist point of view 
for their merchant mentality and egotism, and members of the “Left Hegelians” were quick to 
follow suit.663 Dühring’s intense disapproval of Judaism was touched upon briefly in our 
portrayal of the role of history in his Weltanschauung and bearing towards science. It was not 
until the 1880s that his anti-Semitism came into the forefront of his literary efforts, but as 
early as 1866 he makes reference to what he sees as the peculiarities of the Jews. He writes 
that “the Jewish mind or the Semitic soul leads to a distinctive religion and philosophy”.664 In 
Critical Foundation of Political Economy he labels the Jews a pernicious element of 
traditional society and speaks of a “Semitic relationship to egotism”.665 Although his anti-
Semitism was to escalate in the second half of his career, becoming “the center point of his 
Weltanschauung” (Voelscke), it was only of peripheral importance to his system as conceived 
in the 1870s. However, for a system of sociopolitical economics which advocates universal 
socialization and communities where members share a common ancestry, it is no wonder that 
the Jews, as pariahs, are seen negatively by Dühring; within the context of universal 
socialization they represent for him a racially exclusive sub group of society, and are destined 
to be a theoretical and political issue. Dühring’s poses a “Social Jewish Question” in which 
the role of the Jews for the Free Society is to be examined in a similar manner to the Social 
Question analyzed above. Jews embody for him everything that his system is against. He 
writes from the perspective of the existing Gewaltstaat society of his day: 
The increasing influence of the Jewish element is in no way to be avoided in today’s society 
and in today’s government. A small people, whose early history proclaims ferocity and crass 
egotism as a future plan of action, was ultimately able to spread its seed throughout the earth 
and to parasitically lodge themselves on to the flesh of other nations by means of an 
intrusiveness and toughness which it was already accustomed to before the fall of its own 
state. Being at home everywhere and nowhere, it played the familiar role among the cultured 
nations in trade and finance. Especially the higher lines of business which were less restricted 
by the state […] went to the Jews. In this way the domination of the daily press by Jewish 
newspaper owners, editors, correspondents, etc. is not only an often complained about fact in 
Germany and Austria, but also in France, as on the European continent in general. The 
Political Science Quarterly 55 (Sept., 1940): 378-411.  Although Friedrich Engels spoke disparagingly of 
Dühring’s anti-Semitism in a brief remark of his “Anti-Dühring”, cf. Herr Eugen Dührings Revolution in 
Science (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1934), 126, both he and Marx were known to have seen the Jews in a 
negative light. Cf. Edmund Silberner, “Friedrich Engels and the Jews,” Jewish Social Studies 11 (Oct., 1949): 
323-342. 
663 Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 349. 
664 “Die Philosophie im Jahre 1865,” Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart 1 (1866): 579. 
665 KGV, 450. 
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penetration of Jewish elements into the medical profession is giving the ongoings in this field 
more and more the stamp of a pure business transaction, if not to say a systematic exploitation. 
Even government legislation is in some ways helping to make the public pay tributes to the 
doctors on an ever increasing scale through compulsory vaccinations.666 
Although one is more likely to associate such tones with “conservative revolutionaries” of the 
radical Right and precursors of National Socialism, it should be stressed that Dühring’s 
critique of Jewry stems from the leftist-liberal core of his system.667 He reproaches Jews for 
embodying a lack of freedom. They represent for him the ideal of subservience and the 
mindset of the slave, which for a thinker who strives for complete and utter freedom from 
coercion and domination is truly a sin. He describes them as having been the slaves not only 
to their own religion, but also to the powerful leaders who have ruled society through unjust 
power. They are, he believes, a strong component of the traditional oppressive society that his 
Free Society wishes to replace. The often cited rebellious or revolutionary spirit of Jewry is 
explained as the Jews following of their own interests; this behavior subsides, he writes, as 
soon as the advantages sought have been gained. Aside from a few radical elements, which 
remain isolated within the religion and often radically opposed by it, the Jews’ most salient 
characteristic is, according to Dühring, a flattering, sycophantic cuddling up to political 
authority. This subjugation to authority does not, however, prevent the Jews from exercising 
domination themselves. He writes, “To be a slave or to make slaves, this is the alternative of 
nations based on bondage and thus it is this way because the Jews can nearly lay claim to a 
form of indirect societal sovereignty.” 668  Dühring sees the aggressiveness with which Jews 
pursue their interests and with which they persecute opponents as an asset of the criminal 
state, making them a bulwark of the oppressive historical society.669 
666 CP, 390 et seq.  
667 The term “Conservative Revolution” was made known by the Swiss historian and philosopher Armin Mohler. 
Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932. Ein Handbuch (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1994). 
668 CP, 392. 
669 There seems to be an inherent contradiction in Dühring looking down upon the Jews for their subservience 
and “slave mentality”, on the one hand, while at the same time reproaching them for their inclination towards 
undermining the social order. Dühring’s bearing towards the Jews, in many ways, bears the stamp of a 
subjectivity which at times borders on the infantile. In his autobiography, for example, he irrationally claims that 
early in his career his manuscripts sent to newspapers and magazines were not returned “by the Jews”; he also 
called his optician, the famous eye surgeon Albrecht von Graefe a “Jewish half-breed”, although there is no 
evidence of the doctor having Jewish ancestry. Cf. Ludwig Marcuse, “Der Pioneer Dühring,” 60. Regarding the 
alleged affinity of Jewish intellectuals for subverting the existing order, see Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of 
Critique: an Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth Century Intellectual and Political 
Movements (Long Beach, Ca.: 1st Books, 1998), as well as the more recent work of the Catholic scholar E. 
Michael Jones, The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and its Impact on World History (Fidelity Press: Southbend, 
Indiana, 2008). 
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Although condemning them as immoral, Dühring is careful to emphasize that the Jews are not 
the main source of evil, but rather, in his opinion, “the worst element through which the main 
source of evil receives its strength”.670 With their, as he sees it, slavish worldview and 
intimate allegiance to the forces of society which Dühring wants to replace, they are to be 
excluded from the Free Society. Thus as for Karl Marx and other Left Hegelians, the 
“emancipation from the Jews” is an eminent social problem. Dühring sees socialism as the 
only power that can fight the conditions of a population with a strong Jewish admixture.671 
5. Critical Summary 
Plans for social reform serve as a corollary to Dühring’s economic theories. Whereas Carey 
had believed that a societal harmony would come about as the economy of a nation advanced, 
Dühring was convinced that this could not happen without conscious political initiative on the 
side of groupings within the society. His position highlights a fundamental methodological 
difference between himself and his American mentor: Carey believes that economics can be 
approached like a natural science, such as physics; for Dühring, cultural factors, institutions, 
and societal conditions are decisive. Dühring’s acceptance of Laws of Development – a 
concept established previously by Wilhelm Roscher of the German historical school of 
economics – which determine the institutional and cultural changes of society, separates him 
not only from Carey, but also from Adam Smith and the classical school, and places him in 
the tradition of post-Kantian German Idealism from which modern socialism evolved. Like 
the Young Hegelians, Dühring believes that society can be shaped through philosophy and 
science; he follows in the footsteps of Ruge, Bauer, Stirner, Strauss, Marx and Engels, but is 
young enough to have never been committed to Hegelianism, which, in the eyes of many, had 
become bankrupt due to its incompatibility with natural science. Also like the Young 
Hegelians, Dühring wants socialism, but one of realism and of scientificity, as opposed to 
abstract religious or philosophical-historical constructions. He envisions a form of socialism 
free of utopian ideas. 
670 Cf. PE 251 (1910): 2001. See also Jacob, Eugen Dühring on the Jews, 61. Five pages later it reads, “it is a 
false in a world-historical as well as in a particular case to consider the Jews as the sole causers of corruption of 
peoples. What the Jews create independently of corruption is only a part of that which they, in connection with 
other corruption, increase through their serviceability and raise to a colossal degree.” Ibid., 66. 
671 “Der Sozialismus ist die einzige Macht, welche Bevölkerungszustände mit stärker jüdischer Untermischung 
die Spitze bieten kann.” Ibid., 393. Engels points out that this opinion of Dühring’s calls to mind the bigotry of 
the Middle Ages. However, as Edmund Silberner has shown, there seems to be a certain logical connection 
between anti-Semitism and communism. Cf. idem, Kommunisten zur Judenfrage: zur Geschichte von Theorie 
und Praxis des Kommunismus (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983). 
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His plans for social reform evolve out of Carey’s opposition to British laissez-faire capitalism 
and its social ethos of a decentralized development of economic activity towards a program of 
practical-political measures to strengthen the position of the workers. Following Carey’s 
aspiration to view economic activity as a natural science, Dühring makes the original position 
of trying to explain societal conditions, groupings, and institutional entities similar to “forces 
of gravity” (Gravitationskräfte). He also creatively interprets List’s teachings on the 
development of nations as being applicable for societal groups. Analogous to the ethos of his 
philosophy, the social imperative of his system involves the independence and self-reliance of 
societal groupings. With regard to the workers and the Social Question, the first step to be 
taken is the formation of labor coalitions. He rejects the Marxian call for revolution and 
proposes concrete, practical, and realistic measures to set reform in motion. These practical 
suggestions are not without a theoretical underpinning, which is a twist on the 
Schopenhauerian understanding of morality as based on compassion and Hume’s theory of 
sentiments before that: societal groupings, like individuals follow the moral guidelines of 
reactive sense of revenge (dealt with in Chapter Four above). 
Dühring’s understanding of government, which like so many issues he deals with is 
ambiguous, also seems to bear some similarity to Schopenhauer’s views: both thinkers 
advocate a minimal but important role for the state to play in society as an intermediary 
serving to protect its citizens and preserve a general order.672 Like Carey and List, Dühring 
also believes that government has a role to play in facilitating economic activity, albeit in the 
negative sense of issuing protective tariffs. This is in line with Dühring’s philosophy’s 
inclination towards rationalism, as emphasized in Chapter Three above. His early writings see 
government in a largely positive light; as we have seen, he was commissioned by the Prussian 
state to create governmental policies that would help the working class. Dühring’s efforts to 
find solutions for the workers have much in common with the Kathedersozialisten (“socialist 
of the chair”), who founded the Social Policy Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) in 1873. 
However, just as the Philosophy of the Actual downplays the faculty of Reason, Dühring 
comes to view the role of government in far more critically than did Schopenhauer, List, and 
Carey – not to mention the “Kathedersozialsiten”. In his eyes, the state is not an evil in itself 
(as it is in anarchism), but its power in the form of a centralized government based on force 
(Gewaltstaat), as it has evolved historically, most definitely is. A criminal government is, in 
fact, perhaps the greatest enemy of mankind.  
672 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, 342-345. 
                                                     
216 
 
Dühring’s Promethean spirit, as well as his inclination towards the type of the philosophical 
scholar, leads him to conceptualize a futuristic liberal state, which he calls the “Free Society”. 
In the Free Society, all domination and coercion will be removed, and men and women will 
live together in equality and in freedom. In an attempt to remove the chains that have bound 
men throughout history, he designs a plan for a system of “economic communes”, social units 
based on a common language and common ancestry, in which labor is the basis of earnings 
instead of property ownership. In contrast to the utopian models that came before it, 
Dühring’s design is based on real societal entities and institutions; he envisions the pre-
condition of a price mechanism and the use of gold similar to how it existed in capitalism. 
Beyond this, he attempts to improve on previous egalitarian approaches by suggesting that 
personal qualities, dispositions and capabilities should be taken into consideration. His Free 
Society, therefore, has room for developmental possibilities that prevent social congealment 
and stagnation. Dühring understood the meaning of the phrase natura non facit saltus, a basic 
assumption of Greek philosophy and natural science, and knew that world history moves 
extremely slowly. As Albrecht has shown, the plan for economic communes has substantial 
weakness.673  Dühring fails to show how the commune system will be implemented. He 
correctly demonstrates the importance of competition between individuals and the different 
communes, but gives no indication as to how specific rankings will be established. The 
problem of income not based on work is likely to reappear, and if the members of the 
commune are thrifty, private capital will be created which could presumably be lent, thus 
making capital rent an issue again as it was in the oppressive society. It is, however, to 
Dühring’s credit that he ultimately gives up the idea as not being a realistic alternative in the 
present. The Free Society itself, on the other hand, remains an alternative which, Dühring 
writes, will come into existence through the mechanism of the centralized government based 
on violence itself. His description of the Gewaltstaat and its method of ruling by means of 
institutionalized thought control anticipated some of what was to come into existence under 
the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. 
A “universal socialization” of living conditions in the Free Society is to allow for the 
liberation from all types of social coercion. The ideas of emancipation Dühring advocates 
generally concur with other forms of leftist political ideals seen throughout modern history 
(which we will refrain from analyzing further now, as they are to be dealt with in the next 
chapter). He also focuses on “physiological makeup” of the Free Society, which, to his mind, 
will play a key role in the functioning of the individual communities. Even on a biological 
673 Albrecht, ED, 241-242. 
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level, Dühring is concerned with the danger of coercion and domination; the biological 
constitution of the society has been harmed by forced marriages, created due to material or 
monetary concerns or pressures, and not to natural instinct. He vehemently rejects any type of 
government measures to regulate marriage and reproduction, because only freedom of custom 
and nature itself should perform this task. His underlining of the benefits of a homogenous 
population can also be seen as a corollary to his egalitarian ethos. The emancipation of 
women is to play an important role in improving society. Educational and professional 
opportunities are to be opened for women so that they can become economically independent 
and break the chains of the traditional institution of marriage, which Dühring likens to a 
tyrannical state. The anti-Jewish ethos, inherent in socialism since the days of Fourier and 
Proudhon, is retained by Dühring in his vision of the Free Society. His condemnation of Jewry 
escalates, however, beyond the sentiments of socialists before him because, from his 
perspective, the Jews seem to embody the very ethos of subordination that his philosophy 
wishes to overcome. Like other anti-Jewish writers, such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, 
Dühring reproaches the Jews from a humanitarian point of view.674 He condemns them for 
their alleged intolerance and for the slavish superstition of their religion; the subservient 
structure of their religion, he believes, has been transformed and geared towards the 
centralized state, making them the agents of powerful suppressors in the machinery of the 
government.675 This position stands in contradiction to the fact that there have always been 
Jews among social reformers and radicals often fighting for the very same causes which 
Dühring advocates himself. In our opinion, he fails to sufficiently explain the rebellious spirit 
which has undeniably existed throughout Jewish history.676 
  
674 Cf. Nolte, Geschichtsdenken im 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin, Frankfurt/Main: Propyläen, 1991), 72. 
675 See the unpublished essay “Über die Entstehung der Judenfrage”,  Appendices II below.  
676 It is perhaps not a coincidence that some of Dühring’s greatest and most influential supporters and admirers 
were Jewish, e.g. Eduard Bernstein, Benedikt Friedländer, Franz Oppenheimer, and Hermann Schwarzwald. 
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CHAPTER NINE  
CONSEQUENCES 
1. The Emancipatory Process 
Dühring’s system of sociopolitical economics has been analyzed on three levels. First, it was 
viewed within the context of its basic point of departure: the social grievances brought forth 
by the industrial revolution, or, as this was called in Germany, the Soziale Frage. We dealt 
with Dühring’s initial understanding of the fundamental economic concepts of political 
economy as he defined them in the 1860s, under the influence of his legal studies and the 
thought of List and Carey. Next, we turned to the theoretical dimensions of his system in its 
mature form, which, all philosophical and political considerations aside, involved a matter of 
fact and realistic interpretation of the management of man’s material economic concerns. Here 
Dühring deals with the material interests that humans have as individuals, as nations, and as 
members of various social groupings. Political economy analyses the collective social budget 
determined by economic phenomena that is based on laws which differ from pure laws of 
nature. We came to know Dühring’s understanding of the concepts of production, distribution 
and value. On a third level – and not completely to be separated from the realm of his theory – 
we considered the practical plans of his system, which involved an overcoming of utopian 
socialism, as well realistic suggestions to help the workers help themselves. Equally as 
significant for his system is its concept of the historically inherited government as an 
oppressive institution based on force (termed Gewaltstaat). This concept was derived through 
the pessimistic view of institutions and the societal power structure, which we touched on in 
our treatment of Dühring’s philosophy and his view of history in Part Two. Dühring believes 
that the development of man has been marred by the power of selfish groupings that ruthlessly 
pursue their own interests at the expense of the weaker classes of society. Finally, we saw his 
solutions offered in the form of a “universal socialization”, which is to entail a freer and more 
equal society based on a common language and ancestry in which women are emancipated 
and in which allegedly belligerent minorities, such as the Jews, are to be excluded.  
To further understand Dühring’s system and its full implications, his ideas should also be 
considered within the context of the history of ideas. The dominant fact of the era in which he 
lived is the development of liberal or bourgeois society as it had come into being following 
the French Revolution. One of the salient features characterizing the advance of industrial 
society in Western Europe and North America has been the will towards the undoing of social 
ties that are seen as limiting man’s freedom. The development of bourgeois society represents 
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a universal process of critique directed at various social entities and institutions, such as class, 
nation, religion, forms of law, etc.677 Throughout the course of world history, man has longed 
for freedom from his mundane situation and has speculated on the essence of existence 
through philosophy and religion, both of which have presupposed a supramundane world in 
one form or another. What was new, as the 19th century began, was the application of Reason 
not to negate or rise above the world, as had been done in the past, but towards negating the 
ties made by man himself within this world. Following the French Revolution, Kant, Hegel 
and Fichte gave a philosophical interpretation to the new era and, with the development of 
political economy as a science, the time was ripe to discover the total process of how society 
was developing. As Nolte emphasizes, Marx was the first thinker to develop such a collective 
theory, being of the opinion that the severing of institutional ties must be taken to another 
level. A second revolution was necessary to fulfill the process: “political emancipation” was 
to be succeeded by “human emancipation”.678  Dühring, Marx’s younger rival, engages in a 
similar effort, but, as we have seen, in a different manner: the liberation which he envisions 
must be based on the actual concrete phenomena, and thus the idea of abstraction is not taken 
as far as it had been by Marx. Dühring vehemently rejects the idea of revolution and of 
“miracle solutions”; he offers not a grand vision of an ultimate societal development, but 
rather a practical model of a system of communities, which functions according to real 
economic mechanisms, and develops within the given structure of traditional society. Whereas 
Marx’s vision of emancipation is largely philosophical, Dühring’s is principally political. 
Proceeding from his studies of Hegel, Marx concerns himself with the concept of alienation 
and how it affected society; after praising bourgeois society for its great achievements, Marx 
concludes that it has alienated the proletariat, who in turn, through a dialectical process, will 
rise to create a classless society. Dühring, who considers the revolution of the bourgeoisie in 
1789 to be the one decisive revolution, is interested in fulfilling the values of the 
Enlightenment through concrete political action involving organized group cooperation to 
fight the violent state, and to break the chains of traditional society. Although he is one with 
Marx in affirming the process of man having to sever ties with the confining institutions of 
the past, the Philosophy of the Actual has an inherent aversion to abstraction not wedded to 
the concrete. Dühring therefore rejects the idea of revolution as a “deus ex machina solution”, 
believing that change will have to come on the basis of the existing society. In Dühring’s 
677 Ernst Nolte has labeled this phenomenon “practical transcendence”. Cf. Three Faces of Fascism (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 429-434.  
678 Ibid., 434. 
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philosophy, it is not enough to disassociate oneself without offering a positive association to 
replace it.  
Despite the realistic basis of his system, which shuns utopianism and revolutionary solutions, 
Dühring’s thought is clearly embedded in the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment. There is 
hardly a current of leftist thought which is not to be found in Dühring. Indeed, it could be 
claimed that in many ways his thought represents a microcosm of the leftist values that have 
existed since the French Revolution. In his 1874 article “A New Communist”, socialist leader 
August Bebel wrote that Dühring belongs to the left wing of the socialists.679 Bebel goes on to 
list Dühring’s, as he sees them, communist views: a violent transformation of the state, an 
abolition of land ownership, decentralization and organization of economic communes with 
industrial production, nationalization of all means of transport, abolition of differences in pay 
between “head” and “hand” work, educational opportunity for all, state education and gender 
rights, and a break with religion.680  
Even though, as we have seen, Dühring was to alter some of these positions at a later date – 
some of them quite radically – his leftist credentials remained intact throughout his career. 
The affinity of his thought with leftist principles can be clearly enumerated. Left-liberal 
political thought is characterized by the idea of equality in some form; the main principle of 
Dühring’s system is the ruling out of coercion, and the creation of equality (in the form of 
ethnic homogeny) in society. The Left has always been known for appeals to the concept of 
justice utilizing emotion and feelings of outrage; Dühring advocates the value of instinct and 
emotion in making affirmative moral statements. Liberalism is often eudemonistic and 
concerned with the prosperity of the masses, and Dühring – at least until the late phase of his 
career – praises the instinct of the people and optimistically believes that the happiness of 
mankind lies in the future. The anti-elitism passionately advocated by most liberals was 
strongly evident in Dühring’s attacks on the university professors. The Leftists’ discomfort 
with the power of institutions – as, for example, articulated by the Frankfurt School – is 
mirrored in Dühring’s critique of the university, the state, the church, the military, the 
traditional structure of marriage, etc.681 A salient cause of Left Liberalism has traditionally 
been women’s emancipation; as Bebel pointed out, freeing women from the institution of 
coerced marriage has a prominent place in Dühring’s thought. Pacifism is another main 
679 Bebel, “Ein neuer ‘Communist’,” Volksstaat (12 March 1874). 
680 Ibid., and also “Ein neuer ‘Communist (Schluß),” Volksstaat (20 March 1874). 
681 One thinks of Theodor W. Adorno’s position in his public debates with Arnold Gehlen on the significance of 
institutions. Adorno was of the opinion that institutions cause people to be immature. Cf. “Soziologisches 
Streitgespräch. Adorno vs. Gehlen 1965,” moderated by Felix von Cube. 
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element of liberal thought; Dühring is vehemently opposed to war.682 Liberals are against 
traditional religion; the Philosophy of the Actual, which advocates a strictly immanent view of 
the world, is as well. Leftist intellectuals often advocate atheism, as does Dühring. Liberals 
often advocate science as a means of warding off traditional beliefs; scientism is a main pillar 
of Dühring’s thought. Like many liberals, who often view their ancestors disparagingly, 
Dühring sees the whole of society as having been in a stage of immaturity before the French 
Revolution. He is also an advocate of international human rights, having written a special 
treatise on the Geneva Convention. Dühring’s system of sociopolitical economics thus stands 
out as an embodiment of various currents of modern leftist thought.683 
2. Equality and the Postulate of Destruction 
Dühring system does not only represent a microcosm of leftist thought: in an essential way, it 
can be said to have outdone any liberal doctrines that had ever been formed. Although he was 
one of the first anti-Marxist theoreticians, as Carl-Erich Vollgraf points out, Dühring’s attacks 
against Marxism “came from the left”.684 Dühring’s system aims at taking liberalism to the 
extreme by removing any barriers that will limit man’s freedom.685 Even the concept of the 
Free Society itself will need to be removed as “you should never count on absolutely 
permanent entities, indeed never even want them”.686 For Dühring, life and death, creation, 
and destruction belong unequivocally together. In adding an element of what may be termed 
“liberating destruction” to his system – that may even be applied to the system itself – he 
takes the concept of emancipation to a new extreme. To keep his ideas of liberation in 
perspective, it is again helpful to focus on the historical development of the concept of 
liberation, which prededed the radical solution to the quandary of bondage and liberation 
which Dühring ultimately provided.  
Western Liberalism developed – and is still developing today – as philosophy of history, a 
secular phenomenon unrestricted by nature or God, offering hope and security for a brighter 
682  Once again we should draw attention to changes in his outlook as his career progresses. In the first phase of 
his literary production, he does advocate war. Cf. KGV, 454. 
683 Johannes Berg, a contemporary of Dühring’s and a proponent of free trade, also pointed out how Dühring 
unifies various socialist tendencies. Cf. “Die Pateien im Deutschen Reichstag,” Unsere Zeit (1882): 860. 
684 Carl Erich Vollgraf, Theoriegeschichtliche Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des “Anti-Dühring.” Marx 
Mitarbeit am “Anti-Dühring,” 9 and 38.  
685 Although this sounds similar to anarchism, as we have seen, Dühring’s background in law, as well as his 
historical point of departure, prevent him from rejecting government completely. Dühring, in our opinion, is far 
too much of a rationalist to ever be a true anarchist. E.V. Zenker, however, sees Dühring in the tradition of 
anarchism, but considers him a “watered down social theorist compared with Proudhon.” Der Anarchismus. 
Kritische Geschichte der anarchistischen Theorie (Berlin: Libertad Verlag, 1979 [1895]), 147. On Dühring‘s 
relationship to Proudhon, the founder of anarchism, see F. Kreier, Sozialismus für Kleinbürger. Pierre Joseph 
Proudhon – Wegbereiter des Dritten Reichs, 355-369. 
686 CP, 304.  
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future. 687 As it came to be accepted that man’s fate is not formed by nature, but rather 
through the work of man himself, divine providence was slowly replaced by human 
progress.688 The notion of emancipation served as a vehicle of revolution and civil war and as 
the 19th century progressed moved into the service of industrialization; “liberation” became 
the battle cry to change world history. The prerequisite for this Liberalism, which did not 
develop outside of Europe, was the separation of church and state in the Middle Ages and a 
dualism which may be termed “the necessary condition for the genesis of intellectual and 
political freedom”.689 Although the phrase “Ecclesia semper reformanda” is accurate to 
describe the dynamics of change within the development of Christianity, a new level of 
“emancipation” took place with the “abstraction” of Protestantism from the Catholic Church 
during the Reformation. The atrocities of the confessional wars caused many enlightened 
thinkers to advocate tolerance among citizens and peace among countries. However, thinkers 
began to conclude that it would become possible to eradicate the reasons for war and 
intolerance altogether. The cause of these societal evils was seen to be in the existence of the 
nobility, the church, or simply in the inequality of men in general.  
The idea of liberation advanced to a stage yet unseen through the French Revolution, which 
unseated the monarchy and the feudal order, but was only possible through executions, 
killing, and bloodshed unparalleled in European history.690 1789 became the starting point 
towards a “just social order”, and the abstract power of emancipation, through the bourgeois 
public, continued to gain influence over society. Soon the cause of social suffering and 
inequality was translated into terms of economics. Intellectuals became radicalized, coming to 
view capital and interest as causing individual slavery. There were strong attacks led by men 
such as Thomas Paine against the system of state debt, and aristocratic sinecures and many 
Englishmen began to speak out against the existence of the aristocracy in general, undertones 
of eradicating or destroying a class of people. The English aristocracy acted promptly and 
confidently, passing the reform bill in the year of Dühring’s birth, 1833; this alleviated the 
radicalism to a large degree. Philosophical radicals remained, however, and there was a 
vehement revolt from members on the fringes of the Tory party against child labor. Another 
reaction towards problems of industrialization, involving a “destruction” of sorts, came from 
687 Cf. Hanno Kesting, Geschichtsphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg. 
688 Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was an early proponent of this line of thinking. Cf. Ibid., 56-57. 
689 Wolfgang Reinhard, "Die lateinische Variante von Religion und ihre Bedeutung für die politische Kultur 
Europas. Ein versuch in historischer Anthropologie," op. cit., 243. 
690 On this phenomenon see Ernst Nolte’s article, “Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Vernichtungspostulat,“ in idem, 
Was ist bürgerlich? und andere Artikel, Abhandlungen, Auseinandersetzungen (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), 
222-247. 
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the Malthus school, which feared that industrial improvements could be destroyed by the 
biological power of humans and that the increasing population would be putting pressure on 
society’s means of sustenance until people learned to have self-control and reproduce less.691  
Other suggestions, as Nolte points out, were less direct. An article appeared in 1838 entitled 
“On the Possibility of Limiting Populousness”, written by an anonymous author named 
Marcus, which advocated the painless extermination of surpluses of babies through lethal gas 
as the only way of preserving the happiness of individuals against the evils of overpopulation. 
This writing is the first recorded postulate of extermination through gas and, as Nolte points 
out, is clearly eudemonistic and Benthamian in its character.692 The principle of destruction of 
the radical Left thus contained a rational and humanitarian core. However, its main thrust was 
not a “physical” but rather a “societal” destruction – i.e. the ridding society of a perceived ill. 
There was the feeling of an irrevocable shift in world history, and it was thought that to fulfill 
this development certain societal entities would have to meet destruction. Comte, Dühring’s 
paragon, “claimed the irrevocable end of the theological and metaphysical era and the realities 
which accompanied it; Tocqueville placed a gravestone for the aristocracy on both of his main 
works”.693 Marxism should be mentioned in this context as well: a new proletarian revolution 
was to outdo the bourgeois revolution and destroy “all differences”. In place of the freedom of 
property there was to be freedom from property. In place of commercial freedom, there was to 
be freedom from the egoism of trade; instead of freedom of religion there was to be freedom 
from religion. And finally, instead of the emancipation of the Jews, there was to be 
emancipation from the Jews, as the young Karl Marx formulated it. The enthusiasm that the 
classical German philosophers had for philosophical revolution was ultimately surpassed by 
Marx: a revolutionary theory is converted into a political ideology. To quote Marx on his 
theory of revolution: “It is not an anatomical knife, it is a weapon. Its object is its enemy, 
which it does not want to refute, but to destroy”. 694   
The concept of “destruction” is also an integral part of Dühring’s ontology. In Cursus of 
Philosophy he speaks of destruction in terms of the diverse, constantly new forms that appear 
and then become obliterated.695 Annihilation is also present in human affairs through his 
postulate of the Law of Difference and the idea that antagonism is an element throughout the 
691 An idea which Dühring vehemently rejected, as we have seen above. 
692 Nolte, “Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Vernichtungspostulat,” 227et seq. 
693 Ibid., 229. 
694 “Sie ist kein anatomisches Messer, sie ist eine Waffe. Ihr Gegenstand ist ihr Feind, den sie nicht widerlegen, 
sondern vernichten will.” Karl Marx, „Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung,“ in Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels Werke. Band I (Berlin: Dietz), 380. On the threats of destruction in the works of Marx and 
Engels, cf. also Nolte, Marxismus und Industrielle Revolution, 460 et seq. 
695 CP, 21. 
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whole of nature. His theory of consciousness is based on the premise that harmful superstition 
and aberrations of human thought should be eradicated if deceit and ultimately corruption are 
to be avoided. Dühring also speaks of morally indefensible societal configurations which must 
be destroyed to further the development of life in general.696 These abstract thoughts are given 
extreme expression later in Dühring’s career when, beginning in 1900, he began to publish his 
work on his own. In a fit of what must be seen as unspeakable fanaticism, beginning with the 
sixth edition of his book the Jewish Question, he advocates the physical extermination of the 
Jews as a therapeutic measure to rid society of “the demagoguery of selfishness”. 
3. A Revised Framework of Left-Liberalism 
With regard to political economy, Dühring’s system is a direct challenge to the laissez-faire 
doctrines of classical liberalism. As we have seen, he follows Carey and List in believing that 
the doctrines of free trade professed by the British School do not represent valid theoretical 
premises, i.e. do not have general value for all economies, but are rather far more an 
expression of the situation of Britain and her empire and the particular interests of Great 
Britain. As has been pointed out on several occasions, Dühring’s system is embedded in the 
18th century’s view that laws of nature determine economies; to deny the existence of laws of 
nature is, for Dühring, to abandon any form of a scientific approach to political economy. 
Despite his affinity for the ideas of physiocrats and especially Adam Smith, as we have seen, 
Dühring shows the influence of his background in the Staatswissenschaften and German 
Idealism by postulating the existence of Laws of Development, which soften the strict 
determinism of the social and economic world, functioning differently than do laws of nature. 
Man creates a “world of institutions and facts” towards which we are not bound in the same 
way as to nature.697 Despite his discomfort with and his reservations about the use of history, 
as analyzed in Chapter Five above, Dühring sees man as an historical being, as did both the 
German Historical School and the Marxist Socialists.698 Adam Smith and classical political 
economy’s assumption that there is only one realm of law governing economics is for 
Dühring one-sided and insufficient as it fails to provide for important anthropological 
differentiations, including the importance of technology as a factor of economic development. 
Dühring sees the advance of technology as a liberating factor as  – regardless as to how the 
696 Ibid., 212.  
697 CNS, 66. As mentioned above, this is the distinction would later be developed – albeit with a different 
application – by the Southwest School of Kantianism (Windelband and Rickert), which spoke of “idiographic” 
and “nomothetic” laws. On the difference between naturalism and historicism from the point of scientific 
cognition see Hans Alberts’ insightful lecture “Geschichtswissenschaft als hypothetisch-deduktive Diziplin – zur 
Kritik des methodologischen Historismus,” Mannheimer Vorträge 2 (2000): 5-22. 
698 Binder, SSED, 52.   
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distribution is carried out – it increases the productivity of economic means, natural resources, 
and the workforce. The “Age of Coal and Iron” ushered in by the progress of mechanics and 
technology (man’s “second nature”) has opened up grand possibilities for wealth and 
prosperity.699 Dühring thus equates freedom with man separating, or liberating himself from 
nature. Man must also liberate himself from fabricated entities in the form of monopolies 
created by unbridled capitalism.700 His attack on the traditional forms of ruling, as being 
carried out through immoral political force, presupposes the eradication of these elements to 
create a truly free society. He gives up his plan for the ultimately Free Society, but the seed 
had been planted for others, most prominently Oppenheimer and Hertzka, to attempt to carry 
out this idea, which takes liberalism to its absolute extreme.701 
Having placed Dühring’s thought in the tradition of leftist liberal thought as it developed since 
the French Revolution, we have seen that his ideas in many ways represent an attack on 
various societal entities and institutions in the name of liberation. Along with the sundry of 
liberal beliefs mentioned above, his system also includes even the most radical tenet of 
liberalism, the postulate of destruction and the advocacy of the eradication of harmful societal 
elements in the name of freedom. What separates Dühring from most other leftists, including 
Marx, is his philosophy’s realistic basis and its ad hoc approach to solving concrete practical 
problems as they present themselves at any given time. Karl Marx wrote that philosophers 
should not only interpret the world – they should also try to change it.702 The Philosophy of 
the Actual must contradict this statement because it aims to focus exclusively on the 
phenomena of the world as it is, and not how a philosopher imagines it should be.703 Just as 
Dühring discards the idea of revolution, he must also discard Marx’s thesis on Feuerbach. 
Man must deal with this reality, the actual world; what can be changed is the mere human, or 
the “unnecessarily human”, which leads man astray. The world is to be confronted 
realistically. To be done away with are those “merely human” creations, or the “merely 
historical”, seen as false figments of the imagination, amounting to false volition and which, 
699 CNS, 73. 
700 Ibid., 83. 
701  In his classical treatise on the concept of the political, written in the Weimar Republic and supplemented in 
the early sixties, Carl Schmitt points out the weaknesses of Oppenheimer’s attempt to rule out alleged political 
suppression by replacing the State through Society. Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem 
Vorwort und drei Corollarien (Berlin: Dunker &Humblot, 1991), 75-76. 
702 The famous 11th Feuerbach Thesis, which today hangs on the wall of the Humboldt University’s entrance 
hall. 
703 Dühring’s role model Schopenhauer was also opposed to the idea of revolution. He left a substantial portion 
of his wealth to the families of the Prussian soldiers who died in the 1848 Revolution. Cf. Olaf Briese, 
“Querdenker Schopenhauer. Wechselhafte Wirkungen einer pessimistischen Philosophie,” in Helmut Bock and 
Renate Plöse, eds. Aufbruch in die Bürgerwelt. Lebensbilder aus Vormärz und Biedermeier (Münster: 
Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1994), 509.  
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as he sees it, bring forth false action detrimental to man’s freedom and to the whole of society. 
Dühring’s canons are aimed, so to speak, at the, as he views them, oppressive elements of 
various societal entities – e.g. religion, education, law, customs, etc. – which make up what 
Hegel termed the “objective mind”. The polemic against institutions as restrictive fabricated 
creations is a general characteristic of the Enlightenment, which has been a component of Left 
Liberalism since the French Revolution and until the present.  
The attack on establishments deeply entrenched in society, as advocated on a theoretical and 
practical level by Dühring, is an effort that is not likely to be rewarded on a practical level. 
We now turn to the second half of Dühring’s career to examine the trials and tribulations he 
faced as he fought for the ideals of his system. His cause and his enemies were soon to collide 
in a prolonged struggle which would continue until his death in 1921.  
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PART FOUR:  
THE DESCENT INTO ISOLATION AND OBSCURITY 
1877-1921 
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THE SYSTEM of socio-political economics just described was not conceived in a vacuum 
and must be viewed and understood within the context in which it developed. Dühring’s brand 
of socialism, as we have shown, grew out of the leftist-liberal current of thought that 
originated from the philosophy of Hegel, and it was heavily influenced by the turbulent years 
of the early 1870s, which were plagued by financial crisis and general economic instability. 
August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht had officially founded the Social Democratic German 
Labor Party - the precursor of the Social Democratic Party of Germany today - in Eisenach in 
1869, but there was little ideological cohesion to the labor movement. At the time there was a 
demand for a system of thought which could give guidance to leftist intellectuals and could 
offer scientific legitimacy for the cause of the workers, but no one was able to come up with a 
coherent theory that could unite the disparate elements of socialist thinking. At this stage, 
even Friedrich Engels himself had doubts as to whether Marxism could be termed “scientific 
socialism”.704 Dühring’s system of social economics offered elaborate views on the complex 
quandaries of political economy and also contained a political Weltanschauung supported by 
economic principles, a philosophy, and a critical perspective of history. Beyond that, his 
system possessed a scholarly character while at the same time lashing out at the academic 
elite of the Prussian state apparatus, for whom Dühring was increasingly becoming an 
anathema. Dühring’s thorough and complex teachings on the political economic theory, dealt 
with in Chapter Seven, provided a wealth of material and ideas, which could be applied 
towards creating solutions for the Social Question. Influential leftist intellectuals, such as 
Most, Liebknecht, and even Bebel gravitated towards Dühring, and he became perhaps an 
even greater anathema for “Gods” of socialism, Marx and Engels. Dühring possessed an 
almost diabolical pugnacity which fit the turbulent years of the 1870s. He soon became 
involved in a two-front war between the Prussian professors and the Marxists which would 
break out into intellectual battles on all sides against various societal groupings.705  
704 Cf. “Sozialismus,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: histor. Lexikon zur polit.-sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland,  ed. Otto Brunner (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1974), 985. 
705 It should be noticed that while Marxism postulated a universal historical battle with religious or pseudo-
religious undertones in the name of philosophy, Dühring’s struggles were largely directed towards the present 
and involved his cause and him personally. Marx, as a disciple of Hegel, had loftier visions of a future of world 
revolution led by the “image of the spirit” in struggle with an alien world to transform this world by revolution. 
Cf. Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 79. The philosopher Ludwig Marcuse, as we have 
mentioned above, reproached Dühring’s philosophy for its “lack of a will towards a trans-personal goal” 
(Mangel eines Willens zum überpersönlichen Ziel). “Der Pionier Dühring,” op. cit., 57.        
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CHAPTER TEN  
FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS (1877-1899) 
1. Remotion and the Student Protest Movement  
Since his fight with Adolf Wagner, which had resulted in a warning from the faculty for both 
scholars, Dühring was walking on thin ice at the university. He believed that it was only a 
matter of time before the professors would have him removed from his position as lecturer for 
good. The incident did not, however, cause him to tone down his polemics against the 
university and its professors. If anything, he increased them. He was proud of his stance 
against the university elite, and took inspiration, in this respect, not only from Schopenhauer, 
but also, according to his autobiography, from Adam Smith.706 Echoing the ideals of the 
Enlightenment, but also with a tinge of the self-righteous polemicism that anticipated the 
1968 revolution nearly a century later, he expressed the opinion that the modern university 
had a medieval character and was dominated by exclusive guilds with special privileges. He 
wrote that nepotism reigned supreme and that professors chose subservient successors to 
serve in vacant chairs. The professoriate was a kind of caste procreating through inbreeding, 
immune to competition from outside: in essence, a monopoly.707 
In May of 1877, Dühring was notified by the university that parts of his books Women’s Path 
to Higher Education and the second edition of his prize-winning Critical History of the 
General Principles of Mechanics were considered irreconcilable with his position as a 
university lecturer.708 There were no concrete charges as there had been in the controversy 
with Adolf Wagner two years earlier. Dühring’s main offence, it seems, was to have broken 
the unwritten rules of academic etiquette. His greatest infraction was his insinuation that 
706 Cf. SLF, 2nd edition, 187. 
707 WBF, 36-37. Following his dismissal he collected his thoughts on university life into an article entitled “The 
University Question in Modern Society”. Dühring, “Die Universitätsfrage der moderenen Gesellschaft,” Mehr 
Licht 49 and 52 (Sept.: 1879): 776-779, 826-830. Had he known of Dühring, H.L. Mencken would have agreed 
with him wholeheartedly regarding the negative influence of the university on science. Mencken wrote: 
“Political economy, in so far as it is a science at all, was pumped up and embellished by any such academic 
clients and ticket-of-leave men. It was put on its legs by inquirers who were not only safe from all sousing in the 
campus pump, but who were also free from the mental timorousness and conformity which go inevitably with 
school teaching – in brief, by men of the world, accustomed to its free air, its hospitality to originality and plain 
speaking.” “The Dismal Science,” in Prejudices: Third Series (New York: Cosimo Books, 2009), 284. 
708 Cf. Aktenstücke in der Angelegenheit des Privatdozenten Dr. Dühring. Veröffentlicht durch die 
Philosophische Fakultät der königlichen Universität zu Berlin (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von G.Reimer), 10-11. 
Also, SLF, 2nd edition, 182. On the background of the events leading up to the remotion from the perspective of 
a Dühringian during the Weimar Republic, see Gustav Michaelis, “Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte der Remotion 
Eugen Dührings,” Propagandablätter zur Dühringsche Geisteshaltung und Lebensgestaltung. Zittauer 
(Memento-) Sendbogen (Juli 1927): 1-19. For a perspective critical of Dühring see Wolfgang Drechsler, “Herr 
Dühring’s Remotion,” Eugen Dühring (1833-1921) and the Freedom of Teaching and Research, Journal of 
Economic Studies, ed. Jürgen Backhaus (2002), 262-293. 
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Professor Hermann Helmholtz had plagiarized Robert Mayer by publishing his own theory of 
energy equivalence five years after Mayer published his, saying that he had no knowledge of 
Mayer’s discovery.709 It became apparent to Dühring that he had little chance of defending 
himself successfully this time around.  
Help did come, however, from public opinion: soon after the charges were officially made, the 
first newspapers began to report on the affair. Throughout Germany, there came a wave of 
outrage against the university. The public was clearly behind the erudite blind lecturer. When 
it became known that the critique of Prof. Helmholtz was the reason for his dismissal, the 
newspapers asked the University of Berlin what they thought of Schopenhauer’s description 
of Helmholtz as someone who “related to true greatness as a molehill to Mont Blanc”. The 
people clearly sided with Dühring against the university and its elite professors. At the same 
time, the university students began to speak out for Dühring, as did members of the Social 
Democratic Party (at the time called Social Democratic Labor Party). When the official decree 
from the Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs was released on 6 June, banning Dühring 
from any further lecturing at the Berlin University in the middle of the semester, there was a 
storm of protest building on the horizon. 
Loyal participants of his lectures were outraged and began to take action: soon there was an 
organized protest movement throughout the country. Dühring received a petition against his 
remotion signed by 250 students from the Berlin University. It read: 
Dear Dr. Dühring, 
A rumor has been spreading that there is a proceeding directed by the philosophy faculty 
against your teaching at our university. With this letter, those who have signed this petition 
feel called upon to give testimony to the amount of respect that they owe a man, who, free 
from any selfish intentions, fearing no obstacle in the fight for what he held to be right and 
true, always courageously expressed and defended his opinion under the most difficult 
conditions. We aim to prove that there is still a feeling of justice and freedom among the local 
student body and respect for every opinion based on inner conviction. 
Berlin, 19 June 1877.  
Dühring’s answer followed one day later: 
709 Dühring cast doubt on Helmholtz’s claim to have also discovered the Law of Conservation of Energy 
independently of Robert Mayer. While giving Mayer credit for having first discovered the law, Helmholtz claims 
to have come to the same conclusion without having read Mayer’s article, which was published in the well-
known Annalen der Chemie und Pharmacie von Wöhler und Liebig in 1842. Helmholtz defended himself against 
Dühring’s charge, writing, that at the time, as a military doctor in Potsdam, he had no time to do “extensive 
literature research”. Cf. Aktenstücke in der Angelegenheit des Privatdozenten Dr. Dühring durch die 
philosophische Fakultät der Kgl. Universität zu Berlin (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1877).  
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Dear Students, 
The sentiments that you have documented for me are not only a testimony to my way of 
thinking, but also to yours. The second edition of my History of the Principles of Mechanics, 
which has been incriminated by the University of Berlin, shows the difficulties presented for 
any scientific effort striving for honor and truth. In my book I have written that anyone who 
writes critically of the recent history and present state of mathematics inevitably upsets the 
powers that be to such an extent that his career in science is in jeopardy. Although I have only 
portrayed part of this historically, and only a single branch of applied mathematics, 
condemning the conditions of today as they relate to education, this has sufficed to get a taste 
of the tenuousness of a scientific career. By sincerely thanking you for the sympathy you have 
shown my position towards science and life, and in full appreciation of the value of the steps 
you have taken, I hope that you will experience a day where freedom and truth in science have 
more standing than at the moment.  
Berlin, 20 June 1877  
On 12 July, there was a large public gathering at the Berliner Handwerkerverein (Berlin Trade 
Union Society). Approximately 2,500 people showed up, of which 1,500 were students, the 
rest middle class citizens. At the gathering, according to Dühring, resolutions were made in 
protest of his dismissal and against the deplorable conditions at the universities.710 A 
corporative association for the freedom of science was founded for the purpose of monitoring 
unlawful actions by the university guild and facilitating discussion on freedom in academia. 
The press coverage of the event was mixed, depending on whether the newspaper was for or 
against the Social Democratic movement. 711 The Social Democrats themselves, who had held 
a special event on the same day to protest the dismissal, issued an official resolution to be 
delivered to the assembly by five of their members, among them Johann Most, a radical but 
politically influential socialist, who had discovered Dühring’s works while in Plötzensee 
prison.712 The students accepted the Berlin workers’ deputation with great enthusiasm – an 
occurrence, as Rudolf Rocker (writing in 1924), Most’s biographer, noticed, “one never saw 
710 SFL, 2nd edition, 206. 
711 Cf. Brigitte Mogge, Rhetorik des Hasses (Neuss: Verlag: Gesellschaft für Buchdruckerei AG, 1977), 34.  
712 Most wrote Dühring immediately following his release from prison to thank him for the pleasure that reading 
Cursus der National- und Sozialökonomie and Cursus der Philosophie had given him during his two years in 
prison. He regrets the lack of a unified system of socialism at the time and tries to encourage Dühring to write a 
“system of modern socialism”. Cf. Most to Dühring, 18 June 1876, HA/SBB. Dühring’s change of course, away 
from the workers movement and towards gaining influence among the middle class hindered any further 
cooperation with Most. Cf. Reinhardt’s article “Eugen Dühring und Johann Most,” Sendbogen für Dühringische 
Geisteshaltung und Lebensgestaltung 38 (January 1933): 8-10.   
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again in Germany”.713 Less than one year later, following the attempted assassination of the 
Kaiser, the students rallied around the throne, and were to remain largely anti-Marxist in their 
bearing.714 
The question has been posed as to whether Dühring’s dismissal from the University of Berlin 
was just or not. The charges were imprecise, but, as mentioned, the insinuations of plagiarism 
Dühring made against Prof. Helmholtz seem to have been the main factor.715 At the time, the 
consensus among intellectuals – even those who were vehemently opposed to Dühring – was 
that the firing was unjust. A recent investigation of the incident by Wolfgang Drechsler has, 
however, has judged that the dismissal was legal, legitimate, and would also be upheld 
today.716 Drechsler’s conclusions, in our opinion, fail to grasp the main point, however, which 
does not center on any grave infractions committed by Dühring, but rather on conflicts of 
interest between the professoriate and Dühring. Much like the controversial case of the 
American scholar Dr. Scott Nearing, who was dismissed from the University of Pennsylvania 
in the 1920s for professing socialist views of political economy, Dühring was dismissed not 
for his deportment as a lecturer, but rather because the leftist ethos his scholarship represented 
disturbed the security and equanimity of the tenured professors who controlled the 
university.717 Although he was only a Privatdozent (untenured lecturer), Dühring and his ideas 
of scientific and social reform had generated a large following among the Berlin students, 
who swarmed to his lectures and supported his views. The professoriate, taken aback by the 
allegedly dangerous critique that Dühring issued, had an interest in crushing what they saw as 
a danger to the apparatus of the university which they represented.718  
Perhaps the most significant consideration regarding the incident – untouched upon by 
Drechsler – is that, through the scandal and uproar surrounding the remotion, the content of 
the book for which Dühring was dismissed, which had amounted to a bold and original 
713 Rudolf Rocker, Johann Most. Das Leben eines Rebellen, 56. It would not be until the 1960s that there would 
an uproar among the students on the scale of the protest against Dühring’s dismissal.  
714 Konrad Jarausch, Students, Society, and Politics. The Rise of Academic Illiberalism (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), 264. 
715 Although Mayer’s article was published in a well-known journal at the time, it has generally been accepted 
that Helmholtz did not have access to Mayer’s work; Helmholtz was quick to credit Mayer once he was 
confronted with his theory. To this day, Helmholtz enjoys an esteemed position in the history of German 
thought, and is a revered figure in today’s Germany as witnessed by the Helmholtz Gemeinschaft, an association 
of German research centers named in his honor; his statue stands in front of the main building of Berlin’s 
Humboldt University. Cf. Universalgenie Helmholtz. Rückblick nach 100 Jahren, ed. Lorenz Krüger (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1994). 
716 Drechsler, “Herr Dühring’s Remotion,” op. cit. 
717 Cf. H. L. Mencken’s remarks of Nearing in his article “The Dismal Science,” op. cit., 463-465. 
718 Another consideration was the pecuniary factor. Lectures of both the professors and the unsalaried lecturers 
were remunerated according to the amount of students who attended. There may have been a financial factor as 
well connected with petty jealousies towards a successful teacher like Dühring. 
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attempt to find a way to improve the professional chances of women, was completely ignored 
and removed from public discussion. As Maria Reményi has asserted, the manner in which a 
society deals with radical critics is also a measure of its stability and system of values; 
Dühring’s case showed the existence of concealed fractures in the economic and scientific 
aspiring society of industrial Germany.719 The decision of the faculty to dismiss Dühring was 
a conservative measure which, ironically, may have in the long term done a disservice to the 
institutions that the Berlin professors sought to protect. The stifling of Dühring’s critique 
ensured that an important social issue, such as the improvement of the educational 
opportunities of women, was not addressed, much less solved. The professors’ actions 
increased the growing alienation among certain sectors of the German population and, in our 
opinion, indirectly sowed the seeds of radicalism to come.720        
2. From Friend to Foe of the Social Democrats 
Dühring’s growing popularity within the Social Democratic movement has been touched upon 
already. Since the publication of his Cursus of National and Social Economy in 1873 and the 
near completion of his system of social economics (his treatise on philosophy was to follow in 
1875), he had become a noticeable figure among Social Democratic intellectuals. Looking 
back on the development of the Social Democratic movement in its early days, Eduard 
Bernstein emphasized Dühring’s key role as a catalyst for bringing students and Social 
Democratic activists together.721 Students from different Berlin colleges, inspired by Dühring, 
began to meet to discuss possibilities of socialist cooperation, and out of these gatherings the 
famous “Mohren Club” was founded by Louis Viereck.722 What particularly interested 
Bernstein and others in Dühring’s theories was the economically liberal element in his 
socialism, a factor which they believed had been neglected by Marxism.723 
In the rivalry between the Marxists and the Lassalleists, Dühring had come closer to taking 
sides with the latter. He saw the advocacy of general suffrage as a precondition for the 
workers attaining political power as “one of the most successful elements of Lassalle’s 
719 Reményi, “Der Fall Eugen Dühring und die Diskussion um das Frauenstudium in Berlin,” 278. 
720 It is indeed true, as Bona Meyer, suggested, that Dühring’s charges of nepotism and corruption were vague; 
the veracity of such claims would have needed documentation which Dühring failed to provide. Mayer, “Zur 
Philosophie der Gegenwart,” 54-55. However, we believe that an intellectual rebuttal of the charges would have 
been more effective than dismissing Dühring from the university, which created a bad impression of the tenured 
professors in the public. 
721 Eduard Bernstein, Sozialdemokratische Lehrjahre (Berlin: Der Bücherkeis, 1928), 55. See also Sudermann, 
Das Bilderbuch meiner Jugend, 231. 
722 Ibid. 
723 Bernstein, Entwicklungsgang eines Sozialisten (Leipzig:1930), 11-12. Bernstein thought at the time that Marx 
advocated a strong state, but later after having read his work on the Paris Commune thought otherwise. Cf. 
Richard Adamiak, “Marx, Engels, and Dühring,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974): 105.  
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program”.724 Upon his dismissal from the university, however, even his opponents in the 
Marxist camp showed solidarity with him in his fight against the university. The Berlin Social 
Democratic representative Wilhelm Hasenclever wrote several articles in support of Dühring, 
whom he saw as a martyr for science. The events surrounding his dismissal were followed 
intensely in the national paper Berlin Freie Presse.725  
Dühring’s popularity among Social Democrats had become the cause of concern for Marx and 
Engels some time before his dismissal from the university. Although Dühring rated Marx 
much higher than the Kathedersozialisten, the “socialists of the chair”, as we have seen, he 
did not think particularly highly of him as a theorist, a fact of which Marx found out indirectly 
as early as 1868.726 It should be remembered that as Dühring’s works won influence in the 
1870s, Marxism was far from an established entity in Germany. Even among the leaders of 
the workers movement, the intricacies of Marx’s theories remained little understood. Karl 
Liebknecht, for example, who stood in close personal contact to Marx, claimed that Buckle 
(praised by Dühring - cf. Chapter Four) – whom Marx and Engels saw as the historian of 
laissez-faire capitalism  – was the greatest innovator in the field of history and had achieved 
as much as Darwin in the area of natural science and Marx in social science.727 Bebel’s book 
Woman and Socialism was based much more on the theories of Fourier than on Marx, and 
Proudhon was, at the beginning of the 1870s, far more widely known than Marx.728 
The danger for Marxism at this stage lay in the abstractness of its teachings, which hindered it 
from becoming accepted by the leftist avante garde. Although there were educated and 
intelligent people in their numbers, Social Democratic activist seemed to be wary of 
excessively abstract concepts. The views of the masses of workers tended to focus around the 
basic idea that they had to stick together in the fight against capital in order to finally give the 
workers what they rightfully deserved. As Tenefelde and Dowe have written, there was “a 
724 KSN, 2nd edition, 523. 
725 Cf. Dieter Dowe and Klaus Tenefelde, “Zur Rezeption Eugen Dührings in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 
in den 70er Jahren,” 45 et seq. 
726 Marx gave Dühring credit for being the only academic to write a review of Das Kapital, but later found out 
from Sigfrid Mayer, an acquaintance living in the U.S. who had corresponded with Dühring, that Dühring had 
told him that Marx’s dialectic was “unscientific, unsolid, and dishonest”. Carl-Erich Vollgraf, Marx’ “Randnoten 
zu Dührings ‘Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie,’” 236.    
727 Quoted from Rudolf Rocker, Johan Most. Das Leben eines Rebellen, 52-53. 
728 Marx apparently had the reputation among insiders as being a bit scattered and disorganized. The well-known 
neo-Kantian Philosopher Friedrich Albert Lange once asked Wilhelm Liebknecht why Marx to date (end of the 
1860s) has only published fragments and brochures. Cf. Carl-Erich Vollgraf, “Marx’ erstmals veröffentlichte 
Manuskripte zum 2. Und 3. Buch des Kapitals von 1867/68 im MEGA – Band II/ 4.3.  Zu neuralgischen Punkten 
in der Ausarbeitung des Kapitals,” Beiträge zur Marx-Engels-Forschung. Neue Folge (2010): 77.  
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partly latent, partly manifest proletarian anti-intellectualism” in the movement.729 This 
worked for Dühring, whose popularity lay far less in the theoretical subtleties of his social 
economic system as in the Anschaulichkeit, or the intuitive clarity, of his thought. As 
mentioned above, Gustav Landauer commented that Dühring's writings were in many ways 
superior to Marx's: more universal, more modern and scientific, less dogmatic, and more 
understandable.730 Engel’s “anti-Dühring” articles, which began to be published in Vorwärts 
magazine shortly before Dühring’s dismissal, can be seen in part as an attempt to make up for 
this deficit of Marxism in this respect.731 
Despite the grandiose effort that Engels exerted to fight Dühring, his attack did not diminish 
Dühring’s influence among the Social Democrats – at first. Many party members vehemently 
disapproved of the mocking tone of Engel’s articles. At an assembly in Gotha from 27-30 
May 1877, which was the party’s last before the socialist laws were instituted in 1878, a 
compromise resolution, initiated by Bebel, was passed that would prohibit the “anti-Dühring” 
articles from being printed in the party’s main organ. The articles were to be published as a 
separate scientific supplement to which Dühring would have the right to reply to.732 There 
was even a poem by Eduard Bertz dedicated to Dühring published in the SPD (or Socialist 
Labor Party of Germany, Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, as the party was named 
after the unification congress in Gotha in 1875) central organ.733 Abraham Enß, who would 
later edit the Dühringian paper “Der Antikrat”, before eventually falling out with Dühring in 
the 1890s, countered Engels with a polemical pamphlet titled “Engels Assassination of 
Common Sense or the Scientific Bankruptcy of Marxist Socialism”.734 Hermann Döll helped 
mobilize the students throughout Germany and a “Dühring Comité” was founded which 
729 Dieter Dowe and Klaus Tenefelde, “Zur Rezeption Eugen Dührings in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung in 
den 1870er Jahren,” 37. 
730 Gustav Landauer, “Referat über Dühring’s Kursus der National- und Sozialökonomie,” op. cit.  
731 Wilhelm Bracke correctly made the point, however, that “anti-Dühring” would not influence change the 
minds of the Dühringians and would also not influence the masses of Social Democrats. Its purpose, he believed, 
was to influence a small group of intellectuals who would in turn influence the masses. Cf. Dowe and Tenefeld, 
“Zur Rezeption Eugen Dührings,” 36. 
732 Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, eds. Marga Beyer, Ursula 
Hermann, Anneliese Beska, Gerhard Winkler, Band III, März 1871-April 1878 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974) 106-
107. Cf. also SLF, 201; Mogge, Rhetorik, 148; Richard Adamiak, Marx, Engels, and Dühring, 108; Dowe and 
Tenefelde,52; Rjazanov, 472 et seq.; also Dieter Fricke, Handbuch zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Arbeiterbewegung 1869 bis 1917 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1987), 519. 
733 Dowe and Tenefelde, op. cit., 52-53. Rjazanov, op. cit., 475. 
734 Enß it seems turned on Dühring at some point. Dühring had thought highly of Enß and in a letter to Jünemann 
expressed disbelief in the latter’s report that Enß had spoken disparagingly of him, Dühring to Jünemann, 20 July 
1890, Dühring Papers, Box 7, HA/SBB. 
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contained students who would later be prominent Social Democratic members such as 
Emanuel Wurm, Max Schippel, and the party poet Wittich.735  
Following his three month summer vacation at a cure in southern Germany, Dühring set out 
on a series of lectures on the subject of the freedom of science, which according to Dühring 
were successful, but according to a university newspaper Alma Mater were not.736 He was 
soon asked to work with a new Social Democratic newspaper, “Die Zukunft”, and, according 
to his autobiography, to be a key intellectual figure in the founding of a “Free University” 
bankrolled by the millionaire social philanthropist Karl Höchberg.737 At a meeting on 9 
November 1877, Dühring made public a plan for the founding of this new scientific 
association, introducing a series of statutes with the intent of securing that the organization 
have a scientific goal and that party interests be excluded. Berlin Freie Presse, which had up 
to that point been in support of him, published articles criticizing Dühring as wanting to 
control the Free University “like an infallible pope”.738 In November, Dühring made an 
official statement distancing himself from the Social Democrats, claiming he was in no party 
and that he would remain independent of “church, state, and scholarly guild”. He alleged that 
the Social Democrats were using him and his name to gain influence among the students. This 
statement was answered by the central committee of the Socialist Democratic Labor Party on 
17 November in a report which disclaimed the party’s involvement in the founding of the 
“Free University” and refuted, among other things, Dühring’s claims of being used by the 
party.739 
Despite the extremely favorable conditions and the great sympathy that he received for having 
been unjustly fired due to his own personal convictions, Dühring was not able to utilize the 
situation to further his cause. What were the reasons for his failure? It seems that many people 
disapproved of the increasingly coarse tone of his lectures and the way in which he dealt with 
his opponents, some of whom were popular among Social Democrats. His aggressively 
combative manner turned off intellectuals. At the same time, there were students who rose to 
speak out against Dühring and the influence of the Social Democrats in general on the 
students. Students at the University of Berlin and other universities, as well as student 
735 Emil Döll, Eugen Dühring, Etwas von dessen Character, Leistungen und reformatorischen Beruf (Leipzig: 
C.G. Naumann, 1893),7. Dowe and Tenefelde, op. cit., 46.  
736 SLF, 2nd edition, 217. Mogge, Die Rhetorik des Hasses, 34. Bernstein reported that a substantial number of 
Social Democrats attended.  Eduard Bernstein, Die Geschichte der Berliner Arbeiter-Bewegung (Berlin: 
Buchhandlung Vorwärts, 1907), 343. 
737 Mogge, op. cit., 34. Bernstein, Sozialdemokratische Lehrjahre, 56; Rjazanov, op. cit., 475.  
738 Berlin Freie Presse (14 November 1877). Bernstein, Geschichte der Berliner Arbeiter-Bewegung, 344. 
739 Published in: Vorwärts, No. 137, 21 November 1877. Reprinted in Dokumente und Materialien zur 
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 107-108. 
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associations and fraternities, condemned the bond between the students and social democracy. 
Dühring soon found himself not only excluded from the university, but also having lost the 
sympathies of the Social Democrats. He never was to write for the Social Democratic journal 
financed by Höchberg, and the “Free University”, which he had envisioned, did not come to 
fruition, although an educational institute of the Socialist Labor Party did evolve from the 
original plans that Dühring set in motion.740 
Dühring’s failure to politically utilize the sympathy and support he had following his 
dismissal from the university has been largely attributed to his narrow-minded and 
authoritarian character. Mauthner writes that Dühring is an example of a principle of 
aesthetics that holds “dass nicht zum Helden einer Tragödie taugt, wer bei allen heroischen 
Eigenschaften ein unangenehmer Mensch ist”.741 Dühring’s difficult personality certainly 
played a role in his problems, but it should be pointed out that the difficulties facing him at 
attempting to turn complex theoretical positions into concrete political action, which would be 
accepted by the Social Democrats and students alike, were tremendous, regardless of his 
appeal as a person. In trying to bridge the gap between the interests of the workers and the 
German public at large, Dühring was treading on virgin soil. The ambitious path he took 
contained what were in all likelihood insurmountable obstacles, and the only way to move 
forward was through controversy.  
The failure that his efforts ultimately met may be in part attributed to his personality, but the 
misadventure he faced is also a common, if not usual, result of the struggles of the ideal type 
of the controversial scholar which Dühring embodied. When all was said and done, Dühring’s 
role as the controversial scholar had gone full circle. This type of scholar gains the attention 
of the public due to actions he takes and or opinions he raises. Once the limelight is focused 
on him, he is able to defend himself through the media, but is accordingly “refuted” by 
pundits of the establishment. As the controversial scholar nearly always breaches some sort of 
taboo or forbidden question, when the discussion of the matter intensifies he becomes 
increasingly isolated due to the strength of the mass media, which tends to represent the 
mainstream opinion that the controversial scholar is usually against. Ultimately, the 
controversial scholar, assuming he holds to his positions, disappears from public view, often 
having a certain degree of notoriety for what has occurred to him. Some of these scholars 
740 Bernstein, Sozialdemokratische Lehrhahre, 57. 
741 “Despite all of the heroic characteristics he may have, an unpleasant man will never be the hero of a tragedy.”  
Fritz Mauthner, Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande (Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1923), 316. 
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become resigned and give up. Still others turn to more radical means for their cause. Dühring 
chose the latter. 
3. New Phase of Productivity amid Trials and Tribulations  
Within a relatively short period, Dühring had lost his positions at Victoria Lyceum and the 
university, and the prospect of gaining employment at a newly founded free university had 
vanished. Faced with the problem of having to make a living to support his family, he 
continued doing what he did best: writing and lecturing. He worked intensely to finish the 
book, which he saw as the final piece of his system, entitled Logic and Scientific Theory, a 
new version of his early work Natural Dialectic.742 A second nearly completely rewritten 
edition of The Worth of Life, which was to become his most popular book, was released in 
early 1877, and now a third edition to his Critical History of Philosophy, as well as a new 
book, New Basic Laws of Rational Physics and Chemistry, were published. A third, updated 
version of Critical History of National Economy and Socialism was introduced in January of 
1879, which included a sharper, even more polemical critique of social democracy and 
Marxism. During his vacation in Wildbad following his dismissal, he happened to run into the 
scientist Robert Mayer, whose scientific honor he had been fighting for and for whom, 
ultimately, he had lost his job for. In October of 1879, he published the first of his two books 
on Mayer titled Robert Mayer: The Galilei of the 19th Century, which lashed out at the 
academic community who had shunned him two years before.743  
It was falsely reported in a Berlin newspaper paper at about the same time that Dühring had 
died of a heart attack on a journey to Cologne.744 The news spread like wildfire throughout 
Germany and the Dührings soon had strangers knocking at their door wanting to speak with 
the lonely widow of the family. His follower Abraham Enß, living in Geneva at the time, 
collected various newspaper reports containing uncomplimentary eulogies to Dühring, which 
Dühring saw as evidence that his foes would go to any lengths to defame him. Dühring’s great 
admirer (and Nietzsche’s close friend) Heinrich von Stein was deeply saddened by the report 
and wrote an effusive letter to Frau Dühring to convey his condolences as well as an obituary: 
742 SLF, 2nd edition, 229. 
743 Ibid., 215. Although his book on Mayer seems to have been read avidly in radical political circles, his attack 
on Helmholz was looked down upon by many intellectuals. Egon Friedell, author of the popular Cultural History 
of Modernity, is full of effusive praise for Helmholtz and writes, “Eugen Dühring hat in zwei leeren Bänden in 
seiner rohen echolalischen Manier Robert Mayer als Märtyrer und ‘Galilei des neuzehnten Jahrhunderts’ 
hingestellt.” Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit, 1079. 
744 SLF, 2nd edition, 235-236.  
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A decisive pessimism outwardly characterized his school of thought. He approved of 
indignation towards the bad, revenge, as the principle of justice. However, as he felt goodness 
within himself, his comprehensive perception of passionate intellectual strength led to an 
elevated and, in his own words, transcendental optimism. Building something like this from 
the flesh and blood of our people, like the Hellenes succeeded in doing with their marble 
pictures, is something that goes beyond today and tomorrow.745 
Due to his negative experience with the events surrounding his dismissal, Dühring’s works 
began now to take on the increasingly polemical and pugnacious tone that would characterize 
his work until his death. His books were also now being written to a different audience. The 
dismissal from the university and his tribulations with the Social Democrats led him, it seems, 
to change the strategy of his publishing and activism. He now no longer gave practical and 
theoretical suggestions to help the workers, but took up arms against what he saw as a 
common denominator amongst his enemies: the Jews. His position on the Jews, as we have 
seen, was anchored in his system of sociopolitical economics, but were, up to now, only a 
peripheral issue.746 With the door to the labor movement slammed in his face, and with his 
access to the student movement impeded by the discontinuation of his lectures, he turned to a 
new, predominantly middle class audience which had become increasingly opposed to the 
influence of the Jews in German society since Richard Wagner’s public critique of the Jews in 
the 1850s.747 
In November of 1879, shortly after affirming that the reports of his death were false, he gave a 
talk titled “The Origins of the Jewish Question in Europe”.748 Dühring’s thoughts on the Jews 
have been highlighted in Chapter Eight. Seen in their historical context, it can be said that the 
deliberations in this lecture were symptomatic for how Europeans perceived the “Jewish 
Question”. There had been hostility towards the Jews for centuries, but the enmity towards 
them up to that point had been legitimized predominantly on religious grounds. From the 
745 Heinrich von Stein to Emilie Dühring, 25 October, 1879, Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. Obituary quoted 
from Markus Bernauer, Heinrich von Stein (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 75. Dühring’s 
publisher, Ernst Schmeitzer, was of the opinion that the Dührings created the story themselves, writing in a letter 
to Friedrich Nietzsche that Frau Dühring is “capable of anything” (zu Vielem fähig).  Archiv für Geschichte des 
Buchwesens, vol. 28 Malcom B. Brown, Friedrich Nietzsche und sein Verleger Ernst Schmeizter, in eds. Monika 
Estermann, Reinhard Wittmann, Marietta Kleiss (Frankfurt am Main: Buchhändler-Vereinigung,1987), 235. 
746 Unlike many of the anti-Jewish writers of the day, whose entire intellectual efforts focus on or revolved 
exclusively around Jews or Jewish issues, it should be noted that Dühring was by no means primarily fixated on 
the Jews. His basic point of departure and his main concern was science and the progressive liberal ideas of 
justice. In the battle with Marx and Engels to gain command of the workers movement, Dühring’s anti-Semitism 
was not a major issue. 
747 On Wagner as a precursor of Dühring’s anti-Semitism see Manfred Eger, Wagner und die Juden: Fakten und 
Hintergründe (Bayreuth: Druckhaus, 1985). 
748 “Die Enstehung der Judenfrage in Europe,” unpublished paper, Dühring Papers, HA/SBB (cf. below 
Appendices II). 
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Christian perspective, it was the religion of the murderers of Christ that was to be deplored. 
As Dühring presented his first anti-Semitic lecture in 1879, the opposition to the Jews was no 
longer religious. Judaism through its own peculiarity was now seen as a threat to the modern 
peoples of Europe as a “nation within other nations”. For Dühring, the Jewish question 
became “a question of nations and humanity seen from a liberal point of view”.749 He 
disparages the Jews for what he sees as their inhumane egoism. With the ethos of his system 
of sociopolitical economics in mind, he writes: “The higher goal is the liberation of the spirit 
of nations (Völkergeist) from the crass selfishness, the pursuit of the better characteristics of 
nations, and a better humanity with general human rights in general”. For the atheist Dühring, 
as for the leftist revolutionary of 1848 Wilhelm Marr, religion itself does not serve as an 
explanation of the phenomenon; the problem is in the constitution of the Jewish nation, which 
he condemns on humanitarian grounds.750 Dühring published his book The Jewish Question: 
A Racial, Moral and Cultural Question with a World Historical Answer soon thereafter.751 As 
the title indicates, the Jewish Question is seen as being primarily as a question of “race”, 
although this assertion needs to be clarified somewhat. Dühring does not consider “race” from 
a strict biological stand point, an area he knew relatively little about; perhaps the term 
“ethnicity” comes closer to conveying what Dühring intended.752 His book on the Jews 
became one of his best-selling works, appearing altogether in six editions. It is certainly 
possible, if not likely, that financial considerations played a role in Dühring choosing to write 
about the Jews, as it was not until his dismissal from the university that he singled out the 
“Jewish Question” as a monographic publication, which was a topic likely to find more 
interests than his scientific areas of specialty. Dühring had, however, always been conscious 
of finding readers.753 
749 Ibid. 
750 It is telling that two of the most prominent figures in the history of anti-Semitism came ideologically from the 
Left. According to Mosche Zimmermann, it is likely that Marr even initiated the term. Cf. Zimmermann, 
Wilhelm Marr, The Patriarch of Anti-Semitism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 112. 
751 Although the book sold well, the measures that it advocated were rejected by the Deutsche Reform Partei as 
being too doctrinarian and impractical. Kurt Wawrzinek, Die Entstehung der deutschen Antisemitenparteien 
1873-1890 (Berlin: Ebering, 1927), 53.  
752 Holleck-Weithmann claims that Dühring was far ahead of his times in recognizing biological laws. Referring 
to Dühring’s book Der Ersatz der Religion durch Vollkommeneres, he cites Dühring’s epistemological concept 
of original configurations, which create different unchangeable offshoots, as anticipating Gregor Mendels studies 
of genetics. “Eugen Dühring und die nordische Weltanschauung,” Schriften des Dühringbundes 1 (12 January 
1933): 4. Houston Stewart Chamberlain saw this more accurately, in our opinion, when he emphasizes Dühring’s 
affinity towards the descriptive as opposed to the biological sciences. He wrote, “Will er [Dühring] die grossen 
Namen  der Wissenschaft anrufen, so nennt er Kepler, Galilei, Hugyens, Lagrange – niemals Boerhaave, Harvey, 
Jeussieu, Cuvier, Lyell; denn ihm gelten die beschreibenden und biologischen Wissenschaften als 
untergeordnet.“ Heinrich von Stein und seine Weltanschauung, op. cit., 24.    
753 From the beginning of his career as a scholar onwards Dühring sought what he called the “lively participation 
of the audience” and writes proudly in his autobiography that he purposefully wrote his books to be bought on a 
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As fate would have it, financial assistance came his way from across the ocean. On 13 
October 1879 Dühring’s longtime mentor and correspondent Henry C. Carey passed away. In 
his last years, Carey had followed Dühring’s tribulations with interest from the United States 
and felt deep sorrow for the fate of his erudite blind friend who had helped propagate his 
works more than anyone else in Europe.754 Carey’s last book, The Unity of Law from 1873, 
was dedicated to Dühring with the inscription: 
To Professor Eugene Dühring –  
Worthy successor of Friedrich List in the great work of proving to the Germanic Nation that 
domestic independence, national independence, public peace and private happiness, tend 
always to march hand in hand together. This volume is dedicated in token of its author's high 
respect."755  
Carey left Dühring the sales revenue from the bonds of a Pennsylvania coal company 
amounting to about $1,500, which was a substantial help for Dühring's sustenance.756   
Aside from his book on the Jews, Dühring gave presentations on Lessing, which were 
characteristic of the increasingly negative and pessimistic tone of his latest work, portraying 
the classical German poet and literary critic in an extremely unfavorable light. True to the 
non-historical and anti-classical penchant for “historical revisionism” (dealt with in Chapter 
Five above), he scorned the reverence given to popular icons of German literary history. He 
saw, in the case of Lessing, the opportunity to apply his “new method” of, as he saw it, setting 
the record straight with regard to the poet’s undeservedly good reputation.757 He and his 
growing readership appear to take great pleasure in the bold, iconoclastic accents of his 
writing. This tendency of lashing out at beloved icons would become increasingly stronger as 
Dühring grew older, as we will see in the next chapter. 
large-scale: “Wenn ich Bücher schrieb, so geschah dies nicht in der Weise eines Professors oder eines sonst 
anderweitig unterhaltenden Gelehrten. Meine Bücher mussten neben den höheren Zwecken, denen sie dienten, 
auch praktisch und dazu geeignet sein, in grösserem Umfange gekauft zu werden.” SLF, 412.  
754 As mentioned above, Dühring wrote several articles as well as two books, Carey’s Revolution of Political 
Economy (1865) and Carey’s Belittlers and the Crisis of Political Economy (1867). Carey’s plan to have the 
former translated into English never came to fruition. In a letter to Dühring from 1865, he writes: “My publisher 
is having your “Umwältzung” translated and I shall therefore probably have occasion to send you an English 
version of it.” Dühring Papers, Box 7, HA/SBB.    
755 Carey, The Unity of Law, III-IV. Carey had been sending the chapters of the book separately to Dühring for 
him to read before it was published. Apparently there had been some sort of discord between the two men. With 
reference to his dedication to Dühring, Carey writes, “When you read what is there said, you will be less 
displeased than you are at the present moment.” Draft letter Carey to Dühring 23 June 1872, Edward Carey 
Gardiner Collection (227A), HSP, Box 20, Folder 3. 
756 SLF, 231-232.  
757 SLF, 2nd edition, 247-248. 
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Dühring was struck by a great personal tragedy in 1880: his youngest son Ernst, with whom 
he shared a strong likeness in terms of appearance and disposition, died of an abdominal 
illness at the age of 16. The Dührings were an extremely close-knit family, largely isolated 
from the outside world. Dühring writes in his autobiography, “For us the outer world 
consisted of my activity as a lecturer.” From the time he was a young boy until his father’s 
dismissal, Ernst had led his blind father to his university lectures. Dühring refers to his son as 
his “attentive leader” (aufmerksamer Führer) and writes that, through all of the time they 
spent together, they had become even closer than is usually the case between a father and son. 
Dühring’s personal talent for language and natural science were divided between his sons. 
Young Ernst possessed an aptitude in the areas of language and literature and his older brother 
Ulrich in mathematics and natural science. Both children received home education and never 
attended school. All of the adversity which Dühring had faced, including his blindness, he 
writes, were nothing compared to the loss of his son. This family tragedy, which “at least 
came from nature and not from his enemies”, brought the rest of the already close family even 
closer together.758  
In the coming years, which were financially secured not only through the Carey inheritance, 
but also through the thriftiness that Dühring had developed throughout his life, his literary 
productivity continued at an amazing pace. The family moved from their apartment in 
Zehlendorf to a village near Potsdam called Neuendorf (Novawes), where they would remain 
for the rest of their lives. With the fame that he had earned during his career as a lecturer, 
publishing houses sought him and not the other way around. With the major works of his 
system having been completed by the end of the 1870s, he now decided to write an 
autobiography which would not only tell of his life but which would serve as a “key to his 
system”. My Cause, My Life, My Enemies, as the book was titled, appeared in 1882.759 With 
the great success of his book on the Jews, he decided to write another book on religion which 
he titled The Replacement of Religion through Something More Substantial, published in 1883 
(2nd and 3rd editions in 1897 and 1906). In the years that followed, Dühring concentrated on 
two works, written together with his son Ulrich, in the areas of mathematics and chemistry.760 
The third edition of Cursus of National and Political Economy was released in 1892, 
containing a significant change in theory in which his concept of the economic communes – 
758 SLF, 424-425. 
759 The title is catchy and emphasizes the inevitable antagonism involved in idealistic action, such as Dühring 
pursued; the “cause” brings forth “enemies” and “life” thus finds itself wedged between cause and enemies. 
Heinrich von Stein wrote a review of the book. Cf. Heinrich von Stein, “Eugen Dühring und sein neustes Buch: 
Sache, Leben und Feinde,” Schmeitzner’s Internationale Monatschrift (Chemnitz) 1 (1882): 262-267. 
760 SLF, 2nd edition, 256-275. 
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cf. Chapter Eight – were given up, and a more fiscally conservative approach to political 
economy was advocated. After releasing new editions of Critical History of the General 
Principles of Mechanics, The Worth of Life, Cursus of National and Social Economy, and the 
Jewish Question, he published The Greats of Modern Literature, which had developed from 
his lectures at Victoria Lyceum, and utilized his iconoclastic approach to handling Europe’s 
classical literature. The fourth edition of his history of philosophy came out in 1894 and the 
next year, after a prolonged battle with the publisher of the original book, an updated version 
of his Cursus of Philosophy from 1875, which he titled Philosophy of the Actual. In the same 
year, Dühring published the second volume of his Robert Mayer book, which renewed the 
charges of plagiarism against Hermann Helmholtz. 
At the end of the 1880s, Dühring received, for the second time, a substantial inheritance from 
one of his admirers, the industrialist Friedrich Rogler from Asch in Bohemia, which further 
secured his financial situation as a freelance writer and activist.761 Rogler left Dühring 20,000 
Gilds in his will, citing Dühring as the writer of the book “Sache, Leben und Feinde”. 
Although initially challenged by Rogler’s family, there was a quick settlement, which left 
Dühring with 17,000 Marks, a substantial amount, although, according to Döll, it amounted to 
less than the yearly income of a salaried scholar.762  
Although things seemed generally quiet on the political front, in the decade following his 
dismissal, “Dühringianism” had not vanished. Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Laws had generally 
cooled down the feverish activity of the labor movement that had gone on in the 70s, but 
Dühringians continued to grow in number. His books were still being read and his 
“societarian” ideals, seen as an alternative to Marxism, were still alive, albeit in a latent form. 
Abraham Enß, who had virulently defended Dühring from Engels attack in 1877, began to 
publish a newspaper based on Dühring’s ideals titled Der Antikrat. In 1886 Emil Döll 
organized the collecting of addresses of Dühring supporters to celebrate the author’s twenty-
fifth anniversary as a writer (beginning with his dissertation from 1861).763 The “address 
movement”, as it was called, attempted to “break the attempt of the establishment to act as if 
Eugen Dühring never existed”. Döll coined the term “Dühringsperre” (the ban on Dühring) 
for how he was ignored by the establishment. A proclamation stating that in the last ten years 
over forty thousand of Dühring’s books had been bought by supporters scattered throughout 
761 SLF, 2nd edition, 276.  
762 Cf., Döll, Eugen Dühring. Etwas von dessen Character, Leistung und reformatorischen Beruf (Leipzig: C.G. 
Naumann, 1893), 29. 
763 Emil Döll, Eugen Dühring, 25 et seq. 
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Germany, and was sent out and placed as an advertisement in several large newspapers. The 
goal of collecting the addresses was to try to bring the scattered Dühring supporters together. 
Most of the 20,000 addresses came from people in Germany, but there were also supporters 
listed from Austria, Switzerland, France, Spain, Russia, Serbia, and even the United States.764 
Dühring wrote a response thanking his supporters in May of 1887, listing the main viewpoints 
of his cause: the refinement of public and private life through leadership, “improvement of 
knowledge and science, desire and character, as well as the self-initiative of the intellect 
towards a general emancipation of the mind from suppression”.765 The Dühring movement 
soon gained momentum that became anchored in a newly founded institution. 
4. The Dühring Movement of the 1890s: “Sozialitärer Bund“ and “Der Moderne 
Völkergeist“  
The strong sales of his books and the widespread support of the address movement seemed to 
indicate potential for the Dühring cause. Supporters founded the Sozialitärer Bund in 
November of 1893. The Members of this association aimed to advance the Dühring 
movement and saw in the master’s teaching and personality “the beginning of a new 
foundation of thought with its roots in reality” which offered a “wise teachings for public and 
private life”. The organization aimed to inspire its members and anyone else it could influence 
morally and intellectually. True to the tenets of the Dühring’s Philosophy of the Actual, the 
group aimed to free the intellect from all types of deception, be it “so-called science or 
nebulous concoctions of the imagination”. On the positive side, the association aimed at 
concentrating on scientific works and organized lectures by members and friends who were 
competent to teach. The thrust of its effort was rooted in the position of Natural Law and 
involved “enlightenment concerning the basic nature of morality, whose laws do not owe their 
existence and validity to historically wavering positions, but rather are rooted in the collective 
system of things”.766 The charter members also aim to treat one another “truthfully, faithfully, 
and justly”. The charter proclaims: “The connection between the concept of freedom and the 
idea of justice is the basic principle of societarianism. It separates this association 
substantially, on the one hand, from the groups that suffocate under authoritarian demands of 
freedom and, on the other, from those who let freedom become arbitrary to the detriment of 
764 Ibid., 27. The hundreds of signed proclamations sent back to Emil Döll, which can be found in the Berlin state 
library, give testimony to the powerful trajectory that Dühring had in the 1890s. Cf. Dühring Papers, HA/SBB.  
765 Ibid., 36. 
766 The statutes of the association are listed in the first issue its journal, The Modern Spirit of Nations. Cf. 
“Socialitärer Bund,” Der Moderne Völkergeist 1 (1894): 7. 
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freedom and the organization of positive cooperation”.767 The association considered itself 
German and against ethnic groups opposed to the spirit of the modern European nations, 
particularly the Jews. Due to its demands of truthfulness, faithfulness, justice, and freedom, it 
proclaims its opposition to the elements of communist socialism which were held to be 
destructive of freedom and justice, as well as to the arbitrary freedom of every kind of 
anarchism. The association supports Dühring’s societarianism, which makes better people the 
basis of creating a “free society”. The ancient and new Hebrew means of education were to be 
removed from German institutions. A person can only become a member by registering and 
attending several official association meetings.  
Just weeks after the founding of the Societarian Association (Sozialitärer Bund ) in January of 
1894, the organization began publishing a monthly magazine titled The Modern Spirit of 
Nations (“Der moderne Völkergeist”), a name taken from Dühring’s book on the replacement 
of religion. Its motto, printed under the magazine’s letterhead, read on the one side: “For 
freedom, justice, faithfulness, trust, and truth”. On the other: “Against religious, political and 
economic slavery, as well as Hebrew domination”. The contributors to the magazine were 
mostly anonymous, with the authorship given as initials. One of the driving forces behind the 
paper, listed as “–t –n”, was Ernst Jünemann, who wrote the mission statement in the journal’s 
first issue, and who contributed to every issue until his untimely death in 1898.768 Another 
contributor was Georg Himmelserb, who would later fall out with Dühring and publish a 
pamphlet against him entitled “A Look Behind the Curtains of the Societarian Movement. 
Open Letter to Dr. Eugen Dühring”.  
Topics in the magazine ranged from aspects of Dühring’s work and matters of the Sozialitärer 
Bund to issues of culture and ethnicity, societal reform, the anti-Semitic movement, religion, 
political economy, anarchism. The Societarian Association held regular public meetings, with 
the purpose of fighting against scientific falsification, false scholasticism (“Verlehrtentum”), 
and the crimes of scholars (“Gelehrtenverbrechen”), while advocating science and 
independent mind leadership (“Geistesführung”).769 The meetings concentrated at first on 
Dühring’s Critical History of Philosophy, and then on his second book on Robert Mayer upon 
its publication in 1894. The organization sought to avoid the image of being “a philosophical 
sect” and changed its direction, devoting itself more to current political interests such as the 
767 Ibid. 
768 The Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin has letters from Dühring to Jünemann beginning in 1890 and ending shortly 
before Jünemann’s death in 1898. There are references to Jünemann’s letters addressed to Dühring in nearly 
every letter, but unfortunately, aside from one letter, they seem to have been lost. 
769 MV 1 (Jan. 1896): 2 et seq.  
                                                     
246 
 
anti-Socialist Laws, the Heinrich Heine monument and Freilandbewegung set in motion by 
Franz Oppenheimer. 
The journal held an ambivalent, if not to say disparaging, view of the anti-Semitic movement, 
which was certainly a reflection of Dühring’s opinion. For Dühring, “just as an honest 
communist does not approve of the Social Democrats, an honest anti-Hebrew does not have to 
support anti-Semitism”.770 He was critical of what he called “reactionary anti-Semitism” 
which was conservative and placed strong emphasis on religion instead of ethnic origin. 
However, in a letter to Jünemann, he opines that even the worst form of anti-Semitism may 
help to shake the status quo.771 Of the political anti-Semites, it was Otto Böckel and especially 
Hermann Ahlwardt who combined a racially based anti-Semitism with socialist slogans, 
attacking “Jews and Junkers”. Ahlwardt, a former school headmaster turned politician, who 
was fired for embezzlement from the school he led, can be seen as an authentic Dühringian. In 
the preface to his book Bundschuh from 1894, he pays and effusive tribute to Dühring, 
writing, “In Dr. Eugen Dühring the beams of science become explosive. He is the most 
beautiful blossom which Germany has yet to produce. He has scattered the clouds which have 
kept out air and light for thousands of years; he has turned back superstition in a form that it 
takes and led the Germanic people back to themselves”.772  Relying heavily on Dühring and 
Carey’s economic theories, Ahlwardt developed a populist policy containing elements which 
Dühring could not approve of, such as the glorification of “Germanic Christianity”. Similar to 
Böckel, Ahlwardt’s popularity would soon wane and at the end of the 90s, despite the support 
that he had given him just a short time before, Dühring labeled him a “pseudo anti-Semite”.773    
Dühring downplays his own role in Der Moderne Völkergeist , but his correspondence leaves 
little doubt that he was intimately involved in the efforts of the journal, although he had little 
to nothing to do with its practical financial matters. His letters to Jünemann are filled with 
references to the journal, and convey a strong will to reach the people and spread his cause. 
Dühring had recently passed the age of sixty, but still possessed great vigor and energy; his 
strong ideals and will to reform society had apparently not subsided in the least. He writes to 
Jünemann that it is not a question now of “changing the configuration of the institutions” or of 
“poor reformism” (armseliger Reformismus); religion cannot simply be reformed or negated, 
770 Dühring to Jünemann. 7 June 1994, in Dühring Papers, Box 7, HA/SBB. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Hermann Ahlwardt, Bundschuh (Dresden: Glöß, 1894), IV.  
773 Brigitte Mogge, Rhetorik des Hasses, 54. A few years later Dühring also goes on to attack the anti-Semites in 
his autobiography. He writes, “Along with the categories of the professors, Jews, and the Social Democrats I 
have a fourth rubric […] the anti-Semites.” Cf. SLF, 2nd edition, 496.  
                                                     
247 
 
something positive must replace it. He speaks of the necessity of “waking a spiritual power”, 
which will “do the bulk of the work”, without which “nothing will happen” to change the 
corrupt modern circumstances.774  His good intentions could not, however, be put into action 
the way he envisioned it. Inevitably, there was conflict within the ranks of the journal, and key 
writers left. The biggest blow to the Der Moderne Völkergeist movement was Ernst 
Jünemann’s illness and subsequent untimely death in 1898. Ulrich Dühring became involved 
with the editing and contributed several poems and articles. Dühring lost the faith of several 
loyal followers who would go on to publically denounce him.775 The Sozialitärer Bund was 
disbanded in July of 1898.   
Here again we witness the outer limits of the “controversial scholar”, who, having been 
isolated through public controversy, turns to political organization and activism. Dühring, as 
we have seen, originally had the strong affinity to the “philosophical scholar”, but now 
crossed the border from theory to practice (as the tenets of his philosophy require), and was 
out of his element as it were. Nietzsche’s remark that the philosopher who gets involved in 
politics is destined to play a comic role comes to mind. Dühring’s activism was, however, the 
logical consequence of a philosophy in which the conscious mind is supreme and which 
strives to find direct influence unencumbered by abstraction. As we emphasized above, the 
Philosophy of the Actual downplays abstraction and theory “for the sake of theory”. Had 
Dühring been a “philosophical scholar” by nature, he may have been content to live a life of 
detached philosophical contemplation with the money he inherited and his book earnings. 
This, however, would have gone against his disposition and his inner convictions. Particularly 
with the fame and notoriety which his work had achieved, he was by no means ready to give 
in and quit. His unyielding spirit led him to keep up the fight to the end. Following the failure 
of Der Moderne Völkergeist, Dühring founded his own paper, which he would write in and 
edit until his death over two decades later. 
  
774 Dühring to Jünemann, 10 April 1986, in Dühring Papers, Box 7, HA/SBB. 
775 Cf. George Himmelserb, Hinter den Kulissen der sozialitären Bewegung. Ein offener Brief an Dr. Eugen 
Dühring (Berlin: C. Regenhardt, 1898). 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN  
BEYOND CONTROVERSY 1899-1921 
1. Personalist und Emancipator 
As the title of his new journal, Personalist und Emancipator, indicates, the final phase of 
Dühring’s life is characterized by an increased sense of individualism. The writings’ radical 
tone served to damage his reputation and harm his intellectual legacy.776 It can be said that 
Dühring’s intellectual inheritance from the left-wing Hegelians had come full circle; the 
longing to emancipate society, the will to attain a social justice for the workers through united 
group action was now replaced by a more negative and combative individualism, reminiscent 
of Max Stirner, the author of The Ego and His Own.777 Stirner had taken the consequences of 
Kant’s categorical imperative and given it a Hegelian twist, coming to the conclusion that all 
that mattered in life was the self; life should be led by egoism and the ruthless pursuit of one’s 
own interests. Dühring strongly detested egoism and presumably did not approve of Stirner 
and his philosophy; and yet there is an undeniable tendency towards extreme individualism in 
the last phase of his life. As a realist who had once prided himself on suggesting ad hoc 
measures for fields of activity to help society, he now turns towards more subjective radical 
means of activism. His intent had been – and still was – to make a difference, and although he 
changes positions on several issues, he does not abandon the tenets of his worldview. If his 
influence had waned in the large scheme of things, he would continue his fight through other 
means. In 1896, he had spoken of the need to begin a third phase of his productivity, in which 
he would turn to “very small cheap writings” as part of a program to attack the scientific 
community, capitalism in the name of a “struggle for the life of goodness”.778 A conscious 
disregard for objective standards of academic deportment and etiquette, this remark is 
indicative of a tactic of Dühring, as he saw it, lowering himself to the level of the conditions 
around him. When seen in perspective, it appears not only to be a tactic, but also a part of a 
general strategy that materializes in the second half of his career: Dühring turns to the 
intentional use of base, polemical language to repel his hated opponents. He even comes up 
with a name for this form of resistance: “reagent pessimism” or “reagent anti-Semitism”. 
Through his aggressive style, he hopes to provoke his enemies and to bring them out of their 
776 Cf, Albrecht, ED 18; Theodor Lessing, Dührings Haß (Hannover: Wolf Albrecht Adam Verlag, 1922), 28. 
777 Although Dühring does not seem to have referred to Max Stirner directly, he certainly knew his work. 
Jünemann, Dühring’s young disciple, wrote at length on Stirner in Der Moderne Völkergeist. Dühring would 
likely have labeled Stirner’s work a decadent literary phenomenon. Zenker also compares Dühring with Stirner. 
Der Anarchismus, op. cit.,149.    
778 Cf. Dühring to Jünemann, 21 July 1896, in Dühring Papers, Box 7, HA/SBB.  
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cover, and force them to show their true colors. He ultimately becomes so entrenched in this 
method of “intellectual warfare” – Albrecht speaks of an “addiction to polemic” – that he is 
no longer only fighting the enemies that he has before him, but also the enemies of the past 
and the especially the future. Dühring erects a monument which, in many ways, would stand 
as a repellant to modern liberal society.  
Personalist und Emancipator was an efficient means of carrying out this general strategy of 
the final phase of his literary production. As badly as the Sozialitärer Bund and Der Moderne 
Völkergeist” had ended, as Mogge points out, Dühring could be satisfied with being able to 
take over a journal which had a substantial readership in anti-Semitic circles.779 The coals of 
the Dühring fire were stoked once more. This time around there would be no influence from 
outside, and he would have complete control of the paper. The first issues appeared under the 
editorship of the old journal, but in April of 1900 Dühring’s son Ulrich became editor and 
took over the paper’s distribution from Emil Keil, who had been up to that point in charge of 
the finances of Der Moderne Völkergeist. Ulrich also took on the publishing of the next 
edition of The Jewish Question and soon the whole operation of the cause was in the hands of 
the Dührings.780  
In the second edition of My Cause, My Life, My Enemies Dühring explains the title of the 
journal. “Personalism” was chosen to represent his basic point of view, and to distinguish his 
new “movement” from socialism and anarchism. Years before he had used “societary” and 
“anti-cratic”, but now saw these terms as having been discredited through “alleged 
supporters”. With the new term, which he believes was new, he would not be able to be 
unfairly grouped with some other group whom he did not want to be associated with.781 The 
word “emancipation” has a concrete legal, social and political sense for him, although he sees 
it as having also been discredited by the “Jewish emancipation” and “Catholic emancipation”, 
because, “if intellectual slaves become enslaved, they are merely falling prey to their own 
principle. A true emancipation worthy of the name only comes into effect where personal 
freedom and integrity are secure”.782 
779 Mogge, Rhetorik des Hasses, 55. 
780 Ibid., 56. The history of the Dühring Bund and Der Moderne Völkergeist has yet to be written. There is a 
wealth of material in the Dühring Papers of the manuscript department of the Berlin State Library, which 
unfortunately could not be considered for this dissertation. 
781 SLF, 2nd edition, 507. 
782 Ibid., 508. Dühring gives further explanation of the terms “emancipator” and “personalist” in his journal. Cf. 
“Emancipation vom Teufel statt – des Teufels,” in PE 263 (September 1910): 2097-2098. Here he refers to the 
history of the word “emancipation” from ancient Rome and emphasizes that the term was then not to be equated 
with “becoming free” in general, but rather more with “coming of age”, as when a son reaches maturity and 
                                                     
250 
 
Having long been in the role of the “controversial scholar”, Dühring moved beyond the realm 
of controversy, doing whatever he wanted, however he wanted to do it. The final twenty years 
of his life, like the final chapter of the Greek play Prometheus, would be relatively uneventful. 
If uneventful in terms of public attention and effective group activism, it was not stagnant 
intellectually. Personalist und Emancipator dealt not only with the thought and theories 
stemming from Dühring’s own system; every issue contains topics dealing with current 
events. A wide variety of issues are touched upon, and Dühring’s proclivity for “poly-typical” 
scholarship, seen in his early work with the Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart, is 
put to use. Articles, most of which were authored by Dühring himself, cover topics such as 
money matters, philosophy, music, literature, crime and punishment, monetary theory, also 
home economics, marital behavior, health, diet and general happiness, and, of course, the 
ubiquitous topic of the Jews. Regarding the latter, Dühring’s already ethnically based position, 
which involved the expropriation of Jewish bankers’ money, becomes so radical that he can 
only create enemies for himself and for his cause among influential people. Nolte aptly points 
out that Dühring’s anti-Semitism becomes something that “not a single Jew can sympathize 
with, because as a Jew, i.e. due to an inalienable biological quality, he is declared an enemy, a 
world enemy”.783  
This aggressively repellant “reagent” tactic, as Dühring would term it, is also aimed at other 
social groups and is especially virulently directed at the famous figures of German culture. 
Having once referred to Goethe back in the 1860s as “our national poet”, he now mocks the 
poet, calling him “Köthchen” (“little shit”); Kant becomes “Prof. Cant”, Bismarck “Bisquark” 
(“quark” meaning curd cheese), Nietzsche “Nichtske” (nichts being nothing), Marx simply “a 
criminal” or a “fraud”. As Theodor Lessing writes, anything which had gained or was gaining 
fame or influence becomes suspicious to Dühring and must be knocked down to size in a 
childish manner; Tolstoi becomes “Toll-kraut”(crazy cabbage), Ibsen second-rate “Ibse” 
(child); Plato and Buddha are “religious fanatics”, “scatterbrains”, and “fog-wrights” 
(Nebelmacher).784 It can justifiably be pointed out that Dühring was a proud Berliner who 
took pride in the destructive humor known in the city’s capital, but such childish scoffing and 
jibing, coming from one of the great minds of his generation, was so incongruous that it 
leaves the custody of his father’s family. It is a negative term and involves being liberated from a bond from 
which there are no further prospects. “Personalist” is a positive term which signifies that a person is a 
representative of law and rights.  
783 Ernst Nolte, Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus, 123. 
784 Theodor Lessing, op. cit., 15-16. 
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became absurd. It was not without good reason that Paul Ernst spoke of Dühring as a “tragic-
comical” figure.785  
Although one can rightfully say that his anti-Semitism had been peripheral to his philosophy, 
he now mentions the Jews in nearly every article. Dühring, like the mayor of Vienna Karl 
Lueger (and later Hermann Göring), apparently believes he has the authority to decide who is 
Jewish and who is not. He turns Gentiles such as Lessing, Richard Wagner, Rudolf Virchow, 
and Henry George, and many others, into Jews without any evidence for his case. In 1908, 
U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt is referred to as a “Jew scion”.786 His writings sink to such 
a low level that it is more than questionable as to whether Henry C. Carey would have left 
him an inheritance had he known the form Dühring’s work and career would take in his later 
years.  
The sense of charm, without which, as H.L. Mencken once wrote, all reformers will fail, was 
now lacking in Dühring, and one can understand Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s remark that, 
although Dühring was a thinker of undeniable significance, he lacked a certain open-
mindedness (“Seelenweite”) to make him truly great personality.787 Modesty, constraint, and a 
sense of impartiality, characteristics without which a journal has little broad appeal, are 
missing in the pages Personalist und Emancipator. It is, however, apparent that Dühring is 
not interested in new readership; he is writing to a small group of faithful supporters who 
appreciate an authoritarian style.788 His once influential and realistic visions of reform have 
now regressed into rebarbative polemics. With bitter cynicism and provocative mockery, 
Dühring seems to intentionally run amok. He reaches the end of the line, and, to use an image 
of Nietzsche’s, begins behaving like a beaten watch dog, protecting his work and ready to bite 
anyone who approaches.  
Despite the childish polemics which characterize the journal, there were educated and 
influential people who read Personalist und Emancipator, as the Dühring Papers indicate. The 
diplomat Otto Wiedtfeldt, for example, who was the German ambassador in Washington from 
1922-25, was an avid reader and sent Ulrich Dühring letters from all over the globe from the 
785 Paul Ernst’s reference to Dühring is in his article, “Eine positive Überwindung des Communismus,” Neuland 
1 (October 1896): 16. Schopenhauer defined laughter as a sudden perception of incongruity between a concept 
and real objects which has been thought to be in a certain relationship and his not. The discrepancy causes 
laughter. The World as Will and Representation, vol. one, 59.  
786 Cf. Mogge, Rhetorik des Hasses, 105. 
787 Heinrich von Stein und seine Weltanschauung, op. cit., 22. 
788 One might csee Dühring as an early twentieth century precursor of the “Internet blogger”. The phenomenon 
of podcasts and streamed webcasts lends itself to political, or perhaps better termed “armchair” activism similar 
to the kind Dühring carried out with his magazine. 
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period dating from 1900-1923.789 Some of the Personalist articles, especially those dealing 
with political economic issues, are critical and exhibit an application of the Dühringian 
system.790 Dühring had become acquainted with the Jewish-Austrian bank director Hermann 
Schwarzwald (1871-1939), who became a passionate disciple of the Dühringian views on 
money, publishing articles dealing with Dühring’s monetary theories in prominent journals.791  
Albrecht labels Dühring’s development from a brilliant scholar and social reformer to an 
aggressive writer given to polemics as “tragic”, and speaks of the final phase of his career as a 
“ruinous period”.792 It might, however, be argued that Dühring’s behavior at the end of his 
career was to a degree consistent with the tenets of a philosophy rooted in Anschaulichkeit, 
i.e. in an intuitive perception of the moment, as it were, the will to action at any cost. In the 
last phase of his career, time and circumstance have narrowed the possible fields of action 
Dühring has before him, but his will to action remains ferociously strong. As much as the 
final phase may have hurt his reputation, when the gloss of the polemic and vitriol are 
removed, there is surprisingly still a keen and original mind at work, as we will see now.     
2. The Turn to Extreme Individualism 
The last twenty years of Dühring’s career signify a shift in his outlook from a general focus on 
the concerns of society as a whole towards the rights and responsibilities of the individual. 
Although individualism had been one of the basic tenets of his thought from the beginning of 
his career onwards, it was kept in check by his strong sense of social justice and his political 
orientation towards the German labor movement, following his unsuccessful bids for 
professorship. Once his influence with the workers had waned after his break with the Social 
Democrats, Dühring had turned towards a new group of readers: the educated middle-class. 
Despite his publishing success and the strong trajectory that his views enjoyed for nearly two 
decades, with the demise of the Dühring Bund and Der Moderne Völkergeist at the end of the 
90s, as we have just seen, he begins concentrating on influencing a select few of loyal 
followers. Henceforth he propagates a more personal message, based on individual willpower 
789 Cf. Wiedtfeldt to Ulrich Dühring, Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB.   
790 When it comes to basic theoretical positions on monetary policy and causes of inflation Dühring’s work 
should not be underestimated, as the writings of a leading expert in the field such as Hermann Schwarzwald 
indicate. See the following articles: “Zur Wischwährung noch gar Nullwährung,” PE 283 (July 1911); 
“Geldtheorie wichtiger als Werttheorie,” PE 296 (1912); “Theuerung warum?” PE 301 (May 1912); “Geld, 
Warenhandel, Banken I, II. III. IV, V.” PE 330, 332, 333, 334 (1914); “Stand der Wirtschaftslehre,” PE 358 
(1916). 
791 Schwarzwald, an Austrian Jew, would have to be considered the most prominent Dühringian of the later 
years. See “Kopernikanische Wahrheiten über das Geld,” Neue Wiener Tagblatt (23 December 1926). “Das 
Silber und das Dühringsche Gewichtsgeld,” Sendbogen 33 (1937): 1-24.  
792 ED, 249. 
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and personal conviction. With this change of direction, he either alters or slightly modifies 
various positions of his system, in some cases reverting to stances which he had held at the 
beginning of his career. In general, now more than ever, he emphasizes the primacy of the 
“political” above the mere “economical”. In addition to the third edition of Cursus of National 
and Political Economy, two new works, Weapons, Capital and Labor (1906) and Social 
Rescue (1907), are published and serve to unite Dühring’s positions in this third and final 
phase of his career.793 
Perhaps the most noticeable change was his view on private property. Dühring’s definition of 
property had already undergone a change in the 1870s. His earliest writings, although social 
in their tendency, emphasized the right of property, but in the early 1870s this position was 
changed as he came to reject private property, albeit without advocating public ownership. At 
this stage in his system of social economics, as we saw above, property should be replaced 
through public laws which allow equal usage. He had seen property as having been ruined 
through a societal development that favored those who pursued their interest with unlawful 
force, and he sought to replace it through a new concept. This concept gained its most salient 
form in the idea of the economic communes formulated in the second edition of Cursus of 
National and Social Economics from 1876. The system of economic communes was retracted 
in the third edition of the same book in 1892, and in the final phase of his career he drifts 
away from this vision and goes back to the acceptance of private property as a necessary basic 
form of a person having power over an object. He now writes, “To do away with the 
individual’s power over objects means not only to confiscate freedom, but also to confuse the 
whole relationship of the world of objects. Where is the will if it cannot get involved in the 
matters of nature?”794 If property is not an evil to be overcome, then the current government, 
which is abusing property, is the problem. Rather than seek a theoretical solution to the 
concept of property, as he had done in the past, the focus is now on the “evil of the moment”, 
which is historically anchored “property based on violence” (Gewalteigentum). He now calls 
this “predatory property” (Raubeigentum) and writes, “Whereas legitimate property is a 
configuration that stems from the individual free will, predator property is characterized by 
group violence”. However, he is opposed to the idea of the government or another societal 
power moving in and taking away such “predator property”; this would create the harmful and 
false impression that the state, or merely power, creates property. The answer for Dühring is 
to find a means which can get the root of the problems, even if only indirectly and at a slower 
793 Albrecht, ED, 250. 
794 WCA, 100. 
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pace.795 The problem with such false ownership is that it is based on exploitation of 
manpower; the solution must be to set the manpower free. Workers can be emancipated by 
moving on to find work elsewhere, and those workers who remain can increase their salaries, 
thus making it very difficult for large property owners to exist.796 Pure individual ownership 
is always the ideal, and Dühring adamantly fights against expropriation of any kind. With 
regard to capital and capital interest, his position also takes on an individualist tone. In his 
system of sociopolitical economics, interest was understood as being based on force, and thus 
unjust. Now he sees capital interest as not only a precondition of production, but also as being 
a just earning from it.797 
As we see, his objectives of social reform are now primarily individualistic. Whereas he 
formerly saw social reform primarily in terms of eradicating force, in his book Weapons, 
Capital, and Labor, which he calls the second edition of his book from 1865 Capital and 
Labor (but which is really a completely new book), he now defines it as “the complete 
striving for independence, which looks towards economic and political independence in the 
same fashion”.798 The largely negative concentration on the evils of the “criminal state” and 
on “property based on force”, etc. is shifted into a virulent “personalism” characterized by 
independence and freedom of the individual. The workers are to become “deproletarianized” 
and transformed into truly independent people. In order to foster individual autonomy, he 
recommends an almost puritanical form of political economy where production is to be 
concentrated on only the bare necessities needed for the population, and diligence and 
thriftiness are required by the people.799 Economic independence is to be fostered by 
supporting small and mid-sized instead of large scale farms. The farmers are to remain 
independent of the state and to avoid debt. A surprising turn, considering Dühring’s former 
critique of Malthus, is his suggestion now to adjust births to the state of the economy. He 
writes: “Only with this in mind can individualism and life in general be taken seriously at the 
same time”.800 We see a turn towards an extreme individualism that abhors the collective. 
Dühring also returns to the favorite idea of his early years: the workers’ coalitions. Having 
become skeptical of the instinct of the masses, which had praised early in his career (cf. 
Chapter Six), he now makes a plea for common sense. Seeing sound instincts among the 
795 SR, 175. 
796 Ibid., 176. 
797 This was his original position back in the 1860s. Cf. KG, 401-405. 
798 WCA, 124. 
799 Ibid., 156. 
800 Ibid., 158. 
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working class is now for him merely wishful thinking. He now advocates common sense 
instead of instinct.801 Instead of trying to gain direct ownership, workers should aim at 
attaining indirect power through indirect means of acquiring share certificates or other 
properties which have monetary value, and the coalitions are the best means of doing this. 
Coalitions are, according to Dühring, to decide the distribution of earnings, but do not 
influence production. The organizations should accept the existence of an antagonistic 
position in relation to the employers, which can only be stabilized by having a contract on the 
working conditions, especially the level of salaries. The contracts are necessary and must 
remain as long as judges cannot be considered a legitimate impartial third party, which is the 
case with the current government. (Dühring does not rule out a communal arbitration at some 
later date.) He also foresees the coalitions becoming involved in providing unemployment 
insurance for workers. 
He is, however, extremely skeptical of using the coalitions as an instrument to fight company 
management. More vehemently than in the past, he now rejects general strikes. They are not 
likely to succeed because they lend the government the perception of a moral power which it 
would otherwise not have. Beyond this position, which he also held in the past, he now 
considers strikes to be a ruthless affront to the rest of the population, which is harmed by 
them.802 True to his belief in the sovereignty of the individual, now even stronger than before, 
he also warns against the pressure put on workers to go on strikes; this is unacceptable, 
especially when one considers the uncertain prospect of the strike having success. He warns 
against what he calls “strike-ism” and implies that class struggle can degenerate into “class 
murder”. He writes, “Strike-ism, which seemed to be a beneficial corrective measure in the 
beginning, has created a wild boisterousness of bans by the employers and thus turned all 
action into a war in which there is no trace of legal consideration to speak of. The ‘strike-istry’ 
has taken on the character of a mere inclination to social revolution and the so-called general 
strikes have received the senseless tasks of dissolving the current society into its atoms and 
thus destroying it. More than class murder, it is a kind of suicide and strangely enough one in 
which the masses destroy their own people”.803 It seems that Dühring does not hold much 
hope for the future of the coalitions helping the workers and one can wonder, as Albrecht 
does, how he envisions organizing the men whose cause he is fighting for.804         
801 Ibid., 50. 
802 Ibid., 54. 
803 SR, 3. 
804 Albrecht, ED, 265. 
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Dühring rejects every kind of collectivism or action by general associations of individuals 
which suppress other people or groups. The state is seen as the most powerful collective 
configuration and now he believes it should be limited to an absolute minimum, i.e. only to 
keep law and order, maintaining basic public facilities such as streets, roads, etc. Any 
compulsion from the side of the government towards citizens and their basic rights, towards 
institutions which have effect on individuals, especially property, but also towards education 
and training, is to be rejected. The driving force of society is the individual, or as Albrecht 
writes (perhaps ironically with reference to Nietzsche) the superman (“den 
Übermenschen”).805 
As we have seen, one of Dühring’s greatest reproaches of Marxism was its non-political 
nature. Whereas the Marxists saw society as a product of capital, Dühring was convinced that 
it was the other way around, i.e. that society shaped the development of capital. In the final 
phase of his career, the political is now emphasized even more than before. Any improvement 
of the economic conditions of society involves a restructuring of political behavior. Personal 
political liberation is the precondition of economic liberation.806 All injustice is now seen as 
stemming from inter-personal relationships between people which are based on violence and 
theft based on weaponry. Only political methods will be effective to alleviate the 
disproportion between the powerful and the weak. The use of weapons to take back freedom 
that has been taken away is not only just – it is a human right. This counter measure is, 
however, only temporary, and serves to sustain a condition where violent struggles are 
overcome. Police action is only needed to combat coincidental disturbances – a statement 
which Dühring admits can in no way apply to the present and has utopian overtones.807 
Dühring rejects the current forms of parliamentary government.808 Apparently at a loss for an 
ideal suggestion, he attempts to create what he sees as an improved make-shift alternative to 
the existing conditions which favor the individual. He supports the right to vote as a general 
human right, but calls for the creation of a special (first) house made up of people who 
possess “outwardly recognizable property”; the members are not selected according to the 
size of their property, but rather are voted upon by others with property. This house’s 
jurisdiction is in matters concerning property, and especially those where property rights are 
being violated; for example, through dispossession or taxes. The role of parliament should be 
805 Ibid., 261. 
806 CNS, 3rd edition, 388. 
807 SR, 91. 
808 Cf., WCA, 67 et seq. 
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considerably limited, especially in all matters pertaining to labor, such as working times, etc. 
The ideal of parliamentary government, in which the free, sovereign individual is able to 
make his rights and interests felt politically, and can thereby create the preconditions for a just 
social and economic order, is only fulfilled when the mindset of the people is reformed in the 
sense of an anti-egoistic perspective. Then, according to Dühring, nobody will need the 
parliamentary power to fight the principles that the recognition of its independence are based 
on. 
In his last book, Social Rescue, Dühring goes beyond these ideas, advocating a radical and 
defiant application of individualism as a way out of the current predicament. In almost 
Nietzschean fashion, he describes the right of the masses to vote as something which ruins 
exceptional achievement. A mass democracy amounts to patronizing the nation through the 
rule of demagoguery: the voters are seen as lemmings, blindly following their leaders over the 
edge of the cliff. The latter have a universal calling to preach about and decide on matters they 
know little, if anything, about. Ultimately, in order to rule, Dühring is of the opinion that 
commissions must be formed that serve as a refuge and where decisions can be made by 
commissars hidden from the limelight of the public. When viewing the present political 
situation, he concludes: the ruling parties are all the same. “Social ruin is thus everywhere!” 
he proclaims. Like de Tocqueville, but in a much more raw manner, he goes on to warn 
against parliamentary democracy as a kind of tyranny of the masses amounting to “mass 
slavery” and “mass deceit”.809   
His solution for the moment is the creation of a “legal protectorate”. Dühring does not believe 
the once powerful historical dynasties will live on and, prophetically for the year 1907, writes 
that “even in Russia” the monarchy will be powerless if not completely done away with. The 
answer is not to be found in any form of collectivism, but rather in individual initiative. He 
foresees a man of noticeable achievement, backed up by armed power, giving the wrath of the 
people an ordered expression. He writes: “Given a decisive legal will, which must of course 
be aided by an elite, he can create order and facilitate a transition to such conditions in which 
a legal will, rooted in the people and society, creates the possibility of better institutions 
[…]”.810 Thus through the societal crisis at the beginning of the 20th century, which he has 
before him, Dühring envisions a revolutionary transitional regime coming to power through 
violent struggle. It will be led by a morally and intellectually exceptional leader who is 
809 SR, 279-280. 
810 Ibid.  
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backed up by armed force and surrounded by an elite who share the same spirit. Once a policy 
of law is established, there will be a “purified” way of thinking and a new order will be 
ushered in through the personal initiative of society. For Dühring, the only decisive thing that 
one can count on in light of the ruinous conditions of society is the “inner revenge and 
nemesis inherent in all bad things which pits the powers of the devil against one another”; 
however, he contends, the “most important reagent is that which proceeds from good and thus 
from law”.811  
3. Dühringianism at Work 
In the first decade of the 20th century, Dühringianism had by no means died out. Dühring still 
had many supporters, one of whom was the Jewish-German intellectual Benedict Friedländer. 
Friedländer, who apparently took little offense to Dühring’s virulent anti-Semitism, wrote 
books and articles in support of Dühring and, according to Hans Blüher, even named his son 
after him.812 When he died in 1908, he left Dühring an inheritance of 10,000 Mark, a 
substantial amount of money at the time, which Dühring did not claim, because Friedländer 
was Jewish, For him to have taken the money, he wrote, would have been “an intolerable 
contradiction”. 813  
The “signature movement” of 1885 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Dühring’s career 
as a scholar had shown that he had many followers in the Slavic speaking countries.814 In 
Russia there were several translations of Dühring’s books, and his cause was passionately 
supported by Konstantin Iwanowitsch Petrow from Taschenkent in Turkestan, who has been 
called the “father of the new Dühring movement in Russia”.815 Petrow was highly active in 
propagating the Dühring cause before being murdered by the Bolscheviks in the First World 
War. One of the men Petrow brought into the movement was Dimitri Roitmann, a teacher of 
mathematics at St. Petersberg’s Karl May School, an elite private boys school for children of 
German families founded in 1856 that still exists to this day. He became the founder of what 
Dühring had called a “character group” (as detailed in Wirklichkeitsphilosophie, the second 
edition of Cursus der Philosophie). The erudite Roitmann wrote an in depth monograph on 
Dühring in Russian entitled  Eugen Dühring – The Founder of a New Inspiring Intellectual 
Vanguard. A Systematic Portrayal of his basic Teachings, Research and Discoveries. On the 
811 “Zukunfts Horizont,” in PE 190 (August 1907): 1513.  
812 Hans Blüher, Werke und Tage. Geschichte eines Denkers (München: Paul List, 1953), 234. 
813 Cf. PE 218 (October 1908). 
814 Cf. Dühring Papers, HA/SBB. 
815 Hans Reinhardt, “Dührings Geist in Rußland bis zum Beginn der Bolschewistenherrschfaft,” Sendbogen für 
Dühringsche Geisteshaltung und Lebensgestaltung 18 (January: 1930): 3. 
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50th Anniversary of the Literary Work of the Reformer, Thinker and Researcher.816 The 
detailed nineteen-paged table of contents (written in German) sent to Ulrich Dühring gives 
testimony to an in depth propagandistic work, like none other in the comprehensive list of 
books on Dühring. It contains seven parts, and there is a separate chapter devoted to the issue 
of the Jews; the final chapter handles Dühringianism in Russia. In a letter to Dühring from 
1908, Roitmann writes that intellectually the situation is favorable: he has succeeded in 
making three young people “full-fledged Dühringians”, two of his former students, a 
philosopher and a mathematician, the third a lab technician.817 He has brought up the Jewish 
question with them, which he implies is a sensitive topic in Russia; the young men were 
shocked at first by Dühring’s views, but then “came to terms with it”. (Dühring’s “anti-
Professor” stance, he writes, was not difficult.) Roitmann himself never had any doubts about 
Dühring’s position on the Jews, as he “was not prejudiced towards them as a child”. He 
reports that the material situation of his publishing house is not favorable and that he is very 
ill, but will not give up hope. Over the fate of Roitmann’s book there is little known. He died 
23 December 1911, before the Russian Revolution would wipe any alternative socialist ideas 
off the map in Russia.818 
Dühring’s books also reached across the Atlantic to the United States. There were no English 
translations of his works, but his books seemed to have been widely read by members of 
German-speaking communities in small and large American cities. Otto Wiedtfeldt, the 
German ambassador and subscriber to Personalist und Emancipator living in the U.S., wrote 
Ulrich Dühring that his father’s books were to be found in the American libraries: mostly 
Critical History of Political Economy, Critical History of Philosophy, and The Worth of Life, 
rarer the Jewish Question, which he found in only two libraries. The New York Library, the 
Library of Congress in Washington and the Chicago Public Library contained all or nearly all 
of his books, as well as some of the secondary literature on Dühring. Surprisingly, the books 
of Carey were missing completely “because he is either not recognized or is considered to 
816 The German title is “Eugen Dühring – der Begründer der neuen actionsfähigen Geistesführung. Eine 
systematische Darstellung aller seiner Grundlehren, Forschungen und Entdeckungen. – Zur 50-Jährige 
literarische Arbeit des Reformators, Denkers und Forschers.” Dühring Papers, Box 6 HA/SBB. 
817 Roitmann to Dühring, 12 Dec. 1911, Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. (Krakower und Sawarsin were 
Roitmann’s pupils.)  
818 Dühring wrote a series of articles in Personalist on the development of his cause in Russia in 1912: Cf. 
“Unser Geist in Rußland,” PE 295 (February 1912) et seq. See also “Mein System und die russische 
Revolution,” PE 369 (May 1917).  Hans Reinhardt refers to an article in the Estonian paper “Waba Maa” sent to 
him by a follower of Dühring’s in Dorpat named Eduard Blumberg in which Riotmann’s book is reported to 
have sold well in Dorpat. Cf. Hans Reinhardt, “Dührings Geist in Rußland bis zum Beginn der 
Bolschewistenherrschaft,” Propagandablätter für Dühringsche Geisteshaltung und Lebensgestaltung. 
Dreizehnter Zittauer Sendbogen (March 1929): 4-6.  
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belong to the protectionists”. Wiedtfeldt comments that The Worth of Life, History of 
Philosophy, and History of Political Economy are quite well read (nicht wenig gelesen), 
which can be seen from the entry stamps in the back of the books. His final conclusion is that 
the American libraries offer more of a chance to read Dühring’s books than the German 
libraries; however, he notices, the German language is losing ground and “those who are 
young only speak English”.819  
Over in Germany, Emil Döll and Ulrich Dühring founded the “Dühring Gemeinschaft” in 
1914, which was not an officially registered organization, but rather a small, tight-knit group 
conceived along the lines of the “character-building associations” which Dühring had 
advocated in the book Wirklichkeitsphilosophie (1895). Beginning in September of 1914 they 
began issuing the Sendbogen, a journal with essays about and by Dühring sent to followers 
who were not directly part of the community. Shortly before this, Döll organized a Dühring 
congress in a town in the Harz Mountains, which was attended by the Austrian Klebek, the 
Russian Krakow and the Estonian Blumberg. The portrayals of the journal were intentionally 
kept short as their goal was primarily to awaken interest for the cause. Despite their initial 
success, the flyers were forced to be discontinued during the First World War and resumed in 
November of 1921, shortly after Dühring’s death. Twenty-seven issues were published until 
they were discontinued by Ulrich Dühring in 1925. Two years later, Hans Reinhardt began 
printing a new series titled “Propagandablätter für Dühringische Geisteshaltung und 
Lebensgestaltung“(Propaganda Sheets for Dühringian Mindset and Way of Life), which went 
on successfully until 1929 when they were renamed Sendbogen für Dühringsche 
Geistesführung und Lebensgestaltung. There were several other initiatives (all labeled with 
similarly awkward sounding names) which followed the cause laid down by Dühring: the 
“Popularized Introductory Writings on the Results of Eugen Dühring’s Reformatory Thought” 
(Gemeinverständlichen Einführungsschriften zu Eugen Dührings reformatorischen 
Denkergebnissen), the Societas Eugen Dühring (S.E.D.), the “S.E.D. People’s Books” (S.E.D. 
Volksbücher), “Der Ruck. Wissenschaftliches Blatt für Volk und Völker” as well as smaller 
writings authored by individual my individual organizations. 
4. The Will to “Die Completely”  
Dühring remained active in the last years of his life, continuing to publish and contribute to 
Personalist und Emancipator. In July of 1911, Emilie Dühring died of a heart attack 
819 Otto Wiedtfeldt to Ulrich Dühring, 18 May 1914, Dühring Papers, Box 6, HA/SBB. This was a trend which 
had been already observed by Friedrich List in the early 19th century. Cf. Friedrich Lenz, Friedrich List. Der 
Mann und das Werk (München und Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1936), 402. 
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following an attempt to take her own life.820 Although relatively little is known about Frau 
Dühring, the influence which she had on her husband’s career should not be underestimated. 
Ernst Schmeitzner, who dealt with her on business matters, implied that she had a lot to do 
with management of Dühring’s career and wrote, “she is capable of anything”.821 Emilie 
shared her husband’s anti-Jewish ethos and, if we are to believe Dühring himself, went even 
beyond her husband in this respect.822 A poem which she published titled “Des Judens 
Vaterland” (The Fatherland of the Jews), an anti-Semitic parody of Arndt’s famous poem 
“Des Deutschen Vaterlands” would speak for this assessment. Another indication that Emilie 
Dühring was a driving force behind her husband’s anti-Semitism is that after her death, his 
position on the Jews seems to have softened somewhat.823 His extremely cordial and 
respectful relationship with Hermann Schwarzwald developed following his wife’s death; the 
fact that Schwarzwald was Jewish does not seem to have been an issue for Dühring. 
Dühring would outlive his wife by ten years, continuing to publish and write in Personalist 
und Emancipator. He and his son “bungled in the household”, according to Ulrich Dühring, 
before employing his wife’s twenty-two year old younger sister nearly two years later. She 
took care of Dühring’s physical well-being, and managed household chores. Although she 
reported that there were often arguments between Dühring and his son regarding scientific 
issues, the way that two men were able to bond together and continue their literary 
productivity is a truly amazing feat.824 Considering that Dühring had lost not only his life-
long companion, the mother of his children, but also the voice that conveyed the material 
which had entered his mind throughout his career, the fact that he was able to carry on, as 
productively as he did, for ten more years is perhaps one of the greatest achievements of his 
entire career.  
820 She had suffered from bouts of acute melancholia which appeared, according to Dühring, in intervals. In 
connection with this disorder, she had attempted to commit suicide years before. Cf. Zum Andenken an Frau 
Emilie Dühring, 28-29. “Einer von uns,” in PE 282 (June 1911): 2249, (II.) in PE 283 (July 1911): 2257-2258, 
(III.) in PE 286 (September 1911): 2281-2282. 
821 Schmeizter wrote, in a letter to Nietzsche, one of his other leading writers, “Ich kann nichts behaupten, aber 
eine Frau D[ühring] ist, nach den Erfahrungen die ich mit ihr gemacht habe, zu Vielem fähig!” Malcom B. 
Brown, „Friedrich Nietzsche und sein Verleger Ernst Schmeiztner,” 235.  
822 Cf. “Einer von uns,” PE 287 (October 1911): 2282. Dühring reflected following her death that she probably 
had more of a hard-line position against the Jews than he; he writes that there were times when he thought of 
giving up writing on the Jews for good, but his wife would not let him do so. He writes, “Im Gegensatz zu dieser 
meiner Neigung, die Juden schiessen zu lassen, kam meine Frau nie aus der Haltung.“ Ibid. 
823 In an article from 1917 he claims, for example that the English, as a race, are every bit as much to blame for 
the problems facing the world as the Jews. He advocates now an “English Question” which should be treated the 
same way that he had treated the “Jewish Question” earlier.  
824 Zum Andenken an Frau Emilie Dühring, op. cit., 31. Also, Ulrich Dühring, “Eugen Dühring gestorben,” in PE 
414 (November 1921): 3306. 
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Soon after the Sendbogen was discontinued during the First World War, Dühring nearly 
completely lost his hearing, which disabled him having books, journals, articles, and letters 
read to him as had been done up to then. According to his son, he looked at this situation 
positively and was satisfied to concentrate mostly on his own thoughts. Dühring took pains to 
see that his books – particularly on political economy – were available in the bookstores, 
which due to the war and the financial crisis accompanying was extremely difficult. He 
expressed the will to revise and complement his works as late 1920, which his failing health 
would not allow.825  
Dühring had devoted an entire chapter to the subject of death in his first philosophical book 
The Worth of Life. Death, he holds, is neither good nor bad, neither moral nor immoral. Its 
only positive value lies in that which it destroys. Life is therefore the measure of death. The 
essence of life is not to reach a certain goal, but the functions which carry it. There is no 
hereafter; death is “authentic, full, and complete”.  The nature of the Philosophy of the Actual 
allows for no phantasms or superstitious deifications of the world. Anticipating that the end 
was near, he was emphatic to his son that there were to be no rites observed at his funeral. He 
did not even want a gravestone. The end came on the 21 September 1921 and was portrayed 
by Ulrich Dühring in the “death issue” of Personalist und Emancipator. Dühring’s death 
throes came in the afternoon, and during a short break he said with a relieved voice, “If I pull 
through now, I’ll pull through later”. Fifteen minutes later, shortly after the sundown, he fell 
into unconsciousness and passed away. Fittingly perhaps, he had shown a notion of hope and 
seemed to be looking ahead to something at the precipice of death, “where all are equal and 
all are free”.826 
 
 
 
 
825 Ibid., 3307. 
826 September 21st, the day of Dühring’s death, was coincidentally the same day that Schopenhauer had died on 
sixty-one years earlier. On a side note, Dühring also died on the exact same day of the Oppau explosion in 
Ludwigshafen, up to that time one of the greatest disasters to have ever hit the civilized world, in which 500 to 
600 people were killed and 2,000 injured from a chemical explosion at a BASF plant. 
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CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS 
 “No, this is not good enough, there is somewhere something better.” 
The Promethean Will 
Our plan has been to give a comprehensive portrayal of Dühring’s life and works, and, in so 
doing, to systematize and critique the phenomena of his production as a scholar and activist. 
Although not our main task, we have also aimed to free a controversial but significant 
German scholar from the one-sided treatment he has received as a “chauvinist” and “anti-
Semite”. Instead of focusing primarily on the immature outbursts, aggressive polemics, and 
diatribes of what Albrecht has termed the “ruinous phase” of Dühring’s career, we have 
provided a history of his entire life, examining his worldview and bearing towards science 
along with his system of sociopolitical economics, all within the context of the two main 
periods of his biography. Before putting Dühring’s career into a final perspective, the question 
remains as to how there could be such a stark discrepancy between the early and late phases 
of his career. Was this a case of a once great mind running amok in the second half of his 
career amid the trials and tribulations he faced, or were Dühring’s actions somehow connected 
to the tenets of his philosophy, which may have served to facilitate the circumstances he 
faced? 
Discrepancy and Consistency 
In the 1860s and the early part of the 1870s, Dühring displayed a talent for penetrating 
analysis and poignant intellectual critique, as evidenced by his voluminous articles, essays 
and books at the time. His writings in this period showed the education and erudition of a 
trained Staatswissenschaftler who understood the mechanisms of government and the political 
structures of European and American society.827 Although his idealism was also evident early 
on, Dühring came across then as a sober and learned social reformer with practical 
suggestions for improving German society in the face of the pressing social problems 
associated with the Social Question. In the second half of his career, his work was marred by 
the increasingly subjective perspective of a man bent on taunting and reviling segments of the 
German educated establishment and the public at large. Lacking restraint, he engaged in 
orgies of invective that escalated to the point of advocating fanatical measures of destruction 
of influential societal groups, e.g. professors, aristocrats, and Jews, whom he saw as 
corrupting society.  
827 Here we think here particularly of his voluminous early publications and especially his writings for the 
Hildburghausen Ergänzungsblätter zur Kenntnis der Gegenwart, a supplemental magazine to Meyer’s 
encyclopedia from 1866-1871. 
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During his rise to prominence, Dühring was able to fulfill certain needs that existed among 
educated Germans; the impression that civilization was losing its human element and that 
people were becoming superfluous machines in the recently industrialized society created a 
malaise of sorts among Germans. He became popular, as Maria Reményi has observed, 
because he was able to convey the results of the new developments in science in a clear 
manner, which seemed to lessen the gap between scientific specialists on the one hand, and a 
public interested in science, on the other. His writings offered clear-cut schemes for what was 
right and wrong in society; they postulated the existence of absolute truths of “correct 
science”, combining this with an historical awareness and a fervent belief in progress which 
had the effect of making disturbing social development seem more understandable.828 
In the second half of his career, which began following his dismissal from the University of 
Berlin (and which coincided with Engel’s devastating polemic against him) Dühring adjusted 
his literary efforts to the new circumstances in which he found himself. Having lost any direct 
influence he might have had among Social Democrats, he changed his publishing strategy 
away from trying to influence the German labor movement towards finding a readership 
among the educated middle class. Although he began to concentrate on questions of religion, 
ethnicity, and “mind leadership”, as he called it, the idea of using science to better society 
remained inherent in his work. In the first phase of his career, he had been concerned more 
with concrete political issues and, as evidenced by the commission he received from 
Chancellor Bismarck (ultimately published under the name of Hermann Wagener), actually 
had the real chance of seeing his ideas, e.g. his suggestions for workers coalitions, being 
practically applied. The second period of his career was markedly apolitical in the sense that 
he drifted so far from current practical concerns that he did not have even remote access to 
channels of influence. The first phase was characterized by a sense of what could be called ad 
hoc realism and the second phase more by increasingly abstract idealism, or even a 
metaphysical perspective, as Voelske chose to describe it.829 
Despite contradictions to and alterations of certain positions in the two main periods of his 
career, when we consider the basic philosophical premises of his Weltanschauung and his 
828 Maria Reményi, “Eugen Dühring und die Rezeption moderner mathematischer Konzepte,” in 
Mathematikgeschichte und Unterricht III. Mathematik im Wandel, ed. Michael Toepell (Hildesheim: 
Franzbecker), 253. Without further explanation, Link labels Dühring as “one of the most radical 
protonormalists”. Cf. Jürgen Link, Versuch über den Normalismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2009), 
245.  
829 Voelske’s dissertation on Dühring, written during the 1930s, speaks of Dühring’s turn to “metaphysical anti-
Semitism.” After advocating the role of the “state” and of the “nation” at different junctures, Dühring came to 
place more weight on “ethnicity” as an “intermediate” reality between the individual and humanity. Cf. Voelske, 
Die Entwicklung des “rassischen Antisemitismus” zum Mittelpunkt der Weltanschauung Eugen Dührings, 22.  
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bearing towards science, the discrepancy between the early and late phase of his career 
should, in our opinion, not be overestimated. To a large degree, we hold, his basic outlook 
remained consistent and along the lines he had originally established for his Philosophy of the 
Actual. From the beginning onwards, as we have seen, his writings were characterized by an 
unshakable belief in the conscious powers of the human intellect to shape life and positively 
affect man’s destiny. They were marked by the will to establish absolute scientific clarity in 
all forms of life, and professed a view of the world with a strong allegiance to the 17th and 
18th centuries’ views of progress.830  Despite its optimistic tenor, as we have seen, the 
Philosophy of the Actual remained largely pessimistic with regard to concrete social matters; 
Dühring believed it was necessary to combat the violent forces which stood in the way of 
progress and freedom at any cost. His basic philosophy expressed an unwavering faith in the 
ability of the human mind, and it had a hatred of ambiguity, which led Vaihinger to speak of 
Dühring’s “ruthless rationalism”.831  From the beginning until the end, his thought retained a 
characteristic sobriety, grave even for a country known for its serious and pensive thinkers. 
He was convinced that a philosophy that adheres to exact science, that embodies personal 
conviction, and that was geared towards “the cause of life” could elevate humankind. This 
conviction ran through his entire career. The roots of the outbursts that came to characterize 
the “bad Dühring”, we hold, were inherent in his philosophy. The Philosophy of the Actual 
tended to shun the over-application of human abstraction (Vernunft) and contemplation in 
favor of the intuitive and the concrete (Verstand). Dühring abandoned the transcendental 
critique of the faculties of the mind, which Kant had been careful to establish, and was 
convinced that the categories of the mind were objective. With complete faith in the human 
intellect, he believed that the quandaries of the individual and of society in the industrial age 
could be solved through conscious, rational discourse. In contrast to both Kant and 
Schopenhauer, Dühring abandoned strict laws of determinism in the world of experience in 
favor of political laws that applied to the social world and allowed for purely human initiative. 
830 Dühring’s belief in the values of the Enlightenment and the ideas of social progress put him at odds with 
German “conservative revolutionary” nationalists, who he is often grouped together with – e.g. the book 
Propheten des Nationalismus edited by Schwedhelm. It is, however, telling that Armin Mohler’s dissertation, 
Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932, written under the tutelage of Karl Jaspers in 1950, does 
not mention Dühring a single time. Dühring also does not fit the ideal type of a “Germanic ideology” developed 
by Fritz Stern in his classic work on Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Möller van den Bruck (cf. Stern, The 
Politics of Cultural Despair, introduction). Stern’s comment that “above all these men hated liberalism” does of 
course not apply to Dühring, who felt a strong kinship with Jean Jacques Rousseau and championed the values of 
French Revolution; Dühring also engaged himself for the rights of women to study at the university. (Regarding 
the latter, see Reménye, “Der Fall Eugen Dühring und die Diskussion um das Frauenstudium in Berlin,” 270-
279.) Nor can Dühring be placed in the category of Ringer’s “German Mandarin,” part of a “threatened elite of 
German ‘bearers of culture’, members of a distinct cultured segment of the nation”. Cf. Ringer, Fritz, The 
Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community 1890-1933, 3.     
831 Cf. Vaihinger, Hartmann, Dühring und Lange, 7. 
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Through “rational imagination”, which he added to his system in the 1870s, human volition 
was granted direct importance for shaping human development. The eudemonistic quality of 
Dühring’s philosophy and his optimistic conviction that “good will ultimately prevail over 
evil” led him to believe that the “immediate” or current badness in society must be fought and 
destroyed. He remained focused on the present, and when the nature of his writings and 
activism shifted in the second half of his career, the change was largely an application of the 
same Philosophy of the Actual in the face of a new setting. His emphasis on the ethical and 
practical value of instinct, as founded in his theory of Natural Law based on reactive instinct, 
caused him to respond impulsively and aggressively in view of the precarious situation of 
isolation in the last phase of his life, and the powerlessness he experienced. Instead of 
emphasizing the discrepancy between his early and later thought, one might perhaps speak of 
“different settings” for the activity of the same Philosophy of the Actual. Dühring showed 
little concern for the appearance of consistency, and was not afraid to adapt to the given 
situation in which he found himself and society. The changes in his positions and outlooks, 
which we have followed, give testimony to this, and bring to mind Emerson’s plea for self-
reliance, “Speak what you think now in hard words and tomorrow speak what tomorrow 
thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said today”.832 As a blind 
man, if Dühring had not possessed a high degree of self-reliance and confidence in his own 
knowledge and natural abilities his work as a scholar would never have been possible. He 
held the belief in himself and in his own philosophical worldview until his death. 
The Crisis of the Mind 
The Danish philosopher Harold Höffding wrote in 1894 that Dühring’s philosophy 
represented “one of the most interesting speculative attempts of our day”.833 This statement 
begs the question as to what it was exactly that Dühring was trying to attempt. General 
slogans of “reforming life”, “fighting for justice and exactness”, “combating corruption in 
science”, are to be found in his autobiography. Like no other thinker perhaps, his life and his 
cause were nearly inseparable. Ernst Nolte makes an interesting comparison between Dühring 
and Nietzsche in his book Nietzsche and Nietzscheism; both thinkers were fighters, but the 
battles that Nietzsche fought were “on his own”, i.e. were contained within his mind and in 
his writings. The battles which Dühring fought, on the other hand, took place in real life: his 
blindness before he was thirty, the influence of his ideas among the Social Democrats, the 
public fights with the Berlin professors, his dismissal from the university, and the student 
832 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance and other Essays (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1993), 24.  
833 A History of Modern Philosophy, 561. 
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protest movement that resulted from it. Nietzsche, Nolte writes, was himself a battlefield, but 
Dühring actually fought battles.834 
Yet particularly in matters of philosophy and theoretical speculation, the border between 
thought and reality cannot always be drawn exactly. Dühring was not only pitted against 
numerous “real life foes”, he was also fighting against a strong philosophical current existing 
in his day and beyond. Since Kant and throughout the 19th century, one of the prime motives 
of German thought was an attempt to move the human intellect away from its focus on reality 
and outward concerns, as it were, towards the analysis of the functions of human thought. 
This tendency ended in what Gehlen has termed the “devaluation of the mind”.835 Not only 
Kant, but also Schopenhauer, who saw the mind as being merely the tip of the iceberg of the 
will, cast doubt on the faculties of the human intellect. Hegel’s philosophy and the romantic 
movement, which accompanied it, served to counter the tendency of critique begun by Kant, 
but after Hegel’s death, at around the time of Dühring’s birth, the “subversion of the intellect” 
continued until, in Gehlen’s words, “the mind had lost its reality”.836 Dühring’s Philosophy of 
the Actual, as its name directly implies, was a bold attempt to confront and break this trend.  
The mind was not only endangered philosophically; amid rapid industrialization and the 
emergence of a society of the masses, the role of the individual in general had lost the value 
that it had possessed at the beginning of the century. We touched upon the fact that the 
intellectual climate in Germany had undergone substantial changes during the course of the 
19th century. In one of Dühring’s early essays on Schopenhauer, he had emphasized that the 
modern world threatened the individual in many ways. The accumulation of general 
knowledge rendered man less significant; unilateral efforts had become greatly constrained; 
strong individual opinions about general notions were seen suspiciously (especially where 
they go against generally accepted views of the people); a truth that cannot be confirmed 
through common sense was damned. He wrote, “The further we go back in history, the more 
the great personalities stand out. The more we progress to higher levels of culture, the more 
individual effort disappears in the broadness of being and particularly from high points of our 
development in time one can claim that they are the most adverse for originality and 
independence.”837 
834 Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus, op. cit., 21. 
835 Wirklicher und unwirklicher Geist, in Arnold Gehlen Gesamtausgabe. Philosophische Schriften (1925-1933), 
ed. Lothar Samson (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), 127 et seq. 
836Cf. Lothar Samson, Naturteleologie und Freiheit bei Arnold Gehlen. Systematisch-historische 
Untersuchungen (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1976), 68-70. 
837 “Arthur Schopenhauer und die Bestrebungen unserer Zeit, Part One,“ op. cit., 1. 
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Dühring noticed that only pedestrian views were seen positively, and he posed the question as 
to how the individual can play a significant role in the modern age of the masses. The answer 
he gave is that the human mind will never be satisfied to be subordinated under the pressures 
of society. The creative thinker will always be able to turn “knowledge and desire” into a 
unity for himself, and challenge the impediments of freedom and justice. Natural science, he 
believed, was an ally in this pursuit and not an opponent. It would protect the individual. The 
Philosophy of the Actual optimistically postulated that the sphere of human instinct and 
emotion would ensure that any theoretical disharmonies between the individual and the whole 
of society would be resolved, and that a practical balance is found to even out intolerable 
conflicts that arise. In the face of adversity, Dühring believed, certain enlightened like-minded 
individuals would rise to the occasion, as they had in the past, and act against the economic 
and political corruption of the powerful, who sought to control and manipulate the minds of 
freethinking individuals. Despite the crisis of the mind, brought upon by violent forces which 
currently ruled society, Dühring thought individualism would finally prevail and freedom 
would be preserved. The “enlightened outsider”, a powerful Promethean figure rooted in 
intellectual history, and indeed in the nature of mankind, will be there to preserve the power 
of human freedom and the integrity of the mind.838 If the mind is a sovereign instrument, fit to 
solve the problems of the world, then the outstanding minds will not merely survive in the 
face of adversity, they will ultimately be able to shape the fate of society as a whole. 
                                                  Socialism Proper  
Nietzsche once remarked that the driving force behind Dühring was not his “exuberant mind, 
but rather ambition”.839 One might turn this phrase around and claim that the driving force of 
Dühring’s ambition was in many ways a “justification of the exuberant mind” itself. His faith 
in the human mind drove him to create a system of sociopolitical economics, which stands as 
one of the most elaborate, and indeed ambitious, attempts to answer the Social Question in the 
19th century. Marxism, which would go on to impact the world in the 20th century, in many 
ways, did not possess the thoroughness, the fine knowledge, and the consistency to be found 
838 This view holds a certain resemblance to the idea of “the remnant or certain alien spirits” expressed by Albert 
Jay Nock (1870-1945) in the final chapter of his book Our Enemy the State. Nock spoke of “certain alien spirits 
who, while outwardly conforming to the requirements of the civilization around them, still keep a disinterested 
regard for the plain intelligible law of things, irrespective of any practical end. They have an intellectual 
curiosity, sometimes touched with emotion, concerning the august order of nature; they are impressed by the 
contemplation of it, and like to know as much as they can, even in circumstances where its operation is ever so 
manifestly unfavorable to their best hopes and wishes.” Ibid., 146. It is possible, if not likely, that Nock was 
influenced indirectly by Dühring through Franz Oppenheimer, who Nock considered a “Galileo”. Ibid., 49. 
Oppenheimer’s book The State was often quoted by Nock. 
839 Friedrich Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht. Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe ; drittes und viertes Buch ; 
Nachträge ; 1884 – 1888,  Gesammelte Werke, vol.19, ed. Richard Oehler (München: Marsuion, 1926), 206.  
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in Dühring’s work.840 From the beginning of his career onward, Dühring was concerned with 
creating a realistic and scientific instrument for social reform that could serve to emancipate 
the individual and serve the whole of society by emancipating its suppressed groups from the 
social injustice they endured.  
Dühring’s concept of socialism, like that of Marx, involved theory based not only on abstract 
or pure laws, but also on laws applicable for the social world. He followed Adam Smith in 
using the abstract or isolating method, but parted company from classical economics by 
postulating Laws of Development, or regularities from which the further evolution of the 
future is determined.841 Whereas both Marx and Dühring based their theories, to a certain 
degree, on developmental patterns, the laws that Dühring espoused are different from Marx’s 
as they apply to the actual patterns of behavior involved in production and consumption, as 
opposed to the salutary core concept of Marxism, which prophesized revolution and 
ultimately a classless society. We have shown in Chapter Eight that Dühring came closer to a 
truly “post-utopian socialism” than did Marx.842 
To enhance socialism, Dühring turned to the ideas of the two greatest bourgeois opponents of 
laissez fair capitalism in the generation before him: Henry C. Carey and Friedrich List. He 
used the ideas of both men to carve out his system, the main principle of which was that 
economic development was socially determined and that political economy should be divided 
into “pure economics” (pertaining to production) and “political economics” (pertaining to 
distribution). We saw that, like Adam Smith, Dühring believed that the source of wealth was 
in work, and he assumed that wealth was advanced through the division of labor; theories of 
value, prices and money were interconnected. According to Dühring, as expressed in his 
Critical History of Political Economy from 1871, the unity of the science had been lost in the 
period that followed Adam Smith. Political economy was divided into the largely pessimistic 
English school of liberalism and the still largely utopian school of socialism. The new phase 
of political economy, he believed, was ushered in by Henry C. Carey whose ideas, along with 
List’s, were able to restore a harmonic unity of political economy. Of fundamental importance 
for Dühring and for the theoretical aspect of his understanding of socialism was Carey’s 
refutation of the pessimistic theory of diminishing returns with regard to the cultivation of 
840 It should again be reminded that it was the deficits of Marxism in comparison to Dühring’s system which led 
Engel’s write his un-called for attack on Dühring, which – finally – clarified important elements of the Marxian 
dogma for generations to come. 
841 Scientific socialism, which both men advocate in their own way, must involve Laws of Development, in as 
far as it seeks to change the unfavorable conditions of society in the present. See also Binder, SSED., 52-53. 
842 See Chapter Eight above as well as James Gay, “Eugen Dühring and Post-Utopian Socialism,” in The State as 
Utopia. Continental Approaches, ed. Jürgen Backhaus (New York, et al: Springer, 2011), 202-203. 
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soil, as described in Chapter Seven. Carey had correctly pointed out, he believed, that through 
technology, the soil would yield more and not less.843 Technological advances would enable 
the best soil to be cultivated after the worst and not the other way around, as Malthus and 
Ricardo believed. Dühring also, as we have seen, adopted the main principle of Carey’s theory 
of value, which postulated that it is not the production costs, but rather the reproduction costs 
that determine value; value is not what an object can do for me, but rather what I have to do to 
attain this object. This idea was again developed in terms of the natural and political aspects 
of his theory.  
Proceeding from Carey and List’s teachings, Dühring developed his own ideas, which were 
based on his own philosophical worldview and especially his understanding of Natural Law as 
being rooted in reactive instinct. The harmony that Carey postulated under a “Unity of Law” 
could, in Dühring’s opinion, not be presupposed; a law was, he believed, not unified, as the 
laws of nature are different from those of the social world where arbitrary power and 
domination can play a decisive role. Dühring’s own theory came to involve the socialist 
principle of abolishing all subordination and domination by the means of, as he saw it, 
realistic mechanisms. A harmony in society could be attained when the “criminal state” 
(Gewaltstaat) and “property based on violence” (Gewalteigentum) were eradicated. 
Dühring’s vision of socialism, we hold, took the leftist idea of emancipation to its utmost 
extreme, or perhaps one could say, he drew the final consequences from liberalism. With his 
ambitious nature, to which Nietzsche referred, Dühring had, in many ways, brought the leftist 
values stemming from the French Revolution to a logical conclusion. His design for a Free 
Society would abolish domination and servitude completely and establish equality. Social 
organization was to undergo a complete recreation (although developing on the basis of 
existing political organization). The system of wages would be abolished to be replaced by 
specific price mechanisms, and gold would be used for payments. Each person was to have 
the greatest possible range to develop and fulfill his or her potential in order to live peacefully 
in, and behave respectfully towards, the whole of the community. Free Society was not to 
come about through a sudden revolution, as in Marxism, but rather was to evolve out of the 
current structures of society. The leftist postulate of equality was, in a sense, taken to a new 
level, as the communities of the Free Society were to be based on common ancestry with 
foreign ethnic elements being excluded. Thus Dühring’s anti-Semitism, which would later 
843 This principle has farther reaching consequences for the role of technology in other fields. 
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come to involve fanatical propositions of annihilation, developed to no small degree from a 
consequential interpretation of the tenets of socialism.844 
 Dühring and the Current Age 
Dühring was not a great thinker in terms of impact. Following his death in 1921, his thought 
never regained the influence that it had in the 1870s, when his ideas threatened to spawn - or 
at least be an important part of - a mass political movement.845 His system of sociopolitical 
economics lived on, however, in intellectual circles through the writings of Franz 
Oppenheimer, whose ideas of “liberal socialism”, as Oppenheimer acknowledged, were 
strongly shaped by Dühring. Eduard Bernstein’s “revisionism”, which would come to 
influence the political orientation of the Social Democratic Party, was also closely related to 
Dühring’s socialist ideas, which Bernstein had read with interest in his formative years. The 
Dühringian movement in Russia, which had just begun to germinate, was crushed by the 
Bolsheviks during the First World War with the murder of Konstantin Petrov, its leading 
exponent. In America, aside from a few scattered supporters, Dühring’s ideas had no chance 
because of their alliance with America’s strongest opponent of capitalism, Henry C. Carey, 
whose books were not made available in public libraries because of their systematic 
opposition to free trade. The widespread availability of Engel’s polemic against Dühring in 
libraries and bookstores in America also worked against Dühring’s ideas being received, as 
did, perhaps most importantly, the lack of translations of his works. 
Although Dühring’s impact, particularly when compared with his rival Marx, was miniscule, 
and although he remained on the fringes of the German intellectual establishment, receiving 
little if any institutional recognition for his work after 1877, in terms of sheer scientific 
Bildung, intellectual capacity, and productivity, Dühring was truly one of the great minds of 
his day. His prolific production as a scholar is all the more remarkable when his physical 
handicap as a blind man is taken into consideration. His work is particularly valuable for the 
present as he was, alongside Karl Marx, one of the few all-around scholars of the classical 
period of German thought, with legal and philosophical training, to approach the problems of 
political economy. Unlike Marx, he also had an original philosophy of his own. Particularly 
844 The historical relationship between socialism and anti-Semitism has been investigated by Edmund Silberner. 
Cf. Sozialisten zur Judenfrage (Berlin: Colloquim Verlag, 1962). On Dühring as representative of anti-
Capitalism and anti-Semitism, see Josef Schüßlburner, “Eugen Dühring: Marx-Konkurrent, Vorläufer Hitlers 
und Wegbereiter von ‘Godesberg‘,” EF-Magazine 81 (April 2008): 47-50. Schüßlburner connects Dühring’s 
concept of socialism with the Godesberg Program of 1959, where the German Social Democratic Party gave up 
Marxism and took on a more favorable approach to capitalism. 
845 As mentioned above, the threat of a mass movement based on Dühring’s thought challenging Marxism is 
what provoked Friedrich Engel’s Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science.  
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Dühring’s ideas on capital and credit might prove to be relevant in light of the global 
economic crisis begun in 2008. One can be anything but a friend of Dühring’s postulates of 
emancipation in order to recognize the evils of excessive government power over the people, 
which Dühring investigated so thoroughly. Much of what he wrote in the 1870s on the 
dangers of oppressive centralized governments (Gewaltstaat) anticipated what came into 
being in the 20th century.  
As an enthusiastic representative of the Enlightenment, Dühring looked down on the 19th 
century as an era of reactionary thinking. Had he lived longer it is likely that he would have 
disliked the 20th century even more. His staunch opposition to Marxism would have 
undoubtedly made him an opponent of Bolshevism. However, despite his pronounced anti-
Semitism, it is unlikely that he would have approved of National Socialism, which in its short 
reign in Germany embodied tactics of the Gewaltstaat he had warned about.846 As 
Schüsslburner has pointed out, Dühring was against the concept of “national socialism”, as it 
had been suggested by Ferdinand Lassalle in the early 1860s, as he considered it “untenable in 
the long run for all authentic socialism”.847  There is little doubt, however, that Dühring also 
would have been just as vehemently opposed to our current democratic society, which has 
gravitated, it seems, to a sort of “leftist capitalism”, i.e. an increasingly nontraditional, multi-
cultural, and egalitarian globalist society, with strong government intervention in markets 
initiated by private interests. Indeed, Dühring’s design for society and for capitalism might be 
described as the exact opposite of the society we have today: his vision could even be termed 
a kind of “right-leaning socialism”, or a society made up of ethnically homogeneous 
communities with little to no government intervention, having a hierarchical structure based 
upon the abilities and achievements of its members.    
Eugen Dühring may be an obscure figure today, but his life and work, we believe, hold 
special significance for the intellectual history of 19th century and beyond. Dühring’s 
846 As mentioned above, Dühring was opposed to racial laws instituted by the government, seeing them an 
affront to the natural human desire, which was the only true basis for marriage and reproduction. Gerhard 
Lehmann, the well-known Kant researcher and National Socialist philosopher in Germany under Hitler, correctly 
assesses that Dühring, despite his unification of socialism and anti-Semitism, could not be a member of the 
“gallery of National Socialist ancestors” (Ahnengalerie des Nationalsozialismus) because of his hatred towards 
romanticism and mysticism, as well as his materialism. Gerhard Lehmann, „Eugen Dühring zum 100. 
Geburtstag,“ Vossische Zeitung (15 January 1933): 1.  
847 Schüßlburner, “Eugen Dühring: Marx-Konkurrent, Vorläufer Hitlers und Wegbereiter von ‘Godesberg’,” 49. 
There is no record of Adolf Hitler mentioning Dühring, although having lived in Vienna and being interested in 
ethnic politics, it is more than likely that he had at least heard of Dühring’s book on the Jews. The liberal 
emancipative views of Dühring found little resonance in the movement. Walter Frank, a historian for the 
Reichsinstitut für die Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands, edited a book in which an article mentioning Dühring 
was published. Cf. Clemens August Hoberg, “Zur philosophischen Entwicklung des Rassenantisemitismus,” 
102-106, in „Zur Geschichte der Judenfrage,“ Historische Zeitschrift 164, ed. Walter Frank (1941): 102-113. 
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literary and scientific production was unsurpassed in his day, and is nothing less than 
sensational, particularly when one considers his blindness, as well as his status as an 
untenured lecturer. In light of his handicap, one might even say without exaggeration that 
Dühring’s literary achievements as a scholar signify one of the great intellectual feats of 
modern intellectual history. Above all, his Weltanschauung, his bearing towards science, and 
his system of sociopolitical economics, examined above, represent a highly original attempt 
of a learned scholar to thoroughly and coherently address fundamental quandaries and 
issues facing man in the modern world. Dühring did not succeed at finding a solution to the 
discrepancy between the individual and the good of the whole of society; he did not, as 
Binder has emphasized, succeed at uniting equality and freedom; and he did not, to his own 
detriment, always follow the rules of decent behavior. He did, however, create a philosophic 
and scientific body of work which was an expression of his times, his own hard life, and his 
will to defy unjust authority at any cost. 
274 
 
 APPENDICES 
I  Lecture Notes from Dühring’s “Geschichte der Philosophie” ca. 1870. 
Universitätsbibliothek der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Singl-Handschr. Koll., Nr.: 
68. 
A. Haupttext 
Die Philosophie ist Hervorbringung der höchsten Begriffe über Leben und Welt; die Freiheit 
des Denkens im höchsten Aufschwung; die Autorität ist im strengsten Sinne in der 
Philosophie ausgeschlossen. Die eigene Konstatierung der Wahrheit; Urtheil über das Wesen 
der Sache ist erstes Erfordernis. Die Philosophie ist Wissenschaft und Gesinnung. Es kommt 
nicht sowohl auf theoretische Wahrheiten an, als auf Tradition und Fortpflanzung derselben. 
Der Trieb der Leidenschaften muss den Menschen bewegen, das hohe Ziel der menschlichen 
Bestimmung in der Phil. zu erreichen. Ohne Gesinnung also giebt es Philosophirer, nicht 
Philosophen. 
Philosophisches Heroenthum und Massenstreben. Wie in jeder Geschichte, so gibt es auch in 
der Phil. Heroen u. Epochen, deren Gestaltungen durch die Beziehungen mit den äußeren 
Verhältnissen beeinflusst werden. Practisch haben die einzelnen Persönlichkeiten auf die 
Phil., theoretisch die Massenwirkungen den größten Einfluß.- 
Quellenstudium der Geschichte der Philosophie besteht darin, dass man Forschung u. Studium 
richtet auf die Quellen mit dem nöthigen Geiste, mit den Schriften der Philosophen u. ihren 
Systemen sich eifrig zu beschäftigen u. zu studieren. Das Urtheil und d. Eindringen der 
Philosophie in den Gegenstand ihrer einseitigen Beschäftigung wird uns hierbei die besten 
Orientierungsmittel bieten.X 1 
Verständnis der Vergangenheit aus der Gegenwart. Wie überall so auch in der Geschichte der 
Philosophie gilt der Satz: die Gegenwart muss aus der Vergangenheit verstanden werden und 
umgekehrt. 
Es muss ein Ideenantriebskreis vorhanden sein vermöge dessen es das Frühere versteht. Es 
kommt darauf an was die Phil. will.2 dies ist der Schlüssel zu allem. Dazu muss die Gegenwart 
einen Reichtum philosophischer Leidenschaften bieten, um die Vergangenheit zu verstehen. 
Welches X3ist der gesunde, frische Boden der Philosophie? Die Epoche, die den lebendigen 
Sinn für das Verständnis der Phil hat. Die Culturaufgaben der Zeit müssen dabei in der 
Entwicklung der Phil in Betracht kommen; die Stimmung unserer affeciven Auffassung der 
Dinge wirkt auf Zustandsgestaltung der (Dinge) Philosophie.- 
Die kritischen Gesichtspunkten der Behandlung sind neben den geschichtlichen auch der 
biographischen und der geographischen charto XXX4 In welchen Verhältnissen 
philosophierten früher die Philosophen, wie stellten sie sich zur Gesellschaft, wie weit waren 
sie frei? Der Culturauffschwung und Corruption ist von Einfluss.  
Man spricht von der Philosophie der alten mittleren und neuern u. seit Kant der neusten Zeit. 
Das Mittelalter ist eine Wüste und Lücke im philosophischen Leben. Die griechische 
Philosophie ist der erste Anfang des phil. Denkens. Es folgt auf sie die Zeit von der 
Herstellung der Wissenschaften im 15. Jahrh.. Die Philo. ist Erzeugnis des selbstbewussten 
Geistes, und dies geschah in griech. Zeit zuerst. Das Mittelalter lebt in wirklichem 
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Geistesdunkel. Die breite europäische Philosophie ist aber von der spezifischen deutschen zu 
scheiden; sie ist der Gipfel: Zuspitzungspunkt deutscher Arbeit. Kant ist ihr Angelpunkt. 
Wir haben also griech. u.. deutsche Philo. mit der Einleitung der mittelalterlichen 
Restitutionsphilosophie. Kant steht vielleicht dem Original wie des Pythagoras oder Heraklit 
gleich, u. die deutsche Philos. Hat eine Weltmission; wir stehen noch nicht auf dem 
Höhepunkt unserer Missionsblüthe. Die ästhetische Begabung des deutschen Volkes ist nicht 
die der Greichen, sie ist vielleicht eckiger, doch dieses schleift sich ab. Der (Der) mythische 
Kant ist nicht der feinere harmonische Typus, er steht den Griechen nach. Doch ist er schärfer 
und tiefer. – Das Ausland könnte unsere Prahlerei tadeln. Der (Der) Zwischenraum ist gegen 
das Ganze der Zeit verschwindend sagte Lagrange, von der Zeit von Pyth. bis zum Mittelalter 
(Galilei; warum sollte dies nicht auch in der Philo. Von Herach. Thales et. bis zur neueren 
Zeit gelten. Die ältere Philos. mehr objektiv der subjektiveren neuen gegenüber zu nennen ist 
absurd. Die gr. Phil. wird rein äußerlich mit Thales beginnen; sie fängt mit den ionischen 
Physiologen an, am Ende des 6. Jahrh. 
Eine vorsokratische Periode ist zu unterscheiden – dann folgen die moralischen Denker. Mit 
Socrates tritt Umkehr der Phil. ein; er steht auf seinem Standpunkt allein da. Socrat. u. Plato 
stehen für die Philologen im Vordergrund der Philos. als Quellengeber. Doch als Denker 
stehen Thales; Pythagoras Heraclitos als die ersten da. Die höchsten Productionen waren 
schon zu Socrates u. Plato’s Zeit vorüber, u. Aristoteles hat nichts Neues mehr (Urtheil der 
Geschichtsforscher) produciert.- So tritt also hier der Verfall schon ein. 
Wir haben also 1) eine vorsocratische Epoche 
2) Wendung zum Sittlichen. Bei Socrates nahm die gr. Phil. schon einen 
Umschwung; Beginn des Verfalls. 
3) Gänzlicher Verfall; Mystifizieismus, Sceptizismus u. Eclectizismus.-  
Alles geht schließlich in d. Alexandrinerthum u. Gelehrtenthum über, u. es tritt dann der 
schlimme Mysticismus ein. – Das Beste ist nicht bewahrt der grause Zufall hat sein böses 
Spiel getrieben. –Die Barbarei ist gerade in den litterarischen Erzeugnissen überaus groß 
(Leonardo Davinci’s u.Galilei’s große Werke sind verloren). 
 
B. Randbemerkungen 
Eine objective Darstellung ist nöthig u. wünschenswerth, doch ist sie ohne System nicht 
möglich. Bei der Phil. kommt die Persönlichkeit u. der Character hinzu. 
Die Darstellung Gruckers macht den Anfang der philos. Geschichtsschreibung ziemlich 
kernig.  
Alt ist die philos. Geschichtsschr. Nicht.  
Ob die seit Kant in der phil. Geschichtsschreib. auftretende Ehrlichkeit ihn zum Urheber od. 
Förderer hat, ist unklar. Bule ist noch Kantianer geworden ist nicht mystisch u. magisch. 
Tennemann more professore Kantianer (...) er ist unsolide. In der 1. Hälfte des 19, Jahrh. 
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haben Hegelianer geschrieb. sich ihren Lesern anschließend. Sie gaben seine Vorlesungen mit 
nichthegelianischen Zusätzen heraus. 
Kunow Fischer hat spezifisch hegelianisch geschrieben (verblichnes Hegelianerthum, doch 
viel spezifisches). 
Zeller: Geschichte der gr. Philos. (Hegelianer) doch von Auflage zu Auflage abgestreift. 
Prof. T(f)ans: suchte die hegelianische Phil. auf d. Erbrecht zu übertragen. (Gr. u. Röm. Erbr.) 
aber doch Mittelalter konnte er nicht mit Zugel in Einklang bringen, was er Puchta zugab. 
Die Gesammtdarstellung v. Erdmann ist auch spezif. Hegelianisch (...): ins Centrum gehörte 
Rosenkranz. Eine Linke existiert auch.  
Fischer ist stagnierend in Hegelianismus. 
Die objective Darstellung Ritter ist zu spezif. theol. Das Philos. fehlt. Die Arbeiten v. Brandes 
sind besser in der röm. Phil. ist er anzuerkennen Zeller mehr gelesen. Schwegler ist 
Hegelianer. 
X Der Mensch selbst ist ein Produkt der Vergangenheit. 
Man muss in der Philo. nicht allein wissen sond. auch wollen; es muss phil. Πáđοѕ (Pathos) da sein. 
XX Ueberall giebt es einen Verwesungsprozeß; ist er souverain, wo altes vergeht muß neues erstehen und 
umgekehrt et. gr. Phil. nach der Alexandrinischen Zeit. 
Die Philosophie ist nicht reine Wissenschaft. Die Freiheit der Elemente des Gefühls bedingt ihre Blüthe. Von der 
Kulturaufgabe unserer Zeit hängt unser persönliches Wohl u. Wehe ab, d. Stimmung ab, daher auch die 
Blüthe der Philosophie. 
XXX Culturgeographie der Philosophie. 
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II Unpublished Essay “Über die Entstehung der Juden Frage in Europa” (1880)  
Die Tatsache, daß wir jetzt in der Welt eine brennende Judenfrage haben ist kein Stück wieder 
aufgefrischtes Mittelalter, sondern im Gegenteil den Regungen des modernen Völkergeistes 
entsprossen. Auch ist sie nicht eine Angelegenheit vorzugsweise der unteren Schichten, 
sondern noch mehr der gebildeten Elemente, und zwar umso mehr, je gebildeter und 
geleuchteter diese sind. Sie erstreckt sich über die Hauptkulturstaaten Europas und greift 
bereits über den Ozean hinüber. Sie interessiert alle Klassen der Gesellschaft und all Parteien. 
Sie wird von den Hochkonservativen und von den äußersten Revolutionären wahrgenommen 
und auch alles was zwischen diesen beiden Enden liegt empfindet mehr oder minder, daß die 
moderne Lebensfrage der Nationen und des sittlichen Geistes sei. Sie übertrift das was man 
gemeinhin soziale Frage nennt vorläufig an Bedeutung. Ihre Existenz ist der wichtigste 
Fortschritt den in der geistigen Aufklärung des 19. Jahrhunderts über das 18. Hinausgetragen 
hat. Der Durchschnitt der Schriftsteller, die bisher in der Judenfrage aufgetreten ist, hat sich 
auf die Parteien stützen müssen, die sich zunächst beteiligt haben, bei uns in Deutschland also 
auf die landwirtschaftlichen Elemente, auf einen Teil der Konservativen  und auf die 
katholisch politische Richtung. Das Publikum der sogenannten Liberalen und radikalen 
Parteien fühlt zwar dieselbe Notwendigkeit, hat sich aber nicht regen können; denn es ist von 
denjenigen Presse, die es bisher noch zu stark umklammert gewesen und auf seine 
Parteiführer und Parteiorganisation stehen noch unter zu starken Einfluß des jüdischen 
Elements. Abgesehen von den Parteien können einzelne Schriftsteller aber nur durch 
individuelle Eigentümlichkeit wirken. Das Hauptbespiel bei uns war hierfür zunächst der 
Komponist Richard Wagner, der vor Jahren mit seiner Broschüre über das Judentum in der 
Musik die unkünstlerische Natur des jüdischen Stammes beleuchtete, aber nach künstlerische 
Art für die politischen und sozialen Seite der Frage wenig Verständnis entwickelt hat. In der 
jüngsten Zeit hat dieser Bayreuther Orpheus, dessen Laie auch viele reiche Juden folgen, in 
jene Richtung nichts Nennenswertes kundgegeben. Er braucht viel Geld, und es scheint daß er 
wegen der Spenden auf die seine Zukunftsmusik angewiesen ist, nicht unabhängig genug da 
steht und die Randdissonanzen zu einzelnen Akkorden verklären lässt. Trotzdem wird er 
vielfach vorzugsweise von Juden geleitet in der Press angefeindet. Die aller ernsthafte und 
tiefgreifendste  Behandlung der Judenfrage ergibt sich überdies erst da wo sie als 
weltgeschichtliche Rassen und Kulturangelegenheit erörtert wird. Sie ist vom freiheitlichen 
Standpunkt aus mehr eine Völker- und Humanitätsfrage. Sie würde auch vorhanden sein, 
wenn die Religionsjuden sämtliche ihre Religion abgelegt hätten und nur lauter Rassejuden 
übrig wären. Sie ist die Frage wie die Übelstände zu beseitigen sind, die aus dem Eindringen 
des Judenelements in die Angelegenheiten der modernen Völker erwuchsen. Sie hat viele 
Seiten und Verzweigungen. Die Erörterung ihrer Entstehung ist nur ein vereinzeltes Thema. 
Aus dem sonstigen reichhaltigen Stoff sei nur an einige Hauptgegenstände erinnert. Das 
gesellschaftliche Emporkommen der Juden in der jüngsten Zeit ihre Charakterspiegelung in 
Religion und Moral, die Frage nach ihrer Befähigung zu Wissenschaft und Kunst, ihr 
Verhalten in der Presse und Literatur, ihre Eigenschaften bezüglich der Gesetzgebung und 
Politik, die auserwählte Selbstsucht und der hochgradige Größendunkel die sich in der 
Judengeschichte von Uranfang bis auf den heutigen Tag kundgegeben haben. Ihre schon seit 
dem Altertum bekannte Feindschaft gegen das übrige Menschengeschlecht, das sind 
Gesichtspunkte deren jeder allein schon die Zeit  seines Vortrags in Anspruch nehmen würde 
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ohne solche Ausführung lässt sich jedoch wenigstens die nächste Entstehungsursache der 
Judenfrage einigermaßen sichtbar machen. Seit der Französischen Revolution hat die 
politische Judenemanzipation das fremde Rassenelement mächtiger gemacht und die 
angeborene Selbstsucht zügellos werden lassen. Die modernen Völker haben in der Meinung 
auf religiöse Vorurteile zu verzichten die Rasseneigenschaften übersehen oder zu gering 
angeschlagen. Erst heute fängt man damit an die Mängel an Bildung zu verbessern. Die 
Völker sind nämlich inzwischen  durch die Erfahrung mit den Gleichgestellten Juden belehrt 
worden. Unter den Aufklärern des 18. Jahrhundert stellte sich Voltaire die Juden auch die in 
Berlin studiert hatten auch noch nicht rein auf Rassenstandpunkt. Er könnte noch meinen, daß 
die vornehmeren Juden dadurch daß sie schließlich den Aberglauben verachteten und in der 
übrigen Gesellschaft verschwinden würden, namentlich wenn die Völker ihren Handel selbst 
besorgten. Die untersten Schichten der Juden aber würden mit den Dieben eine Klasse bilden, 
um so daß das Judentum künftig dasselbe Schicksal haben würde wie die Zigeuner. Im alten 
Rom dachte man entschieden und klarer wie er das jetzt auch schon dem weiteren Publikum 
nicht unbekannte Wort des humanen Philosophen Seneca beweist, der die Juden den 
verbrecherischen Volksstamm nannte. Die uralten Völker hatten gelegentlich schon ihre 
Judenfrage, aber die jüngste Zeit hat die Judenfrage erst so gestaltet, daß sie eine 
Humanitätsfrage wird, nämlich mit vollen Dasein wie die Frage, mit der Humanität, also die 
bessere Wahrheit, gegen die antihumane Selbstsucht des jüdischen Elements zu schützen sei. 
In Deutschland sind es besonders die letzten fünfzehn Jahre, in welchen sich die 
Mißverhältnisse, die die Gesellschaft durch den Übermut des Judentums ausgesetzt ist bis zur 
Unleidlichkeit gesteigert haben. So ist hier die so kritische Spannung entstanden. Sonst hatte 
im 19. Jahrhundert, daß viel Juden anscheinend mit für die Freiheit getreten haben in 
freiheitlich gesinnten Kreisen ihre sonstigen Eigenschaften mit Nachsicht betrachten lassen. 
In unserer Ära hat sich aber vor aller Welt gezeigt, daß sie ihre eigene Freiheit und Macht 
betrieben. Gerade sie haben sich als die Ärztemonopolisten erwiesen und ihre Beteiligung an 
politischen und sozialen Angelegenheiten hat fast nur das Schlechte im Auge gehabt und 
gefördert. Leicht verständliche Beispiele sind der Impfzwang, der erst kürzlich eingeführten 
Advokatenzwang überhaupt den Rest der Gesetzgebund und speziell die Justizgesetzgebung 
in welcher die Züge des jüdischen Geistes nach Inhalt und Form dem Publikum bereits 
fühlbar geworden sind und es immer mehr müssen. Die noch von Friedrich II angeregte 
preußische Gesetzgebung war gediegener, gesunder und weit volksmäßiger. Es ist der von 
den Juden gefördert Geist, der ungeniert Selbstsucht und Monopolherrscherei, der überall 
Vorrechte ergattert aber keine Pflichten übernehmen will, wie beispielsweise das Verhältnis 
der Ärzte und Advokaten zu Gesellschaft lehrt.  Der Advokat kann trotz seines Zwangs und 
Bandrechts durch welches er uns aufgenötigt wird, Sachen, die ihm nicht gewinnreich genug 
sind, ablehnen und uns für seine Dienste von vornherein einen beliebigen Preis machen; denn 
die Taxe geht nur, wenn etwas nicht abgemacht ist, daß der Advokat also stillschweigend auf 
besondere Forderungen verzichtet hat. Die Juden sind in den letzen fünfzehn Jahren von 
unseren Politikern und Parlamentariern förmlich begünstigt und groß gezogen worden. Juden 
haben die sogenannte liberale Presse ausschließlich bewirtschaftet, die übrige Presse aber 
auch schon vielfach besetzt. Hierdurch haben sie in der öffentlichen Meinung, wo es nur 
irgend für die Berufe den er sich zuwendet, ging eine Judenmeinung untergeschoben. Diese 
schleichende. Diese schleichenden Verfolgungen gegen diejenigen,  welche gegen die 
Judenmeinung eine Selbständigkeit behaupten, sind bösartiger und niedriger geartet gewesen 
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als das, was staatliche oder kirchliche Eifer gegen Gegner getan haben. Sie haben Beamte aus 
ihren Stellungen gedrängt und solche, die keine Bedeutung hatten, durch ihre Reklame 
aufgeblassen, je nachdem sich diese dem Dienst der Judeninteressen versagten oder 
anbequemten. Ja komischer Weise haben die Juden darüber entschieden was Freiheit der 
Wissenschaft gelten soll. Vor allem spitz sich daher der Judenfrage zu Frage der Entjudung 
der Presse der verschiedenen Länder insbesondere aber derjenigen Deutschlands zu, damit der 
bessere Geist unter den Völkern wieder eine öffentliche Stimme habe. Die Zurückweisung des 
Judentums in seiner natürlichen Schranken ist nur die eine negative Seite der Frage nur das 
Mittel zum Zweck. Das höhere Ziel ist die innere Befreiung des Völkergeistes von der krassen 
Selbstsucht, die Betätigung der besseren Eigenart der Nation und überhaupt eine bessere 
Menschlichkeit und eines allgemein Menschenrechts. Das Judentum ist als eigener Staat 
längst bankrott geworden; die modernen Nationen können nicht dulden, daß es mit seinen 
Trümmern und Splittern auch sie in den geistigen, sittlichen, politischen, und sozialen 
bankrott hineinziehe. Ja für die Juden selbst sei es gesagt, daß es eine auf ihnen heilsame 
Disziplin sein wird, wenn man ihre öffentliche Zudringlichkeit unter den Völkern einige 
Zügeln anlegt. 
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IV Lectures Given at Friedrichs-Wilhlem Universität  
1864-1877 
Sommersemester 1864 
Logik – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag 8:00-9:00 
Psychologie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag  9:00-10:00 
Naturphilosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Freitag  4:00-5:00 
Naturrecht – Dienstag und Freitag, 5:00-6:00 
Wintersemester 1864/65 
Logik – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 8:00-9:00 
Naturrecht und juristische Dialektik – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 9:00-10:00 
Pädagogik und Dialektik – Mittwoch, Sonnabend von 8:00-10:00 
Sommersemester 1865 
Logik und Metaphysik - Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 8:00-9:00 
Optimismus und Pessimismus– Donnerstag von 6:00-7:00 
Wintersemester 1865/66 
Über die Grenzen der Dichtung und Philosophie mit besonderem Rücksicht auf Byron und 
Schopenhauer – Mittwoch von 6:00-7:00 
Logik und Metaphysik  - Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 8:00-9:00 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Freitag 9:00-19:00 
Über den amerikanischen Nationalökonomen Henry Carey – Mittwochs von 5:00-6:00 
Sommersemester 1866 
Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 9:00-
10:00 
Über Buckle und dessen Geschichte der Civilization – Mittwoch von 6:00-7:00 
Zu Privatisseme in der National Ökonomie 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Freitag von 8:00-9:00 
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Wintersemester 1866/67 
Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 9:00-
10:00 
Logik und Metaphysik – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, und Freitag von 11:00-12:00 
Über Positivismus in Staat und Gesellschaft – Mittwoch von 6:00-7:00 
National Ökonomie– Montag, Dienstag, Donnertag, Freitag von 12:00-1:00 
Politik, Polizei und Diplomatie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von  12:00-1:00 
Sommersemester 1867 
Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie – Montags, Dienstags, Donnerstag 
Über Optimismus und Pessimismus – Mittwoch von 12:00-1:00 
Staatswissenschaften 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnertag, Freitag von 12:00-1:00 
Politik, Polizei, Diplomatie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 11:00-12:00 
Wintersemester 1867/68 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag 12:00-1:00 
Sommersemester 1868 
Staats-, Cameral-, und Gewerbewissenschaft 
Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag von 5:00-6:00 
Nationalökonomie - Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag von 8:00-9:00 (privatim) 
Zu Privatisseme in der Nationalökonomie, sowie Preussische Finanzen, Polizei- und 
Verwaltungsrecht 
Wintersemester 1868/69 
Logik verbunden mit einem Cursus der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Freitag von 11:00-
12:00 (privatim) 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitags von 12:00-1:00 
Über Parteien in Staat und Gesellschaft – Mittwoch von 6:00-7:00 
Zu Privatissime in der Nationalökonomie sowie über preußische Finanzen, 
Polizeiwissenschaft, und Verwaltungsrecht 
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Sommersemester 1869 
Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie - Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 9:00-10:00 
(privatim) 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 8:00-9:00 (privatim) 
Privatissime in der Nationalökonomie sowie über preußische Finanzen, Polizeiwissenschaft, 
und Verwaltungsrecht 
Wintersemester 1869/1870 
Logik verbunden mit einem Cursus der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag 
von 11:00-12:00. 
Philosophische Privatissimis 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 12:00-1:00 
Privatissimis in der Nationalökonomie, sowie preußische Finanzen, Poliziewissenschaft und 
Verwaltungsrecht 
Sommersemester 1870 
Über philosophische und politische Optimismus und Pessimismus – Mittwoch von 6:00-7:00 
Privatissimis in der Philosophie sowie Anleitung zum wissenschaftliche Arbeiten 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag (privatim) 
Privatissimis in der Nationalökonomie, sowie preußische Finanzen, Polizeiwissenschaft und 
Verwaltungsrecht 
Winteresemester 1870/71 
Logik verbunden mit einem Cursus der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag 
von 11:00-12:00 
Privatissimis in der Philosophie 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 12:00-1:00 (privatim) 
Über Parteien in Staat und Gesellschaft 
Privatissimis in der Nationalökonomie 
Sommersemester 1871 
Geschichte der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 9:00-10:00 
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Über philosophische und politische Pessimismus – Mittwoch von 6:00-7:00 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 8:00-9:00 
Privatissimis in der Nationalökonomie 
Wintersemester 1871/72 
Logik – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 11:00-12:00 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 12:00-1:00 
Privatissimis in der Nationalökonomie 
Sommersemester 1871 
Über philosophischer und politischer Optimismus – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag 
6:00-7:00 
Privatissimis in der Philosophie 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 8:00-9:00 
Privatissimis in den Staatswissenschaften 
Wintersemester 1872/73 
Logik – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 11:00-12:00 
Nationalökonomie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 12:00-1:00 
Staatswissenschaftliche Privatissimis 
Sommersemester 1873 
Geschichte der Philosophie – Montag, Dienstag, Donnerstag, Freitag von 9:00-10:00 
Über philosophischer und politischer Optimismus – Mittwoch von 6:00-7:00 
Privatissmis in der Philosophie 
Nationalökonomie 
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